## Technical Appendix to

# attitudes TO Uncertainty in A Strategic setting 

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## Appendix A. Example of Experimental Instructions

Welcome to the experiment! Your earnings in this experiment will be composed of the $£ 3$ showup fee plus your experimental 'payoff'. The latter could be a gain of up to $£ 20$. You cannot walk away from this experiment with less money than $£ 3$. However, in order to earn more money, it is essential that you follow the experimental instructions displayed on your computer screen as closely as possible.

There are no right or wrong ways to complete the experiment, but the decisions that you make will determine your payoff. Your payoff in this experiment depends partly on the decisions that you make during the experiment and partly on chance. In this experiment, your payoff may depend not only on your own decisions but also on decisions of one other participant in this room or ten other participants in this room.

At the beginning of the experiment, you have drawn a unique ID (ID001, ID002, ID003, ID004, ...). This ID will be used by the computer program to randomly match you with one other participant or ten other participants in this room. During the experiment you will be identified by your letter ID and other participants will not know who you are. Likewise, you will only know the IDs of other participants matched with you but not their names or other private information.
At the end of the experiment you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire and sign a receipt for the payment that you received.

## Experimental Questions

In this experiment, you will be asked 64 questions. At the end of the experiment, one of these questions will be selected at random. You will receive payment for this one randomly selected question. It is in your best interest to answer each question as if that were the question to be played out.

Questions will be of six types: $\boldsymbol{\bullet}, \mathbf{R}, \boldsymbol{Z}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{Z}$, and II. Questions of the same type have identical instructions. The type of the question is displayed in the upper left corner of your computer screen. Before asking you to make the decisions which could determine your payoff, we will go through some practice questions that will give you a chance to become familiar with what you are being asked to do.
Here is the basic idea behind the questions you will be asked. Two people who cannot communicate with each other are presented separately with a list of items and are told that if they both select the same item they will each be paid $£ 20$. But if they select different items they get nothing. So they each want to try to select the same item.
For example, suppose the list consists of three capital cities - Canberra, Lagos and London. (in this example, items are listed in alphabetical order but in the main experiment they will be shown to each person in random order which is likely to be different for different people.)
So if you are trying to select the same city as another person in the room, which of those three would you choose in order to give yourself - and the other person - the best chance of selecting
the same one and being paid $£ 20$ each? Then consider the other two: which of these would be your second choice? That is, if the other person DOES NOT select the same one as you, which of the other two are they most likely to select?

All the judgments you will be asked to make concern different aspects of this kind of scenario, involving different lists of three items. In some cases, you may think it is easy to judge which one will be selected, while in other cases you may find it more difficult to judge. In every case, it is in your interests to think carefully about the decisions you are being asked to make, because at the end of the session one of your decisions will be picked at random and played out for real and your entire payment for taking part in the experiment will depend on how that one decision works out.

## How We Will Determine Your Payoff

After you have answered all 64 questions and completed the questionnaire you will be asked to call over an experiment administrator. Then you will choose one of the questions at random by picking a card from a box containing cards numbered from 1 to 64 . Your computer will recall your answer to that question. If your payoff in that question depends on your own decision and on chance, the computer will recall only your answer to that question. If your payoff in that question depends not only on your decision but also on decisions of one other participant, the computer will also recall the answer of one other participant chosen at random. If your payoff in that question depends not only on your decision but also on decisions of ten other participants, the computer will recall your answer as well as answers of those ten participants. Then you will play out your decision in that question in the manner described on your computer screen.

We will then pay you and you will sign a receipt, after which point you will be free to go. Note that the experiment takes approximately 60 minutes. You may take shorter or longer but it is in your best interest to be as careful as you can when you are answering the questions.

Example of Screenshots for the Category ANIMALS


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Question 9


Now we want you to think about decisions of 10 other (randomly selected) participants in the room. How many of them have put each of the items displayed below as their top choice?
For example, you might feel very confident that (almost) everyone will put the same item top and that (almost) no one will go for one of the other two items. So you might judge that 9 people will choose the same "likely" item, and 1 and 0 will go for the two "unlikely" items.
Or you might think that each item is (almost) equally likely selected by the others, so maybe you say $4,3,3$.
We want you to try to be as accurate as possible, because this question could be chosen to be played out as the basis for paying you. In that case, we will pick at random 10 of the others in this session and look at what they did. You will then roll a three-sided die to pick one of the three items at random and we will see whether your guess was accurate for that item. If you got it exactly right, you will be paid $£ 20$; but if you got it wrong, you will get nothing.


## Selected $\mathbf{0}$ of $\mathbf{1 0}$

Confirm \& Proceed
Toggle Instructions


Question 11


You are given a ticket which will pay you $£ 20$ if another randomly-selected participant in this session puts Lion as their top choice. However, this ticket will be worth nothing if that person puts either Giraffe or Hippo as their top choice. You could choose to have this ticket and play it out.
Or else you could exchange this ticket for another lottery ticket which gives you a chance to win $£ 20$. Please use the slider below to indicate:

- the highest percent chance of winning $£ 20$ that this new lottery ticket should offer for you to reject the exchange because you would prefer to keep your initial ticket and play it out yourself
- the lowest percent chance of winning $£ 20$ that this new lottery ticket should offer for you to accept the exchange
If this question is selected to be played out as the basis for paying you, you will blindly draw a percentage number at random. If the drawn number is greater or equal to the lowest percent chance you would accept, you will play the lottery which will give you $£ 20$ with the drawn chance and nothing otherwise.
Alternatively, if the drawn number is lower or equal to the highest chance you would reject, you will play the lottery by looking up the answers of one other participant (chosen at random), and you will be paid $£ 20$ if they put Lion top but you will get nothing if they put either Giraffe or Hippo top.

Consider the following lottery ticket:


You receive $£ 20$ if the other participant has chosen Lion as their top choice.
You receive nothing otherwise.

I would reject any percentage chance of $£ 20$ in the range: $0 \%$ to $\%$

I would accept any percentage chance of $£ 20$ in the range: $\%$ to $100 \%$



Question 14


You are given a ticket which will pay you $£ 20$ if another randomly-selected participant in this session puts either Hippo or Giraffe as their top choice. However, this ticket will be worth nothing if that person puts Lion as their top choice. You could choose to have this ticket and play it out.
Or else you could exchange this ticket for another lottery ticket which gives you a chance to win $£ 20$. Please use the slider below to indicate:

- the highest percent chance of winning $£ 20$ that this new lottery ticket should offer for you to reject the exchange because you would prefer to keep your initial ticket and play it out yourself
- the lowest percent chance of winning $£ 20$ that this new lottery ticket should offer for you to accept the exchange
If this question is selected to be played out as the basis for paying you, you will blindly draw a percentage number at random. If the drawn number is greater or equal to the lowest percent chance you would accept, you will play the lottery which will give you $£ 20$ with the drawn chance and nothing otherwise.
Alternatively, if the drawn number is lower or equal to the highest chance you would reject, you will play the lottery by looking up the answers of one other participant (chosen at random), and you will be paid $£ 20$ if they put either Hippo or Giraffe top but you will get nothing if they put Lion top.

Consider the following lottery ticket:

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Table A1
$[P E(X)+P E(Y)-P E(X \cup Y)]$ for Each Pair of Items

| X, Y | Number of individuals |  |  | Mean | t-statistic |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $>0$ | $=0$ | $<0$ |  |  |
| Subsample T1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Red, Blue | 44 | 1 | 6 | 31.10 | 8.29 |
| Red, Green | 42 | 1 | 8 | 23.61 | 7.05 |
| Blue, Green | 45 | 2 | 4 | 24.57 | 6.55 |
| Strawberry, Banana | 43 | 0 | 8 | 25.75 | 7.08 |
| Strawberry, Apple | 42 | 1 | 8 | 27.82 | 7.09 |
| Banana, Apple | 40 | 1 | 10 | 27.49 | 6.93 |
| Lion, Hippo | 40 | 2 | 9 | 23.73 | 5.59 |
| Lion, Giraffe | 44 | 2 | 5 | 25.08 | 7.06 |
| Hippo, Giraffe | 45 | 2 | 4 | 23.63 | 6.84 |
| Rose, Tulip | 42 | 3 | 6 | 23.31 | 6.83 |
| Rose, Daisy | 46 | 3 | 2 | 23.37 | 7.05 |
| Tulip, Daisy | 35 | 5 | 11 | 16.78 | 4.96 |
| Subsample T2 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Red, Blue | 45 | 2 | 7 | 21.57 | 6.43 |
| Red, Green | 40 | 2 | 12 | 19.93 | 5.21 |
| Blue, Green | 42 | 2 | 10 | 19.22 | 5.91 |
| Dog, Rabbit | 47 | 1 | 6 | 17.80 | 6.04 |
| Dog, Cat | 44 | 1 | 9 | 20.91 | 6.60 |
| Cat, Rabbit | 44 | 2 | 8 | 19.85 | 7.09 |
| Diamond, Emerald | 41 | 7 | 6 | 20.48 | 5.15 |
| Diamond, Ruby | 44 | 8 | 2 | 26.65 | 6.04 |
| Emerald, Ruby | 42 | 2 | 10 | 25.13 | 4.87 |
| Car, Bicycle | 47 | 2 | 5 | 18.26 | 5.45 |
| Car, Bus | 46 | 2 | 6 | 18.31 | 4.61 |
| Bicycle, Bus | 46 | 2 | 6 | 23.94 | 6.61 |

Table A2
Crossing Point for Each Individual's Probability
Weighting Function (PWF) Based on Question 9 Responses

|  | Goldstein <br> and Einhorn |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Participant | Sub-sample | $45^{\circ}$ line <br> (1987) PWF shape | Prelec (1998) <br> crossing point | $45^{\circ}$ line <br> PWF shape | crossing point |

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Table A2
(Continued)

| Participant ID | Sub-sample | Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point | Prelec (1998) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 12 | T1 | Concave | 0.999992 | Concave | 1.006774 |
| 13 | T1 | Inverse | 0.884314 | Inverse | 0.949215 |
| 14 | T1 | Inverse | 0.463206 | Inverse | 0.450207 |
| 15 | T1 | Inverse | 0.076319 | Inverse | 0.153688 |
| 16 | T1 | Concave | 1.000962 | Concave | 1.004176 |
| 17 | T1 | s | 0.179138 | s | 0.199077 |
| 18 | T1 | Convex | 1.024145 | Convex | 1.116015 |
| 19 | T1 | Inverse | 0.363365 | Inverse | 0.353143 |
| 20 | T1 | Inverse | 0.879889 | Inverse | 0.946867 |
| 21 | T1 | Concave | 0.998785 | Concave | 1.000383 |
| 22 | T1 | Inverse | 0.468183 | Inverse | 0.465001 |
| 23 | T1 | s | 0.279200 | s | 0.275999 |
| 24 | T1 | Inverse | 0.687735 | Inverse | 0.687691 |
| 25 | T1 | Inverse | 0.543206 | Inverse | 0.530104 |
| 26 | T1 | Convex | 1.032303 | Inverse | 0.014284 |
| 27 | T1 | Inverse | 0.794984 | Inverse | 0.795005 |
| 28 | T1 | s | 0.476652 | s | 0.468934 |
| 29 | T1 | Inverse | 0.953346 | Concave | 1.00743 |
| 30 | T1 | Inverse | 0.817965 | Inverse | 0.836769 |
| 31 | T1 | Inverse | 0.840736 | Inverse | 0.888215 |
| 32 | T1 | Inverse | 0.758494 | Inverse | 0.784992 |
| 33 | T1 | Inverse | 0.665093 | Inverse | 0.665754 |
| 34 | T1 | Inverse | 0.560768 | Inverse | 0.537547 |
| 35 | T1 | Inverse | 0.650809 | Inverse | 0.636688 |
| 36 | T1 | Inverse | 0.661774 | Inverse | 0.660332 |
| 37 | T1 | Inverse | 0.503200 | Inverse | 0.490546 |
| 38 | T1 | inverse | 0.782121 | Inverse | 0.802861 |
| 39 | T1 | Inverse | 0.783282 | Inverse | 0.815024 |
| 40 | T1 | Inverse | 0.386289 | Inverse | 0.379023 |
| 41 | T1 | Inverse | 0.893967 | Inverse | 0.987187 |
| 42 | T1 | Inverse | 0.654660 | Inverse | 0.631375 |
| 43 | T1 | Inverse | 0.808536 | Inverse | 0.86869 |
| 44 | T1 | Inverse | 0.198625 | Inverse | 0.206639 |
| 45 | T1 | Inverse | 0.466421 | Inverse | 0.457526 |
| 46 | T1 | Inverse | 0.791723 | Inverse | 0.797319 |
| 47 | T1 | Inverse | 0.726270 | Inverse | 0.723106 |
| 48 | T1 | Inverse | 0.549586 | Inverse | 0.53525 |
| 49 | T1 | Inverse | 0.641145 | Inverse | 0.623202 |
| 50 | T1 | s | 0.192369 | s | 0.187468 |
| 51 | T1 | Inverse | 0.188101 | Inverse | 0.192403 |
| 52 | T2 | Inverse | 0.598148 | Inverse | 0.584596 |
| 53 | T2 | Inverse | 0.617653 | Inverse | 0.608736 |
| 54 | T2 | s | 0.108657 | s | 0.165255 |
| 55 | T2 | Inverse | 0.500427 | Inverse | 0.499968 |
| 56 | T2 | Inverse | 0.642655 | Inverse | 0.635349 |
| 57 | T2 | Convex | 1.018909 | Convex | 1.036619 |
| 58 | T2 | Inverse | 0.519347 | Inverse | 0.519378 |
| 59 | T2 | Inverse | 0.575089 | Inverse | 0.563599 |
| 60 | T2 | Inverse | 0.794870 | Inverse | 0.809708 |
| 61 | T2 | s | 0.067116 |  | 0.08762 |
| 62 | T2 | Convex | 1.012396 | Convex | 1.019104 |
| 63 | T2 | Inverse | 0.138881 | Inverse | 0.140665 |
| 64 | T2 | Inverse | 0.521429 | Inverse | 0.49841 |
| 65 | T2 | Inverse | 0.980369 | Concave | 1.001762 |
| 66 | T2 | Inverse | 0.525167 | Inverse | 0.496987 |

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Table A2
(Continued)

| Participant ID | Sub-sample | Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point | Prelec (1998) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 67 | T2 | s | 0.567352 | s | 0.532802 |
| 68 | T2 | Inverse | 0.178346 | Inverse | 0.186863 |
| 69 | T2 | Inverse | 0.298554 | Inverse | 0.256507 |
| 70 | T2 | Inverse | 0.441397 | Inverse | 0.42167 |
| 71 | T2 | Inverse | 0.501617 | Inverse | 0.489482 |
| 72 | T2 | Inverse | 0.584444 | Inverse | 0.571607 |
| 73 | T2 | Inverse | 0.537740 | Inverse | 0.537493 |
| 74 | T2 | Inverse | 0.182491 | Inverse | 0.182828 |
| 75 | T2 | Inverse | 0.526272 | Inverse | 0.513303 |
| 76 | T2 | Inverse | 0.549540 | Inverse | 0.542392 |
| 77 | T2 | Inverse | 0.497413 | Inverse | 0.470681 |
| 78 | T2 | Inverse | 0.480248 | Inverse | 0.455236 |
| 79 | T2 | Inverse | 0.532766 | Inverse | 0.540341 |
| 80 | T2 | Inverse | 0.472393 | Inverse | 0.434485 |
| 81 | T2 | Inverse | 0.581260 | Inverse | 0.57077 |
| 82 | T2 | Inverse | 0.507879 | Inverse | 0.490042 |
| 83 | T2 | Inverse | 0.389073 | Inverse | 0.380182 |
| 84 | T2 | Inverse | 0.412441 | Inverse | 0.370126 |
| 85 | T2 | Inverse | 0.867757 | Inverse | 0.930317 |
| 86 | T2 | s | 0.962861 | Convex | 0.998317 |
| 87 | T2 | Inverse | 0.068581 | Inverse | 0.073104 |
| 88 | T2 | Inverse | 0.353148 | Inverse | 0.354433 |
| 89 | T2 | Inverse | 0.737912 | Inverse | 0.834645 |
| 90 | T2 | Inverse | 0.572782 | Inverse | 0.551395 |
| 91 | T2 | Inverse | 0.225925 | Inverse | 0.225253 |
| 92 | T2 | Inverse | 0.849203 | Inverse | 0.897122 |
| 93 | T2 | s | 0.490511 | s | 0.457269 |
| 94 | T2 | Inverse | 0.532913 | Inverse | 0.532632 |
| 95 | T2 | Inverse | 0.653289 | Inverse | 0.650088 |
| 96 | T2 | Inverse | 0.744403 | Inverse | 0.762967 |
| 97 | T2 | Inverse | 0.214521 | Inverse | 0.2237 |
| 98 | T2 | Inverse | 0.471170 | Inverse | 0.453083 |
| 99 | T2 | Inverse | 0.308679 | Inverse | 0.307606 |
| 100 | T2 | Inverse | 0.527578 | Inverse | 0.520974 |
| 101 | T2 | Inverse | 0.781895 | Inverse | 0.791253 |
| 102 | T2 | Inverse | 0.522640 | Inverse | 0.518718 |
| 103 | T2 | Inverse | 0.593653 | Inverse | 0.58866 |
| 104 | T2 | Inverse | 0.827127 | Inverse | 0.854865 |
| 105 | T2 | Inverse | 0.756631 | Inverse | 0.742698 |
|  |  | Inverse-s only median | 0.547990 | Inverse-s only median | 0.532632 |
|  |  | Inverse-s only mean | 0.561343 | Inverse-s only mean | 0.547527 |

Table A3
Crossing Point for Each Individual's Probability Weighting Function (PWF) Based on Question 10 Responses

| Participant ID | Sub-sample | Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point | Prelec (1998) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | T1 | Inverse | 0.523178 | Inverse | 0.504001 |
| 2 | T1 | Inverse | 0.293413 | Inverse | 0.278262 |
| 3 | T1 | Inverse | 0.449971 | Inverse | 0.447576 |
| 4 | T1 | Inverse | 0.641030 | Inverse | 0.639202 |
| 5 | T1 | Inverse | 0.517626 | Inverse | 0.505536 |
| 6 | T1 | Inverse | 0.546701 | Inverse | 0.535899 |
| 7 | T1 | s-shaped | 0.497004 | s-shaped | 0.471146 |
| 8 | T1 | Inverse | 0.557395 | Inverse | 0.53957 |
| 9 | T1 | Inverse | 0.084111 | Inverse | 0.081939 |
| 10 | T1 | Inverse | 0.790537 | Inverse | 0.814344 |
| 11 | T1 | Inverse | 0.650018 | Inverse | 0.640455 |
| 12 | T1 | Inverse | 0.890796 | Inverse | 0.948789 |
| 13 | T1 | Inverse | 0.881640 | Inverse | 0.940316 |
| 14 | T1 | Inverse | 0.458743 | Inverse | 0.444107 |
| 15 | T1 | Inverse | 0.403229 | Inverse | 0.377827 |
| 16 | T1 | Concave | 0.999999 | Concave | 1.003695 |
| 17 | T1 | Inverse | 0.797384 | Inverse | 0.814049 |
| 18 | T1 | Convex | 1.106260 | Convex | 1.135875 |
| 19 | T1 | Inverse | 0.361143 | Inverse | 0.35106 |
| 20 | T1 | Inverse | 0.860509 | Inverse | 0.946794 |
| 21 | T1 | Concave | 1 | Concave | 1.003258 |
| 22 | T1 | Inverse | 0.470202 | Inverse | 0.47366 |
| 23 | T1 | Inverse | 0.878521 | Inverse | 0.920987 |
| 24 | T1 | Inverse | 0.682084 | Inverse | 0.683893 |
| 25 | T1 | Inverse | 0.540681 | Inverse | 0.527153 |
| 26 | T1 | Convex | 0.999240 | Convex | 1.014324 |
| 27 | T1 | Inverse | 0.776863 | Inverse | 0.77788 |
| 28 | T1 | Inverse | 0.507052 | Inverse | 0.473282 |
| 29 | T1 | Concave | 1.005540 | s-shaped | 0.051091 |
| 30 | T1 | s-shaped | 0.374222 | s-shaped | 0.363332 |
| 31 | T1 | Inverse | 0.958130 | Concave | 0.999995 |
| 32 | T1 | Inverse | 0.738220 | Inverse | 0.756537 |
| 33 | T1 | Inverse | 0.637501 | Inverse | 0.638922 |
| 34 | T1 | Inverse | 0.527348 | Inverse | 0.483869 |
| 35 | T1 | Inverse | 0.662991 | Inverse | 0.649427 |
| 36 | T1 | Inverse | 0.634829 | Inverse | 0.63292 |
| 37 | T1 | Inverse | 0.513643 | Inverse | 0.502037 |
| 38 | T1 | Inverse | 0.807402 | Inverse | 0.840506 |
| 39 | T1 | Inverse | 0.768940 | Inverse | 0.807362 |
| 40 | T1 | Inverse | 0.395587 | Inverse | 0.387014 |
| 41 | T1 | s-shaped | 0.008542 | s-shaped | 0.046824 |
| 42 | T1 | Concave | 1.009502 | s-shaped | 0.020037 |
| 43 | T1 | Inverse | 0.777162 | Inverse | 0.840785 |
| 44 | T1 | Inverse | 0.261305 | Inverse | 0.246559 |
| 45 | T1 | Inverse | 0.466788 | Inverse | 0.455092 |
| 46 | T1 | Inverse | 0.790278 | Inverse | 0.795567 |
| 47 | T1 | Inverse | 0.714902 | Inverse | 0.713295 |
| 48 | T1 | Inverse | 0.519452 | Inverse | 0.508824 |
| 49 | T1 | Inverse | 0.617233 | Inverse | 0.584488 |
| 50 | T1 | s-shaped | 0.145280 | s-shaped | 0.157855 |
| 51 | T1 | Inverse | 0.155922 | Inverse | 0.166176 |
| 52 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.166126 | s-shaped | 0.196589 |
| 53 | T2 | Inverse | 0.663226 | Inverse | 0.662549 |

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Table A3
(Continued)

| Participant ID | Sub-sample | Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point | Prelec (1998) PWF shape | $45^{\circ}$ line crossing point |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 54 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.411574 | s-shaped | 0.379668 |
| 55 | T2 | Inverse | 0.500434 | Inverse | 0.500058 |
| 56 | T2 | Inverse | 0.650979 | Inverse | 0.635125 |
| 57 | T2 | Convex | 1.029433 | Inverse | 0.010429 |
| 58 | T2 | Inverse | 0.519403 | Inverse | 0.519332 |
| 59 | T2 | Inverse | 0.949442 | Inverse | 0.983145 |
| 60 | T2 | Inverse | 0.874550 | Inverse | 0.941598 |
| 61 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.139988 | s-shaped | 0.155251 |
| 62 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.989121 | Convex | 1 |
| 63 | T2 | Inverse | 0.135589 | Inverse | 0.137386 |
| 64 | T2 | Inverse | 0.574966 | Inverse | 0.562575 |
| 65 | T2 | Inverse | 0.859855 | Inverse | 0.877689 |
| 66 | T2 | Inverse | 0.515756 | Inverse | 0.508161 |
| 67 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.567352 | s-shaped | 0.532802 |
| 68 | T2 | Inverse | 0.030015 | Inverse | 0.047963 |
| 69 | T2 | Inverse | 0.174873 | Inverse | 0.338264 |
| 70 | T2 | Inverse | 0.433391 | Inverse | 0.411358 |
| 71 | T2 | Inverse | 0.501024 | Inverse | 0.491546 |
| 72 | T2 | Inverse | 0.559434 | Inverse | 0.539049 |
| 73 | T2 | Inverse | 0.544472 | Inverse | 0.542382 |
| 74 | T2 | Inverse | 0.182787 | Inverse | 0.180735 |
| 75 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.459307 | s-shaped | 0.445057 |
| 76 | T2 | Inverse | 0.531538 | Inverse | 0.508701 |
| 77 | T2 | Inverse | 0.507543 | Inverse | 0.479659 |
| 78 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.595036 | s-shaped | 0.569118 |
| 79 | T2 | Inverse | 0.533201 | Inverse | 0.549582 |
| 80 | T2 | Inverse | 0.419018 | Inverse | 0.401498 |
| 81 | T2 | Inverse | 0.606095 | Inverse | 0.598769 |
| 82 | T2 | Inverse | 0.506009 | Inverse | 0.491174 |
| 83 | T2 | Inverse | 0.394806 | Inverse | 0.381568 |
| 84 | T2 | Inverse | 0.417290 | Inverse | 0.371282 |
| 85 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.211198 | s-shaped | 0.243566 |
| 86 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.975254 | Convex | 0.999977 |
| 87 | T2 | Inverse | 0.016363 | Inverse | 0.020759 |
| 88 | T2 | Inverse | 0.354845 | Inverse | 0.35545 |
| 89 | T2 | Inverse | 0.607296 | Inverse | 0.623522 |
| 90 | T2 | Inverse | 0.574939 | Inverse | 0.553156 |
| 91 | T2 | Inverse | 0.206054 | Inverse | 0.209917 |
| 92 | T2 | Inverse | 0.797482 | Inverse | 0.814778 |
| 93 | T2 | s-shaped | 0.491149 | s-shaped | 0.456941 |
| 94 | T2 | Inverse | 0.533461 | Inverse | 0.532261 |
| 95 | T2 | Inverse | 0.756449 | Inverse | 0.778517 |
| 96 | T2 | Inverse | 0.926144 | Concave | 0.995455 |
| 97 | T2 | Inverse | 0.228316 | Inverse | 0.236385 |
| 98 | T2 | Inverse | 0.478069 | Inverse | 0.456783 |
| 99 | T2 | Inverse | 0.309003 | Inverse | 0.307942 |
| 100 | T2 | Inverse | 0.534197 | Inverse | 0.524441 |
| 101 | T2 | Inverse | 0.728036 | Inverse | 0.72664 |
| 102 | T2 | Inverse | 0.520964 | Inverse | 0.518288 |
| 103 | T2 | Inverse | 0.604971 | Inverse | 0.599181 |
| 104 | T2 | Inverse | 0.819745 | Inverse | 0.841091 |
| 105 | T2 | Inverse | 0.901730 | Inverse | 0.947446 |
| All | T1 + T2 | Median (inverse-s only) | 0.542576 | Median (inverse-s only) | 0.527153 |
| All | T1 + T2 | Mean (inverse-s only) | 0.559961 | Mean (inverse-s only) | 0.546917 |

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