Religious Freedom and Toleration: A Liberal Pluralist Approach to Conflicts over Religious Displays

Extract

Introduction

Among the defining features of a liberal pluralist state is what John Rawls has called the “fact of pluralism”: individuals hold diverse “comprehensive doctrines” as to the meaning, value, and ends of life. For Rawls this is a permanent feature of modern democracies, a fact which motivates him to seek a political conception of justice that rests on fundamental intuitive ideas of a democratic society, implicitly shared by people whatever their religion or other comprehensive doctrine happens to be.¹ For Rawls, a liberal society addresses conflicts by seeking an “overlapping consensus” that does not favor one particular comprehensive doctrine—such as a particular religious or philosophical world view—because no such view would be acceptable to all members of society. Thus, imposing it would require the oppressive use of state power.² Common ground is sought by exercising the civic virtue of tolerance, of “being ready to meet others halfway.”³ Toleration need not mean acceptance. Though these concepts overlap, there is an important sense of acceptance—adopting the beliefs of others—that should be distinguished from toleration. Toleration requires not that I adopt your beliefs when we are in disagreement, only that I resist coercing you because you have different beliefs and, more positively, that I try to accommodate you.⁴