Virtual issue: India's odyssey through *International Affairs*

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In 1922, the year *International Affairs* launched its first issue, a British colonial court sentenced Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the man who would become the symbol of India's independence movement, to a six-year prison term for sedition. From 1920 to 1922, Gandhi had led his first significant campaign of non-violent non-cooperation and disobedience in India, partly in protest against 'the massacre of more than 300 bystanders at a meeting in Amritsar on the command of a British army officer'.[1] The campaign had degenerated into acts of violence—which Gandhi himself denounced—with the result that in March of 1922, he was charged with the incitement of hatred and disaffection towards His Majesty's Government in British India. In a speech before the court Gandhi declared: 'I hold it to be a virtue to be disaffected towards a Government which in its totality has done more harm to India than any previous system.'[2]

Looking back, the coincidence of Gandhi's arrest, trial and imprisonment with the first issue of the then *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, published in early 1922, positions the journal's birth against the backdrop of the impending twilight of British colonialism in India. *International Affairs* was, and remains, the flagship publication of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, itself an institution set up in 1920 'to collect, examine and distribute information on *imperial* and foreign, political, economic and social problems'.[3] The journal's archive of some 70 articles and published speeches relating to India is thus of interest for its reach into India's pre-independence history and its capture of a longer period than seven decades of Indian sovereign statehood. However, it must also be noted that 70 articles in 95 years is not a great number: the journal's coverage of India has been sporadic and in some decades extremely thin.

The aim of this virtual issue is to curate a subset of articles from *International Affairs* that capture the multiple transformations of both India and its representations through the journal. The articles selected for this collection lay bare

[1] Judith M. Brown, 'Gandhi as nationalist leader, 1915–1948', in Judith M. Brown and Anthony Parel, eds, *The Cambridge companion to Gandhi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 52.

[2] 'Trial of Mahatma Gandhi—1922', High Court of Bombay, http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/libweb/historicalcases/cases/TRIAL_OF__MAHATMA_GANDHI-1922.html. See also: Thomas Joseph Strangman, *Indian courts and characters* (London: W. Heinemann, 1931).

[3] Stephen King-Hall, *Chatham House: a brief account of the origins, purposes, and methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 27, emphasis added.

evolving perspectives on India's significance, achievements and challenges, and offer predictions that range—with the benefit of hindsight—from the uncannily accurate to the quaintly farcical. These snapshots, of course, are not simply of India. They equally reflect the evolution of *International Affairs* itself and the kinds of voices and themes granted entry to its pages. It is telling, for example, that early India-related articles and printed speeches from the 1920s and 1930s are contributions by white, elite British men—and occasionally by Indians connected to the British establishment, with the notable exception of M. K. Gandhi—in service of British interests. In contrast, in January 2017 *International Affairs* published its first ever special issue dedicated entirely to India, guest-edited by two women, and presenting a collection of articles penned in their majority by scholars from India or of Indian origin. Moreover, the special issue, titled 'India's rise at 70', examines India's foreign policy trajectory in its own right and centres on appraisals of India's global standing, rather than Britain's.

The articles selected for this virtual issue begin in the closing decades of British rule, tackle questions regarding India's transition to independence, glance in at a tumultuous and audacious political project, observe the frustrating and later uplifting course of the Indian economy, and seek to bring understanding to India's unique and at times fateful record of international engagement. To be sure, the authors of these pieces open portholes onto India's voyage in different times and from different ships, but together they deliver critical glimpses of an Indian odyssey into freedom and on to the twenty-first century.

India and Britain in 1925 and 1931: an end to colonial rule?

The virtual issue begins with a paper published in 1925 by George Lloyd, a Conservative politician who, like Winston Churchill, believed that the British sacrifices of the Great War 'had not been given merely to toss away the jewel in the imperial crown'.[4] Lloyd's 'British foreign policy in Asia and its relation to Asia' centres on an argument about the material significance of India to the Empire—on account of its 'geographical and strategic value', and 'colossal productive and trading power'—and a conviction of Britain's unassailable moral right to rule. This makes his text emblematic of the position that would be adopted by the so-called 'diehards' of the 1930s, who, in the company of Churchill, opposed moves towards granting India self-rule. Lloyd's view of the value of India to Britain is unequivocal: 'there is no part of the Empire which can to-day compare in importance, economic or strategic, with India'.[5] Yet he also makes a case for Britain's contribution to India, where value comes to Indians through 'protection from the ravages of war' and access to 'world position, training and opportunity'.[6] Dismissive of an Indian capacity for self-rule, his response to the question of India's independence

[4] Richard Carr, *Veteran MPs and Conservative politics in the aftermath of the Great War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 146.

[5] George Lloyd, 'British foreign policy in Asia and its relation to Asia', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 4: 3, 1925, pp. 109–117.

[6] Lloyd, 'British foreign policy in Asia', pp.111–12.

is strident: '[a]s an alternative at this time to British rule there is only anarchy and tyranny.'[7]

A fitting antidote to Lloyd's conviction of colonial rectitude comes in the published form of M. K. Gandhi's speech before Chatham House during his three-month visit to Britain in late 1931. Gandhi visited the institute on 20 October, and his talk on 'The future of India' drew the attendance of 750 Chatham House members, at the time the largest ever meeting.[8] Gandhi's presence in London, as the editor's introduction to his speech makes clear, was for the purpose of attending the second in a series of three Round Table Conferences convened by the British government from 1930 to 1932. Their purpose was to discuss constitutional reforms that would bring greater participation to Indians in the governing of India. The conference's second edition, at which Gandhi was in attendance, failed to meet his, and others', expectations, with the result that he and his party would boycott the third conference. The eventual outcome of the Round Table Conferences, the 1935 Government of India Act, may have 'changed the context of Indian politics', but ultimately was conservative in nature, 'designed to salvage and buttress the empire, not to liquidate it'.[9]

The themes of Gandhi's speech reveal multiple agendas. Most immediate is his focus on the devastating consequences to the people of India of Britain's economically extractive brand of colonial rule. Conspicuous, too, are Gandhi's efforts to present the Indian National Congress, the political organization in whose name he was attending the Round Table Conference, as the legitimate future custodian of a free India, and the only organization 'representing the whole of India'.[10] These efforts must be viewed in the context of calls at the time for special electorates and safeguards for certain minority groups in India, many of whose representatives were also in attendance at the Conference. Perhaps the most disagreeable of these to Gandhi came from B. R. Ambedkar, whose aim in London was to seek separate electorates for 'Untouchables' as a minority apart from the majority Hindu community. Gandhi's fears of a 'nation vivisected and torn to pieces' by such electoral divisions explain his lengthy reassurance to the audience at Chatham House that 'Congress has made the removal of Untouchability an integral part of its programme'.[11]

Besides presenting a vivid picture of the domestic political, social and economic challenges facing the common man and woman in India, Gandhi's speech also offers a glimpse into India's future defence policy. His critique of British India's military expenditure and his recommendation that 'we should get rid of three quarters of [it]' reveals an early projection of Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence into the international realm.[12] 'If we really succeed in demonstrating that we have

[7] Lloyd, 'British foreign policy in Asia', p. 117.

[8] 'Report of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs to the 7th AGM', in *The Royal Institute of International Affairs Annual Reports 1926–1931* (London: Chatham House, 1931), p. 11.

[9] Judith M. Brown, *Modern India: the origins of an Asian democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 285–6.

[10] M. K. Gandhi, 'The future of India', *International Affairs* 10: 6, 1931, p. 738.

[11] Gandhi, 'The future of India', p. 738, 723.

[12] Gandhi, 'The future of India', p. 729.

won our freedom through non-violent means', Gandhi declares, then 'the people of India will not require much argument to convince them that non-violence will also enable them to retain their freedom … We are convinced that we do not need the arms that India is carrying'.[13] Such a belief was reflected in India's post-independent policies: from 1947 to 1964, India would make only limited investments in defence.[14] This was in part a result of the prioritization of urgent developmental needs such as industrialization above military development. But it also reflected a view among influential sections of the Congress leadership that India's armed forces had been a financial drain under British rule, and military power a central tool of colonial oppression.[15]

India's independent foreign policy: the early years

It is independent India's nascent foreign and defence policy that forms the focus of A. Appadorai's article, 'India's foreign policy', published in 1949.[16] In it, the 'doyen of international studies in India' lays out the 'three fundamental ideas' that give shape to India's nascent international approach two years after independence: the pursuit of peace and freedom though the United Nations and its Charter; the following of an independent foreign policy and the avoidance of alignments; and the taking up of an advocacy role on behalf of oppressed nations.[17] In doing so, Appadorai sketches out what emerges over the coming decades as India's 'Nehruvian' foreign policy legacy, centred on liberal internationalism, non-alignment and anti-colonialism, and named after its dominant architect, independent India's first prime and foreign minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. At the root of this policy, Appadorai argues, is the recent history of the nationalist movement, bequeathing India a deep-rooted antipathy to imperialism and war based on Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence; and the material constraints that form one of the central legacies of colonialism: a lack of self-sufficiency in food and limited economic and military power.

Appadorai's is not simply an effort at mapping the policy, however. Of interest is his gentle questioning of certain of its logics. Should India express 'sympathy with the dependent peoples who are struggling to be free' if its government is not in a position to be of active help, and succeeds only in 'putting India in the wrong with Great Powers'?[18] Should India take more seriously unofficial thinking on the urgent need for regional defence arrangements, perhaps with British assistance, even if such arrangements may not mesh well with official declarations of an independent foreign policy?[19] Appadorai's ruminations give a sense of an

[13] Gandhi, 'The future of India', p. 729.
[14] Stephen P. Cohen, *India: emerging power* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 128.
[15] Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without aiming: India's military modernization* (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 3.
[16] A. Appadorai, 'India's foreign policy', *International Affairs* 25: 1, 1949, pp. 37–46.
[17] John Cherian, 'A diplomat and a strategist', *Frontline* 22: 2, Jan. 15–28, 2005, http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2202/stories/20050128004511000.htm; Appadorai, 'India's foreign policy', p. 40.
[18] Appadorai, 'India's foreign policy', p. 43.
[19] Here, Appadorai references the writings of K. M. Panikkar that explore the possibility of a post-independence

Indian foreign policy still very much in formation, and one serving a people 'new to diplomacy' with a foreign service still under construction.[20] They speak, too, to themes that persist long into the future of India's international engagement: the tensions between seeking a Third World following and a major power audience, and managing security challenges under conditions of limited material capability. They are also, in part, unfathomably optimistic. One of Appadorai's concluding predictions is particularly noteworthy for its complete absence of foreboding: '[a]fter the Kashmir problem is solved', he writes, referring to a conflict now sometimes referred to, tellingly, as the First Kashmir War, 'there is no doubt that attention will be devoted to the concrete steps required to forge … friendly relations [with Pakistan]'.[21]

Such a nonchalant view of 'the Kashmir problem' certainly does not feature in the fourth article of this collection.[22] Lord Birdwood's 1952 piece is simply titled 'Kashmir', and offers one retelling of the first war fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and 1948. Engaging with Birdwood's view of the region, it should be warned, requires the swallowing of his shocking cultural essentializing of Kashmiris ('soft, friendly people … of little stamina'[23]). However, his unusually detailed account of the military operations of both India and Pakistan is noteworthy, as is his patent frustration with the failure of international political negotiations to bring any form of resolution to the dispute. Birdwood's assessment of the problems of holding a popular plebiscite to determine the region's fate is unusually revealing and less than flattering to India. Moreover, he delivers a poignant sense of the arbitrariness of the Indo-Pakistani cease-fire line left behind by the conflict: while the first formal battle is over, its intrusions into the lives of ordinary people continue. Birdwood visits the headquarters of the United Nations Military Observers Corps in Jammu, whose central duty he describes as 'keeping sacrosanct a no-man's land 500 yards either side of the line'.[24] One of their tasks, he notes, is 'to smooth out many difficulties of a local nature … For instance, a goat or a sheep is not … overconcerned with the position of a red line drawn on a map, and its owner is equally on such occasions more concerned with his ownership than with the political problem of Kashmir'.[25]

Birdwood's exasperation at the lack of progress on a resolution to the Kashmir problem portends what we know today as an enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. Moreover, his characterization of the Kashmir situation as 'charged with international potential' speaks to the dispute's opening up of a south Asian fissure through which Cold War pressures would enter the region.[26]

defence alliance with Britain. Panikkar in fact makes a similar case in the journal three years before the publication of Appadorai's article: K. M. Panikkar, 'The defence of India and Indo-British obligations', *International Affairs* 22: 1, 1946, pp. 85–90.

[20] Appadorai, 'India's foreign policy', p. 39.

[21] Appadorai, 'India's foreign policy', p. 46.

[22] Lord Birdwood, 'Kashmir', *International Affairs* 28: 3, 1952, pp. 299–309.

[23] Birdwood, 'Kashmir', p. 299.

[24] Birdwood, 'Kashmir', p. 306.

[25] Birdwood, 'Kashmir', p. 306.

[26] Robert Wirsing, 'Great-Power foreign policies in South Asia', in Devin T. Hagerty, ed., *South Asia in world politics* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 135–57.

East and West: the politics of aid to India during the Cold War

Geoffrey Tyson's first-hand account of the Russian state visit to India in 1955, 'India and the Russian visitors', captures a sense of such pressures. Tyson, present in cities across the country at the time of the visit, describes himself as a bystander to the 'physical stamina' of Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev on a tour that included 'every part of India' and involved 'a lot of speech making … at very high temperature indeed'.[27]

Tyson's assessment centres on the political significance of the Soviet visit, particularly in the context of increased Indian suspicion towards the West in the mid-1950s. Bulganin and Khrushchev's visit is timed, after all, in the immediate wake of early US military aid to Pakistan and the US and British-led development of an anti-Communist alliance system under the 1954 South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the 1955 Baghdad Pact, that drew in Asian and Middle Eastern powers, including Pakistan. Would Bulganin and Khrushchev succeed in moving the Soviet Union closer to a non-aligned India newly resentful towards the West?

Tyson appraises both the visit's successes and shortcomings. At the level of the masses, he argues, 'comparatively few of Kruschev's fulminations hit the target with any lasting effect'.[28] Yet, 'for the newspaper-reading and radio-listening public', which Tyson puts as in the 'several millions', the visit left them 'pleased, even flattered, by the recognition which the visit seemed to give to India's status in world affairs'.[29] Tyson clarifies that India's commitment to non-alignment is not simply a pet project of Nehru, but extends across India's educated citizenry. Indeed, 'large numbers of Indians do not necessarily share all our fears and suspicions about Russia and about Communism'.[30]

Nevertheless, Tyson's conclusion is that India's non-alignment will spell a resistance to Soviet overtures, citing as evidence Khruschev's offers to support India on Kashmir or on the question of the annexure of Goa, and Nehru's quiet refusal to respond. However, the economic dimensions of the Soviet–India relationship worry Tyson somewhat more. The timing of the Soviet visit is crucial not simply for its juxtaposition with western regional alliance-building, but for coming 'at a moment when the Indian Union and the States Government, chambers of commerce and industrial associations, the press and public opinion were busily engaged in putting final touches to India's second Five Year Plan'.[31] 'Plan-minded' India, argues Tyson, will require considerable outside economic assistance in order to carry out the Second Five Year Plan, and as such, the Soviet leaders had 'a very welcome opportunity to state what they could do for India in the period imme-

[27] Geoffrey Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', *International Affairs* 32: 2, 1956, pp. 174, 173.
[28] Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', p. 175.
[29] Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', p. 175.
[30] Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', p. 175.
[31] Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', p. 178. While India did not embrace a Communist economic model after independence, Nehru was inspired by the Soviet central planning of the 1920s and its objective of social equality.

diately ahead'.[32] Russia and India are somewhat closer after the visit, concludes Tyson, and 'whether that relationship will flower … will depend largely on how we in the West are able to help India through her next difficult years of development'.[33]

Barbara Ward's 1961 address to Chatham House, 'India and the West', furthers the argument in support of the provision of economic and developmental assistance to India.[34] Ward, an authoritative development economist who 'influenced the thinking of a generation in such matters as aid to underdeveloped Third World countries', published her book, also titled *India and the West*, in the same year.[35] Ward's talk and book dovetail in their characterization of India as a 'breakthrough' country: the most likely of the former colonies to succeed in combining economic growth with a democratic society, thereby avoiding a 'lapse' into Communism.[36] Ward's Chatham House address offers an appraisal of India's first and second five-year plans (1951–6 and 1956–61) and charts the numerous challenges that plagued especially the latter. Looking ahead to the Third Plan (1961–6), she makes a plea for Britain to play a leading role in meeting Indian requests for aid from western governments and the World Bank.[37]

Like Tyson, Ward views western assistance in India's development as a means of countering the Soviet Union, largely by debunking Communist accusations of the 'neo-colonialism' of the West: 'the argument that the western colonialists may seem to move out politically, but they are going to come back through economic skullduggery.'[38] In the ideological battle of the Cold War, Ward recognizes how much 'ideas matter'.[39] To her, 'our post-colonial image is not yet clear enough to belie Communist charges of western self-interest and deceit'.[40] Indeed, the only means of challenging such an image is by replacing it with a 'concept of sustained, disinterested economic assistance, whereby the wealthy nations use their affluence freely to aid developing countries with the means of growth', thereby conveying 'a new kind of image of what we are trying to do'.[41] What may surprise the reader is the picture Ward presents of British aid to India between 1948 and 1960. At a time when 'Britain was less affluent than she is now', Ward tells us, '£1,800 million of sterling balances' were released to India, 'virtually the equivalent of the dollar aid she received under the Marshall Plan'.[42]

Ward's plea is for economic aid to continue. Moreover, Britain has a special responsibility within the Atlantic community for encouraging the United States to make a 'sustained American contribution'.[43] And yet, for all her efforts to draw

[32] Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', pp. 178–9.
[33] Tyson, 'India and the Russian visitors', p. 180.
[34] Barbara Ward, 'India and the West', *International Affairs* 37: 4, 1961, pp. 450–51.
[35] Georgetown University Library Associates, *Newsletter*, vol. 21, Aug. 1987, p. 3, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/551056/LibraryAssociatesNewsletter21.pdf?page=2. Barbara Ward, *India and the West: pattern for a common policy* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1961).
[36] Ward, *India and the West: pattern for a common policy*.
[37] Ward, 'India and the West', *International Affairs*, p. 449.
[38] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 450.
[39] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 450.
[40] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 450.
[41] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 450.
[42] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 449.
[43] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 451.

Britain away from a neo-colonial economic relationship with India, the case Ward makes for doing so is not free from the echoes of empire. The failure of India's democratic experiment would taint 'not only India's future but Britain's historical record as the transmitter of western culture'.[44] In selling her aid agenda, Ward's key justificatory message is that 'the Asian version of the "open society"' is critical for both the security and status of the Western world.[45]

A point of rupture: the 1962 border war with China and the death of Nehru

In 'Illusion and reality in India's foreign policy', the seventh article in this collection, Michael Edwardes, a historian of India, looks in 1965 at 'India's foreign policy in the twilight of the age of Nehru'.[46] Edwardes' analysis comes in the wake of the (for India) devastating 1962 border war with China and the death in 1964 of Jawaharlal Nehru. Edwardes' stocktake finds that with the 'magician' of India's foreign policy dead, 'some of the most important [of its essential ingredients] have disappeared altogether'.[47]

Edwardes clarifies: 'With the Chinese invasion of the North-East frontier Agency in the autumn of 1962, the premises as well as the superstructure of Nehru's foreign policy lay in ruins.'[48] The 1962 war not only proved India's low investment in defence to be a catastrophic miscalculation—it shattered Nehru's 'doctrine of defence by friendship'.[49] And yet, Edwardes observes, 'there still seems to remain among Nehru's successors a touching, and perhaps naive, faith in the legacy of the master'.[50]

Edwardes' central focus is on Indian non-alignment's first major trial: the Indian leadership's 'appeals for military aid ... to the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union' in the heat of the conflict with China.[51] Yet his criticism of the policy extends beyond this moment of traumatic necessity. For Edwardes, non-alignment had anyway become a victim of its own successes, prompting both the Soviet Union and the United States to court a non-aligned India through the sending of foreign aid and creating for India 'an international persona which was not congruent with her actual status as an underdeveloped country'.[52] While India under Nehru had 'won the respect of the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, gratified that one of themselves could speak on equal terms with the Great Powers', after a time, this unusual status had 'eroded any implied Indian claim to represent the revolutionary mood of the newly emerging nations'.[53] With non-alignment, Nehru had delivered India into isolation.

[44] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 451.
[45] Ward, 'India and the West', p. 441; 'Barbara Ward, British economist, dies', *The New York Times*, 1 June 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/01/obituaries/barbara-ward-british-economist-dies.html.
[46] Michael Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality in India's foreign policy' *International Affairs* 41: 1, 1965, p. 48.
[47] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 48.
[48] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 51.
[49] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 49.
[50] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 48.
[51] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 52.
[52] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 50–51.
[53] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p.51.

In the aftermath of the war with China and in light of 'the explosion of a sophisticated nuclear device by the Chinese' in October 1964, Edwardes sees an independent nuclear capability—an 'Indian bomb'—as one means of bringing back 'India's lost international prestige ... a seat at the top table ... and leadership of the other non-aligned nations'.[54] Yet such a choice, he argues, is likely to aggravate China. What India needs most of all is to move forward in solving the issue of the disputed border, a problem whose solution cannot be found in the Nehruvian legacy. In India's post-1962, post-Nehru, and uncertain dawn, Edwardes' article is an entreaty for 'India to cut herself away from the past'.[55]

An 'unhappy legacy of antagonism': 26 years of Indo-US relations

The largely unchanging character of India's worldview and approach to foreign affairs is at the root of one half of William J. Barnds's incisive and melancholic 1973 analysis, 'India and America at odds'.[56] From the vantage point of today, when India has been courted by successive US leaderships since the mid-1990s, and has responded with increasing warmth to such efforts,[57] it is easy to overlook the longer and more tortuous history of diplomatic relations between the world's two largest democracies. As Barnds writes in the early 1970s, 'Indo-American relations have been troubled under every president since Truman'.[58]

Barnds's is a thorough cataloguing of the persistent ills that plague the relationship, despite the two countries' 'common language and shared democratic values'.[59] First, he notes their 'different perceptions of the key issues in world affairs': India's strong anti-colonial commitments and desire to maintain its independence; and the US desire for the independence of Asian countries to lead to cooperation with the West.[60] Next, is the American quest for peace 'through establishing positions of strength' in Asia; and the Indian belief that long-term stability will result only from 'allowing the Asian countries to work out their own problems without Great Power involvement'.[61] On top of that, is India's reliance on moral rhetoric as its primary source of power, juxtaposed with America's very material power-maximizing forays into alliance-building on the subcontinent. Most damaging of all, US military aid and support to Pakistan 'have led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary aim of the United States is to prevent India's emergence as a major power'.[62] Meanwhile, 'the contention that American policy is directed *primarily* at containing India strikes Americans as based upon an incredibly inflated view of India's importance'.[63] These and other 'problems of percep-

[54] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p.56–8.
[55] Edwardes, 'Illusion and reality', p. 58.
[56] William J. Barnds, 'India and America at odds', *International Affairs* 49: 3, 1973, pp. 371–84.
[57] Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, 'Indo-US relations under Modi: the strategic logic underlying the embrace', *International Affairs* 93: 1, 2017, pp. 133–46.
[58] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p. 372.
[59] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p. 372.
[60] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p. 373.
[61] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p. 374.
[62] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p. 375.
[63] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p. 375.

tion' have resulted in India and the United States achieving cooperation only in one area, economic development, in which, according to Barnds, two thirds of global aid have stemmed from the United States. Yet even in this domain, Indians seem ungrateful to the Americans: they are resentful about US attempts to use aid as a means of shaping Indian policies.

Unsurprisingly, Barnds's long-term prognosis is less than optimistic. For him, the possibility of US support for Indian development into the future is hobbled by uncertainty. From the US perspective, aid will neither decisively influence India's foreign policy nor, on its own, sustain Indian democracy. A closer relationship will only be achieved through a radical recasting of the relationship, and only 'if the two countries are able to overcome their unhappy legacy of antagonism'.[64]

Entering the twenty-first century (with a bang)

More than two decades later, Bhabani Sen Gupta's 1997 article, 'India in the twenty-first century', can finally feed any appetite for change within India. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, Sen Gupta maps India's political and economic transformations at both the domestic, regional and international levels. At home, he documents key major shifts since 1989: the rise of caste-based politics, the dismantling of the single-party state, the emergence of multiparty coalitions, the embrace of market-oriented economic reforms, and the acceleration of economic growth.[65]

Abroad, he reports on India's undertaking to 'look East' and invigorate cooperation with ASEAN countries, and to recast relations in south Asia through the five-point foreign policy programme named after foreign minister I. K. Gujral.[66] A framework Sen Gupta himself is rumoured to have invented,[67] the Gujral Doctrine's key components aim to bring to an end in the region 'the mental and physical display of India's unassailable size, its economic and military power, and even its eminence as one of the upcoming major powers of the world; in other words they signal the end of India's hegemony'.[68] Certainly, this objective appears to see some success: India's relationship with its neighbours does become 'less hegemonic', or at least less interventionist in the early twenty-first century.[69] Yet as benevolent as the Gujral Doctrine may sound, Sen Gupta reveals that its ultimate purpose is to 'break out of the claustrophobic confines of south Asia' and 'place India centre stage in the Asia–Pacific region, and hence in global affairs'.[70]

At the end of the twentieth century, Sen Gupta's India is one increasingly engaged in liberalization and globalization, making way for a growth in foreign

[64] Barnds, 'India and America at odds', p.384.
[65] Bhabani Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', *International Affairs* 73: 2, 1997, p. 298.
[66] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 308.
[67] Swapan Dasgupta, 'Betraying the doctrine: the Sengupta affair shows up Gujral in a poor light', *India Today*, 31 May 1997, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/the-sengupta-affair-shows-up-gujral-in-a-poor-light/1/275858.html.
[68] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 309.
[69] Rajesh Basrur, 'Global quest and regional reversal: rising India and South Asia', *International Studies* 47: 2–4, 2010, pp. 267–84.
[70] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 309.

investment, preparing for new relationships in its region, and making progress towards warmer relations with the United States. Yet while India's increased growth rate is generating 'new expectations', Sen Gupta is careful to stress that 'a severe resource shortage reminds Indians that the time is far off when there will be enough resources to meet the needs of its massive population'.[71]

Sen Gupta's analysis ends with a prediction that a rising India 'will be entering the twenty-first century flying its economic flag and not parading its military might'.[72] For him, this includes in the nuclear domain. Keeping India's nuclear option open 'is a symbol of independence and sovereignty and of India's potential to emerge as a major power'.[73] Yet, he appears assured that India will never pursue the nuclear path: 'successive governments have not used the option nor are future governments likely to use it'.[74]

It is the 'shock' of India's nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 that precipitates William Walker's article of the same year, 'International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test explosions'.[75] Walker's thoroughly global analysis of the tests and their repercussions presents India and Pakistan's nuclearization as a shock comparable to the Cuban missile crisis, thereby emphasizing the paradigm shift that the explosions deliver to the nuclear order.[76] While situating India and Pakistan's nuclear tests against the 'deterioration of international nuclear relations that has taken place since the mid-1990s', Walker nonetheless describes 'a palpable sense of violation, of hard-won and cherished norms being trampled by an exultant India, and of neighbours being threatened with intimidation'.[77]

Why did India test? Walker's explanation extends beyond a simple security-centric account that identifies Pakistan and China as regional nuclear threats. He attributes the tests also to India's identity as 'a proud and ambitious nation-state … with pretensions to become a modern and respected international power'.[78] When India's rejection of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) closed off a possibility for India's legitimate inclusion among the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 'it had to look on as the five anointed states enjoyed wide privileges under the treaty, it was subjected to the indignity of trade embargoes over many years, and it was constantly being pressed to join the NPT and other treaties against its will.'[79] 'At one level', allows Walker, 'one can sympathize with India's inherited predicament.'[80]

If India's engagement with the bomb is 'a declaration of political aspiration, of a desire for recognition as one of the world's most influential powers', Walker sees

[71] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 314.
[72] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 314.
[73] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 312.
[74] Sen Gupta, 'India in the twenty-first century', p. 312.
[75] William Walker, 'International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test explosions', *International Affairs* 74: 3, 1998, pp. 505–28.
[76] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 505.
[77] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 505.
[78] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 516.
[79] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 516.
[80] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 516.

little hope for the conferral of such recognition.[81] India's accession to the NPT is a legal impossibility, India's 'moral claims for recognition' have been further weakened, and New Delhi faces 'increasing ostracism'.[82] However, Walker sees a way forward which today looks remarkably prescient. If India has lost in prestige through testing, it 'will have to begin to exhibit great responsibility in the manner in which it henceforth handles its nuclear policies'.[83] For Walker 'this will become one of the most powerful forces acting in the direction of moderation and conciliation in Indian political and strategic thinking'.[84] Indeed, 'India's political elite should understand that they now have an opportunity—and a responsibility—to play a prestigious role in transforming international nuclear relations.'[85]

This is, of course, exactly what India has done. From 1998 onwards, successive Indian leaderships have expended much energy in developing a constructive working relationship with the non-proliferation regime, securing status, institutional recognition and material advantages in the process. In 2005, the United States categorized India 'as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology'.[86] Following on from this, the bilateral agreement signed with the United States in 2006 that provided India with exceptional civil nuclear trading rights, and the 2008 waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group that permitted this agreement to operate outside the norms of the Group's export policy, signal India's broad (though not universal) recognition as a nuclear partner rather than a nuclear challenger.

India: rising 'southern' power or partner to the West?

Ian Taylor's 'India's rise in Africa', published in 2012, tells an important broader story about how India, by the second decade of the twenty-first century a rising 'southern' power, must confront its multiple roles and identities.[87] As a demonstration of India's enhanced economic and political stature, Taylor points to two transformations in India's relationship with aid. First, 'India has emerged in recent years from being an aid recipient to become an important aid donor', and second, in the African context, India's aid 'has gradually shifted from political aid (channelled through the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement to support African anti-colonial struggles) to development aid'.[88]

India's contemporary interest in providing development assistance in Africa, Taylor argues, lies in seeking 'to balance Chinese activities', open up 'new market opportunities', 'reinforce India's position within multilateral institutions', and

[81] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 519.
[82] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 519.
[83] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 518.
[84] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 518.
[85] Walker, 'International nuclear relations', p. 528.
[86] 'Joint statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh', 18 July 2005, Washington DC, see: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm, accessed 9 Sept. 2016.
[87] Ian Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', *International Affairs* 88: 4, 2012, pp. 779–98.
[88] Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', pp. 785, 787.

'enhance the country's international presence and prestige'.[89] This suggests that India–Africa relations are founded on an implicit bargain: 'mutual political and economic cooperation (as well as aid) in exchange for increased … support for India's rise on the global stage'.[90] The dividends of this transaction include the improvement of 'trading and political conditions' for both developing countries and India, and a common 'southern' position on some questions of global governance reform.[91]

Yet Taylor sees an inherent tension in this tacit basis for exchange: India's rise, including as a player in the African aid landscape, creates important incompatibilities with South–South solidarity, ranging from competition for market access at the local level and with 'other ostensibly "southern" players such as Brazil and China', to the challenges to India's status as a champion of the South posed by the pressure from above to align with the existing global order.[92] In an intensification of Appadorai's early concerns and Edwardes' later observations about the conflict inherent in India's dual relations with both major and weaker powers, Taylor's critical insight is that 'as India develops, the basis of a residual Indian foreign policy grounded in notions of Third World coalition-building dissipates as the significant structural heterogeneity and differentiated interest among this disparate group of states become ever starker'.[93]

These insights are consistent with Amrita Narlikar's 2013 analysis of a rising India's international negotiating behaviour; in the article 'India rising: responsible to whom?' Narlikar positions India, together with China and Brazil, as one of 'three rising powers with remarkable growth trajectories' and seeks to understand India's varying approaches to international negotiations across a range of partners.[94] Contrary to the expectations of established western powers—who tend to view India's status as a democratic polity with a largely English-speaking elite more conducive to positive negotiations—Narlikar sees no natural convergence between India and these powers. On trade and climate change, India allies with the BRICS countries in 'a form of balancing against the established powers'.[95] Moreover, India is more likely to 'share the burdens of international responsibility' in its negotiating behaviour with 'smaller players, such as the least developed countries'.[96] Narlikar's analysis reveals important continuities of the past even as India's economic power grows: India continues to self-identify as a developing country in some contexts, remains reluctant to 'bandwagon' with established powers, and, to a degree, maintains a 'moralistic style of framing its negotiating positions' that chime with the Nehru era.[97]

[89] Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', p. 787.
[90] Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', p. 794.
[91] Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', p. 793.
[92] Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', p. 797.
[93] Taylor, 'India's rise in Africa', p. 797.
[94] Amrita Narlikar, 'India rising: responsible to whom?', *International Affairs* 89: 3, 2013, p. 596.
[95] Narlikar, 'India rising', p. 603.
[96] Narlikar, 'India rising', p. 603.
[97] Narlikar, 'India rising', p. 608.

Harsh Pant and Julie Super provide additional context to this complex picture of a rising India's global relationships in the article 'India's "non-alignment" conundrum'.[98] Tracing the history of India's policy of non-alignment from where Appadorai's early presentation leaves off, the authors develop a portrait of an Indian leadership still wedded to a particularly Indian conception of strategic autonomy, but taking 'substantial steps towards the United States and America's allies in the Asia–Pacific region'.[99] For Pant and Super, 'India's rising global profile is reshaping New Delhi's approach to its major partnerships in the changing global order', as India turns its attention to an Indian Ocean region 'riddled with rivalries', not least as it confronts China's rise. Yet, optimistically, they see India's new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, as 'positioning India to use its renewed partnerships across the global scene to make progress in its relations with China'.[100] Whether conflict or cooperation with China will win out as the Indian Ocean emerges as the new nexus of global power and conflict—at least in the eyes of some analysts[101]—is one of the most pressing questions of the twenty-first century, both for India and the world.

India and Britain in 2017

The final article in this virtual collection revisits the ties that bind India and Britain, bringing the narrative full circle. Taken from the India-focused January 2017 special issue of *International Affairs*, David Scott's analysis, 'The rise of India: UK perspectives', seeks to understand the UK government's response to India's rise. In mapping a brief history of UK–India relations since 1947 in the article's opening section, Scott highlights the paradoxical proximity and distance of the UK–India relationship today, a product of the 'troubled colonial history' of some two hundred years of British rule in India.[102] He sees only occasional—and less than successful—attempts to address this difficult legacy, such as David Cameron's 2013 partial apology for the 1919 Amritsar massacre that so incensed Gandhi and his contemporaries. And sobering is Scott's reference to a 2015 British Council report that identifies 'a growing sense of frustration in India as some feel that a colonial mindset still lingers with some people in the UK'.[103]

Both the mind-set and its reception surface in current UK attempts to forge a new and reinvigorated economic partnership with India, some seventy years after Indian independence, and some few months after the UK's vote to leave the European Union. What India seeks, in the words of a recent UK newspaper editorial, is 'free movement of people as a condition for concluding free trade deals for goods and services'.[104] That the UK government's current and likely ongoing

[98] Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super, 'India's "non-alignment" conundrum: a twentieth-century policy in a changing world', *International Affairs* 91: 4, 2015, pp. 747–64.
[99] Pant and Super, 'India's "non-alignment" conundrum', p. 759.
[100] Pant and Super, 'India's "non-alignment" conundrum', p. 763.
[101] Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon* (New York: Random House).
[102] David Scott, 'The rise of India: UK perspectives', *International Affairs* 93: 1, 2017, p. 166.
[103] British Council, *India matters* (London: British Council, 2015), p. 12, cited in Scott, 'The rise of India', p. 166.
[104] 'A trade deal with India isn't as easy as Boris Johnson and Theresa May think', *The Independent*, 18 Jan. 2017,

restrictive immigration policy, including towards Indian citizens, is at odds with this aim is clear, but the message being received may be less so. Manoj Ladwa, a former adviser to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's electoral campaign frames it unequivocally: 'The impression Britain is giving to countries such as India is, we want your business but we don't want your people.'[105]

Scott's article shows why this may matter to the UK. His analysis centres on the ways in which India's recent economic transformation has shifted the political calculus of the relationship. As Scott notes, 'India's hand is increasingly being politically strengthened *vis-à-vis* the UK precisely through India's increasing economic weight'.[106] And as the guest-editors of the issue that hosts his article emphasize, when considering India's rise, 'the question raised by Scott's analysis of India through British eyes is less whether the UK will accommodate India than whether India will accommodate the UK'.[107]

Scott implicitly suggests that India's future global role, certainly economically speaking, will outshine that of Britain. The transformation plotted out through the articles in this virtual issue, from a colonized, divided and economically drained nation to a rising nuclear power carving out a normatively distinct place in the global order, may support such a prediction. Yet if disaffection towards a government that is seen to 'harm' India remains the virtue for today's Indian leaders that it did for Gandhi in 1922, then the UK, with its to India unpalatable stance on immigration, may find itself relegated to a position of low priority among the many global relationships that India is fostering in the twenty-first century.

Continued efforts to understand, engage with and learn from India are needed, not merely in the pages of *International Affairs*, but also in the policies of the governments who have regularly turned to its pages.

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/india-trade-deal-boris-johnson-theresa-may-brexit-freedom-of-movement-a7534121.html.

[105] Vidya Ram, 'Britain's Indian litmus test', *The Hindu*, 20 Oct. 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Britain%E2%80%99s-Indian-litmus-test/article16076765.ece.

[106] Scott, 'The rise of India', p. 165.

[107] Manjari Chatterjee Miller and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, 'Introduction: India's rise at 70', *International Affairs* 93: 1, 2017, p. 5.