In an earlier Analysis paper, (Miller 1989), I developed an objection to Crispin Wright's widely discussed suggestion that the truth about intention can be viewed as judgement-dependent (Wright 1987 and 1989). In reply, Wright has suggested that a strategy he adopts for blocking a related worry might also block the objection in Miller 1989. In this note, I argue that the strategy suggested by Wright leaves the original objections untouched.


1.Consider the provisional equation:

  • (1)

    C-conditions obtain → (Jones judges that he intends to φ ↔ he intends to φ)

Suppose that ‘C-conditions’ are conditions that are cognitively ideal for the formation by Jones of a judgement about the content of his intentions, and suppose that we can specify a set of C-conditions such that (1) is true. Do Jones's best judgements – those formed when the C-conditions...

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