Stoneham (2007: 254) characterizes coherentism as follows:
There are finite sets of beliefs such that each member of the set is epistemically supported by some other members (and nothing else).
Jäger (2007) offers a convincing case that Stoneham's alleged reductio of coherentism, on the basis of (1), fails. As an adjunct, however, it is worthwhile to add that it appears to be remarkably easy to show that (1) is true.
Consider someone who has their memories suppressed by brainwashing, and subsequently has three beliefs implanted by an evil hypnotist. These beliefs are selected deliberately with falsehood in mind, and are not justified, in either an internal or an external sense, except in so far as they might cohere. (This ensures that the beliefs are ‘supported by ... nothing else’, as required by (1).) The beliefs are as follows: