Anthony Brueckner (2008) offers a compelling argument for incompatibilism – the New Third Argument (here after ‘NTA’) – in response to my criticisms of the Third Argument (Campbell 2007).1 I explicate NTA (§2), offer some preliminary considerations (§ 3), and then close with a discussion of Brueckner's critique of my Adam example (2007: 109) (§4). In the end I show that, like the Third Argument, NTA does not establish incompatibilism, the view that no one has free will if determinism is true.

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In this paper, I accept several assumptions from van Inwagen's discussion of free will and determinism (1983). First, free will is necessary for moral responsibility (cf. 1983: 104–5). Second, no one has free will iff ‘no one has a choice about anything whatever’ (1983: 94). Third, an agent has a choice about whether p, for some proposition p...

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