There is an apparent problem stemming from the factivity of knowledge that seems to afflict both contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI).1 In this article, we will first explain how the problem arises for each theory, and then we will propose a uniform resolution.

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Let Kt(X,_) stands for X knows _ at t. Let h stand for S has hands. According to contextualism, ‘Kt(S, h)’ is true as uttered in some ordinary conversational contexts. Let O be such a context. So we have Consider a demanding conversational context D (such as a philosophical context in which scepticism is under discussion). Let S* be a participant in D. We have

In prose: ‘S* knows at t that S has hands’...

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