Consider the following possible utterances made by, say, Alison: As many philosophers have noted, (3) functions in many contexts much like (1) or (2). (I will discuss the nature of such contexts below.) That is, it amounts to a hedged assertion about how things are in the world, rather than an autobiographical report that would be the first-personal counterpart of (4). One tell-tale sign of this is that in these contexts, it is natural for a hearer, say Barack, who knows that the keys could not possibly be in the car, to respond to (3) with something like Barack intuitively disagrees with Alison, even though his utterance is clearly not about her psychological state; hence, her utterance cannot have been about her psychological states either, at...

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