David McNaughton and Piers Rawling (2011) take us to task for the following proposal:

R: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that A ought to Φ.

In particular, they think a right-to-left reading of R is problematic. Their initial worry is this: that a reliable friend tells you that you have overriding moral reason to Φ is evidence that you ought to Φ, but is not a reason to Φ. Why? Because her telling you does not contribute to the rightness of your Φ-ing. Reasons are, according to them, right-makers.

...

As McNaughton and Rawling admit, we have two plausible replies open to us. First, we may simply deny that reasons are always right-makers, and claim...

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