In Truth-Conditional Pragmatics François Recanati develops an interesting alternative to standard Kaplan semantics that treats the intuitive truth-conditional content of sentences as what is asserted by them. According to standard Kaplan semantics, sentences express propositions relative to contexts. The proposition expressed by a sentence relative to a context is what is said or asserted by the sentence relative to the context. The context is a set of parameters that include a world, a speaker, a time and a location. This set of parameters determines a referent for indexical expressions, such as ‘I’, ‘now’ and ‘here’. Though sentences do not express propositions independently of a context, in standard semantics, the context-dependence in question depends on objective features rather than, say, speaker intentions. Recanati calls this sort of...

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