This book provides a rigorous and highly original defence of the claim that properties are tropes (i.e., particulars) as opposed to universals. Like many other trope theorists, Douglas Ehring defends tropes within the framework of a one-category ontology – substances are reducible to bundles of compresent tropes. What is unusual about his account is his acceptance of a Natural Class Trope Nominalism (‘NCTN’). The most popular account of tropes – which Ehring refers to as ‘Standard Trope Theory’ (‘STT’) – cashes out property-types in terms of resemblance classes of tropes. However, according to STT, a trope’s nature – its being what it is – is not determined by the trope’s resemblance relations to other tropes or by the trope’s membership in natural classes of tropes. Rather, it...

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