The Argument for Propositions from Modal Validity

Extract

1. Introduction

One of the central goals of Propositions (Merricks 2015) is to argue that propositions exist. My plan for the following is to explore the options for Merricks’s opponents (let’s just call them ‘nominalists’). I’m not sure whether, in the end, they have any entirely satisfactory strategy, but the discussion will still be of some interest. At least I hope to achieve some clarification of the initial arguments of the book and to prompt Merricks to elaborate on a few issues. Before continuing, I should say that I found many other challenging arguments throughout the book as well as much to agree with. I focus on the first chapter due to its foundational status with respect to the rest of the book, but every chapter is well worth careful thought and discussion.

2. Reconstructing the argument

Merricks argues for the existence of propositions by appealing to modally valid arguments, where ‘an argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true’ (1). His reasoning is this:

There are modally valid arguments. So there are the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments. This chapter argues that those premises and conclusions have certain features. For example, they exist necessarily, have their truth conditions essentially, and are the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity. I shall, with good reason, call them ‘propositions’. So there are propositions. (1)