This book focuses on recent debates about perceptual warrant. Against the ‘liberal’ views of Jim Pryor (an undefeated perceptual belief that P is justified iff one's experience represents that P (21)) and the ‘conservative’ views of Crispin Wright (an undefeated perceptual belief that P is justified iff one's experience represents that P, and ‘it is warrantedly assumed that there is an external world’ (29–30)), Coliva defends a ‘moderatism,’ according to which an undefeated perceptual belief that P is justified iff one's experience represents that P, and ‘it is assumed [unwarrantedly] that there is an external world’ (34). This ‘hinge epistemology’ turns on Wittgenstein's insight that empirical beliefs rest on assumptions that are themselves unfounded (1972: §253), and which serve as the ‘hinges’ (§§341 and 343) of...

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