LOGOS — Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició, Universitat de Barcelona Arché— The AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind, University of St Andrews, 17 College Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, Scotland, firstname.lastname@example.org
The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in every possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one pays attention to such a distinction.