
Contents
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1 The high-grade a priori: the full package 1 The high-grade a priori: the full package
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2 Rationalist and empiricist variations 2 Rationalist and empiricist variations
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3 Some common ground and an orientation for the investigation 3 Some common ground and an orientation for the investigation
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4 Toward the low-grade a priori 4 Toward the low-grade a priori
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4.1 The easy model, an easy mistake 4.1 The easy model, an easy mistake
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4.2 Three important observations, and the need for a two-stage model 4.2 Three important observations, and the need for a two-stage model
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4.3 An instructive parallel: investigations of syntax in theoretical linguistics 4.3 An instructive parallel: investigations of syntax in theoretical linguistics
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5 The reciprocal two-stage model of philosophical reflection 5 The reciprocal two-stage model of philosophical reflection
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5.1 Preliminaries 5.1 Preliminaries
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5.2 Conceptual-analytic reflection as low-grade a priori abduction 5.2 Conceptual-analytic reflection as low-grade a priori abduction
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5.3 Core data: intuitive judgments about concrete cases 5.3 Core data: intuitive judgments about concrete cases
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5.4 Abductive transitions and the representativeness assumption 5.4 Abductive transitions and the representativeness assumption
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5.5 Reciprocal equilibration 5.5 Reciprocal equilibration
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5.6 Real conceptual competence and noise elimination 5.6 Real conceptual competence and noise elimination
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5.7 Dual-pull phenomena and other data 5.7 Dual-pull phenomena and other data
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5.7.1 Type 2 5.7.1 Type 2
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5.7.2 Type 3 5.7.2 Type 3
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5.7.3 Type 4 5.7.3 Type 4
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5.7.4 Type 5 5.7.4 Type 5
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5.8 The two-stage model elaborated 5.8 The two-stage model elaborated
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6 Conclusion 6 Conclusion
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2 Grades of A Priori Justification
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Published:June 2011
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Abstract
This chapter develops a revisionary account of a kind of a priori reflection that is central to much philosophy—viz., conceptual analysis. It argues that this kind of a priori inquiry has subtle empirical elements rather than being a wholly non-empirical enterprise. This break with more traditional conceptions of the a priori is marked by writing of “low-grade a priori” justification. The chapter begins with the observation that philosophical reflection commonly commences with intuitive judgments having to do with concrete scenarios. This is as it should be, for one's conceptual competence typically is much better at applying concepts to concrete cases then it is at directly yielding highly abstract, highly general, conceptually grounded necessary truths. To arrive at the sorts of general conceptually grounded necessary truths to which philosophers typically aspire, one must go beyond the direct and reasonably reliable deliverances of one's conceptual competence: one must engage in what is essentially an abductive inference—an inference to the best explanatory account of the workings of the relevant concepts and of one's conceptual competence. It is argued that the needed abductive inference has an ineliminable empirical component.
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