
Contents
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1 Overview 1 Overview
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2 The problem of infinities 2 The problem of infinities
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3 Epistemic safety, postclassical reliability, and the truth connection 3 Epistemic safety, postclassical reliability, and the truth connection
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4 Key purposes served by the concept of epistemic justification 4 Key purposes served by the concept of epistemic justification
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4.1 The generic purpose: safe truth-seeking under uncertainty 4.1 The generic purpose: safe truth-seeking under uncertainty
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4.2 Cases evincing a dual pull toward crediting and gatekeeping: Sophie and Hypatia 4.2 Cases evincing a dual pull toward crediting and gatekeeping: Sophie and Hypatia
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5 Knowledge and the dual pull 5 Knowledge and the dual pull
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6 Comparative theoretical advantages 6 Comparative theoretical advantages
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6.1 Goldman on approved belief-fixing processes 6.1 Goldman on approved belief-fixing processes
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6.2 Goldman on meta-reliability 6.2 Goldman on meta-reliability
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6.3 Sosa on Safety 6.3 Sosa on Safety
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6.4 Sosa on the new evil demon problem 6.4 Sosa on the new evil demon problem
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7 Summary: the case for transglobal reliabilism 7 Summary: the case for transglobal reliabilism
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5 Defending Transglobal Reliabilism
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Published:June 2011
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Abstract
The overall work of this chapter is two-fold: First, it illustrates how philosophical reflection leading to transglobal reliabilism fully conforms to the model of low-grade a priori reflection advanced in Chapter 2. Second, the chapter serves to provide a sustained defense of transglobal reliabilism. The defense involves the full range of data that is characteristic of low-grade a priori philosophical reflection. Of course the data to be accommodated includes judgments provoked by scenarios—so this chapter discusses a diversity of such judgments (some featured in the previous to chapters, some newly introduced here). Various judgment tendencies that initially seem to point in directions incompatible with transglobal reliabilism are discussed. It is shown how these tendencies can be accounted for by transglobal reliabilists. However, the data to be accommodated also includes some sense for the points and purposes of the evaluative concept of epistemic justification. It is not uncommon in philosophical reflection to find oneself pulled in apparently opposing directions when thinking about particularly difficult cases—and the concept of epistemic justification has its difficult applications and “dual pulls.” Ultimately, reflection on the points and purposes of the concept of epistemic justification allows one to understand this dual pull within a fleshed out transglobal reliabilist account.
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