
Contents
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Section I: 2.1 Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy Section I: 2.1 Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy
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2.1.1 Clark and Chalmers on ‘belief’ and the extended mind 2.1.1 Clark and Chalmers on ‘belief’ and the extended mind
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2.1.2 Explication: from Carnap and Quine to Gupta 2.1.2 Explication: from Carnap and Quine to Gupta
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2.1.3 Haslanger on amelioration in general and of gender and race terms in particular 2.1.3 Haslanger on amelioration in general and of gender and race terms in particular
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2.1.4 Revisionism about moral language 2.1.4 Revisionism about moral language
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2.1.4.1 Railton’s Revisionism 2.1.4.1 Railton’s Revisionism
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2.1.4.2 Richard Joyce’s Revolutionary Fictionalism: Moral Discourse is Hopelessly Flawed 2.1.4.2 Richard Joyce’s Revolutionary Fictionalism: Moral Discourse is Hopelessly Flawed
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2.1.5 Revisionism about truth 2.1.5 Revisionism about truth
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2.1.6 More on inconsistent or incoherent concepts: Weiner and van Inwagen 2.1.6 More on inconsistent or incoherent concepts: Weiner and van Inwagen
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2.1.7 Engineering the concept of race 2.1.7 Engineering the concept of race
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2.1.8 Leslie on generics and social prejudice 2.1.8 Leslie on generics and social prejudice
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2.1.9 Epistemology: ‘what is knowledge?’ or ‘what should knowledge be?’ 2.1.9 Epistemology: ‘what is knowledge?’ or ‘what should knowledge be?’
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2.1.10 Carnap on nonsense 2.1.10 Carnap on nonsense
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2.1.11 Is all of philosophy conceptual engineering? 2.1.11 Is all of philosophy conceptual engineering?
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2.1.12 Chalmers on conceptual pluralism and pointless verbal disputes 2.1.12 Chalmers on conceptual pluralism and pointless verbal disputes
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2.1.13 Brief historical digression: analytic philosophy, Strawson, Soames, and contemporary semantics and epistemology 2.1.13 Brief historical digression: analytic philosophy, Strawson, Soames, and contemporary semantics and epistemology
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Section II: 2.2 Conceptual Engineering beyond Philosophy Section II: 2.2 Conceptual Engineering beyond Philosophy
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2.2.1 Conceptual engineering in law and psychiatry 2.2.1 Conceptual engineering in law and psychiatry
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2.2.2 Public controversies over ‘person’, ‘marriage’, ‘rape’, and Biko on ‘black vs. non-white’ 2.2.2 Public controversies over ‘person’, ‘marriage’, ‘rape’, and Biko on ‘black vs. non-white’
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2.2.3 Related phenomena: semantic drift and contextual negotiations 2.2.3 Related phenomena: semantic drift and contextual negotiations
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2.2.3.1 Semantic Drift and Semantic Plasticity: A Continuous Process of Conceptual Engineering? 2.2.3.1 Semantic Drift and Semantic Plasticity: A Continuous Process of Conceptual Engineering?
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2.2.3.2 Contextual Negotiation as a Form of Conceptual Engineering? 2.2.3.2 Contextual Negotiation as a Form of Conceptual Engineering?
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Section III: 2.3 The Logical Space of Conceptual Engineering: A Taxonomy Section III: 2.3 The Logical Space of Conceptual Engineering: A Taxonomy
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2.3.1 The varieties of conceptual deficiency 2.3.1 The varieties of conceptual deficiency
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2.3.2 The varieties of ameliorative strategies 2.3.2 The varieties of ameliorative strategies
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2.3.2.1 Improve the Concept and Keep the Lexical Item 2.3.2.1 Improve the Concept and Keep the Lexical Item
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2.3.2.2 Improve the Concept and Change the Lexical Item 2.3.2.2 Improve the Concept and Change the Lexical Item
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2.3.2.3 Complete Abandonment 2.3.2.3 Complete Abandonment
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2.3.3 Intentional vs. unintentional 2.3.3 Intentional vs. unintentional
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2.3.4 Local vs. broad conceptual engineering 2.3.4 Local vs. broad conceptual engineering
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2.3.5 Institutional vs. non-institutional 2.3.5 Institutional vs. non-institutional
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2.3.6 The kinds of norms involved 2.3.6 The kinds of norms involved
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2.3.7 Two things I haven’t mentioned: holism and creating from scratch 2.3.7 Two things I haven’t mentioned: holism and creating from scratch
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2 Illustrations: Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy and Beyond
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Published:March 2018
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Abstract
This chapter considers a wide range of examples of conceptual engineering, both within and outside of philosophy, and then provides a taxonomy of conceptual engineering. Section I provides a range of examples of philosophers trying to improve their representational devices, with examples from various philosophical sub-disciplines (including philosophy of mind, feminist philosophy, and ethics). Section II gives examples of conceptual engineering occurring outside philosophy, and makes connections with semantic drift and contextual negotiation. Section III provides a taxonomy for understanding conceptual engineering, laying out a series of distinctions we can use to show the commonalities and differences linking and differentiating between the examples we considered.
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