
Published online:
18 December 2014
Published in print:
06 November 2014
Online ISBN:
9780191787324
Print ISBN:
9780198717812
Contents
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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2. Moral Condemnation 2. Moral Condemnation
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2.1. Section Prospectus 2.1. Section Prospectus
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2.2. The Egoistic Theory 2.2. The Egoistic Theory
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2.3. The Deterrence Theory 2.3. The Deterrence Theory
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2.4. The Accountability Theory vs. the Retributive Theory 2.4. The Accountability Theory vs. the Retributive Theory
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2.4.1. Evidence for the Retributive Theory 2.4.1. Evidence for the Retributive Theory
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2.4.2. Evidence for the Accountability Theory 2.4.2. Evidence for the Accountability Theory
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2.5. The Existence of Genuine Moral Condemnation 2.5. The Existence of Genuine Moral Condemnation
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3. Moral Conscience 3. Moral Conscience
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3.1. Section Prospectus 3.1. Section Prospectus
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3.2. Arguments for the Approval Theory 3.2. Arguments for the Approval Theory
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3.2.1. First Argument: Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Licensing 3.2.1. First Argument: Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Licensing
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3.2.2. Second Argument: The Dependence of Conscience on Social Norms 3.2.2. Second Argument: The Dependence of Conscience on Social Norms
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3.3. Argument for the Accountability Theory: Guilt as Backward-Looking Moral Conscience 3.3. Argument for the Accountability Theory: Guilt as Backward-Looking Moral Conscience
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4. What is Distinctive about Morality? 4. What is Distinctive about Morality?
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Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
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References References
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Chapter
3 Moral Psychology as Accountability
Get access
Pages
40–83
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Published:November 2014
Cite
Dill, Brendan, and Stephen Darwall, 'Moral Psychology as Accountability', in Justin D'Arms, and Daniel Jacobson (eds), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics (Oxford , 2014; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 Dec. 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.003.0003, accessed 21 Apr. 2025.
Abstract
On the basis of recent work in moral philosophy (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b), this chapter hypothesizes that interpersonal accountability plays a foundational role in moral psychology. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, it argues that the implicit aim of the central moral motives and emotions is to hold people accountable for compliance with the demands of morality. Moral condemnation aims to hold perpetrators accountable to moral demands, and moral conscience aims to hold oneself accountable to these demands. This framework allows us to see what makes morality distinctive: its essential connection to accountability.
Keywords:
accountability, moral emotions, moral motivation, reactive attitudes, second-person standpoint
Collection:
Oxford Scholarship Online
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