
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1. Introduction: Deontic Moral Judgement, Moral Obligation, and Empirical Explanation 1. Introduction: Deontic Moral Judgement, Moral Obligation, and Empirical Explanation
-
2. From the Outside: Empirical Starting Points 2. From the Outside: Empirical Starting Points
-
2.1. Approaching Moral Obligation 1: Primates and the Token-Exchange Paradigm 2.1. Approaching Moral Obligation 1: Primates and the Token-Exchange Paradigm
-
2.2. Approaching Moral Obligation 2: Psychopaths 2.2. Approaching Moral Obligation 2: Psychopaths
-
2.2.1. Lack of Moral Motivation 2.2.1. Lack of Moral Motivation
-
2.2.2. Lack of, or Severely Restricted Ability to Make Moral Judgements 2.2.2. Lack of, or Severely Restricted Ability to Make Moral Judgements
-
2.2.2.1. The “Nomological Cluster” Objection 2.2.2.1. The “Nomological Cluster” Objection
-
2.2.2.2. Authority-Independence 2.2.2.2. Authority-Independence
-
2.2.2.3. Deontic Moral Judgements 2.2.2.3. Deontic Moral Judgements
-
-
2.2.3. Lack of Specific Affective Dispositions 2.2.3. Lack of Specific Affective Dispositions
-
-
-
3. A Psychological Infrastructure for Deontic Moral Judgement 3. A Psychological Infrastructure for Deontic Moral Judgement
-
3.1. Resentment*, Smithian Empathy, and Indignation* 3.1. Resentment*, Smithian Empathy, and Indignation*
-
3.2. From Impartial Indignation* to Moral Obligation 3.2. From Impartial Indignation* to Moral Obligation
-
-
4. Defending and Contextualising the Account 4. Defending and Contextualising the Account
-
4.1. Responses to Three Objections 4.1. Responses to Three Objections
-
4.2. Moral Obligation and Social Norms 4.2. Moral Obligation and Social Norms
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11 Moral Obligation from the Outside In
Get access-
Published:July 2019
Cite
Abstract
This chapter presents an analysis of moral obligation, proceeding from the assumption that the decisive facts can only have resulted from the development of psychological structures specific to the human life form. The method involves piecing together a psychology of deontic moral judgement and arguing that moral obligation is what must be the case if such judgements are true. The three key building blocks are resentment*, an affectively coloured, egoistic demand in reaction to agential ill will or indifference, found in both primates and psychopaths; Smithian empathy, which makes possible vicarious resentment*, or indignation*; and impartial empathising. Facts about moral obligation turn out to be facts about counterfactual informed impartial empathic indignation*. Phylogenetically, the constitution of such facts presumably required the prior genesis of social norms through the sharing of indignation*. This phylogenetic condition is, however, no part of the concept of moral obligation thus made possible.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 1 |
November 2022 | 2 |
December 2022 | 2 |
June 2023 | 2 |
July 2023 | 5 |
October 2023 | 1 |
December 2023 | 3 |
January 2024 | 2 |
April 2024 | 6 |
June 2024 | 4 |
July 2024 | 1 |
September 2024 | 3 |
December 2024 | 3 |
January 2025 | 2 |
February 2025 | 2 |
March 2025 | 2 |
April 2025 | 2 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.