
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
-
2. From a Policy of Non-interference to Non-indifference 2. From a Policy of Non-interference to Non-indifference
-
3. The Concept of Unconstitutional Change of Government 3. The Concept of Unconstitutional Change of Government
-
3.1 Unconstitutional Removal of Democratically Elected Government 3.1 Unconstitutional Removal of Democratically Elected Government
-
3.2 Unconstitutional Retention of Power 3.2 Unconstitutional Retention of Power
-
3.2.1 Refusal to Relinquish Power after Losing in Free, Fair, and Regular Elections 3.2.1 Refusal to Relinquish Power after Losing in Free, Fair, and Regular Elections
-
3.2.2 Continuation of Governmental Power through Constitutional or Legal Change 3.2.2 Continuation of Governmental Power through Constitutional or Legal Change
-
-
3.3 Emerging Challenges: Popular Uprisings 3.3 Emerging Challenges: Popular Uprisings
-
3.4 The Zimbabwe Conundrum: The Threshold of the Forcible Removal of Incumbents 3.4 The Zimbabwe Conundrum: The Threshold of the Forcible Removal of Incumbents
-
3.5 Ascertainment of and Responses to UCG 3.5 Ascertainment of and Responses to UCG
-
3.6 Preventing UCG: Towards an AU Support Framework for Constitutional Reform 3.6 Preventing UCG: Towards an AU Support Framework for Constitutional Reform
-
3.7 A General Assessment of the Normative Framework of UCG in Africa 3.7 A General Assessment of the Normative Framework of UCG in Africa
-
-
4. Sub-regional Responses to UCGs: Challenges and Emerging Trends 4. Sub-regional Responses to UCGs: Challenges and Emerging Trends
-
5. Conclusion 5. Conclusion
-
Bibliography Bibliography
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3 The African Union and the Advancement of Democracy: The Problem of Unconstitutional Retention of Governmental Power
Get access-
Published:March 2021
Cite
Abstract
The African Union (AU) has as one of its goals the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights, and constitutionalism. A critical element of this goal is the rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), particularly in the form of coups d’état. While there have been some inconsistencies, the AU has rejected coups d’état and called for the reinstatement of democratic dispensations. Nevertheless, the UCG framework has been unable to stem subtler mechanisms of retaining power, such as the suspension of elections or the imposition of ostensibly proper constitutional reform initiatives. This chapter calls for increased attention to the latter forms of extending governmental power. Specifically, it recommends the establishment of formal mechanisms through which the AU can engage directly and offer assistance at moments when reform proposals are debated so as to ensure that domestic actors take cognizance of both the relevant AU frameworks and the comparative continental and global experience. Such a mechanism would be comparable in its workings to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 3 |
November 2022 | 3 |
December 2022 | 2 |
March 2023 | 2 |
April 2023 | 4 |
May 2023 | 4 |
June 2023 | 1 |
July 2023 | 1 |
September 2023 | 5 |
October 2023 | 3 |
November 2023 | 3 |
January 2024 | 7 |
February 2024 | 2 |
March 2024 | 4 |
April 2024 | 2 |
May 2024 | 4 |
June 2024 | 14 |
July 2024 | 4 |
August 2024 | 1 |
September 2024 | 2 |
October 2024 | 3 |
November 2024 | 4 |
December 2024 | 7 |
January 2025 | 5 |
February 2025 | 5 |
March 2025 | 1 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.