Skip to Main Content

Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value

Online ISBN:
9780191847318
Print ISBN:
9780198810322
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Book

Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value

Conor McHugh,
Conor McHugh

Associate Professor in Philosophy

University of Southampton
Find on
Jonathan Way
Jonathan Way

Professor of Philosophy

University of Southampton
Find on
Published online:
17 November 2022
Published in print:
28 October 2022
Online ISBN:
9780191847318
Print ISBN:
9780198810322
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Abstract

This book has two main aims. First, it develops and defends a constitutive account of normative reasons as premises of good reasoning. This account says, roughly, that to be a normative reason for a response (such as a belief or intention) is to be premise of good reasoning, from fitting responses, to that response. Second, building on the account of reasons, it develops and defends a fittingness-first account of the structure of the normative domain. This account says that there is a single normative property, fittingness, which is normatively basic, and on which all other normative properties depend. On this view, reasons, oughts, value, and other normative phenomena all ultimately depend on fittingness. The account of normative reasons is a part of this general view of the normative domain. The book begins, in Chapter 1, by motivating the account of reasons as premises of good reasoning. Chapter 2 argues that good reasoning is, roughly, reasoning that preserves fittingness. Chapter 3 addresses the question of what fittingness is. Chapter 4 defends constitutive accounts of evaluative properties, like goodness, in terms of fitting attitudes. Chapters 5 and 6 shows how the view provides an attractive account of how reasons determine the deontic status of a response—whether you ought or may so respond. Chapter 7 addresses some challenges concerning certain reasons for belief, the relationship between reasons for action and reasons for intention, and reasons for emotion.

Contents
Close
This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

Close

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

View Article Abstract & Purchase Options

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Close