
Contents
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INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
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3.I. KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 3.I. KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
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3.I.1. The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative 3.I.1. The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
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3.I.2. Perfect and Imperfect Duties 3.I.2. Perfect and Imperfect Duties
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3.I.3. The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative 3.I.3. The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative
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3.II. WHAT KANT SAYS ABOUT THE MORALITY OF LYING 3.II. WHAT KANT SAYS ABOUT THE MORALITY OF LYING
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3.II.1. The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) 3.II.1. The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
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3.II.2. Metaphysics of Morals (1797) 3.II.2. Metaphysics of Morals (1797)
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3.II.3. “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns” 3.II.3. “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns”
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3.II.4. Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of “On a Supposed Right . . . ” 3.II.4. Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of “On a Supposed Right . . . ”
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3.II.5. Lectures on Ethics 3.II.5. Lectures on Ethics
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3.III. DOES THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? 3.III. DOES THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG?
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3.IV. Does the Second Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is always Wrong? 3.IV. Does the Second Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is always Wrong?
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3.V. A ROSSIAN ARGUMENT FOR THINKING THAT LYING IS SOMETIMES MORALLY PERMISSIBLE 3.V. A ROSSIAN ARGUMENT FOR THINKING THAT LYING IS SOMETIMES MORALLY PERMISSIBLE
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Conclusions Conclusions
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ENDNOTES ENDNOTES
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3 Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying
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Published:April 2010
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Abstract
In several works, Kant claims that lying is always wrong, no matter what. He is probably the most well‐known defender of an absolute prohibition against lying in the history of Western philosophy. The chapter surveys what Kant says about lying in his writings. It is noteworthy that he never directly appeals to the categorical imperative in any of his arguments to show that lying is always wrong. The chapter argues that the universal law version of the categorical imperative does not imply that lying is always wrong – one can consistently will that everyone follows maxims or principles that sometimes permit lying. Korsgaard to the contrary, the second version of the categorical imperative, which says that we should never treat another person as a mere means, does not imply that lying is never permissible. The chapter contends that Korsgaard's arguments rest on contentious interpretations of several ambiguous passages in Kant. None of the versions of the categorical imperative commits Kant to an absolute prohibition against lying. Not only does Kant fail to give a compelling argument for an absolute prohibition against lying, there are positive reasons to reject his absolutism. The duty not to lie can conflict with other moral duties. If lying is always wrong no matter what, then the duty not to lie must always be more important than any conflicting duty. However, it is most implausible to hold that the duty not to lie is always more important than any conflicting duty. Kant's own example of lying to thwart the plans of a would‐be murderer is one of the best illustrations of this.
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