8 The Uneven Path to Recovery: The Sub-Saharan African Experience

The COVID-19 pandemic caused a major disruption to economic activity across the world. In sub–Saharan Africa (SSA), the containment measures, particularly the severe lockdowns, contributed to a significant economic downturn in many countries across the region, with subsequent major impacts on unemployment, poverty, and food insecurity. A global drop in commodity prices and demand from the main trading partners (including China, India, the United States, and several European countries), alongside stringent government response measures, had a devastating impact on the incomes of workers and their dependents. While the longer-term socio-economic impacts of the pandemic remain unclear, the pandemic’s impact on the labour market is a major issue of global concern.

In SSA, workplace and market closures, restrictions on mobility, the suspension of some activities, and the associated reduction in demand for goods and services resulted in a slowdown in production and caused a reduction in working hours and labour earnings. In some countries in the region, lockdown measures reduced business activity by more than half (Lakuma and Sunday 2020). This especially affected workers in the large informal sector, which accounts for 80 per cent of all non-agricultural employment in the region (ILO 2018). Real-time survey data collected in Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso suggests that, on average, by the end of April 2020, one out of four workers had lost their jobs and one out of two workers had experienced a decline in earnings. These findings furthermore indicate that informal workers were at higher risk as they generally rely on daily sales for their earnings, lack mechanisms for collective bargaining, and tend to be in activities that are contact-intensive and, thus, were most affected—particularly livelihood sources such as restaurants, tourism, small retail shops, hairdressers, and taxi drivers (Balde et al. 2020).

The policy measures taken to combat the adverse economic effects of the pandemic and respond to the economic crisis by SSA governments included a combination of measures to stabilize the economy via support to businesses and households (tax breaks, lowering of bank rates, loans to micro, small, and medium enterprises, MSMEs), cash and in-kind transfers to support households, and ‘moderate’ economic stimulus programmes. A notable challenge faced by SSA governments is that informal workers, who constitute a large proportion of the workforce on the continent, are often outside the reach of the state, making it difficult to enact the furlough schemes that Western governments undertook. While the spread of COVID-19 in SSA has been more limited compared to other developing regions, so far, the effectiveness of these policy responses in stimulating recovery in many SSA countries is uncertain.

In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of the pandemic, the subsequent policy responses, and the effectiveness of these early interventions in three SSA countries—Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa. The relief and stimulus packages in these countries, in particular, are of interest because the three countries rolled out very similar policies in different economies and labour markets. For instance, Ghana and Kenya have very high numbers of informal workers compared to South Africa (ILO 2018). The detailed country case studies for Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa are discussed in sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The conclusions are presented in section 5.

The first two cases of COVID-19 were reported in Ghana on 12 March 2020 by the health ministry. As a first response, on 15 March, all public gatherings were banned and all schools and universities were closed, and on 23 March, all of the country’s borders were closed. In the interest of public safety, a partial lockdown was introduced on 30 March in Accra, Tema, Kasoa, and Kumasi, which have been identified by the Ghana Health Service as ‘hotspot’ areas. This was lifted on 19 April. When lifting the partial lockdown, the President cited the country’s current capacity to trace, test, isolate and quarantine, and treat victims of the disease as one of the reasons for the decision. Mask-wearing was made mandatory for all.

The second phase of re-opening started on 1 August, lifting restrictions on the number of people in public gatherings and opening tourist sites. However, beaches, pubs, cinemas, and nightclubs remained closed. International flights resumed from 1 September, subject to enhanced COVID-19 protocols. Land and sea borders remained closed to human traffic. Figure 8.1 illustrates the stringency of policy measures that were in place in Ghana between January and November 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (see also Chen and Vanek, Chapter 2 in this volume). The stringency index shows the response level in the national subregion with the strictest policies (districts subject to lockdown regulations), and the grey shaded area indicates the lockdown period. The stringency index in November largely remained in place throughout 2021.

Considering the evolution of newly confirmed COVID-19 cases (see Figure 8.1), the Ghanaian government was quick to implement stringent measures when case numbers were still relatively low. The number of confirmed COVID-19 infections continued to escalate during the lockdown and increased exponentially after restrictions were lifted, reaching peak levels only in late July or early August 2020, after which the pandemic curve of the first infection wave flattened. The decision to lift the partial lockdown was largely influenced by mounting concerns regarding the severe economic burden that the restrictions posed, especially on the livelihoods of the urban poor, many of whom had, by that time, run out of money to buy food, due both to the hike in food prices and to the restricted possibilities to earn a living (Asante and Mills 2020).

As at the end of March 2023, the number of confirmed COVID-19 infections had risen to 171,412, whilst COVID-related deaths stood at 1,462. Accordingly, as of 25 March 2023, a total of 22,384,226 doses of COVID vaccines had been administered, representing 72 per cent of total doses administered per 100 population (WHO 2023).

The policy measures taken by the government of Ghana to combat the adverse economic effects of the pandemic are representative of what other SSA governments have also done in responding to the economic crisis—a combination of stimulus packages, cash and in-kind transfers, tax breaks, and loans to MSMEs. The government of Ghana rolled out the Coronavirus Alleviation Programme (CAP) to address the disruption in economic activities and the hardship of the people, and to rescue and revitalize industries. Some of these measures included:

Among these measures, the flagship CAP business support scheme was the major intervention mitigating the negative impact of COVID-19 on households and livelihoods and providing support to MSMEs. Out of the GH¢1.2 billion earmarked for this programme, GH¢600 million was to be disbursed as soft loans to SMEs, with up to a one-year moratorium and a two-year repayment period. The rate of interest on this facility was 3 per cent. Additionally, selected participating banks provided negotiated counterpart funding to the tune of GH¢400 million, making the facility worth, in all, GH¢1 billion for disbursement under this business support scheme, with the entire scheme initially expected to attract some 180,000 beneficiaries across the country. The funds were managed by the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) and supervised by a loan committee. The NBSSI reports that more than 450,000 applicants, representing MSMEs, registered for the fund, with 66 per cent of the applicants being female and 34 per cent male. All applicants were required to register for a tax identification number (TIN) with the Ghana Revenue Authority to enable them to access the COVID-19 Relief Fund. The beneficiary sectors included agribusinesses, manufacturing, water and sanitation, tourism and hospitality, education, food and beverages, technology, transportation, commerce and trade, health care and pharmaceuticals, and textiles and garments.

Although the rate of infections of COVID-19 in Ghana has been low compared to other countries, the policy responses rolled out by the Ghanaian government have had some effects on employment and incomes and seem to have put the country on a path of partial recovery in economic growth. For instance, Ghana’s economy grew by 5.4 per cent in 2021; this was a significant increase from the 0.4 per cent growth rate recorded in the full year of 2020 (GSS 2021).However, growth slowed to 3.2 per cent in 2022, and it is projected to slow further to 1.6 per cent in 2023. The agriculture and services sectors experienced slower growth, especially in 2022, than before. Higher inflation and interest rates depressed private consumption and investment, thereby slowing down employment. The policies targeted at reducing the hardships on households, such as reduction in cost of mobile money services, free food for individuals and households, and the free utility services (water and electricity), allowed many households and individuals who lost jobs and incomes to survive during the period. The COVID Relief Fund made various donations to communities to help them build back, especially when the lockdown was lifted.

The flagship CAP business support scheme implemented by the NBSSI seems to have revitalized many MSMEs across the country. It supported many SMEs, both formal and informal enterprises, including petty traders and hairdressers, among many others, and most importantly, sectors like tourism and hospitality, which were hit badly by the pandemic. An additional emergency programme, funded by the MasterCard foundation and administered by NBSSI, also effectively supported:

The nature of the partial lockdown and the swift implementation of CAP business support seems to have had some impact on the recovery in the labour market in Ghana. The country saw some green shoots in the labour market, given that many Ghanaians in the business sector were able to receive adequate support and capital to start working again. The recovery in employment up to August/September 2020 was strong, albeit uneven. As at September 2020, about 85.3 per cent of workers who had been employed in February 2020 were again observed to be working, and more importantly, the gap in employment rates between lockdown and no-lockdown districts had closed. The slower growth in 2022, coupled with high inflation (up from 10 per cent in 2021 to 31.5 in 2022), interest rate, and weakened government demand due to lack of access to capital markets and high debt service obligations resulted in decline in employment, a 0.05 per cent decrease from 2020. However, there was a concerning gender gap in employment recovery. Specifically, women were less likely than men to have resumed work, whilst workers who had been informally employed pre-pandemic were less likely to have resumed work compared to workers who had been in formal employment (see also Chen and Vanek, Chapter 2 in this volume). The argument is that these initial gains in August/September 2020 can be attributed to the policies adopted by the Ghanaian government, such as the timely lifting of the partial lockdown and the swift support to households and businesses. As of early 2023, gains in employment and earnings have remained partial and uneven, and the economic burden of the pandemic continues to fall on the most vulnerable (i.e. low-income earners in informal work and women), who were more likely to drop out of work in the early phases of the pandemic and saw a slower recovery in both employment and earnings (see details in Chen and Vanek, Chapter 2 in this volume). The current situation of high inflation and public debt crisis, and its attendant effect on retarding employment and incomes, indicate the need for protective measures that prevent the most vulnerable workers from being left behind in the crisis.

Kenya reported its first COVID-19 case on 13 March 2020. The country experienced four key waves of COVID-19 infections that peaked during the second and fourth quarters of 2020, around March–April 2021, and the third quarter of 2021 (Figure 8.2).

Following confirmation of the first case, the government moved swiftly to curb the spread of the pandemic. The starting point included standard measures such as encouraging regular hand washing, social distancing, suspension of public gatherings and events, the closure of learning institutions, and travel restrictions limiting entry to citizens and foreigners. International passenger flights were suspended effective 25 March 2020. Government offices and businesses were asked to allow staff to work from home, with the exception of employees working in critical or essential services.

As the number of confirmed cases increased, the suspension of public gatherings was extended to churches, mosques, and other religious gatherings. Bars and restaurants were directed to close. On 27 March, the President instituted a countrywide curfew from 7 p.m. to 5 a.m., excepting only critical and essential service providers. Furthermore, the wearing of face masks in public places was made mandatory. In addition, the government began to recruit additional health workers to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. To limit intracommunity transmission from urban to rural areas, the government imposed a temporary ban on movement in and out of the Nairobi metropolitan area and the most affected counties.¹

Over time, the intensification of containment measures was largely determined by the rate of spread and severity of infections. For instance, in June 2021, the infections started edging up again, mainly driven by an upsurge of cases in the Western Kenya region, attributable to the Delta variant. In response, 13 counties in the region were placed under partial lockdown up to 31 July 2021. The national curfew remained in force for over a year until 20 October 2021, with variations in curfew hours. Most of the containment measures were, however, done away with over time following the easing of infection rates.

As of the end of November 2021, total confirmed cases were 255,164, while the number of recorded fatalities stood at 5,335. A total of 2,839,918 tests had been conducted. Although the government launched a vaccination programme in March 2021, like most African countries, Kenya is still lagging behind in COVID-19 inoculations. This is partly attributable to the limited supply of vaccines, particularly during the first phase, coupled with the sluggish uptake. As of 30 November 2021, the number of people who had been vaccinated at least once stood at 7,175,590.² However, the majority (61.5 per cent) had only received the first jab. Only 2,759,827 people—about 5.6 per cent of the population—had been fully vaccinated. Total vaccines administered increased to 10,100,993 as of end of December 2021, while the number of people fully vaccinated increased to 4,206,106—8.5 per cent of the population. As of the end of December 2022, the number of confirmed cases was 342,499, while fatalities stood at 5,688.

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country, various policy response measures were undertaken by the government to protect incomes and cushion the economy from the adverse effects of the pandemic. On 25 March 2020, the President announced fiscal policy measures consisting of tax relief and other measures:

In addition, a COVID-19 Emergency Response Fund was established to receive donations from well-wishers, and the National Treasury was directed to utilize KES2 billion of recovered corruption proceeds and reallocate the travel budgets of state agencies to support the most vulnerable. Other measures included presidential directives to develop a welfare package for health-care professionals, an allocation of KES5 billion to support county governments, inauguration of a weekly support stipend to needy households in Nairobi on a pilot basis, and release of KES500 million that were in arrears to persons with severe disabilities.

With regard to monetary policy, the CBK lowered the central bank rate (CBR) from 8.25 per cent to 7.25 per cent and the cash reserve ratio (CRR) from 5.25 per cent to 4.25 per cent, thus effectively adopting an accommodative monetary policy stance to support the economy. The CBR was further lowered to 7 per cent. The maximum tenor of repurchase agreements (REPOs) was extended from 28 to 91 days to allow flexibility on liquidity management.⁴ By lowering the CRR, an additional liquidity of KES35 billion was made available to commercial banks to loan out to borrowers. Additionally, the CBK outlined commercial banks’ loans restructuring emergency measures in March 2020 to provide relief to borrowers, based on their individual circumstances arising from the pandemic. Furthermore, in a bid to facilitate increased use of mobile money transactions and curb the spread of the virus through cash handling, charges for mobile transactions up to Ksh.1,000 (about US$9) were waived, while transaction amounts and daily limits for mobile transactions were revised upwards. The CBK also revised the minimum threshold for submitting negative credit information on borrowers to credit reference bureaus and delisted borrowers previously blacklisted for loans of less than KES1,000. These types of small loans are mainly accessed by the low-income segments of the population when hard pressed to meet various needs.

In May 2020, the government unveiled an eight-point economic stimulus programme with an allocation of KES56.6 billion (US$540 million) in the 2020/21 financial year and a further KES23.1 billion (US$220 million) in 2021/22. The programme aimed to cushion vulnerable citizens and businesses, particularly those affected by the pandemic. The key sectors covered included the following:

The informal sector accounts for slightly over 80 per cent of total employment in Kenya. Following the adverse impacts of COVID containment measures, workers in the informal sector, casual labourers, and poor households were hard hit. Hence, there was need to provide some quick support to the socially and economically vulnerable households, particularly in densely populated settlements. This was implemented through the multi-agency COVID-19 cash transfer initiative, under which vulnerable households received a stipend of KES4,000 (US$37) per month to help them cope with the adverse effects of the pandemic. Support was prioritized for households in informal settlements with a high poverty index, where the head or breadwinner had a physical disability, was widowed, a minor (orphan or child-headed households), had pre-existing medical conditions such as cancer or HIV, had a mental health condition, and was not benefiting from other government support. The programme ran from April to November 2020 and, in its first phase, targeted 85,300 households in four counties—Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi, and Kwale—before being rolled out to more counties. However, there has been quite limited public documentation on the implementation and impact of the government COVID-19 cash transfer initiative.

The government’s multi-agency COVID-19 cash transfer initiative was complimented by emergency cash transfer programmes provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and some development partners in a bid to reach out to more vulnerable households. Between June and December 2020, a total of KES590,292,000 (about US$5.5 million) is reported to have been transferred by a consortium of NGOs⁵ to 29,400 families in Nairobi and Mombasa informal settlements (Oxfam International 2020). Compared to the government’s regular cash transfer programme, the NGO’s safety net programme covered slightly more needs and provided top-up payments to beneficiaries of the regular Inua Jamii⁶ to enable them to adequately cover basic needs in light of COVID-19 challenges.

The fiscal stimulus and social protection measures were severely constrained by the limited fiscal space and fell short of the huge stimulus packages unveiled by many developed countries. The containment measures and subdued economic activities adversely affected revenue performance amidst elevated COVID-19-related expenditures, ballooning public debt, a high wage bill, and budgetary allocations to the 47 county governments. Consequently, the fiscal space needed to provide a generous economic stimulus package and safety nets for the poor and vulnerable were limited. Moreover, most of the key policy response measures were short-lived. Not only were tax relief measures reversed in January 2021, but also some taxes were later adjusted upwards or subsequently introduced. The waiver of charges on the low-value mobile money transactions expired on 31 December 2020, while loan-restructuring measures expired in March 2021. In the absence of comprehensive information and data regarding the specific socio-economic outcomes, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the policy responses, particularly at the household level. Overall, while the supportive policy response and relief measures helped boost resilience and economic recovery, they remained limited in scope, coverage, and focus.

The Kenyan economy contracted by 0.3 per cent in 2020 following the adverse impact of the pandemic. The sectors that were most affected include the services sectors (especially education, wholesale, and retail trade) and accommodation and restaurants. However, following the lifting of the various COVID containment measures, the economy recovered strongly and recorded a growth of 7.5 per cent in 2021. Growth was largely supported by the recovery of the manufacturing and services sectors. The agriculture sector recorded a contraction of 0.2 per cent, largely due to adverse weather conditions. Some services sectors (such as education, information and communication, transport and storage, and finance and insurance) recovered relatively faster than others, such as the tourism sector—especially international tourism. Economic growth normalized at 5.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2022. However, the performance of the agriculture sector remained subdued owing to prolonged drought. Although total employment recovered from a contraction of 4.1 per cent in 2020 to a growth of 5.3 per cent in 2021, the rate of recovery was relatively higher for modern wage employment (6 per cent) compared with the estimated informal-sector employment (5.2 per cent).

Some of the financial-sector COVID response measures undertaken by the CBK, such as loan restructuring, were instrumental in facilitating continuity of business activities and aiding enterprises to remain afloat, particularly the MSMEs, which ordinarily tend to experience credit constraints. Besides helping to curb the spread of COVID infections, the emergency measures instituted to facilitate mobile money transactions led to a notable increase in mobile money usage, thus further boosting the country’s fairly advanced mobile financial services and the drive towards a cashless society. The use of mobile money saw an increase of 2.8 million additional customers. Most of the micro and informal activities are bound to have equally benefited, especially from the waiver of charges on low-value mobile money transactions and the increased digitization. Additionally, the introduction of CGS to de-risk lending benefited some of the MSMEs—a total of KES604.6 million (about US$6 million) had been disbursed by June 2021, with a guaranteed amount of KES151.2 million (CBK 2021).

The multi-agency COVID-19 cash transfer initiative was quite limited in coverage. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch (2021), the initiative provided support to less than 5 per cent of the socio-economically vulnerable families in Nairobi, and an even smaller percentage across the country. The report indicated a lack of transparency, awareness, and involvement of politicians that made the implementation process vulnerable to cronyism. Some of the beneficiaries reported receiving cash for only one or two months. The majority of the vulnerable households meeting the criteria did not benefit from the COVID-19 cash transfer programme. In the absence of a social registry with data on beneficiaries, the need to undertake new registration, targeting, and enrolment undermined the timeliness and efficient implementation of the social protection response (Wyatt and Guest 2021). By August 2020, the cash transfers made had not reached the caseload target. This is in spite of the convenience of using mobile money to effect the cash transfers, which also helped minimize physical mobility and contact.

In terms of comprehensiveness, the COVID-19 cash transfer programmes were generally limited to subsistence support, with no linkage to interventions that address additional risks that vulnerable households might face (Wyatt and Guest 2021). However, to the few beneficiaries, the social protection initiatives helped meet basic daily needs such as ability to buy food or increase the number of meals per day. Most of the recipients reported to have spent the money on food, with approximately 51 per cent of the grant provided being used to meet daily food needs. Similarly, 98 per cent of the respondents reported having spent part of the cash received to buy food (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Although the ‘Kazi Mtaani’ (urban public works programme) targeting the youth in urban informal settlements might have provided some reprieve, the coverage was quite limited in relation to the high unemployment among.⁷ Over 100,000 job opportunities are reported to have been created during the first year.⁸

Overall, the COVID-19 policy response and measures, though helpful in aiding economic recovery, were limited in scope, amount, and coverage and, hence, unlikely to have effectively addressed the more serious impacts on the lowest-income households and vulnerabilities of informal workers. The pandemic has provided key lessons, including the need to develop a robust social protection system. Additionally, safety net and economic stimulus packages during such crises should be gender-sensitive and well targeted to ensure they benefit the most affected. There is the need to maintain an updated comprehensive database of information and statistics that is vital for planning and identification of beneficiaries for targeted social protection.

The first COVID-19 positive case in South Africa was confirmed on 5 March 2020. Three weeks later, the government declared a national state of disaster and initiated one of the most severe lockdowns seen around the world (see also Rogan and Skinner, Chapter 4 in this volume). The adopted measures to mitigate and supress the spread of the virus included limiting contact between persons (social distancing), a travel ban on foreign nationals travelling from countries classified as ‘high risk’, quarantine for citizens returning from high-risk countries, health surveillance at ports of entry, and school closures. During the lockdown, movement was only permitted by health-care and essential-service workers. Wide-scale testing and tracing, with quarantine of confirmed cases, was put in place in an attempt to control the outbreak in the early phase of the pandemic.

In order to balance between the public health and economic crises brought about by the pandemic, the government initiated five alert levels, with varying levels of restrictions to be used in various waves of the pandemic. This ranged from Level 1 (no restrictions on economic activity and limited curfew) to Level 5 (all businesses closed except for essential services and no movement permitted without permission).

The alert levels were used in the country as cases surged or declined but ended in April 2022. Figure 8.3 shows a COVID-19 stringency index for South Africa with the various escalations and phasedowns of the alert levels. The index is a composite measure from various indicators, including school or workplace closure and travel restrictions (Hale et al. 2021).

Sixteen months after the first case in South Africa, the country reached 2.45 million confirmed cases, translating to 40,762 cases per million people (Ritchie et al. 2020). At the end of July 2021, the country had reached 75,000 coronavirus-related deaths and an estimated number of 227,000 excess deaths (Bradshaw et al. 2021; NICD 2021). A total of 360,000 COVID-19 hospital admissions have been recorded, with only 36 per cent of the adult population being fully vaccinated by the end of November 2021 (NICD 2021).

Lockdown was largely viewed as necessary to respond to the public health crisis. Beyond the very high levels of inequality and large numbers of poor, the South African population has a large number of people with suppressed immunity due to HIV, tuberculosis, and malnutrition. At the same time, it was acknowledged that the economic impact for the poor and most vulnerable would be devastating. Bassier et al. (2020) predicted that the extreme poverty rate among vulnerable households would almost triple without any intervention. The paper by Bassier et al. (2020) also showed that the extension of the existing child support grant would be an effective way to reach informal workers, who were otherwise largely out of reach of government support mechanisms.

As an immediate response, the government put in place several measures to reduce the economic impact when the lockdown was announced. Some measures were clearly articulated, while promises were made to create additional measures. Most of the measures were concentrated in the formal economy (see Ramaphosa 2020 for a full list of measures).

Price ceilings were introduced on many essential items and regulations put in place to prohibit unjustified price hikes and stockpiling by individuals. Several complaints of price gouging had been lodged and the police were asked to investigate cases across the country. To support the poor and vulnerable, the government set up a solidarity fund, which had ZAR3 billion in funds committed by the middle of 2021. The aim of the fund was to support the government’s response to combat the spread of the virus by assisting existing programmes and initiatives. In the early weeks of the lockdown period, the fund supported emergency food relief to distressed households across the country and other similar initiatives.

The government made existing social grants available a few days earlier than usual to alleviate congestion and maintain social distancing during collection of grants by recipients. This measure also provided recipients with an extended period to access their funds. Several measures were put in place to support businesses in distress. This included tax relief, funding support to SMEs, and extending the wage subsidy programme, allowing firms to retain a larger number of workers.

A secondary response to the pandemic was aimed at stabilizing the economy through supporting businesses and households to resume economic activity. In April, the president announced a social and economic support package amounting to 10 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) or ZAR500 billion. The funds were to be allocated in three areas: health, households, and businesses. Additional cash in the hands of poor individuals is critical to protect the poor and vulnerable in South Africa. The first measure was to use the country’s well-established, extensive social grant system to distribute additional support to households in need. The increase in the grants was intended to be temporary, lasting for a period of seven months.

Another measure was the creation of the COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (COVID grant). This new support mechanism was a temporary provision of assistance intended for individuals that were unable to meet their families’ most basic needs. The relief came in the form of food parcels, food vouchers, or cash. The relief was only intended for a short period of time but was extended through April 2021 and was recently reinstated after severe riots took place in the country. In order to support South African households, unemployment insurance via the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) was expanded. Employers were able to claim from the COVID-19 Temporary Employee/Employer Relief Scheme (TERS) and continue supporting workers’ wages. The COVID-TERS benefits were intended to be temporary but were extended until January 2021 and then further extended until April 2021.

A tertiary response to the pandemic has aimed to drive the recovery of the economy. Measures to stimulate demand and supply through interventions such as infrastructure-building programmes, the implementation of economic reforms, and other actions have been discussed to kickstart inclusive economic growth. While considering and implementing the broader economic recovery, initial interventions, such as the food parcel distribution, was increased. In early 2021, funds were made available to the tourism industry, and an official loan guarantee scheme was introduced to provide government-guaranteed bank loans to assist eligible businesses with operational expenses. The loan scheme was extended until July 2021 as there were several challenges to economic recovery.

The pandemic presented a distinct challenge to policymakers with respect to support for informal workers. Informal workers, and the households they support, were placed in a particularly severe situation during the initial, most stringent part of the lockdown, when informal food vendors were excluded from the essential services workforce. This informal workforce is often the only source of income for many households, ensuring that they stay above the poverty line. Furthermore, 70 per cent of households in townships usually source food from informal vendors (PLAAS 2020). The very nature of informality makes it difficult for governments to provide appropriate and timely relief. Close to 3 million people were working in the informal sector (around 18 per cent of total employment) in the months before the pandemic struck South Africa (see Rogan and Skinner, Chapter 4 in this volume). The COVID grant was intended to cover those not already included in the safety net of social grants and unemployment insurance, such as those in the informal sector. The COVID grant, in addition to the top up offered via the social grant system, was arguably the only protection provided to informal-sector workers.

It is perhaps too early, and challenging, to conclusively answer the question whether the particular mitigation strategies used in South Africa have resulted in lower infection rates, or fewer deaths, or boosted the paths to recovery. The emergence of new strains of the virus and delayed rollout of the vaccinations in South Africa are also understood to have affected the severity of the subsequent waves of the pandemic.

Several studies have been able to examine the effectiveness of the social protection policies enacted during the pandemic (see Benhura and Magejo 2020; Bridgman et al. 2020; Jain et al. 2020; Köhler et al. 2021). The general consensus from the evidence is that the policies were well intentioned, but many workers and household still fell through the safety net, pointing to inadequacy of the policies both in terms of scale and targeting. It is known that the safety net provided by pre-pandemic social policies did not reach all those that needed support. The pandemic makes clear the large holes in the social security safety net, and several research projects have been able to point to very specific groups of individuals who received very little or no support (see Köhler et al. 2021 for a detailed analysis).

Food insecurity and adult and child hunger increased alarmingly in the early stages of the pandemic, reversing the improvements from the past 20 years (Bridgman et al. 2020). No single policy is found to be responsible for reducing food insecurity during the pandemic; rather, a combination of the COVID-TERS, individuals returning to work, the COVID grant, return to the National Schools Nutrition Programme in July 2020, and public and private food assistance all played a role. Further research shows that, for 10 per cent of South African households, the only government grant received by the household was the COVID grant (Jain et al. 2020). The civil unrest in July 2021 in South Africa is testament to the serious hunger crisis faced by the vulnerable since much of the social support was suspended in April 2021.

Employment losses were most significant among women, those with lower levels of education, those in manual occupations, informal workers, and the poor (Jain et al. 2020). Wage decreases were seen for formally and informally employed workers, whereas informally employed men and urban area workers faced larger decreases. There have been large decreases in hours worked for both men and women in urban informal employment relative to formal employment (Benhura and Magejo 2020). Early in the pandemic, it was evident that informal workers had been locked out of the economy and that interventions needed to be scaled up and better targeted to informal workers (Rogan and Skinner 2020). Evidence shows that a small share of TERS recipients were informally employed (Köhler and Hill 2021). The programme targeted workers registered for UIF, typically in the formal sector. The evidence suggests that the TERS programme supported informal workers disproportionately affected by the lockdown. At the end of 2020, only one-third of jobs lost in the informal sector had been recovered (Köhler et al. 2021). At the same time, the government faced a challenging budget situation. The unemployment rate remained high, at 32.7 per cent, at the end of 2022. Efforts will need to continue until there is consistent evidence of economic recovery and stabilization in households.

This chapter discussed the evolution of the pandemic and containment measures and the policy responses as well as the effectiveness of the policies in Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa. All these countries confirmed the first COVID case in March 2020 and initiated more or less similar restriction measures such as lockdowns, travel restrictions, closure of schools, and curfews, among others, to contain the spread of the disease. The countries also came up with several policy measures to reduce the economic impact, especially when the lockdowns were introduced. Some initiatives were put in place to help highly vulnerable households and informal workers who dominate the labour market, particularly in Ghana and Kenya. To stabilize the economy, policies were initiated to support enterprises and businesses, particularly MSMEs. Some of the policies, particularly the economic stimulus packages, were also aimed at aiding the recovery of the economy.

Although, it is still too early to ascertain the effectiveness of these policies, it is clear from these case studies that there seems to be a strong but uneven recovery in employment and incomes following the relaxation of the stringent measures and support from policy interventions. In Ghana, although there was a rebound in economic growth in the third quarter of 2021, the recovery in employment is stronger for formal employment, whilst females and informal workers were less likely to resume work. In Kenya, the supportive policy and relief interventions helped to boost economic recovery, as demonstrated by the strong growth of 7.5 per cent in 2021, largely supported by services sectors. Growth normalized to 5.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2022. However, the employment and income effects of the pandemic are still being felt, especially among the youth, women, and workers in the informal sector. In South Africa, the recovery has been uneven: economic growth decreased by 1.3 per cent in the last quarter of 2022, following an increase in the third quarter. The economy only grew by 0.3 per cent from the pre-pandemic period, lagging behind the 3.5 per cent population growth over the same period. Whilst the rate and level of recovery in employment have been greater for formal employment, it has been very sluggish and uneven for informal workers, particularly women.

The employment situation in all three countries suggests a slow and uneven recovery for informal workers, particularly women, given lack of access to the cash transfers and other relief packages available during the pandemic. The Ghanaian case showed that informal workers were less likely to start work compared to workers who had been in formal employment. There is also a gender gap in the labour market recovery, where more men are able to start work compared to women. In Kenya, the limitation in scope, amount, and coverage of policy interventions and safety nets had adverse impacts on informal workers, including the youth. Although at the aggregate level employment recovered in 2021, the effects still linger, though they are difficult to quantify at the micro level, given limited detailed data on informal-sector employment. In South Africa, the rate of informal employment is still significantly lower than the pre-pandemic period. Particularly, the recovery in employment among women has only improved slightly since the third quarter of 2020. Within these countries, there is unevenness in the recovery of informal employment. It is also likely that the recovery of informal employment between these countries differs as the size of the informal sector and recovery measures differ across these countries.

The experiences from these countries show the difficulty in attempting to achieve the balance between protecting lives and sustaining livelihoods. It also highlights the challenge of designing targeted policies that ensure the most vulnerable are not being left behind. The pandemic has provided key lessons, including the need to develop a robust social protection system. Additionally, safety net and economic stimulus packages during such pandemics should be gender-sensitive and well coordinated to ensure that they benefit the most affected. Containment measures must be complemented by adequate relief to the poor and vulnerable in a quick, safe, and effective manner. In order to restore income and preserve livelihoods, income support, in the form of direct cash payments to those in need, are crucial. But more needs to be done to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on informal workers, particularly women. It is important for countries to develop measures to support workers in this segment of employment. Maintaining an updated comprehensive database of information and statistics is vital for planning and identification of beneficiaries for targeted social protection. There is, therefore, the need to build capacities across all the countries to deal with future shocks and pandemics.

The pandemic is not over yet, and hence, access to vaccines to boost herd immunity remains central to stronger recovery. Furthermore, the emergence of other global shocks, including the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022 and elevated inflation in advanced economies, has slowed recovery. It is time for the world to continue showing solidarity with the needy and most affected since pandemics know no boundaries.