In July 1990, a troubled Hubert Védrine, François Mitterrand's strategic adviser and spokesman, wrote to Zbigniew Brzezinski. He was frustrated with an interview that the former U.S. national security adviser under Jimmy Carter had given to a leading French daily newspaper a few days before. In the interview (Moscow had just given its final green light to German unification by accepting that Germany would remain a full North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member), Brzezinski, a widely respected pundit, had declared that “for many years, we have known that the end of the Cold War would make two winners: the United States and Germany, and two losers: the Soviet Union and France.”1 Responding to what in his eyes was a “debatable” viewpoint “to say the least,” Védrine argued that France, since General de Gaulle in the 1960s and under...

Article PDF first page preview

Article PDF first page preview
Article PDF first page preview
You do not currently have access to this article.