https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3940-7575
In an interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur in January 1998, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recounted that “according to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until now, is quite different: Indeed, it was on July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.” This admission—corroborating previous disclosures by the CIA’s Charles Cogan and Robert Gates—was quite innocuous on its own, but Brzezinski was further quoted alleging that “on that day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention.” He admitted that the administration had “knowingly increased the probability” that the Soviets would intervene militarily, and maintained that he had no regrets as the “secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.” He added that on the “day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, in essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam War,’” and boasted that “for almost ten years, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for the regime, a conflict that led to the demoralization and ultimately the breakup of the Soviet empire.”1
These revelations received relatively little attention at the time but gained new importance after 9/11. The fact that the terrorist attacks were hatched from within Afghanistan led to a surge in interest in the origins of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and the emergence of a “blowback” argument that asserted that CIA efforts to “bleed” the Soviets in Afghanistan had bred the militant Islamists who later “turned their sights on their former benefactor.”2 Much criticism has been levied on the Carter administration for its role in authorizing the initial covert aid program, and Brzezinski received particular vilification for allegedly masterminding a strategy designed to provoke the Soviet invasion and ensnare Moscow in a Vietnam-style quagmire. Based almost solely on the French interview (as well as Brzezinski’s hawkish reputation, and the circumstantial fact that U.S. support antedated the invasion), this “Afghan trap” thesis purports that Brzezinski is responsible for precipitating the four decades of conflict and instability that continues to consume Afghanistan today.3 Some historians have taken a more prudent approach by dismissing Brzezinski’s claims as “an example of self-ingratiation run amuck” and “after-the-fact boasting designed to advance his own reputation” by wresting some credit for the USSR’s dissolution away from Carter’s successors.4 Yet, the myth has filtered uncritically into the works of several reputable historians, and there have been few academic studies that deal with the topic in any comprehensive detail, resulting in abridged characterizations, misinterpretations, and assumptions, largely based on Brzezinski’s reputation.5
The French interview has had a major impact on the historiography, being used as the almost sole basis to prove the existence of a concerted effort to lure Moscow into the “Afghan trap.” There are, however, significant problems with it as an historical source. First, the title is deceptive. It reads (in translation): “The revelations of a former adviser to Carter: ‘Yes, the CIA came into Afghanistan before the Russians …’” Quotation marks and ellipsis indicate that this is a direct quote from Brzezinski and implies CIA operations inside Afghanistan before December 1979, which does not fit with the historical record. Although insisting on the accuracy of the interview, the journalist has since conceded that the quote in the title was not actually from Brzezinski but was “invented” by the editors, which casts doubt on the subsequent text.6 Secondly, the published remarks were heavily edited and Brzezinski has denied the article’s accuracy on numerous occasions, asserting that it was “not an interview, but excerpts from an interview that was originally supposed to be published in full but which they never checked with me for approval in the form that it did appear.”7 It is also likely a casualty of translation—being conducted in English, translated and printed in French, and reconverted to English—with the original statements becoming skewed and distorted in their edited and translated form. Additionally, many of the interview’s claims are unsupported by documentary evidence. For example, Brzezinski has denied he ever sent a note claiming the covert aid would “lead to a Soviet military intervention,” and no such note, nor references to it, has ever been found. Nowhere else has Brzezinski ever referred to a systematic plan for the “Afghan trap” and neither in his subsequent actions, writings, interviews, or public remarks on the topic has he shown any satisfaction that his strategy had worked. It is highly questionable that Brzezinski would attempt to bolster his reputation and disclose information on a secret plan to ensnare Moscow in an Afghan quagmire in just one foreign interview and then subsequently and repeatedly deny it. The editing, translation, inventions, and lack of final approval and corroborating documentation generates doubts on the accuracy of the words attributed to Brzezinski and, ultimately, if this one unreliable interview is discounted there is very little legitimate evidence to back up the “trap” thesis.
With the release of declassified archival material from the Carter Library, and the recent Foreign Relations of the United States volume on Afghanistan, it is now possible to reconstruct the decision-making process and development of the covert action program.8 This article will demonstrate that the “trap” thesis has little basis in fact. First, U.S. assistance for the Afghans was extremely limited and non-lethal in 1979, and the planning process reveals significant caution rather than an effort to induce an invasion. Military support options were discussed by the National Security Council (NSC) but consistently rejected as potentially offering Moscow justification for overt military intervention. Second, U.S. policies were almost wholly reactive and developed in response to the Soviets’ escalating military presence at a time of declining American influence in the Persian Gulf/South Asian region. Third, a Soviet invasion was not something desired or welcomed by the administration as it clashed with other priorities in 1979, having strategic implications and political consequences for Carter’s upcoming re-election campaign. Brzezinski’s actions through 1979 exhibited a meaningful effort to dissuade Moscow from intervening through publicizing the Sovietization of Afghanistan and warning of the adverse effects of military involvement. His post-invasion memos reveal concern, not opportunity, which belies the claim that inducing an invasion was his objective. Finally, the Soviet decision to intervene was undertaken primarily for political reasons related to the distrust of President Hafizullah Amin, and not as a result of an urgent military need to prevent the collapse of Kabul. Consideration of Washington’s reaction was minimal and U.S. policies were largely peripheral to the ultimate decision. In sum, a Soviet military intervention was neither sought nor desired by the Carter administration, and the covert program initiated in the summer of 1979 is insufficient to charge Carter and Brzezinski with actively attempting to ensnare Moscow in the “Afghan trap.”
Covert Action Planning
Following the April 1978 Saur Revolution, which brought the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power, the Carter administration adopted an optimistic “wait-and-see” approach towards the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The United States recognized Nur Mohammad Taraki’s new regime on May 6, conducted normal relations, and continued the existing economic aid program to “avoid driving the new regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might wish.”9 Brzezinski later defended the administration’s cautious response: “What could we have done? It was an internal coup, there was no evidence of Soviet involvement, and hence, there were no grounds for an American protest. The regime was undefined and unconsolidated; there was doubts as to whether it could hold power. As long as we could have some influence in Kabul, why cut off aid? It was better to wait and see how things turned out.”10 Although the idea of covertly making it “difficult for the new regime to consolidate its power” was raised soon after the coup, the NSC’s Thomas Thornton reported that the CIA was “unwilling to consider covert action.”11 Brzezinski relayed to Carter that “Covert action is not appropriate at this time,” but that “intelligence collection priorities and capabilities” would be reviewed.12 During the summer, the CIA began to assess the viability of the burgeoning anti-government groups and compiled two detailed evaluations, which Thornton forwarded to Brzezinski in mid-July. The CIA counted six occasions in which anti-government groups approached U.S. officials for assistance.13 It was the view of both State and CIA that “no official encouragement” be given to “coup plotters,” but that “contact be maintained for intelligence collection purposes.”14 In his covering note, Thornton wrote: “I guess the question of giving a helping hand is out of the question and am doubtful that we should in any event; the result would likely be an invitation for massive Soviet involvement.”15
Although publicly maintaining a position of nonalignment, it soon became clear that the DRA was drawing increasingly close to Moscow, and Brzezinski became progressively “concerned that [recent events] are the prelude for Soviet domination of Afghanistan and use of Afghanistan as a base for destabilization.”16 He reported to Carter in early November that “Soviet activities in Afghanistan have increased significantly in recent months. The Soviet presence has more than doubled since the coup. Soviet military advisers are now occupying positions in the Ministry of Defense and in divisional and corps commands which were [previously] filled by Afghan personnel. In addition, seven military aid protocols, one large military aid agreement—calling for the Soviets to deliver an estimated $257 [million] worth of equipment—and approximately 40 economic agreements have been concluded.”17 The signing of a twenty-year Afghan-Soviet “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation” on December 5 seemed to confirm Brzezinski’s suspicions. Although containing no explicit defense commitment, article 4 called for both governments to “consult with each other” and “take the necessary steps to safeguard the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.”18The Washington Post concluded that “the treaty in effect confirms Moscow’s dominance of the Taraki government.”19 Little was done, however, to directly engage the situation and there remained little consensus for action until a series of critical turning points necessitated a more active Afghan policy in 1979.
The Iranian Revolution and the strategic loss of a stalwart pillar of U.S. influence in the region had a significant bearing on attitudes towards Afghanistan. The advent of a fully-fledged Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul had much greater consequence for U.S. regional interests after January 1979 than it had in April 1978.20 Brzezinski tasked Thornton with getting a “clearer appraisal of local and regional dynamics” during his mid-January trip to South Asia.21 After meeting with then-Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin, Thornton sensed a “basic hostility” towards the United States and concluded that “this was not a regime that we could do much business with.”22 Brzezinski reported to Carter that the DRA “would be delighted to receive American aid but was quite unprepared to take any account of our interests in return,” and cautioned that a decision would have to be made on “the question of whether we can continue an aid program there in light of legislative restrictions on aid to Communist countries.”23 Professor William Griffith, an NSC consultative adviser, went further, recommending “U.S. endorsement of arms support of rebels” in Afghanistan to “contain, and if possible to reverse, Soviet gains” and “U.S. losses in Iran.”24 Commenting on Griffith’s memo, Thornton expressed reservations about supporting dissidents and recounted “inconclusive” discussions with State and CIA representatives about such support. Although noting that a successful insurgency could preoccupy the DRA, which would be less able to stir up trouble in neighboring Pakistan, it was judged that the insurgency, even if extended, was unlikely to directly threaten the government, which would undoubtedly turn to Moscow for more help, in turn greatly increasing the Soviet role. U.S. support would simply stimulate significant bloodshed for little gain. There would be “a lot of fighting, the government will be distracted, the Soviets will get more involved, but overall the odds are against it having much effect on the strategic outcome.” Thornton concluded that, given the “problems we might have ‘consulting’ with Congress on this,” the consensus was to “keep hands off.” He nonetheless suggested that the matter be kept under review, and the Pakistanis and Saudis not be discouraged from “keeping their hand in to the extent they see desirable.”25
The kidnapping and murder of Ambassador Adolph “Spike” Dubs on February 14 led to the first significant reorientation of policy and marked the end of the “wait-and-see” approach. Dubs was kidnapped off the street by four unidentified terrorists and held in Hotel Kabul for four hours. He was eventually killed in the crossfire when Afghan security forces stormed the hotel room, despite repeated calls from U.S. officials for patience and “extreme discretion.”26 Carter “thought the Afghanistan officials, advised by Soviets, were too peremptory in their showdown with weapons and probably caused the death of our ambassador.”27 The failure of the DRA to show restraint, take responsibility, or even express sincere regret for the tragedy led to a reassessment of Washington’s posture towards Kabul.28 The “incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate” DRA account of the episode and the lack of cooperation with the subsequent U.S. investigation led to frustration with the Afghan authorities and a marked deterioration in relations.29 Aid was severely reduced, and a replacement ambassador was not appointed. But it also had a deeper policy impact. A week after Dubs’ murder Brzezinski requested a “coherent and systematic plan for Afghanistan” from the NSC’s intelligence coordinator Paul Henze. Among the questions Brzezinski wanted addressed were: “Should we help any insurgents? What would be required? With whom would we have to work? How likely are the Pakistanis to be effectively helpful? What will be the chances of success, and how would success be defined?”30 Henze followed up five days later, stressing that it was impossible to develop the requested plan due to only “fragmentary” knowledge of “Afghanistan and of Afghan groups abroad opposed to the present regime.” He suggested “remedying this deficiency” in knowledge as the first step, and added further questions to be considered: “Do we simply want to harass the present regime and prevent its consolidation? Do we want to replace it with something else? What? What kind of resources in what amounts are we willing to commit to supporting a regime more to our liking?”31
In early March, the CIA forwarded a covert action options paper to the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the NSC.32 The paper was characterized as “not a set of concrete proposals” but rather a range of options from radio broadcast and propaganda support, financial or non-lethal “humanitarian” assistance, through to the “sponsorship of large-scale insurgency to bring about a change in government in power in Kabul.” The paper noted that the “tribal insurrection cannot directly bring down the central government” as the “insurrectionists are poorly armed and lack money, medical facilities and ammunition” and do not “appear to be receiving more than token assistance from external sources.” “Left to its own devices, the insurrection will probably peter out,” but “actively stimulated, it conceivably could” spur “recalcitrant tribal elements” and “politically uncommitted army officers” to assume “belligerent postures towards Kabul’s control.” In a covering memo, Brzezinski’s special assistant Karl Inderfurth noted that the “principal deficiency” of the paper was that “it gives only a vague impression of CIA’s capabilities,” with the agency likely unequipped to implement many of the proposed options. He recommended, therefore, improving “operational intelligence collection as an essential first-step toward planning more concrete programs.”33 The SCC, chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron, met on March 6 to discuss the options. It resulted in the CIA being instructed to “provide more detailed proposals” and a second “more detailed paper on possibilities for covert action.”34
Despite these important steps the consensus for an active role nonetheless remained limited. State and CIA showed little enthusiasm and Thornton reported that at “present reading there seems little we can do directly in Afghanistan.”35 Henze also offered his impression that Carter would be “unwilling to support serious intervention in Afghanistan or any similar situation,” and complained that the CIA’s capacity to “plan and implement covert action” in Afghanistan was “extremely limited.”36 Brzezinski relayed to Vice President Walter Mondale that the “ability to exploit the situation in Afghanistan” was constrained “since we have very few instrumentalities available there,” and conceded that there “does not seem much likelihood that we will be able to play a significant role.” The “unclear situation” meant that by mid-March it was “by no means certain that there would be a basis for American involvement.”37
The serious anti-communist revolt in the western city of Herat in mid-March changed everything. Hitherto, the insurgency was limited to sporadic and localized outbreaks in response to the enforcement of radical reforms. Herat, however, was the “first important anti-regime fighting within a major urban area” and demonstrated a widespread popular repudiation of the PDPA, and a clear anti-Soviet bent.38 For several days the defecting 17th Infantry Division of the Afghan Army joined with dissidents to take control of the city and launch a jihad against the godless communist officials and their Soviet advisers. Taraki and Amin appealed to Moscow for help. While the Soviet leaders conceded that “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan,” they rejected the calls for deployment of Soviet combat troops at this time.39 Moscow nonetheless greatly increased its Afghan investment over the ensuing weeks through enhanced military equipment, support, and advisers.40
Herat led to a shift in attitude in Washington and the consensus began to slide towards a more active role. The CIA reported that the insurgencies have “now grown into serious threats to the survival of the Soviet-backed regime,” and Moscow could “face a dilemma if—despite expanded assistance—the situation deteriorates to the point where only massive Soviet military intervention could save the Afghan Marxists.” It was assessed, however, that the “Soviets would be most reluctant to introduce large numbers of ground forces into Afghanistan to keep in power an Afghan Government that had lost the support of virtually all segments of the population.”41 Brzezinski’s concerns over the Soviets’ growing involvement led him to raise “the matter repeatedly with the President, most frequently at [his] morning national security briefing,” and the covert planning process began to greatly accelerate from late-March.42 Most importantly, as a follow-up to the March 6 meeting, Aaron chaired a “historic ‘mini-SCC’” on March 30.43 The key issue debated was whether it was in Washington’s “interest to see the dissidence in [Afghanistan] continue and whether we should be prepared to try and support it in some fashion.” Brzezinski reported to Carter that “preliminary indications” were that “State, Defense, and CIA all believe that the insurgency is in our interest and should be encouraged depending on the costs and risks involved.”44 Indeed, Under Secretary of State David Newsom, who was representing the State Department, agreed that Washington should try to reverse the growing Soviet presence to demonstrate to regional allies the administration’s resolve to stop the expansion of Soviet influence. He added, however, that it was not clear how possible it would be to reverse the current trend or how Moscow would react and warned that efforts could have a converse impact on the region by leading to increased Soviet involvement. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocombe raised the question of whether there was any merit in keeping the insurgency going and “sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire,” and Aaron concluded by asking whether there was “an interest in maintaining and assisting the insurgency, or is the risk that we will provoke the Soviets too great?” Aaron added that if the interest were there then Washington would need to consult with others, especially Pakistan, and be prepared to make a limited commitment. No decisions were made but State was directed to develop the “articulation” of policy, while CIA was tasked with formulating a paper on possible Soviet reactions in preparation for the first cabinet-level interagency SCC meeting on April 6.45
While exploring the options in the spring of 1979, the CIA began to make contact with the Pakistanis and Saudis, both of whom feared for regional stability following the recent events. Intelligence reports indicated that Islamabad was making little effort to limit rebel activity within its borders but was not yet actively supporting the insurgency. President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq believed that “without a firm commitment” from Washington, Pakistan “could not risk Soviet wrath.”46 The United States-Pakistan relationship, which had developed in the early Cold War, was on the decline through the 1970s as Iran and Saudi Arabia became the twin pillars upholding U.S. regional interests. By 1979, bilateral relations were at their lowest ebb as the Carter administration denounced Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions, poor human rights record, and lack of democratic freedoms. The events in Iran and Afghanistan, however, increased the geopolitical importance of Pakistan and required a modification of policy—something Zia no doubt recognized. Relations gradually improved through 1979 and 1980—mainly in the field of intelligence cooperation—when Pakistan became a “front-line state” in the containment of Soviet expansionism.47 Relations with Saudi Arabia similarly developed through a Cold War lens. Although oil was a major impetus, the relationship was largely built on a shared interest in countering the spread of Soviet influence. The Carter administration continued and expanded the relationship, authorizing the sale of sixty highly-prized F-15 fighter jets to Riyadh in May 1978.48 As with Zia, the Saudi government was withholding support for the Afghan insurgents in early 1979, but was reportedly “very much impressed” by their successes and was considering officially approaching Washington to aid them.49
Several papers were prepared for the SCC, including a more detailed covert options paper outlining “specific proposals for support of Afghan dissidents and insurgents” as well as “rough cost estimates and a summary of pros and cons for each.” The nine options included: a small-scale propaganda campaign publicizing Soviet activities in Afghanistan; indirect financial support through third-party intermediaries; direct financial support via Afghan émigrés as conduits; non-lethal material support (communications equipment and medical supplies); lethal arms supplies; and a range of training and unconventional warfare support options. The paper noted that non-lethal “humanitarian assistance” would allow the CIA to establish a network with the Afghans—“and thus [be] better able to influence events”—and “once a supply channel to the rebels is established, it later could be used, if desired, to provide them with other types of material including lethal equipment.” It warned, however, that the lethal material and training support options would deepen U.S. involvement in the conflict, decrease the possibilities of plausible deniability, and may “provoke vigorous Soviet countermeasures.”50
The CIA paper on possible Soviet reactions echoed these concerns. The paper maintained that covert action would not prevent Moscow from keeping Taraki in power and external interference would be used to justify the Soviets’ deepening involvement. Moscow, however, would blame external interference anyway and “successful covert action” would “raise the costs to the Soviets of larger and more visible increments in their role” and “inflame Moslem opinion in many countries against the USSR.” Although there was “an insufficient basis to judge in which direction” Moscow was “leaning on the subject of combat intervention,” the CIA saw little risk of “vigorous” Soviet counteraction in response to financial, broadcast, and non-lethal support, but again judged that a “substantial covert aid program” could raise the stakes and induce the Soviets to “intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended.”51
The SCC, chaired by Brzezinski, met on the morning of April 6 to consider the options. After a “detailed discussion” and what Brzezinski referred to as a “forceful pep talk” by Mondale, “mercilessly squelching the rather timid opposition of David Newsom, who was representing the State Department,” there was general agreement on the need for an active role, but many members remained cautious and reluctant. Upon Brzezinski’s urging, a recommendation was made to first explore with Islamabad the feasibility of radio broadcasts into Afghanistan, financial assistance to selected insurgent groups, and “an effort to assess the insurgent movement from the viewpoint of providing training and material assistance.” If the Pakistanis “are not willing to cooperate, [they would] not do it,” but if they responded positively, the CIA would be directed to draw up an intelligence finding for Carter’s signature.52
During the summer, as the insurgency continued to spread, rebel leaders again contacted CIA officers to appeal for assistance. CIA Director Stansfield Turner reported this to Brzezinski and “recommended that we do what we could to get the Pakistanis to move unilaterally.”53 The CIA reported that Zia had approved a covert aid program on May 18 and the Pakistanis were prepared to “continue their support to Afghan tribal rebels” and to “keep open the option for expanded support, depending on the rebels’ fortunes in the next few months.”54 Concurrently, the Chinese indicated that they would be willing to support the insurgents. Observing the “turbulent situation,” CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci advocated the covert action finding be promptly signed and realized.55
On June 26, Brzezinski chaired another SCC meeting on Afghanistan. Turner summarized CIA activities since April, stating that contact with rebels had been established in Pakistan and that the CIA judged funding for food, clothing, and medical supplies to be “critical if opposition to the Taraki regime is to be sustained throughout the winter.” A consensus emerged to approve five steps, including authorization for “psychological operations” through radio broadcasts into Afghanistan from a third country; unilateral “material support” of “cash payments to the insurgents”; expansion of “psych efforts to support the insurgency and to unite the Afghan dissidents”; provisions of “humanitarian aid” through third countries; and encouragement of Saudi funding for similar covert projects. A sixth step “to provide limited military supplies” was not considered. The CIA was tasked with drafting a presidential finding “with as much flexibility built into the plan as possible.”56
On July 3, Carter signed two findings. The first provided authorization to “support insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establish radio access to the Afghan population through third-country facilities”; and “provide unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to Afghan insurgents, either in the form of cash or non-military supplies.” The second authorized the tasking or encouragement of “the network of agents or other contacts in foreign countries to provide non-attributable propaganda, or related actions” to “expose the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its leadership as despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union,” and to “publicize efforts by the Afghan insurgents to regain their country’s sovereignty.”57 The CIA was authorized to expend up to $695,000, of which $575,000 was drawn by mid-August.58 Officers from the Near East South Asia Division imported cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), who then distributed them to the insurgents. Unilateral assets also separately transferred funds into Afghanistan and to exiles abroad.59
Beyond the use of the French interview, seemingly the primary basis for the “trap” thesis comes from the circumstantial fact that Carter’s authorization of the covert program predated the overt Soviet intervention in December and that the objective was to draw the Soviets in. However, by mid-1979 the Soviets were “injecting their forces into Afghanistan” and “already had political control over Afghanistan.”60 As Brzezinski monitored their intensifying “creeping intervention,” he was convinced that Moscow would continue to expand its influence until a de facto invasion had taken place. The purpose of the covert program was not to draw the Soviets in (as in Brzezinski’s view they were already in) but to halt any temptation to expand out from Afghanistan, which could potentially take place if they easily consolidated their position there.61 Due to the weaknesses of Pakistan and Iran, Washington’s declining influence in the region, and the evident dissatisfaction of the Afghan people towards the DRA, giving some limited aid to the insurgents seemed justified. Yet the program was carefully calibrated to avoid provoking Moscow. The decision-making process demonstrated caution, rather than an effort to induce an invasion. The risks in aiding the insurgency—increased dependence of the DRA on Moscow and an augmented Soviet presence—were carefully considered before the decision was taken, with the CIA concluding that a substantial covert aid program could result in a forceful Soviet intervention. As a result, the SCC rejected the military options and decided only on limited funding for propaganda, psychological operations, and humanitarian assistance. The initial decisions were also taken at a time when the direct introduction of Soviet combat troops was deemed highly unlikely.62 U.S. assistance was largely insignificant in the larger context of the insurgency and particularly trivial relative to the tens of millions of dollars in military aid provided by Moscow to the DRA. The primary significance of this small-scale aid was in creating constructive links with dissidents through Pakistan’s ISI that could be utilized in the case of an overt Soviet intervention, and not in its responsibility for inducing the invasion. The small-scale covert program that developed in response to the increasing Soviet influence was part of a contingency plan if the Soviets did intervene militarily, as Washington would be in a better position to make it difficult for them to consolidate their position, but not designed to induce an intervention.
The limits of the aid were noted in Washington, Islamabad, and Riyadh, with mounting pressure for increases through the fall of 1979. Beginning in August, the ISI cautioned that the insurgency was not self-sustaining, and Zia began pressing for more U.S. assistance, including military equipment.63 Afghan rebels also continued their appeals, which led to a debate about whether to augment assistance. On September 20, an interagency meeting convened in Thornton’s office to “produce a list of options on Afghanistan for the President to consider.” Thornton said that after Amin’s ousting of Taraki on September 14, prospects for large-scale Soviet military intervention had increased, which produced fears of the consequential impact on SALT II ratification. Diplomatic action would be required to prevent or counter such an eventuality. The resulting paper, however, cautioned against any military assistance to insurgents before an overt Soviet intervention.64 National Intelligence Officer for the USSR Arnold Horelick similarly argued that it would be “unwise” to provide military equipment until the fact of a Soviet combat role was blatantly visible and widely known and accepted. Horelick warned that providing lethal equipment would be used by Moscow to justify an intervention.65
On October 4 Brzezinski and Turner “discussed the Afghan situation.” Noting that the funds authorized in July had been dispersed, Brzezinski “suggested we come in for more.” Turner countered that “all the signs were that only arms were really wanted at this point.”66 Nonetheless, Turner urged the Directorate of Operations to “get moving in providing more financial support, communications and other help to the insurgents,” and requested proposals for supplementary aid.67 They responded with “several enhancement options” that “followed … naturally on the actions that had already been undertaken as a result” of the July findings. These included an approach to Saudi intelligence to provide coordinated support and funding for the insurgency; tactical military communications equipment (transceivers and walkie-talkies) for the insurgents via Pakistan or Saudi Arabia; $772,000 in funds for the Pakistanis to purchase lethal military equipment for the insurgents; and a comparable amount of lethal equipment provided directly from CIA stocks for distribution to insurgents via Pakistan.68 These options were taken up by the SCC on October 23. At the meeting, State came out against any additional aid, with Newsom suggesting that “all further actions supporting the Afghan rebels be deferred until spring so that we could see how the insurgency fared through the winter months.” All others, however, felt that the “need to act now was urgent.” Brzezinski stressed, in particular, the “political importance of demonstrating to Saudi Arabian leaders that we were serious in opposing Soviet inroads in Afghanistan,” and that a “substantial commitment of assistance on our part” would likely result in “increased Saudi willingness to provide support.” CIA representatives pointed out that delays were inevitable but that decisions made now “greatly improved the possibility that some of our aid could reach rebel forces in time to help them through the strains of winter.” The SCC unanimously endorsed additional nonlethal aid and recommended Carter sign an amendment to the July findings to “provide support, either directly or through third countries, to the Afghan insurgents in the form of cash, non-military supplies, communications equipment and procurement advice.”69
Carter’s “preference” was to “have the consultations with the Saudis (& perhaps Paks) first” before committing to a finding, and Brzezinski directed Turner to “take soundings with Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies on their intentions for covert action.” Turner understood that Brzezinski “wanted to know what the degree of their commitment would be were we to join them in such endeavors.” Turner’s reply on November 5 assessed that “Pakistan will cooperate in covert action” and “can be counted on for operational support for joint efforts, but cannot be looked upon to take the lead or to supply resources.” Saudi Arabia was “concerned about what they perceive as a lack of U.S. will to engage in political action and they are not sanguine that we will become involved to any significant extent” but “appear willing to put up resources once we make a firm commitment.” As a result, Turner recommended Carter sign the amended finding and that the CIA be authorized to inform Riyadh that Washington expects “them to put up at least as much.” Carter did so on November 7.70
Again, the provision of lethal weapons was not seriously considered, but the idea gained traction towards the end of the year as the likelihood of Soviet military intervention increased. A November 20 Department of Defense paper called for “a more aggressive covert action policy” and an increase in aid to the insurgents to $5 million to “ensure that the Soviets do not win and to ensure the fall of the Amin regime.” Commenting on the paper, Slocombe came out in favor of expanded “funds for arms and facilitating services to locate them and get them there.”71 Brzezinski’s military assistant William Odom similarly recommended stepping up support.72 With the “evidence of movement” of Soviet military forces detected near Afghanistan’s borders, the SCC resolved on December 17 to “explore with the Pakistanis and British the possibility of improving the financing, arming and communications of rebel forces to make it as expensive as possible for the Soviets to continue their efforts.”73 This likely meant increased financing of arms purchases rather than direct arms support, but the initiatives were not undertaken until after the invasion began, and no weapons were directly supplied before January 1980. On December 28, the day after Soviet Spetsnaz assassinated President Amin, Carter signed a new finding to supply “lethal military equipment either directly or through third countries to the Afghan opponents of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,” and to provide “selective training, conducted outside of Afghanistan, in the use of such equipment either directly or via third country intermediation.”74 The first U.S.-supplied weapons (single-shot, bolt-action, World War I-era .303 Lee Enfield rifles) arrived in Pakistan on January 10, 1980, and were distributed to insurgent groups, marking the beginning of a new phase in the covert program.75
Responding to Moscow’s “creeping intervention”
While the administration identified some quantifiable gains that could be extracted from a Soviet invasion—particularly propaganda opportunities in inflaming Islamic sentiment against Moscow, and away from Washington—any attempt to actively induce an intervention would have run counter to U.S. interests and is a further reason to doubt the “trap” thesis (and most frequently cited by former administration officials).76 A Soviet military presence within 300 miles of the Persian Gulf could threaten the oil supplies that the United States, Japan, and Western Europe were increasingly dependent on, and expose the region to further Soviet penetration. Beginning in May 1979, Brzezinski reminded Carter of “Russia’s traditional push to the south, and briefed him specifically on Molotov’s proposal to Hitler in late 1940 that the Nazis recognize the Soviet claims to pre-eminence in the region south of Batum and Baku.” He noted that Baluchi tribes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran had long agitated for a separate Baluchi state, and warned that the cause of a separate Baluchistan could be used to justify an advance into Pakistan and Iran and fulfill the “age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean.”77 Brzezinski cautioned that a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan could allow Moscow to gradually exert its influence over much of the region by implementing a process of “Finlandization” by which regional states, frightened by the presence of the Red Army and the threat of political subversion, could adopt a more compliant relationship with the USSR. He was particularly worried about Pakistan and Iran, as two highly important, vulnerable, and exposed states that were increasingly at odds with Washington. With Iran destabilized there would be no “firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean,” and Islamabad could acquiesce to “some form of external Soviet domination.”78 Most worryingly, if Soviet influence extended directly into Iran it would, in Brzezinski’s view, “be the most massive American defeat since the beginning of the Cold War, overshadowing in its real consequences the setback in Vietnam.”79
Afghanistan's Strategic Position. (“Azimuthal Equidistant Projection Centered on Kabul, Afghanistan,” G5671.B72 1986.US, Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress)
Domestically, an invasion would also have severe repercussions, coming in the wake of the November 4 seizure of the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and would provide significant ammunition for the critics who disparaged the administration as weak and helpless to curb the recent spate of Soviet expansionism. It would have considerable political costs for Carter’s upcoming re-election campaign and would conflict with the administration’s other priorities in 1979, particularly the ratification of SALT II, which was ultimately rendered impossible due to the invasion. The very idea that Carter would actively endorse a policy that would risk SALT and détente, and jeopardize his re-election campaign, while simultaneously threatening Iran, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf to future Soviet infiltration, is largely inconceivable. As Steve Coll has assessed, any claim that the Carter administration actively pushed the Soviets into Afghanistan “warrants deep skepticism” given the “enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed.”80
Rather than attempting to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan, Brzezinski sought to forestall an intervention through 1979. He persistently urged Carter to be more forceful in dealing with Moscow and draw the line to avoid past mistakes where inaction and silence implied acquiescence (as in 1956 and 1968). Brzezinski believed that the only way to deter Soviet aggression was to signal concern and show that Washington was prepared to act in response.81 More so than other senior policymakers, he took the Soviet presence in Afghanistan very seriously, advocated publicizing the “creeping intervention,” and demonstrated a strong effort to warn of the adverse consequences of the growing involvement.
As early as March 1979, in response to Soviet propaganda alleging a U.S.-led imperialist conspiracy to overthrow the DRA, as well as evidence of augmented Soviet support, Brzezinski began to agitate for public warnings to “deter Soviet troop intervention.”82 In a memo to Mondale, he wrote, “we can and should … be building a public record to head off possible Soviet intervention or reap the propaganda benefits if it should occur. My staff is prodding State on this.”83 In late March he directed State to take “appropriate steps to implement the President’s decision … to publicize Soviet involvement,” and informed the CIA and the International Communication Agency (ICA) that Carter “would like to see your agency make a special effort—both in radio broadcasts and in other information output—to publicize the nature of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and to underscore the atheistic and anti-Islamic nature of both the Soviet and Afghan governments.”84 In preparation for the Vienna summit in June, Brzezinski urged Carter to call for Soviet “restraint” and “make clear we have a vital interest” in the Persian Gulf, which “we will act firmly and expeditiously to protect.”85 In his opening statement, Carter declared the Persian Gulf a vital interest and included Afghanistan in a list of troublesome areas in which Washington had shown restraint, in contrast with Moscow.86 In a similar vein, in a speech on August 2, Brzezinski—with Carter’s authorization—cautioned against increasing Soviet involvement. Noting the “prudent” U.S. restraint in Iran, he warned “others” to refrain “from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply religious and nationally conscious peoples.”87 Brzezinski later revealed that in the original draft he explicitly referred to Afghanistan, but State deleted the references. Brzezinski, however, “privately” imparted the information to a journalist and the speech was featured on the front page of The New York Times under the heading “U.S. Is Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention.”88
Following Amin’s takeover in mid-September, Brzezinski “again recommended further public statements” by the administration as, in his view, a direct Soviet intervention was becoming more probable. As a result, State reiterated its position that Washington was “opposed to any intervention in Afghanistan’s internal affairs” but failed to single out the USSR or indicate any actions that would be taken in response.89 Brzezinski again requested greater publicity from both State and ICA in October. Vance was instructed to issue “more frequent public comment,” and ICA implored to do more to publicize the “increasing evidence of growing Soviet involvement in the Afghanistan civil war.”90 Brzezinski also instructed his staff to check on progress and to “keep pushing.”91 As Soviet military maneuvers became more evident, Brzezinski directed the CIA to publicize this and pressed Carter to “again register our concern with the Soviets so that there would be a clear-cut record of our position.” State, however, continued to resist turning Afghanistan into a high-profile issue and, in Brzezinski’s view, remained “reluctant to press the matter.” In mid-December, Newsom vetoed an NSC press backgrounder on the growing possibilities for Soviet military intervention “on the grounds that this might be seen by the Soviets as U.S. meddling in Afghanistani affairs.”92 While sub-cabinet officials made some vague public and private warnings—mainly through the Soviet embassy in Washington—neither Carter nor Vance issued any explicit warnings, thus missing an opportunity to adequately demonstrate the level of concern.
Although working well together in other areas, Carter's two primary foreign policy advisers, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (left) and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (right), clashed over the administration's Soviet policy, with Vance emphasizing the cooperative aspects of the relationship (such as the SALT II treaty) and Brzezinski the competitive. On Afghanistan, the State Department sought to downplay the significance of the growing Sovietization and, in Brzezinski’s view, was “reluctant to press the matter.” (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)
Some Soviet officials later claimed that Washington purposely muted its reaction to Moscow’s military preparations, as they “had an interest in us getting stuck in Afghanistan, and paying the greatest possible price for that.”93 Although this charge goes too far, days after the invasion, Brzezinski noted the impact of the lack of warnings in his diary: “Had we been tougher sooner, had we drawn the line more clearly, had we engaged in the kind of consultations that I had so many times advocated, maybe the Soviets would not have engaged in this kind of miscalculation.”94 Indeed, had concern been more clearly and unambiguously aired—as it would, for example, over Poland in December 1980—Moscow may have given greater consideration to the likely international repercussions, and the tenuous arguments for intervention might have been challenged within the Politburo, as they had numerous times in 1979, most notably after Herat.95 Nonetheless, Brzezinski’s incessant recommendations to publicize the growing Soviet role and warn of the consequences of military intervention run counter to claims that his strategy was to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan.
“A Soviet Vietnam?”
Oft-quoted is Brzezinski’s remark that on the day of the invasion, he explained to Carter that they now had “the opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam War,” and that this “led to the demoralization and ultimately the breakup of the Soviet empire.”96 The “trap” thesis is predicated on the assumption that Brzezinski foresaw Afghanistan as a “Soviet Vietnam” that would ultimately contribute to the USSR’s collapse, and that this was the rationale for the covert program. This claim does not, however, conform to the reality of the expectations held by the administration. While a plan to ensnare the Soviets in an Afghan quagmire may appear retrospectively astute given the ultimate difficulties that the Red Army faced over the successive decade, there was no way to predict this in 1979. Turner recalled that he “assumed that 75,000 Soviet troops arrayed against a disorganized rebel force was going to succeed,” and that no one “thought the chances for success on the rebel part were very high.”97 At the December 28 NSC meeting, Brzezinski, Vance, and Turner all indicated their view that the insurgents were unlikely to have much success, and the resulting finding sought to aid in the harassment, not the defeat, of the Red Army.98
Brzezinski’s post-invasion memos to Carter, as well as his later writings, do not display any satisfaction that his strategy to ensnare Moscow had worked or that the invasion was in any way positive. He was under no illusion of a potential “Soviet Vietnam,” instead fearing the Soviets would quickly subdue the insurgency, consolidate their hold on Afghanistan, and position themselves for further expansion in the region. While it was recognized that the Soviet 40th Army could get into difficulty in such an unforgiving terrain against a motivated population in ways similar to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, policymakers did not generally expect that this would be the case. Writing to Carter on December 26 under the heading “A Soviet Vietnam?” Brzezinski warned that the “initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us,” and “we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam.” He outlined numerous distinctions between Afghanistan and Vietnam, which worked in Moscow’s favor, including the lack of organization and leadership amongst the insurgents (“no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government—all of which North Vietnam had”); the “limited foreign support” in contrast with “the enormous amount of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China”; and the likelihood that the Soviets would “act decisively” and “assert themselves effectively,” unlike the United States, “which pursued in Vietnam a policy of ‘inoculating’ the enemy.”99 In press briefings, Brzezinski repeatedly downplayed the Vietnam analogy as “wishful thinking,” arguing, “let’s not kid ourselves into the comforting conclusion that this can be Vietnam for them just because we had a Vietnam.”100 Throughout 1980, he repeatedly brought up the probability of a Soviet victory. In March he reported on the Soviets’ “considerable success on the ground in Afghanistan itself,” where they had “seized the major population centers,” “controlled the major lines of communication,” and “begun to control the major passes or block them from insurgent usage.” Having “survived a major general strike in Kabul and other major cities,” they had “commenced rebuilding the Afghan army” and “started to organize themselves for effective counter-insurgency warfare.” Brzezinski saw “good prospects” for “breaking the back of the resistance forces, and reducing them to ‘bandit’ levels by this summer.”101 Even by the end of the Carter administration and into the mid-1980s, when aid was greatly expanded, there was continual skepticism of the rebels’ chances of holding out, let alone defeating the Red Army.102
Rather than attempting to create a quagmire for Moscow, Brzezinski encouraged low-key secret negotiations through Ambassador Dobrynin to bring about a Soviet withdrawal in 1980, which casts further doubt on the idea of a “trap.” Beginning in late January, Vance began to urge Carter to open a direct dialogue with Brezhnev or sanction high-level talks, but Carter, “troubled and angered by recent events,” refused any direct contact with the Kremlin.103 Brzezinski concurred with Carter and at a February 28 meeting stated that he was “appalled at the thought” that two months after the invasion the United States would engage in formal high-level talks with the Soviets, as it would “send the wrong messages to Moscow,” “confuse our allies,” and “be politically devastating at home.” In a follow-up memo, he explicitly stated his fear that “we are being sucked too early into a formal dialogue, which the Soviets can then exploit in various ways,” and urged “greater prudence.” He warned that Moscow was “pursuing the ‘fight and talk’ strategy—consolidating their position while diluting external criticism.” He indicated, however, that he was not “against moving forward with a probe to see whether Soviet attitudes have started changing,” but that he favored “doing it in an extremely cautious and deliberate fashion.”104
Brzezinski personally probed for “Soviet flexibility” in a non-visible fashion through Dobrynin, whom he met several times in 1980. At his home in McLean, Virginia, on March 17, he presented Dobrynin with a plan for Afghanistan’s neutralization that had been considered by the SCC.105 Brzezinski explained that if Moscow was prepared to accept a nominally non-communist government (but with communist participation) that was genuinely non-aligned and non-hostile to the USSR then the “international arrangements” (including a transnational force from Islamic countries) could be arranged. The “prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops” was, however, a prerequisite to any agreement. If this was acceptable, Moscow could expect a “relatively quick upswing” in relations. Dobrynin indicated that this was a “harder” position than anticipated. He hoped that Washington would be satisfied with “guarantees” that Moscow had “no designs against Pakistan and Iran,” and would leave once Afghanistan was “stable,” but cautioned that this could take a year or more. Brzezinski assured him that although Washington saw neutralization and withdrawal as inextricably linked, they were “not insisting that the latter is sequentially a precondition for the former.” Additionally, Brzezinski disclosed that “the creation of a genuine Afghani government need not be the point of departure for a solution because it is not our intention to humiliate the Soviet Union,” but he insisted that “we do have to agree in advance on where we will end up (i.e. a genuinely neutral and independent Afghanistan) and then we can work on the steps of getting there.” Brzezinski later wrote that “such interim arrangement would make it easier for the Soviets to leave, if at some point they should conclude that their venture in Afghanistan had become counter-productive.”106
Although Dobrynin later acknowledged his impression that Brzezinski’s statements were “part of a definite scheme to emphasize concrete ideas on Afghanistan for the first time” and “could have provided for a basis for negotiations,” they were rejected by the Soviet leaders, who saw it as “unrealistic” to expect Washington to “play a constructive role in the future Afghan settlement” and held a “stubborn determination to continue [the] course in Afghanistan and stand fast against Carter.”107 While Vance and his successor Edmund Muskie continued to push for high-level talks, Brzezinski resisted and indicated his preference for low-key discussions. Carter ultimately concluded that the Soviets were likely to remain in Afghanistan for at least another year and that negotiations were therefore futile.108
Brzezinski nonetheless continued his demarches to Dobrynin. In mid-July, he further clarified the idea of “transitional arrangements,” explaining it as designed to put in place a government that was not hostile to Moscow but not dependent on it for survival (he singled out Babrak Karmal, the Soviet-installed Afghan president, as part of the problem).109 On two final occasions in October, Brzezinski met Dobrynin to discuss a “process of gradual normalization” of relations, which included a return to the SALT negotiations and options for accommodation on Afghanistan. According to Dobrynin, Brzezinski indicated they would “no longer link a Soviet withdrawal to SALT, and Carter would no longer insist on replacing Babrak Karmal, although his transfer to some respectable position and replacement by a new prime minister could contribute to a settlement.”110 Moscow, however, was unable to devise an acceptable withdrawal formula and believed it fruitless to engage in any substantive discussions until after the U.S. presidential election in November. There was no further movement on the issue for the remainder of Carter’s term.111
Brzezinski’s negotiations demonstrated his longstanding belief that by remaining constant and firm for a sufficient period of time—six to nine months with a “united West,” an “aroused Islamic world,” and “continued Afghani resistance”—and then offering incentives, the “Soviet leaders might calculate that a gracious accommodation is preferable to continued military involvement.”112 Although his efforts ultimately came to nothing, they underline the fact that he was willing to quietly negotiate and was prepared to accept a Soviet withdrawal in return for a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan that was friendly to Moscow. It greatly undermines the argument that a trap was his primary objective. The pressure on Moscow was not an end in itself but simply a means to deal with the crisis at hand, demonstrate the consequences of aggressive actions (to give reason for future pause), and to initiate a more comprehensive and reciprocal form of détente in the future.
A final element to be considered is Soviet decision-making and the extent that the insurgency influenced the decision to intervene militarily. A detailed examination is beyond the scope of this article, but the available evidence suggests that the decision was taken largely for defensive and political reasons related to the need to strengthen the Afghan revolution and the Soviet investment by replacing the unpredictable Amin with a more compliant leader.113 It was not taken due to any immediate insurgent threat to the DRA. Herat remained the insurgency’s single most significant accomplishment and the mujahideen did not score a comparable success until 1980, with insurgent attacks declining in the second half of 1979, and the uncoordinated rebels unable to take advantage of the DRA’s weaknesses.114 According to both Soviet and U.S. military experts, the sporadic insurgency did not pose a significant threat in 1979, and the Afghan Army was deemed sufficiently strong to deal with it on its own without the need for Soviet troop deployments.115 In their deliberations in November and December, the Politburo paid little attention to the insurgent threat. KGB Chief Yuri Andropov sold the intervention plan to Brezhnev based on the need for Amin’s replacement, which was the primary concern. Fighting the rebels was not the purpose of the intervention and it was hoped that once Karmal was installed the situation would stabilize without a major Soviet operational role.116
Similarly, the Kremlin paid little attention to international reactions. It is credible to presume that if the invasion was a response to Washington’s provocations, the likely U.S. reaction would have been carefully considered. Yet this was barely mentioned. At the key Politburo meeting on December 12, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Gromyko briefly addressed the likelihood of international backlash but rationalized that—as in 1968—the security aspect overshadowed it. Gromyko, according to Dobrynin, “believed that the American reaction, whatever it might be, was not a major factor to be taken into consideration.”117 Dobrynin himself was not consulted on the impact on superpower relations and when he later highlighted his concerns Brezhnev dismissed them, assuring him that the “limited operation” would “be over in three or four weeks.”118 As such, claims of U.S. responsibility for inducing the invasion have been greatly overblown.
Brzezinski praised Carter’s approach to the Cold War as being “much tougher than most people realize.”119 Gates similarly wrote that Carter’s dealings with Moscow were “far more complex and successful than commonly believed at the time or since.” “If people had known what he was doing secretly to take on the Soviets, perceptions of his record would likely have been very different.”120 The Afghan episode offers an example of Carter’s resolute conduct of the Cold War that has often been neglected and contrasts with the prevailing perception of weakness, naiveté, and indecision.121 Carter’s significant contribution in creating the constructive links between the CIA, ISI, and the mujahideen, and in coordination with the Saudis, Chinese, and others, was an important first step that allowed Washington to counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1980. Although the invasion is frequently portrayed as a “strategic surprise,” contributing to the image of weakness, the CIA had accurately tracked the growing Soviet involvement for over a year, Brzezinski relayed his concerns to Carter, contingency planning was initiated, and covert action was authorized.122 U.S. policy was largely reactive and prudent—evolving as both the level of Soviet involvement and the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan increased—and more multifaceted than traditionally portrayed. It was neither the disengaged and negligent policy that was blindsided by the invasion due to a lack of attention, nor the reckless confrontational policy that sought to draw the Soviets into the “Afghan trap.” Detailed examination of the episode also helps to counter the stereotype of Brzezinski as a “militant anti-communist,” blinkered by a simpleminded and extreme hatred of the USSR.123 This “caricature”—as Robert Pastor has termed it—has unduly shaped assumptions of his foreign policy positions, and partly fuels the “trap” argument.124
Brzezinski has defended the Carter administration’s role in aiding the mujahideen on many occasions, but nowhere other than in the problematic Le Nouvel Observateur interview has he referred to the “Afghan trap” or shown any satisfaction at having masterminded a plan to ensnare the USSR in a Vietnamese-style quagmire. There is no documentary evidence to back up many of the assertions made in the interview and the historical record does not support the arguments that underpin the “trap” thesis. When later asked if he had considered that disclosing information on the origins of the covert program in his memoirs would create doubts as to the administration’s objectives, Gates responded, “No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily.” He continued, stating categorically that there “is no case that such help provoked the Soviet invasion” and “no one in the Carter administration wanted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan and no one, as I can recall at least, ever advocated attempting to induce them to invade.”125
The strategic implications of a Soviet military presence in Afghanistan at a time of declining U.S. regional influence and the political consequences for SALT II and Carter’s re-election campaign make the idea that Carter would endorse a plan to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan fundamentally doubtful. U.S. policies, including the small-scale covert aid program, were peripheral to Moscow’s decision to intervene, with Washington accurately characterized by one historian as “at most a bit player in a local drama.”126 It was not the intention to ensnare Moscow in its own “Soviet Vietnam” (an eventuality that could not plausibly have been foreseen in 1979), but rather to prevent the consolidation of the Sovietization of Afghanistan. The nascent covert program was a consequence of the Soviets’ “creeping intervention,” not its cause, and carefully calibrated to avoid provoking an invasion. Brzezinski’s actions through 1979 demonstrated an effort to dissuade intervention through publicizing the growing Soviet presence and warning directly of the consequences of intervention, and his post-invasion actions belie the argument that bogging down the Soviets in an unrelenting insurgency was his objective. The limited pre-invasion covert program is wholly insignificant to charge the Carter administration with actively attempting to induce an invasion, and thus causing the subsequent decades of destabilization in Afghanistan. It is, as Mondale wrote, “a huge, unwarranted leap to conclude that the CIA plan was designed to provoke a Soviet intervention when we were, in fact, trying to discourage one.”127
Footnotes
Vincent Jauvert, “Les révélations d’un ancien conseiller de Carter: « Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes … ,»” Le Nouvel Observateur, January 15–21, 1998, 76 [author translation]; Charles Cogan, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan Since 1979,” World Policy Journal 10, no. 2 (1993): 76; Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York, 1996), 146.
Jeffrey Sommers, “Blowback!,” ZNet, September 12, 2001, https://zcomm.org/zcommentary/blowback-by-jeffrey-sommers/ (last accessed November 12, 2019). See also, Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York, 2006), 110; and Michael Lüders, Blowback: How the West F*cked Up the Middle East (And Why It Was a Bad Idea) (London, 2017).
See, Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York, 2005), 256–57, 265; William Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Operations and the Presidency (Lexington, KY, 2004), 188–89; Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (New York, 2010), 378; Marvin Kalb and Deborah Kalb, Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama, rev. ed. (Washington, DC, 2012), 74–75, 82; and Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould, Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (San Francisco, CA, 2009), 162–66. Fitzgerald and Gould even traced a “straight line” from Brzezinski to the 2016 attack on Pulse nightclub in Orlando, which killed 49 people: “Brzezinski’s Vision to Lure Soviets into ‘Afghan Trap’ Now Orlando’s Nightmare,” Huffington Post, June 21, 2016.
Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, IL, 2008), 209; Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York, 2008), 99. See also, Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, 2004), 593; and Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA, 2018), 307–9.
Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT, 2011), 319, 325–26; Andrew Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History (New York, 2016), 26, 60; John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago, IL, 2006), 470, 472.
Jauvert email correspondences, in Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 307–8.
Brzezinski interview in “Brzezinski’s Afghan Wars and the Grand Chessboard, Part 2,” Real News Network, January 15, 2010, https://therealnews.com/stories/zbrzezinski1218gpt2 (last accessed November 12, 2019).
Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1977–1980, Vol. XII, Afghanistan, ed. David Zierler (Washington, DC, 2018).
Harold Saunders to Cyrus Vance, “Situation in Afghanistan,” April 30, 1978, AF00274, “Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973–1990,” Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA).
Brzezinski interview in Thomas Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder, CO, 1985), 63.
Michel Oksenberg to Brzezinski, “Afghanistan,” May 1, 1978, Remote Archives Capture Project (hereafter RAC), NLC-6-1-1-4-9, Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter JCL); Thornton to Brzezinski, “SCC Working Group Meeting on Afghanistan,” May 3, 1978, RAC, NLC-15-1-2-11-0, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “Status of Our Relations with Afghanistan,” May 22, 1978, RAC, NLC-15-1-2-5-7, JCL.
Thornton to Brzezinski and Aaron, “Opposition in Afghanistan,” July 14, 1978, RAC, NLC-6-1-1-6-7, JCL.
“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 25.
Thornton to Brzezinski and David Aaron, “Opposition in Afghanistan.” Brzezinski wrote “yes” in the margins.
“Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua,” May 20, 1978, FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XIII, China, ed. David P. Nickles (Washington, DC, 2013), doc. 108.
Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #78,” November 3, 1978, “Weekly Reports, 71–81,” Box 42, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection (hereafter ZB-Donated), Subject File (hereafter SF), JCL.
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1145, I-17976 (1979): 333–35.
Kevin Klose, “Soviets Sign Treaty With Afghanistan,” Washington Post, December 6, 1978.
See, Brzezinski to Carter, “Daily Report,” March 5, 1979, RAC, NLC-1-9-8-21-0, JCL.
Author interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 19, 2012.
Author interview with Thomas Thornton, October 3, 2018; Kabul-00384, “National Security Council Adviser Visits Afghanistan’s Hafizullah Amin,” January 17, 1979, D790023-0503, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG59), Central Foreign Policy Files (hereafter CFPF), U.S. National Archives (hereafter USNA); “Aid to Afghanistan: Considerations,” c. January 30, 1979, RAC, NLC-24-98-3-9-6, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #85,” January 19, 1979, “Weekly Reports, 82–90,” Box 42, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL; Brzezinski to Mondale, “Soviet-Afghan Relations,” February 12, 1979, RAC, NLC-133-42-1-2-4, JCL.
William Griffith to Brzezinski, “The Arc of Instability: What is to be Done?” January 31, 1979, RAC, NLC-6-85-4-5-3, JCL.
Thornton to Brzezinski, “Afghanistan—Possible Covert Action,” February 1, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 35.
Kabul-01098, “Death of Ambassador Dubs,” February 14, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 36.
Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York, 2010), 291.
State-041516, “US-Afghan Relations,” February 17, 1979, D790076-0726, RG59, CFPF, USNA.
“The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, February 14, 1979, Kabul, Afghanistan: Summary of Report of Investigation,” February 1980, AF00851, DNSA.
Brzezinski to Henze, “Afghanistan,” February 21, 1979, “2/79,” Box 3, National Security Affairs, Staff Material (hereafter NSA-ST), Horn/Special, JCL.
Henze to Brzezinski, “Afghanistan,” February 26, 1979, RAC, NLC-17-88-4-1-2, JCL.
An earlier “first cut” was presented in late January. See, Frank Carlucci to Aaron, “Covert Action Options Paper on Afghanistan,” January 26, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 34.
CIA Paper, “Covert Action Options for Afghanistan,” February 28, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 38.
Henze to Brzezinski, “Follow-up SCC on Sensitive Collection and Covert Action Proposals,” March 20, 1979, “3/79,” Box 3, NSA-ST, Horn/Special, JCL.
Thornton to Brzezinski, “Afghanistan—Possible Covert Action,” February 1, 1979, FRUS, vol. XII, doc. 35.
Henze to Brzezinski, “Afghanistan.”
Brzezinski to Mondale, “Afghanistan,” March 22, 1979, RAC, NLC-17-88-4-1-2, JCL.
Kabul-02016, “Situation at Herat,” March 16, 1979, D790120-0960, RG59, CFPF, USNA.
Politburo Discussions, March 17, 1979, doc. 113260, Wilson Center Digital Archive (hereafter WCDA).
See, Meeting of Alexei Kosygin et al with Taraki, March 20, 1979, doc. 113263, WCDA; Politburo Protocol #152/159, May 24, 1979, doc. 113270, WCDA.
CIA Paper, “Afghanistan: A Regime in Trouble,” March 23, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 39.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York, 1983), 426.
Gates, From the Shadows, 144.
Brzezinski to Carter, “Daily Report,” March 31, 1979, RAC, NLC-1-10-2-32-2, JCL.
Gates, From the Shadows, 144–45.
National Intelligence Daily, “Afghanistan: Prospects for the Insurgents,” April 12, 1979, RAC, NLC-23-61-2-3-4, JCL; CIA Paper, “Afghanistan,” c. March/April 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 45.
See, Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, DC, 2001).
Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York, 2006), 142–43.
Intelligence Information Cable, “Saudi Arabian Aid to the Afghanistan National Liberation Front,” March 27, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 40.
CIA Paper, “Afghanistan,” c. March/April 1979, FRUS, vol. XII, doc. 45.
CIA Paper, “Possible Soviet Reactions to Specific Covert Action Initiatives,” c. March/April 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, XII, doc. 47.
SCC Meeting, “Covert Action and Sensitive Collection Issues,” April 6, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 48; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 427.
Gates, From the Shadows, 146; Turner to Brzezinski, “Status of CIA Discussions with the Pakistanis Concerning Aid to the Afghan Dissidents,” April 26, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 51.
Briefs and Comments, “Pakistan-Afghanistan: Support to Insurgents,” July 2, 1979, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000534933.pdf (last accessed November 12, 2019).
Gates, From the Shadows, 146.
SCC Meeting, “Afghanistan and Grenada,” June 26, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 53.
Findings, July 3, 1979, “CIA Charter: 2/9–25/80,” Box 60, Staff Offices, Counsel’s Office (Cutler), JCL.
SCC Meeting, “Covert Action,” October 23, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 76.
Author interview with a senior intelligence official, October 7, 2017; CIA Report, “CIA Covert Action Activities in Afghanistan,” August 22, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 59.
Brzezinski interviews, in Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 308; and Tang Yong, “‘Agenda for Constructive American-Chinese Dialogue Huge’: Brzezinski,” People’s Daily Online, March 20, 2006, http://en.people.cn/200603/20/eng20060320_251953.html (last accessed November 12, 2019).
Author interview with Brzezinski, June 19, 2012.
CIA Paper, “Afghanistan,” c. March/April 1979, FRUS, vol. XII, doc. 45; Moscow-13083, “Afghanistan: Prospects for Soviet Intervention,” May 24, 1979, D790236-0352, RG59, CFPF, USNA.
“Staff Meeting Minutes of 31 August 1979,” August 31, 1979, CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010145-9, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), USNA; Turner to Brzezinski, “Saudi Arabian and Pakistani Views on the Afghan Insurgency,” November 5, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc 80.
Thornton to Odom, September 20, 1979, RAC, NLC-12-1-2-5-0, JCL; Robert Murray to David McGiffert, “Afghanistan,” September 21, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 66.
Gates’ 1993 draft and handwritten notecard, “From the Shadows, Draft and Source Material, Chapter 13, 1993,” Box 186, Series VI, Robert M. Gates Papers, Special Collections Research Center, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA.
“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 71.
Gates’ 1993 draft.
SCC Meeting, “Covert Action,” October 23, 1979, FRUS, vol. XII, doc.76; Gates’ handwritten notecard. See also, Gates, From the Shadows, 147.
SCC Meeting, “Covert Action,” October 23, 1979, FRUS, vol. XII, doc. 76.
Turner to Brzezinski, “Saudi Arabian and Pakistani Views,” November 5, 1979, FRUS, vol. XII, doc 80.
Slocombe to Daniel Murphy, “Afghanistan,” November 21, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 81.
William Odom to Brzezinski, “Strategy for the Persian Gulf in 1980,” November 28, 1979, “Presidential Directives re Defense Policy Development (1 of 2),” Box 36, Series 8, William E. Odom Papers, Library of Congress.
SCC Meeting, “Iran,” December 17, 1979, “Meetings—SCC 230: 12/15/79,” Box 31, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL.
NSC Meeting, “Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan,” December 28, 1979, RAC, NLC-25-98-28-2-5, JCL; Finding, December 28, 1979, “Meetings—SCC 240,” Box 31, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL.
Cogan, “Partners in Time,” 76.
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), 481; Walter F. Mondale (with David Hage), The Good Fight: A Life in Liberal Politics (New York, 2010), 254. For propaganda opportunities see, for example, Thornton to Brzezinski, “Evening Report,” May 16, 1979, RAC, NLC-10-20-7-8-3, JCL; Brzezinski to Carter, “Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” December 26, 1979, “Afghanistan: 4–12/79,” Box 1, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material (hereafter NSA-ZB), Country File (hereafter CF), JCL.
Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 427. See also, Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #134,” March 28, 1980, RAC, NLC-128-10-3-11-3, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “Reflections on Soviet Intervention.” See also, Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #81,” December 2, 1978, “Weekly Reports, 71–81,” Box 42, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #83,” December 28, 1978, “Weekly Reports, 82–90,” Box 42, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL.
Coll, Ghost Wars, 593.
See, for example, Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #109,” September 13, 1979, “Weekly Reports, 102–120,” Box 42, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “Daily Report,” March 31, 1979, RAC, NLC-1-10-2-32-2, JCL.
Brzezinski to Mondale, “Afghanistan,” March 22, 1979.
Brzezinski to Vance, “Soviet Response to the Afghan Rebellion,” March 28, 1979, “Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79,” Box 1, NSA-ZB, CF, JCL; Brzezinski to Turner, “Soviet Accusations about Afghanistan,” March 30, 1979, RAC, NLC-27-3-4-32-0, JCL; Brzezinski to John Reinhardt, “Soviet Accusations about Afghanistan,” March 30, 1979, “ICA, 1-5/79,” Box 9, NSA-ZB, Agency File, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “Decisions on Summit Objectives,” May 24, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. VI: Soviet Union, ed. Melissa Jane Taylor (Washington, DC, 2013), doc. 196.
See Memcon, “Fourth Plenary Meeting: International Issues,” Vienna, June 17, 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. VI, doc. 204.
Brzezinski Address to the Annual Convention of the International Platform Association, August 2, 1979, American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980 (hereafter AFP) (Washington, DC, 1983), doc. 13.
Hendrik Smith, “U.S. Is Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention,” New York Times, August 3, 1979; Brzezinski interview in Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, 108.
Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 427–28; Press Briefing, September 19, 1979, AFP, doc. 404.
Brzezinski to Vance, “Growing Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” October 4, 1979, “Afghanistan: 4–12/79,” Box 1, NSA-ZB, CF, JCL; Brzezinski to Reinhardt, “Growing Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” October 4, 1979, “Afghanistan, 1979,” Box 1, NSA-ZB, Office File, JCL.
Brzezinski handwritten notes on: Thornton to Brzezinski, “Growing Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” October 18, 1979, “Afghanistan, 1979,” Box 1, NSA-ZB, Office File, JCL; and Henze to Brzezinski, “Evening Report—27 November 1979,” November 27, 1979, “ERF 7–12/79,” NSA-ST, Horn/Special, JCL.
Brzezinski to Turner, “Publicizing the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan,” December 10, 1979, “Afghanistan,” Box 1, Vertical File, JCL; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 428.
General Valentin Varennikov at “The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente” conference, Lysebu, Norway, September 17–20, 1995 (hereafter Lysebu), 124–26, Carter-Brezhnev Project, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/fall_of_detente_transcript.pdf (last accessed November 12, 2019).
Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 432.
See, Politburo Protocol #149, “Our Future Policy in Connection with the Situation in Afghanistan,” April 1, 1979, doc. 110060, WCDA.
Jauvert, “Les révélations,” 76.
Turner, Lysebu, 143.
NSC Meeting, “Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan,” December 28, 1979.
Brzezinski to Carter, “Reflections on Soviet Intervention.”
Briefing for Non-Washington Editorial Page Editors and Writers, January 9, 1980, “Brzezinski Briefings and Backgrounders (Press and Public), 1/80,” Box 1, NSA-ZB, Schecter/Friendly Press File, JCL. See also, “An Interview with Brzezinski,” Time, January 14, 1980, 18–19.
Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Meeting,” March 18, 1980, RAC, NLC-17-2-19-2-9, JCL. See also, Brzezinski to Carter, “Daily Report,” March 17, 1980, “3/11/80–3/20/80,” Box 14, NSA-ZB, President’s Daily Report File (hereafter PDRF), JCL.
Turner, Lysebu, 147. See, for example, “The Afghan Resistance Movement in 1981: Progress, But a Long Way to Go,” January 19, 1982, AF01310, DNSA.
Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York, 1983), 394–95.
Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 435–36; Brzezinski to Carter, “Message to Brezhnev,” February 29, 1980, “Carter-Brezhnev Correspondence, 9/79–2/81,” Box 18, ZB-Donated, Geographic File, JCL; Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #131,” February 29, 1980, “Weekly Reports, 121–135,” Box 42, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL.
See, for example, SCC Meeting, “Security Framework for the Persian Gulf,” February 22, 1980, RAC, NLC-12-47-7-8-2, JCL; Report, “Neutralization of Afghanistan: Prospects and Policy,” February 29, 1980, “2/80,” Box 15, ZB-Donated, Geographic File, JCL.
Memcon, Brzezinski and Dobrynin, March 17, 1980, “Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—1/80–3/80,” Box 20, ZB-Donated, SF, JCL; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 434.
Andrei Gromyko to Muskie, June 27, 1980, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. VI, doc. 285; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York, 1995), 450–51.
NSC Meeting, March 18, 1980, RAC, NLC-17-2-19-4-7, JCL.
Memcon, Brzezinski and Dobrynin, July 12, 1980, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XII, doc. 302.
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 462–63.
White House Situation Room to Brzezinski, “Noon Notes,” May 29, 1980, “5/21/80–5/31/80,” Box 15, NSA-ZB, PDRF, JCL.
Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #131,” February 29, 1980.
See, for example, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York, 2005), 316–26; David Gibbs, “Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: A Declassified History,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 239–63; Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89 (London, 2011), 73–81.
Westad, The Global Cold War, 326.
See, Braithwaite, Afgantsy, 77; Varennikov, Lysebu, 85–86; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 440–41. For the American view, see NID, “Afghanistan: Prospects for the Insurgents,” April 12, 1979; Stephen Larrabee to Brzezinski, “Increasing Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” December 15, 1979, RAC, NLC-23-61-3-2-4, JCL; SCC Meeting, “Iran,” December 17, 1979.
Yuri Andropov to Brezhnev, December 1, 1979, doc. 113254, WCDA.
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 438–39; Dobrynin, Lysebu, 92.
Westad, The Global Cold War, 325; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 439–40.
Brzezinski interview for CNN’s “Cold War,” National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski2.html (last accessed November 12, 2019).
Gates, From the Shadows, 572.
For example, Walter Russell Mead, “The Carter Syndrome,” Foreign Policy, no. 177 (January/February 2010): 58–64.
For example, Bruce Riedel, What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (Washington, DC, 2014), 21–22, 102; Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York, 2008), 423–25.
Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game, 251. See also, Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisers, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY, 2010).
Robert Pastor, “The Caricature and the Man,” in Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed. Charles Gati, (Baltimore, MD, 2013), 104–111.
Gates interview, in J.B. White, Jr., “The Strategic Mind of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How a Native Pole Used Afghanistan to Protect His Homeland,” (MA thesis, Louisiana State University, 2012), 45–46, 82.
Freedman, A Choice of Enemies, 99.
Mondale, The Good Fight, 255.
