

Business Creation during COVID-19

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Abstract

Using UK data, we present greater empirical detail on the puzzling firm dynamics that emerged during COVID-19. We show that firm entry increased during the pandemic across several countries, and this contrasts with typical recessions where firm entry declines. Additionally, the rise in firm entry is driven by individual entrepreneurs creating companies for the first time, particularly in online retail. We find evidence that firm creation responded significantly to declines in retail footfall, and that firms created during the pandemic are more likely to exit and less likely to post jobs. Overall this implies that, despite surging firm creation during the pandemic, the overall employment effect is limited. Finally, we find that the primary contributor to limited employment creation is the shift in ownership composition of new entrants during COVID.

JEL: E32, L25, L26.

Keywords: Firm Dynamics, COVID-19, Business Dynamism, Firm Entry.

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3 descriptive statistics suggest that, conditional on employing, firms born during the pan-
4 demic are smaller in size. Taking these four margins – registrations, survival, posting
5 rate, firm size – together, we perform approximate calculations for the overall employ-
6 ment effect of the boom in firm creation during the pandemic. Our results show that the
7 positive margin of greater firm creation, which *ceteris paribus* would raise employment,
8 is more than offset, by weaker survival rates, weaker conversion of surviving firms to em-
9 ployers (posting), and weaker employment growth. The end result is that employment
10 from firm creation during COVID is worse than employment from firm creation over
11 an equivalent duration in normal times, even though there is more firm creation during
12 COVID.

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14 We extend the aggregate analysis to understand the effect of changing industry and
15 ownership composition. Our main result is not driven by the industrial composition
16 of the entrants. Instead we find that an important determinant of the limited employ-
17 ment potential of firms created during COVID is ownership structure. This finding is
18 consistent with our evidence that firms created during COVID are disproportionately
19 setup by individuals with no prior experience in firm ownership, so-called new solo en-
20 trepreneurs. Firms setup by these sort of entrepreneurs are both less likely to attempt to
21 hire workers and more likely to dissolve. Additionally, we find new firms owned by ex-
22 isting corporations, an important source of employment among entrants, created fewer
23 jobs on average with no offsetting boom in entry. This phenomenon further contributed
24 to the limited employment impact of new entrants. Overall, we show that the change in
25 ex-ante characteristics of firms created during COVID is part of the explanation for why
26 firms had weaker employment potential.

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28 To show our results, we use data from the UK's register of limited firms from Com-
29 panies House, Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) data on firms' ownership structure, Indeed data
30 on job postings and Google data on footfall. Companies House data provides the reg-
31 istration date, dissolution date and sector of activity of new company registrations. We
32 refer to company registrations as firm entry and business creation throughout the paper.
33 Companies House data is accessible directly or via BvD-FAME, which also adds own-
34 ership information. We can merge all of these data at a granular level, enabling us to
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3 estimate the response of entry to footfall and to track whether the newly created com-
4 panies post jobs or dissolve. We use local projections to show how firm entry responds
5 to a negative footfall shock for several periods after the shock. To study the probability
6 of posting a vacancy and probability of dissolving for pre-COVID and COVID cohorts of
7 firms, we classify firms by the quarter they are created and study each cohorts' probabili-
8 ty of posting a job or dissolving as they age. We first present simple cumulative shares
9 of firms posting and dissolving by age for pre-COVID and COVID cohorts, and then we
10 conduct a more detailed fixed effects analysis. The fixed effects analysis purges other ag-
11 gregate time and sector composition effects that influence job postings and dissolutions
12 during the pandemic. Our final methodological step is to present a statistical framework
13 to quantify the employment effects of these various characteristics of firm dynamics dur-
14 ing the crisis. The statistical framework clarifies how some of these channels enhance
15 aggregate employment whereas others weaken employment.

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Related Literature: The resilience of firm entry during COVID-19 has been noted for
a number of economies. Dinlersoz, Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Penciakova (2021) present
evidence for the US, and OECD (2021) provide evidence for OECD countries. Duncan,
Galanakis, León-Ledesma, and Savagar (2021) present early-evidence of the aggregate
and sectoral effects of the COVID-19 crisis on UK firm creation. Additionally, our find-
ing that entry is concentrated in the online retail sector is consistent with most US reg-
istrations being in non-store retail (Haltiwanger 2021; Haltiwanger and Decker 2023).
However, existing literature has not studied the real impact of these new entrants on
aggregate employment. Benedetti-Fasil, Sedláček, and Sterk (2022) show that the initial
sharp falls in firm creation in France, Germany, Italy and Spain could have persistent
negative effects on employment due to fewer high-growth startups. Our results focus on
the surge in firm entry following this initial decline, and suggest that these new firms are
weaker in their ability to buoy employment.

Our findings have implications beyond the context of COVID-19. Recent business
cycle theory emphasises the role of sector-specific shocks which induce structural re-
allocation (Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub, and Werning 2022; Baqaee and Rubbo 2023).
Yet, an open question is how much reallocation there is in practice and through which

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3 channels does reallocation happen. Our paper quantifies the amount of structural real-
4 location through the firm creation channel. This is one of three prominent channels for
5 structural reallocation. Other channels are incumbent firms expanding production and
6 the re-direction of production to growing sectors. Despite the rapid response of entry,
7 our findings cast doubts on whether large numbers of new firms will always support a
8 reallocation of employment.
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15 Additionally, we add to growing evidence on the importance of firm characteristics at
16 start-up for future employment (Sedláček and Sterk 2017; Sterk, Sedláček, and Pugsley
17 2021). We stress that the composition of ownership structure responds to the recession,
18 and that this is an important dimension for understanding the employment impact of
19 entry. This adds a business cycle perspective to research which shows that ownership
20 structure at start-up affects subsequent firm performance (Felix, Karmakar, and Sedláček
21 2021).
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29 We also contribute to research on entrepreneurship by necessity versus opportunity
30 (Fairlie and Fossen 2019). While we cannot track the employment situation of new en-
31 trepreneurs in our data, our results do suggest that new businesses were created out of
32 opportunity more than by necessity for three reasons. First, our data are on company in-
33 corporations, not self-employment¹ and the process of incorporating a company implies
34 a well-defined business entity, rather than more informal self-employment². Second,
35 we show that company incorporations respond to demand shocks in specific COVID-
36 compliant sectors, suggesting a response to opportunities. Third, the UK provided gen-
37 erous employment support during the pandemic to both employed and self-employed
38 individuals preventing a rise in unemployment and a consequent shift into entrepreneur-
39 ship by necessity. Typically, necessity entrepreneurs enter entrepreneurship from unem-
40 ployment and create small, low-growth, businesses relative to opportunity entrepreneurs
41 (Poschke 2013). Our findings suggest that even opportunity entrepreneurs can create
42 small and low-growth businesses, so challenging the idea that the motivation for en-
43 trepreneurship, opportunity versus necessity, is a key predictor of future performance.
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58 ¹In the the data section (Section 2.1.1), we discuss the differences between these two legal forms.

59 ²For the same reason, OECD (2021) interpret their analysis of company incorporations as opportunity
60 entrepreneurship.

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3 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our data; Sec-
4 tion 3 presents our five facts (3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5) on firm creation during the COVID-19
5 pandemic. Section 4 discusses our results and presents a statistical framework to analyse
6 the effect of our facts on employment. Section 5 concludes.
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10 11 12 13 **2 Data**

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16 We use data from Companies House and Bureau van Dijk (FAME) to construct daily en-
17 try, dissolution and ownership statistics. We supplement these high frequency statistics
18 with Office for National Statistics (ONS) summary statistics derived from the, confiden-
19 tial, Inter-departmental Business Register (IDBR). We use data from Indeed to measure
20 job postings. Lastly, we use Google mobility data to measure retail footfall.
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28 **2.1 Business registrations (Companies House & FAME)**

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30 We use the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk
31 (BvD). The dataset keeps track of historical Companies House data in an accessible man-
32 ner. We use this historical data to build a series of daily firm entry since 2005 (see Ap-
33 pendix A.1 for a time series of entry). Companies House is the name of the government
34 department which maintains the business register.
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41 The Companies House register records all *incorporated companies* in the UK. In corpo-
42 rated companies are separate legal entities to the business owner.³ We restrict the firms'
43 legal status to private limited companies which represent 91% of all companies on the
44 register. The remaining 9% are public companies and nonprofit organizations.
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49 To register a company with Companies House, the business owner completes an on-
50 line form which costs £12. The registration is processed within 24 hours meaning that it
51 appears on the [publicly available database](#) within this time.⁴ Updates to the Companies
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55 ³Unincorporated companies are not on the register. They are not legal entities (the owner is fully
56 liable for debts of the business). The most important constituent of unincorporated companies is sole
57 proprietors. In 2021, 56% of all UK businesses were sole proprietors, 37% were companies, and 7% were
58 ordinary partnerships (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2021).

59 ⁴Further details on the registration process are here: <https://www.gov.uk/limited-company-formation/register-your-company>.
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House register are automated following a business application. Consequently, there are no administrative lags due to the pandemic. There is a short lag between a company appearing on the public register and BvD recording it in their proprietary dataset (FAME).

The process of dissolving a company is less automated than registration. A company owner can complete a form for removal or Companies House administrators can remove companies that have not returned mandatory forms for a period of time. Consequently, dissolutions often occur at specific points in a firm's lifecycle. For example, in our analysis we will see dissolutions rising sharply in quarters 6 and 8 after birth. This corresponds to months 18 to 21 when new firms must submit their first set of accounts.⁵ Our analysis does not rely on random firm dissolution over the lifecycle. The main effect of this feature of the data is to weaken the role of dissolutions at shorter time horizons, as few firms dissolve within a year, and strengthen effects at longer time horizons once account submission deadlines are reached.

When registering, each firm is provided with a unique company number, a registration date, and has to indicate a legal status, a headquarters address and an industry code (4 or 5-digit SIC). BvD reports all of this information, as well as dissolution date when applicable. This allows us to measure daily number of incorporations and dissolutions by local authority and industrial sector.⁶

2.1.1 Company Incorporation Versus Self-employment

It is helpful to note the differences between registering an incorporated company versus working as a self-employed individual in the United Kingdom. Although self-employed individuals and incorporated companies represent roughly half of the UK business population each, incorporated companies are much larger when employment or revenues are taken into consideration (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2021).

The decision to pursue self-employment or incorporation often hinges on personal

⁵The relevant documentation from Companies House on account submission deadlines is available <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/life-of-a-company-annual-requirements/life-of-a-company-part-1-accounts>.

⁶We follow the [Office of National Statistics](#) and exclude postcodes with more than 500 incorporations in a single day. Multiple incorporations at a single postcode most often reflect registrations by management and personal service companies or are tax motivated, with little economic impact. See Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2020) article for more details.

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3 tax considerations, the need to hire employees, and the potential for borrowing capi-
4 tal. Self-employed individuals face less administrative work compared to incorporated
5 companies. Self-employment requires only an annual personal tax return, while incor-
6 porated companies must submit annual company accounts. Additionally, incorporation
7 requires a business bank account as well as various company details, including a set of
8 directors and a business address which are available on the Companies House public
9 register. Incorporated company status is necessary for some external financing.⁷

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17 Incorporated companies represent more formal business entities characterized by
18 well-defined purposes, higher revenue, and the potential for employment. Self-employed
19 businesses are more likely to involve informal work, variable occupations, and a reduced
20 need to employ or to borrow. Informal rules-of-thumb suggest transitioning from self-
21 employment to company status occurs when revenues exceed £50,000.

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27 During the pandemic, the UK offered generous employment support through the Self-
28 Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) and the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme
29 (CJRS). This limited the number of workers who become unemployed, but may have in-
30 creased the number of self-employed individuals switching to *employee* status in order to
31 qualify for this ‘furlough scheme’, see Blundell and Machin (2020). However, these tran-
32 sitions would not affect our firm creation statistics. Also, government support schemes
33 could only be claimed by firms that were existing prior to the pandemic, limiting the
34 likelihood of self-employed to become corporations in order to benefit from these sup-
35 port schemes.

46 2.1.2 Ownership information

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49 The BvD-FAME dataset reports ownership information, which is acquired from Com-
50 panies House. Firms registering with Companies House usually have to provide in-
51 formation on their ownership, including the name of firm shareholders and the size of
52 their stakes. BvD processes this textual information and provides unique identifiers for
53 shareholders, together with their stake and their type (individual, corporate, unnamed
54 or other). There is a two-month lag for the ownership information to appear in FAME

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60 ⁷Incorporating a company also incurs a £12 fee.

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3 and laws ensure that business ownership information in Companies House is updated
4 regularly. The FAME dataset maintains a historical record of owners. We use this histor-
5 ical data and BvD shareholder identifiers to identify ‘*new*’ and ‘*serial*’ entrepreneurs. We
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7 define these types as follows:
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11 • *New entrepreneur*: Has not owned a business in the five years prior to the pandemic.
12 Specifically, has not owned a firm registered since January 2016, even one that was
13 subsequently dissolved, or is not owning another live firm in January 2020 created
14 prior to January 2016.
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- 17 • *Serial entrepreneur*: Has owned at least one business in the five years prior to the
18 pandemic. Specifically, the owner founded a firm since January 2016, which may
19 have subsequently dissolved, or, owned a firm that was live in January 2020 but
20 that was born prior to January 2016.⁸
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29 Combining the directly-available ownership information (individual, group, corporate)
30 with our constructed new/serial information, we classify new firms as:
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34 • *Solo entrepreneur (new)*: one owner who has not owned another firm in the last five
35 years.
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- 38 • *Solo entrepreneur (serial)*: one owner who has owned at least one other firm in the
39 last five years.
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- 42 • *Group of entrepreneurs (new)*: all shareholders are new entrepreneurs.
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- 45 • *Group of entrepreneurs (serial)*: at least one shareholder is a serial entrepreneur.
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- 48 • *Corporate*: at least one shareholder is a corporation.
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51 ⁸Of the 7 million individual shareholders in our data, 15% are “serial” entrepreneurs. Of the 5 million
52 firms founded by individuals between January 2016 and December 2021, 40% of them have at least one se-
53 rial entrepreneur; and one-third of firms founded by solo entrepreneurs over the same period are founded
54 by serial solo entrepreneurs.
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2.2 Firm employment (FAME and IDBR)

Due to accounting exemptions and lags, employment information for new firms in Companies House (BvD-FAME) is sparse.⁹ We use the data to study the change in firm size for firms born pre-COVID and COVID cohorts, but highlight the uncertainty around them provided the sample is small.

We complement this information with aggregate data released by the ONS which is derived from the Government's, confidential, business register known as the Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR).¹⁰ Firms are added to the IDBR if they employ someone (register for payroll tax, PAYE) or register for VAT tax. The data provides quarterly number of additions to the IDBR in total and the number of employees hired by these new firms, it also provides the annual count of new employer-firms.¹¹ In 2019, 90% of firms on the IDBR were employer-firms and just over 90% of additions were accounted for by new employers. Additions to the IDBR are closely correlated with Companies House (CH) registrations but with a lag of four quarters (see Appendix Figure 13).

We use this data in two ways: to approximate the company registration to employee-firm conversion rate and to approximate firm size. To approximate the fraction of Companies House registrations that become employer-firms, we take the following ratio:

$$\frac{\text{ONS IDBR employer-firm births in year } a}{\text{Number of company registrations in year } a - 1}$$

The ratio represents the company registration to employee-firm conversion rate. It would be one if all company registrations became employers, but in practice it is less than one. In 2019, this ratio suggests that 54% of firm registrations in Companies House in 2018 become employer-firms in the IDBR in 2019 (assuming they do so within a year); by contrast, this ratio is only 40% in 2021, i.e. 40% of firm registered in 2020 become employer-firms within a year (in 2021). We use the ratio of the annual number of employees hired

⁹There were 1.4 million firms registered between March 2020 and September 2021, but 1.7 thousand have filed employment information by the end of 2021.

¹⁰We use both the detailed annual updates of business demography (ONS "Business demography") and the quarterly updates (ONS "Business demography, quarterly experimental statistics"). Appendix A compares Companies House registrations to ONS firm entry from the IDBR.

¹¹There are short lags from registering with the tax authority to being added to the IDBR. Our data tracks the date of addition to the IDBR (Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2022b).

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3 Indeed is major recruitment platform but it does not have universal coverage of UK
4 job postings. In January 2020 the number of firms posting in Indeed was 13% of the
5 number of employer-firms in the IDBR. Hence, the proportion of firms posting in Indeed
6 should not be used to extrapolate to the overall level of hiring. However, we consider
7 the Indeed data as a representative sample of job vacancies in the UK. Appendix E shows
8 there is a close correlation with official ONS vacancy data from surveys and Van Dijcke,
9 Buckmann, Turrell, and Key 2022 show that the industrial mix in Indeed is similar to the
10 wider UK economy. Moreover, the vacancy data from Indeed is timely, not survey based,
11 and can be matched to firm creation information to track cohorts through time.
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22 **2.4 Retail footfall (Google Mobility)**

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25 We use retail footfall figures from Google LLC (2021) to assess the impact of changes
26 in mobility on firm entry. Specifically, we use mobility trends for ‘retail and recreation’
27 which represents places such as restaurants, cafés, shopping centres, theme parks, mu-
28 seums, libraries and cinemas. We refer to ‘visits to retail and recreation’ as *footfall*. For
29 a placebo exercise, we also use mobility trends for ‘parks’ which represents places like
30 local parks, national parks, public beaches, marinas, dog parks, plazas, and public gar-
31 dens. In both cases, the data shows how visitors to these locations changed compared to
32 a baseline. The baseline is the median value from the 5-week period Jan 3 – Feb 6, 2020
33 for a specific day of the week. For example, a value of -10% on a Monday in June 2020
34 would represent 10% fewer visits than the median value for Mondays over the baseline
35 period, on average across all of the UK. The series begins February 15 2020 and ends in
36 October 15 2022.
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3 Facts

3.1 Entry cyclicalities


Figure 1 plots firm registrations in the UK over 120 years.¹⁵ Entry of new employers (employer-firms) is typically procyclical: it rises in booms and declines in recessions (Lee and Mukoyama 2015; Tian 2018). However, our evidence for firm registrations in the UK (Figure 1) shows that in ‘extreme event’ recessions, such as wartime and the COVID-19 pandemic, firm entry (registrations) is countercyclical.¹⁶ These ‘extreme event’ recessions share the feature that the economy restructures to substantial shifts in the patterns of consumer demand and producer supply. The post-war recessions in 1919 and 1946 saw entry boom as wartime production declined and private enterprise restarted. Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic widespread lockdowns reallocated demand to sectors that complied with social distancing.

¹⁵Companies House directly provides the number of registrations back to 1939. To calculate registrations for early periods we use firms’ Companies House numbers. Private limited firms have been numbered sequentially since the first Companies Act in the 1800s. Hence, the difference in the company number between the first firm incorporated in a given year and first firm incorporated in the next year corresponds to new registrations in the year (Scotland has a different set of numbers to England and Wales but they are still sequential). We do not observe the incorporation date of all firms that have ever entered the register. However, we do observe a sample of incorporation dates of old firms in our BvD-FAME data. We can use the company numbers of the first firm founded in a year that we do see to construct an approximate entry rate instead. As the first firm recorded as being incorporated in BvD-FAME in a given year, back to 1900, is still founded on January 1st the approximation error from doing this is not large.

¹⁶Company registrations comove with employer-firm creation, although not all business registrations lead to new employers. Importantly, our measure of business registrations in the UK does not include self-employed individuals. Self-employment is often countercyclical (Fossen 2021).

Figure 1: Business creation in the UK, 1900-2020

Source: Historical Companies House Register and BvD-FAME for firm entry, BoE: A Millenium of Macroeconomic Data for GDP.




Note: Logarithm of annual new business registrations, linearly detrended. Shaded areas correspond to years when UK GDP growth was negative.

Figure 2 focuses on the comparison between the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 recessions but with a cross-country perspective. We extend the evidence of Dinlersoz, Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Penciakova (2021) for the US (US Census) to France (INSEE) and the UK (Companies House), and we follow their methodology.¹⁷ The interpretation is growth rates of cumulative registrations during the crisis period relative to the reference period. Whilst the COVID period shows a clear decline and sharp recovery across all countries, the GFC exhibited a protracted decline in entry growth rates from the onset of the crisis.

¹⁷This takes the ratio of cumulative firm creation beginning in 2008m3 for the GFC and 2019m9 for COVID, relative to cumulative firm creation beginning in 2006m3 and 2017m9 for the reference period. It then rescales these ratios as percent deviation from the crisis start, 2008m9 and 2020m3 respectively.

Figure 2: Cumulative business registrations, Global Financial Crisis (GFC) vs. COVID, for UK, United States, France

Source: Authors' calculations using Companies House, BvD-FAME, US Census and INSEE.



Note: registrations of corporations or equivalent. Reference period: similar month of 2018 for COVID, 2006 for the GFC.

Since the pandemic several papers have documented other cross-country evidence on firm creation. Different economic policies and different data measurement of firm creation across countries (e.g. whether it includes self-employment or informal work) is likely to explain differences across countries. A detailed analysis is beyond our scope, but it is helpful to reflect on several studies compared to our UK evidence. Importantly our evidence is for incorporated companies, and the UK Government offered among the most generous employment support worldwide.

OECD (2021) document that countries such as Australia, Belgium, France, Norway, Singapore, the UK, and the US experienced V-shaped recoveries in firm creation, noting strong firm creation throughout 2021. Other countries, such as Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain, experienced U-shaped recoveries with milder firm creation into 2021. Consistent with the analysis in this paper, the OECD evidence is for company incorporations. As described in the Introduction, that literature typically considers entrepreneurship by necessity to lead to rises in self-employment rather than incorporations. This sug-

gests the patterns seen reflect changes in opportunity entrepreneurship over necessity entrepreneurship.

Recent work on the US by Haltiwanger and Decker (2023) finds resilience in firm creation since COVID-19 that has persisted into 2023. They verify their results against other well-established US data sources on firm creation, and they find evidence for a rise in employer businesses, and a break in trend. A difference with our work is that the core data – Business Formation Statistics (BFS) – may include self-employed individuals since there are reasons for them to seek Employer Identification Numbers (EINs). In a discussion of this work, Pugsley (2023) analyses self-employment data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), also covered in Fairlie (2020), which surges during the pandemic. He hypothesises that the surge is due to replacement (exit of firms) and incumbents shrinking, such that aggregate labour goes towards startups in the form of self-employment or small businesses, the latter of which is more consistent with the UK experience. For Spain, Albert, Caggese, González, and Martin-Sanchez (2023) show that there was an overall increase in necessity entrepreneurship, but opportunity entrepreneurship accounts for relatively higher firm creation among wealthier groups since they faced fewer financial constraints. Given generous employment support in the UK, our evidence is consistent with the limited financial constraints hypothesis and stark difference we show between the pandemic recession and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in Figure 2. In early work, Galanakis, Greaves, Savagar, and Simpson (2023) find positive correlations between furlough intensity and business creation. Furlough gave workers a guaranteed income, limiting their financial constraint.

3.2 Entry composition

We then focus on the UK experience, and describe in more details the rise in firm entry during COVID. Figure 3 shows the total cumulative increase in firm creation over the COVID-19 pandemic (2020q2-2021q3) relative to pre-pandemic (2018q2-2019q3), and its decomposition by sector. We can see that 139,863 more firms were created during the pandemic relative to pre-pandemic, with the online retail sector (SIC 4-digit sector ‘Retail sale via mail order houses or via internet’) being the largest contributor to this

increase with 35,092 more firms.¹⁸ For reference, firms in online retail accounted for less than 2% of firms in January 2020 (Appendix B). Despite the sector’s modest size in aggregate figures, the contribution of 35,092 extra firms in online retail represents one-fourth of the increase of 139,863 in total entry. In other words, online retail makes up 25% of excess entry.

Figure 3: Change in number of cumulative incorporations, during COVID (2020q2-2021q3) vs. pre-COVID (2018q2-2019q3) and sector contributions
 Source: Authors’ calculations using BvD-FAME.




Figure 4 shows monthly firm creation in the aggregate economy and for the online retail sector. Additionally, we decompose firm creation by ownership structure to explore ex-ante sources of heterogeneity, which may affect subsequent behaviour such as survival and job posting. If existing firms quickly adjusted to setup online retail subsidiaries or benefit indirectly from business support packages we would expect to see an increase in entry from firms that are part of existing groups and therefore have a corporate shareholder. We do not find evidence for this. In fact, our evidence shows that new solo entrepreneurs play a disproportionate role, particularly in the online retail sector.

¹⁸One caveat with our results for the UK is that the pandemic is contemporaneous with the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union in January 2020 which entered fully into force in January 2021. This adds some uncertainty to our results but the fact that the changes in entrepreneurship align so closely with events during pandemic lends some confidence to our analysis.


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3 Notably, there is no increase in the share of corporate-owned firms which might occur
4 if existing firms responded quickly to new opportunities created by the pandemic. This
5 may be because the shifts in demand patterns generated by the pandemic created oppor-
6 tunities for these businesses founded by new entrepreneurs. Alternatively, this finding
7 may represent a shift in the supply of nascent entrepreneurs due to a reduction in formal
8 employment or an increase in available time due to the government furlough scheme and
9 shorter travel times.
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17 The full sample shows a sharp decline and rapid rise in firm entry after the intro-
18 duction of the first national lockdown in 2020m3. Before the crisis there are roughly
19 50,000 monthly registrations in total and this increases to 60,000 after March 2020. Solo
20 entrepreneurs increase from 60% to 65% of total firm registrations, with the increase
21 driven mostly by new solo entrepreneurs. On average, new solo entrepreneurs share
22 rises from 40% pre-COVID to 43% of all new monthly registrations from March 2020.¹⁹
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29 The online retail sample exhibits similar dynamics to the full sample but more pro-
30 nounced. Before 2020m3 average monthly entry in online retail is 1,000 compared to
31 total monthly entry of 50,000. After 2020m3 average monthly entry in online retail in-
32 creases threefold to 3,100 while total entry rises to 60,000. Hence, the sector's importance
33 more than doubles from 2% of entry to 5% of entry. Furthermore, the right panel also
34 shows that the surge in firm entry in online retail is driven to even greater extent by
35 companies setup by new solo entrepreneurs. Pre-pandemic 65% of monthly firm entry
36 in the online retail sector is attributable to solo entrepreneurs and 42% to new solo en-
37 trepreneurs; these numbers increase to 76% and 57% respectively during the pandemic.
38 The rise from 65% to 76% share for solo entrepreneurs during the pandemic is entirely
39 driven by entrepreneurs opening a business for the first time (new solo entrepreneurs).
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51 ¹⁹These numbers correspond to the share of firms by ownership type in total registrations. Note that we
52 observe an unusual number of registrations with missing ownership information in the first few months
53 of the pandemic (between March and July 2020) that we cannot allocate to ownership types. The share of
54 registrations with missing ownership information increased from an average of 0.1% pre-pandemic to 3%
55 during the pandemic, and peaked at 20% in July 2020.
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
Figure 4: Monthly firm creation by type of ownership, total economy and online retail sector, January 2016 to September 2021
 Source: authors' calculations using BvD-FAME.



Note: new solo entrepreneurs are individuals who started their first business during the pandemic. Serial entrepreneurs are individuals who owned at least one live business in January 2020 or had started another business in the five years prior to the pandemic. See section 2.1 for a detailed description of ownership categories. The red vertical line denotes March 2020, the start of the pandemic.

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Figure 5: Local projection of retail footfall on the birth rate: estimated coefficient following a 1% decline in footfall




Note: this figure shows the impulse response of the annualized weekly birth rate to a 1% footfall shock using the local projection framework as described in equation (1). The response in online retail is expressed as a contribution to the total birth rate. This annualized birth rate can be converted in weekly firm creation using the total number of firms in Jan. 20 (about 4 million of firms); a 0.082% increase in the birth rate corresponds to about $0.082\% \times 4m / 52 = 63$ more firms. Standard errors are clustered at the week level. The light shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.


Figure 5 presents the impulse response functions following a 1% negative shock to footfall. The left panel shows that following the decrease in footfall, the firm birth rate takes 9 weeks to have a significant positive effect, peaking at 0.082%. The right panel shows that the reaction of online retail is faster, and at the peak new entrants in online retail explain about a tenth (0.007 out of 0.08) of the increase in the total birth rate, despite accounting for 2% of the pre-pandemic stock.

Figure 6: Local projection of retail footfall on the birth rate: observed vs. counterfactual

(a) Annualized birth rate, observed and counterfactual (with no footfall shock), 2020w14-2021w39



(b) Cumulative firm creation in deviation from counterfactual entry with no footfall shock, 2020w14-2021w39



Note: the counterfactual is estimated using equation (1) at horizon 0: $\text{Birth rate}_t = \sum_{j=0}^4 \gamma_j^0 \text{Footfall}_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \eta_j^0 \text{Birth Rate}_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t$. We start by predicting the birth rate in 2020w10 assuming the footfall shock is null, i.e. using four past observations of the birth rates and their estimated coefficients (η_j^0) as well as the residuals (ε_t). We then process by iteration and use the lagged predicted values to predict following weeks. This way, we are able to compute an annualized counterfactual birth rate over 2020w14-2021w39, shown in Figure 6a. We then convert the annualized birth rate in weekly firm creation using the total number of firms in Jan. 20 (about 4 million of firms). Figure 6b shows the difference between observed cumulative business creation over 2020w14-2021w39 and counterfactual cumulative business creation over 2020w14-2021w39 absent any footfall shock.

To put these impulse responses into context, Figure 6a shows the observed annual-

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3 ized birth rate (in blue) for the total economy (left-hand side) and the contribution of
4 the online retail sector to this total (right-hand side). It also shows a counterfactual
5 birth rate absent any footfall shock (in black). The counterfactual is constructed by us-
6 ing the estimates of equation (1) at horizon zero to generate the alternative time series
7 for Birth Rate_t absent any shock to footfall, that is $\text{Footfall}_t = 0$. Figure 6b translates
8 this rate in number of firms and shows the difference between the observed cumulative
9 business creation and the counterfactual over 2020w14-2021w39. The results show that
10 the footfall shock alone can account for 148,345 more businesses created over the full
11 COVID period (2020w14-2021w39, corresponding to 2020q2-2021q3), with 17,686 of
12 them in the online retail sector (12%). This corresponds roughly to the 139,863 extra
13 firms created during COVID relative to pre-COVID that we identified in Figure 3.

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25 In the Appendix D we provide additional robustness checks of our local projections
26 specification including an analysis that utilises the regional component in the data.
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30 3.3.1 Placebo Analysis and Mechanisms

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33 One potential mechanism that explains the relationship between footfall and entry, and,
34 in particular, entry in the online retail sector, is that the pandemic generated a reallo-
35 cation of demand to lockdown-compliant sectors (e.g. from brick-and-mortar to online
36 retail) and new businesses were created to meet this demand, i.e. entrepreneurship by
37 opportunity. To provide evidence for this mechanism we consider two placebo exercises.
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43 Our first placebo exercise illustrates that it is footfall in the retail sector specifically
44 that explains entry. During the pandemic, consumers faced various restrictions on leav-
45 ing their homes. Footfall dropped across many locations where people usually spend
46 time, but our evidence shows that footfall declines in other locations have no impact on
47 entry. To illustrate this, Figure 7a shows the impulse responses to a shock to mobility to
48 ‘parks’ (see definition in Section 2.4, and further discussion in Appendix C). This serves
49 as a placebo since access to such places was also restricted during the pandemic. Our
50 results show that a decline in mobility to parks has no significant effect on firm creation
51 in total, and in online retail there is a modest negative effect after nine weeks. This shows
52 that the type of footfall shock matters to firm creation responses. Specifically, declines in
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3 through a reallocation of demand to lockdown-compliant retail sectors, we would ex-
4 pect: (i) entry in sectors whose activities are unrelated to retail (e.g. construction) to
5 show no response to footfall; and (ii) a decline in entry in sectors that were not lockdown-
6 compliant (e.g. hotels and restaurants). Figure 7b confirms this hypothesis by plotting
7 the impulse responses to a retail footfall shock in two industries, namely *Accommoda-*
8 *tion and Food Services* and *Construction*. Neither sector shows a significant firm creation
9 response to a decline in retail footfall with the former showing a decline in entry. This
10 suggests that sector footfall captures sector demand. This is in contrast to our main re-
11 sults for the *Online Retail* sector, where we would expect a decline in retail footfall to
12 stimulate firm creation because of a demand shift.

13
14 An alternative mechanism that could explain our results is that the supply of en-
15 trepreneurs responds positively to footfall as there are now more people with either the
16 additional time to create firms or became entrepreneurs by necessity due to disrupted
17 labour markets (despite the furlough scheme). Such a mechanism would be consistent
18 with the rise of new solo entrepreneurs documented above. On the other hand, it is
19 harder to reconcile with our two findings that it is retail footfall that matters for entry
20 not footfall in general and that the entry is concentrated in industries that seem best
21 placed to benefit from the demand shift brought on by the pandemic.²¹ However, new
22 entrants may choose to congregate in sectors where demand is strongest so we do not
23 rule out this mechanism.

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3.4 Entrants are less likely to become employers

We have established the unusual increase in firm entry during the COVID recession and the close relationship to declines in footfall and entry, particularly for online firms. Next we consider whether this increase in entry is having a real economic impact. Are the new firms seeking to hire workers? Are they dissolving at a faster rate? We start by matching our Companies House firm entry data with job posting data from Indeed (see Section 2.3 for more details) in order to understand whether newly created firms are likely to have

²¹Entry of solo entrepreneurs specifically is not sensitive to footfall empirically. However, this result may be due to data quality issues in the early stages of the pandemic. As can be seen in Figure 4, there is a sharp increase in missing ownership information among firms entering in 2020m3-m7.

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3 an effect on employment.
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6 **3.4.1 Job posting probabilities** 7 8

9 We investigate the probability that COVID cohorts of firms post jobs as they age. To do
10 so, we analyse the cumulative share of all firms incorporated in a quarter (i.e. quarterly
11 cohorts of firms) that post a job by quarter since incorporation. We compare these shares
12 for cohorts of firms incorporated during COVID (from 2020q3) and pre-COVID (since
13 2018).
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
19 Figure 8 presents the average share for cohorts born pre and during COVID. There are
20 eight pre-COVID cohorts (2018q1-2019q4) and five COVID cohorts (2020q3-2021q3).
21 Our data ends in 2022q3, so we observe the final cohort 2021q3 until age 5.²² The fig-
22 ure reports the percentage of firms within a cohort posting a job by age, which can be
23 interpreted as the probability of posting a job by age. The statistics show that firms born
24 during COVID are less likely to post jobs at every age. There are 2.63% of firms posting
25 within two years (8 quarters) for the average pre-COVID cohort, but only 2.28% for the
26 average cohort of firms born during COVID, so a 13% decline in the posting probabili-
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36 ²²Our Indeed data begins in 2018Q1, hence our first cohort in the pre-COVID control group is 2018Q1.
37 A limitation of not having earlier data is that some pre-COVID cohorts will include COVID periods as they
38 age. For example, cohort 2018Q3 will be age 7 and 8 in 2020Q1 and 2020Q2 when COVID began. Overall,
39 this effect will decrease the pre-COVID posting rate at higher ages, so we would understate the difference
40 in posting activity. We discuss this further in Appendix E.2.1.
41

42 ²³Because job posting and incorporation data are on a daily frequency, we observe some firms posting a
43 job within the same quarter they incorporate. This case would correspond to firms posting at age one, i.e.
44 within the first quarter since incorporation.
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Figure 8: Cumulative share of firms posting a vacancy by quarter since incorporation: average over cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID

Source: Authors' calculations using matched Indeed and BvD-FAME data.



3.4.2 Job posting probabilities controlling for sector-time trends

However, the results in Figure 8 require further investigation to conclude that there was something special about the pandemic that depressed the posting rates of new entrants in particular. There are a couple of reasons for this.

First, the differential posting rate of COVID cohorts could be explained by aggregate labour market conditions that affected all firms trying to hire at the time rather than something specific about firms that were born in the pandemic. We discuss the aggregate trends in vacancy postings during the pandemic in Appendix E (see Figure 22). Importantly, there was a strong decline in the first quarters of the pandemic followed by a strong rebound in aggregate vacancy postings from Spring 2021 as the economy recovered. Therefore, entrants born during COVID operated in an aggregate environment of strong labour demand soon after their birth.

Second, entry in only a few sectors was particularly affected by the pandemic (see Figure 3). If new entrants were in sectors that typically see a lower hiring rate, then Figure 8 could simply be explained by a shift in industry composition.

To deal with these two forces we control for sector-time trends. First we transform cohort shares of firms posting at each age by subtracting the average time-sector trend across all cohorts, and we then look at the average posting per period to compare pre-COVID and COVID trends.

More specifically, let the variable $n_{c,s,q}$ be the share of companies posting on Indeed in quarter q , that were within the cohort of firms that incorporated in quarter c and operate in sector s .

We can remove the average sector time trends from this posting rate by deducting the average posting rates across cohorts (where C is the total number of cohorts in the sample).

$$\hat{n}_{c,s,q} = n_{c,s,q} - \frac{1}{C} \sum_c n_{c,s,q}$$


The age of the firm, a , is simply $q + 1 - c$.²⁴ Hence, we can manipulate indices to define $\tilde{n}_{c,s,a} \equiv \hat{n}_{c,s,a-1+c}$ as the detrended job posting rate for firms of a particular age rather than at a particular quarter. Given this, we consider the age-cohort group fixed effect coefficient ($FE_{i,a}$) from the following regression:

$$\tilde{n}_{c,s,a} = FE_{i,a} + \varepsilon_{c,s,a} \quad (2)$$

where i is a dummy denoting cohort groups ($c \in i$, with $i = \text{pre-COVID, COVID}$).

²⁴Note that $a > 0$, and $a = 1$ corresponds to the same quarter the firms incorporate. $n_{2018q1,1}$ thus corresponds to the share of firms born in 2018q1 and posting within the first quarter, i.e. between their incorporation day and the last day of 2018q1. This number is non-zero as we observe both daily incorporations and postings. We define age this way so that $a = 4$ captures firms within their fourth quarter since incorporation, i.e. within the first year. This ensures consistency with timings used for our framework in Section 4.

Figure 9: Cumulative share of firms posting a vacancy by quarter since incorporation: age-cohort group effects for cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID, controlling for sector-time trends in vacancy postings



Note: The figure on the left-hand side plots the age-cohort group fixed effects from a regression using the demeaned cumulative share of posting in Indeed in each quarter by 2-digit sector. It shows age effects by cohort group for an average cohort (absent sector-time trends). We normalize the results so that the pre-COVID group share at age one is zero. Dotted lines plot the 90% confidence intervals. The figure on the right-hand side compares the coefficients for COVID vs. pre-COVID cohorts at quarters 4 and 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference. The left-hand side focuses on the significance of the coefficients taken independently, while the right-hand side shows the significance of their difference.

Figure 9, left panel, plots the age-cohort group fixed effects with 90% confidence interval. We renormalise the coefficient plots such that $FE_{pre-COVID,1} = 0$. Hence, the values on the y-axis represents the cumulative posting rates for the two groups at different ages in deviation from the rate of the average pre-COVID cohort at age 1. The black line suggests that, by quarter 8, there are two percentage points more postings than in quarter 1 for the average cohort pre-COVID.²⁵

The green line shows that a significantly lower share of firms from cohorts of firms incorporated during the COVID pandemic (green line) relative to pre-COVID (black line)

²⁵Note that this share is an average share absent sector-time trends in postings. As a reference, 2.49% of firms post in Indeed by quarter 8 since incorporation for the average cohort.

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3 tend to post vacancies in the eight quarters following their incorporation. Indeed, the fact
4 that the green line is significantly below the black line means that at each quarter after
5 creation a firm created during COVID is less likely to post a job than a firm in the same
6 sector, subject to the same aggregate shocks, at the same point in its lifecycle, than pre-
7 COVID. The figure on the right-hand side compares the two coefficients (COVID minus
8 pre-COVID) and shows that firms born during the pandemic are about 2p.p. less likely
9 to post a vacancy in Indeed two years or eight quarters after they incorporate than firms
10 born pre-COVID.
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15 By including sector-time fixed effects and using an unweighted regression (i.e. giving
16 an equal weight to each cohort), we control for sectoral composition effects arising from
17 (i) different levels of posting rates across sectors on average over the full period and
18 (ii) sectors having different dynamics for posting and entry rates both pre and during
19 COVID. We investigate the role of both dimensions in Appendix E.2. We investigate the
20 role of different dynamics for posting rates across sectors using a weighted regression
21 (using cohort size). We then allow also for different posting rate levels across sectors
22 running the regression on aggregate data, i.e. at the quarterly cohort level and collapsing
23 cohorts across sectors. In both cases, the results are unaffected.
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28 The limited role of industry composition in driving our results suggests that the
29 greater difference between posting rates observed in Figure 9 as opposed to the simple
30 share shown in Figure 8 is due to aggregate time trends. Specifically, despite the more
31 favourable labour market conditions in 2021 experienced by firms born during COVID,
32 they did not post jobs at a faster rate than their predecessors who had a more adverse
33 environment. Our methodology enables us to control for these aggregate trends and
34 suggests that even a lower share of firms posting for firms born during COVID relative
35 to firms born pre-COVID.
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40 In contrast, our specification does not control for the changing composition of owner-
41 ship of new entrants. One explanation for a declining job posting rate among firms born
42 during COVID is that the entrants are more likely to be founded by new entrepreneurs
43 rather than serial entrepreneurs or existing corporations. We show in Figure 26 in Ap-
44 pendix that firms founded by new solo entrepreneurs are significantly less likely to post
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3 a vacancy than any other ownership group 8 quarters after entry. This is an explanation
4 for the lower probability of firms born during COVID to post on Indeed.
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8 **3.5 Entrants are more likely to dissolve**


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11 We next turn to the dissolution analysis, and want to analyse the share of firms dissolving
12 by quarter since incorporation and by cohort (born pre-COVID vs. COVID). Dissolutions
13 were strongly affected by the ‘easement’ period in which Companies House stopped reg-
14 istering dissolutions for the first two quarters of 2020 (Appendix F). Consequently we
15 exclude cohorts of firms affected by the easement period. Therefore, we abstract from
16 the 2018q1-2020q2 period and compare dissolutions within the first two years since in-
17 corporation for firms born between 2016q1-2017q4 (and dissolving before the easement
18 period) to firms born after 2020q2.
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28 **3.5.1 Dissolution probabilities**

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31 Figure 10 presents the average share for cohorts born pre and during COVID. There are
32 eight pre-COVID cohorts (2016q1-2017q4) and five COVID cohorts (2020q3-2021q3).
33 Our data ends in 2022q3, so we observe the final cohort 2021q3 until age 5. The figure
34 reports the percentage of firms within a cohort dissolving by age, which can be inter-
35 preted as the probability of dissolving by age. The statistics show that firms born during
36 COVID are more likely to dissolve at every age. There are 27.5% of firms dissolving
37 within two years (8 quarters) for the average pre-COVID cohort, and 34.1% for the aver-
38 age cohort of firms born during COVID, so a 24% increase in the dissolution probability.
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Figure 10: Cumulative share of firms dissolving by quarter since incorporation: average over cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID

Source: Authors' calculations using BvD-FAME data.



In Appendix F.1.1 we present the data points underlying Figure 10 and list the cohorts used in obtaining the averages. The sharp increase in dissolutions at ages 6 and 7 is because new firms must submit their accounts from 18 to 21 months old, hence many dissolve at this stage.


3.5.2 Dissolution probabilities: age-cohort group effects

Because we already exclude cohorts affected by the easement period, and because there is no aggregate trend in dissolution rates, we do not need to control for time-sector trends as we do in the job postings analysis.²⁶

Figure 11 plots the age-cohort group fixed effects coefficient ($FE_{i,a}$) from the following regression: $n_{c,s,a} = FE_{i,a} + \varepsilon_{c,s,a}$, with $n_{c,s,a}$ denoting this time the share of companies dissolving, with s the sector, a the quarterly age of the cohort and c the quarter of incorporation. We have i a dummy denoting cohort groups ($c \in i$, with $i = \text{pre-COVID, COVID}$).

²⁶In the Appendix, Figure 27 shows similar life-cycle profiles for dissolutions across all cohorts, except those affected by easement which we exclude, whereas Figure 23 shows clear differences in the shape of the cohort plots across the lifecycle for vacancy postings.

Figure 11: Cumulative share of firms dissolving by quarter since incorporation: age-cohort group effects for cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID



Note: The figure on the left-hand side plots the age-cohort group fixed effects from a regression using the demeaned cumulative share of firms dissolving in each quarter by 2-digit sector. It shows age effects by cohort group for an average cohort. We normalize the results so that the pre-COVID group share at age one is zero. Dotted lines plot the 90% confidence intervals. The figure on the right-hand side compares the coefficients for COVID vs. pre-COVID cohorts at quarters 4 and 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference. The left-hand side focuses on the significance of the coefficients taken independently, while the right-hand side shows the significance of their difference.

Figure 11, left panel, shows the age-cohort group fixed effects as well as its 90% confidence interval. It shows that a significantly higher share of firms from cohorts of firms incorporated during the COVID pandemic (green line) relative to pre-COVID (black line) tend to dissolve within the first eight quarters following their incorporation, and this relative higher probability increases as firms age. The figure on the right-hand side compares the two coefficients (COVID minus pre-COVID) and shows that firms born during the pandemic are about 14p.p. more likely to dissolve in the eighth quarter after they incorporate than firms born pre-COVID.

The regressions presented here are again unweighted, so do not account for a change in cohort size and do not capture composition effects driven by a change in sector compo-

sition. We present a weighted regression (using cohort size) and a regression on aggregate data in Appendix F; results are unaffected.

As with job postings, the results could reflect changing composition of ownership with the rising share of new solo entrepreneurs. We find in Figure 30 in Appendix that new solo entrepreneurs dissolve significantly more than most other groups by quarter 8 raising the overall dissolution rate for COVID cohorts.

4 Statistical Framework

Our five facts achieve our first aim of providing deeper understanding to the firm dynamics observed during COVID-19. However, the findings still present a puzzle when it comes to the aggregate impact of firm creation during the pandemic: many more firms were born but they were also more likely to fail and, conditional on survival, less likely to hire workers. Therefore, did the surge in firm creation generate an increase in aggregate employment? To answer this question, we map our observed facts into a statistical framework, based on a simplified version of work by Pugsley and Sahin (2018). This allows us to estimate the aggregate effect of entry on employment and to decompose the employment effect into different channels as cohorts of firms age.

Let $E_{j,a}^i$ be the total employment of firms of type j that register in period i by the time they reach age a (in quarters). To fix ideas, in line with the analysis above, we will focus on j 's that index firms industry or ownership status. Mechanically, $E_{j,a}^i$ can be decomposed into the following product:

$$E_{j,a}^i = N_{j,0}^i \times (1 - \delta_{j,a}^i) \times p_{j,a}^i \times s_{j,a}^i. \quad (3)$$

$N_{j,0}^i$ is the number of new firms started in period i and $(1 - \delta_{j,a}^i)$ is the number that survive to age a (such that $\delta_{j,a}^i$ is a cumulative dissolution rate as in the previous section). Thus the product of the first two terms is the number of live firms remaining as potential employers. Next, $p_{j,a}^i$ is the share of live firms that hire workers and $s_{j,a}^i$ is the average size of an employer-firm at age a . Together, the last two terms give us the average employment

per live firm. Recall that, as with other rapidly available data on firm creation during the pandemic such as US BFS data (Haltiwanger 2021), our Companies House data measures registrations ('incorporations'), rather than the number of new employing firms. Aggregate job creation is simply $E_a^i = \sum_j E_{j,a}^i$.

Our objective is to compare typical pre-COVID job creation by new entrants to job creation from new entrants born during the COVID period. Let $i \in \{\text{pre-COVID, COVID}\}$ denote the two different time periods. To implement our framework, we need to specify each of the four terms in equation (3) for $i \in \{\text{pre-COVID, COVID}\}$ for different age horizons a and for different firm types j . Our data and models allow us to do this for most of the required parameters although along some dimensions we only observe proxies. Consequently, our estimates are approximations and uncertainty is greater further into the future (e.g. when $a = 8$) and for certain firm types where the sample size is small. Nonetheless, the exercise emphasises the relative importance of the different channels for aggregate employment, and distils how the facts we have documented push in opposite directions in terms of their effect on aggregate employment.²⁷

4.1 Aggregate Employment Projections

To start, we abstract from ex-ante heterogeneity in firm types, dropping j subscripts accordingly, and treat all firms born at a particular time i as having equivalent prospects. This has the advantage of improving the precision of our estimates for the average firm but at the cost of not taking into account that the composition of entry also changed during the pandemic. We focus on how many jobs new entrants created in aggregate at $a = 4$ and 8 quarters old.

4.1.1 Calibration

To calibrate the required parameters, first, consider the firm creation levels, N_0^{pre} and N_0^{COVID} . The COVID period corresponds to the 6 quarters from 2020q2-2021q3 where footfall shocks generated excessive entry (Section 3.2). Therefore as a pre-COVID com-

²⁷Brexit uncertainty affects all cohorts over the time period. Pre-Covid cohorts are affected by the impact of the UK vote to exit the EU in June 2016 and Covid cohorts by the UK leaving the EU's single market and customs union in January 2021.

parison we take the equivalent 6 quarters prior to the pandemic – 2018q2-2019q3. During the pre-COVID period 959,225 (639,483 annualised) firms were registered versus 1,099,088 (732,725 annualised) registered in the COVID period. This difference of 139,863 closely matches the 148,345 counterfactual difference in entry that occurred due to foot-fall shocks (Figure 6b).

Second, consider the dissolution rates, δ_a^{pre} and δ_a^{COVID} for $a \in \{4, 8\}$. These are directly observable from our data. The only complexity is dealing with the previously discussed easement period which means dissolution rates at firms created immediately pre-COVID are not reliable. Instead, we compute average, realised, dissolution rates for the same pre-COVID and COVID cohorts as in Figure 10.²⁸ That is, pre-COVID cohorts are 2016q1-2017q4 and COVID cohorts are 2020q3-2021q3.

Third, consider aggregate hiring rates of live firms, p_a^{pre} and p_a^{COVID} . These require more work to ascertain directly. Our Indeed job posting data is advantageous in allowing us to track posting rates of cohorts over time at high frequency. However, since only about 13% of employers use Indeed, the data underestimates aggregate posting rates. From the IDBR we know the number of employer-firm births in a given year. This number tracks new firm registrations with a one year lag (Appendix Figure 13). Therefore, to approximate p_4^{pre} we use the ratio between employer-firm births in 2019 (described in Section 2.2) and company registrations in 2018 adjusted for dissolutions:

$$p_{4,IDBR}^{\text{pre}} = \frac{\text{ONS IDBR employer-firm births}_{t=2019}}{\text{Companies House registrations}_{t=2018} \times (1 - \delta_4^{\text{pre}})} = 0.55.$$

Hence, our approximation for p_4^{pre} is 55% implying that 55% of registrations become employers within one year. This is likely to be an underestimate as firms may become employers long after they have incorporated. Although levels in Indeed may not represent the aggregate, the time-series evolution of postings is reliable (see Appendix E.1). Therefore, to compute the remaining three hiring rates ($p_8^{\text{pre}}, p_4^{\text{COVID}}, p_8^{\text{COVID}}$), we assume

²⁸Note that we take the realised aggregate dissolution rates (as shown in Figure 10) as opposed to using the estimates from Figure 11 which control for industry specific factors to distinguish between periods. This enables us to capture any effect on dissolutions that comes through changes in industrial composition of entrants. This decision makes little difference for $a = 4$. However, if δ_8^{COVID} was 14pp higher than δ_8^{pre} as Figure 11 suggests, versus the 7pp difference in the aggregate data, then job creation would fall by an additional 151,787 jobs.

that the ratio between each rate and $p_{4,IDBR}^{\text{pre}}$ equals the equivalent ratio in our Indeed posting data. Hence, we scale the Indeed data ratio by our approximations of p_4^{pre} :

$$p_8^{\text{pre}} = p_{4,IDBR}^{\text{pre}} \times \frac{p_{8,Indeed}^{\text{pre}}}{p_{4,Indeed}^{\text{pre}}}, \quad p_4^{\text{COVID}} = p_{4,IDBR}^{\text{pre}} \times \frac{p_{4,Indeed}^{\text{COVID}}}{p_{4,Indeed}^{\text{pre}}}, \quad p_8^{\text{COVID}} = p_{4,IDBR}^{\text{pre}} \times \frac{p_{8,Indeed}^{\text{COVID}}}{p_{4,Indeed}^{\text{pre}}}.$$

The parameter values with subscript ‘‘Indeed’’ correspond to the data in Figure 8.

Lastly, consider firm size given by the number of workers per employer-firm (s_a^i). Our facts do not offer direct evidence on this channel, but we can obtain estimates from ONS-IDBR data. From the quarterly IDBR we know that new employer-firms started with 3.56 employees on average over 2019 which we use to approximate s_4^{pre} . A similar calculation from the IDBR over 2021 gives s_4^{COVID} as 3.42.²⁹ Our BvD data enables us to calculate mean employer-firm growth in its labour force between quarters 4 and 8, on average over 2017-2019 and for the 1.7k firms that already filed employment data and were born from 2020q1. We get that the average firm pre-COVID grows by 10% between its first and second year (since incorporation) suggesting s_8^{pre} is 3.92; similarly we get that the average COVID firm grows by 8% between its first and second year (since incorporation) suggesting s_8^{post} is 3.68.

4.1.2 Results

The first two columns in Table 1 presents our calibration for each of the four parameters in equation (3) for horizons $a = 4$ and $a = 8$. In turn, the table shows the value of employment creation (E_a^i) given these values, and the difference in employment creation from pre-COVID to COVID periods.

²⁹The quarterly IDBR only enables us to measure employment creation over total firm births, which we rescale using the share of employer-firms in total births using IDBR annual files. This number is thus firm size conditional on being an employer.

Table 1: Estimated job creation by new firms before and during the pandemic

	Weighting: Horizon:	- a=4	- a=8	Industry a=4	Ownership a=4
<u>pre-COVID</u>					
(1)	N_0^{pre} (annualised)	639,483	639,483	639,483	639,483
(2)	$1 - \delta_a^{\text{pre}}$	0.98	0.73	see	see
(3)	p_a^{pre}	0.57	0.86	Table	Table
(4)	s_a^{pre}	3.56	3.92	5	2
(5)	E_a^{pre}	1,268,322	1,565,397	1,281,340	1,225,954
<u>COVID</u>					
(6)	N_0^{COVID} (annualised)	732,725	732,725	732,725	732,725
(7)	$1 - \delta_a^{\text{COVID}}$	0.97	0.66	see	see
(8)	p_a^{COVID}	0.45	0.75	Table	Table
(9)	s_a^{COVID}	3.42	3.68	5	2
(10)	E_a^{COVID}	1,105,597	1,335,024	1,124,738	763,267
(11)	E_a Difference	-162,725	-230,373	-156,602	-462,688
<u>Counterfactuals</u>					
(12)	Only $N_{j,0}^i$ Changes	184,932	228,248	71,934	66,948
(13)	Only $\delta_{j,a}^i$ Changes	-7,265	-142,898	-13,630	-3,940
(14)	Only $p_{j,a}^i$ Changes	-256,617	-200,505	-93,427	-202,749
(15)	Only $s_{j,a}^i$ Changes	-51,702	-94,861	-80,656	-353,493
(16)	No change in $s_{j,a}^i$	-115,741	-144,254	-69,750	-154,259

Given our calibration, row (5) of Table 1 suggests that prior to the pandemic a year's worth of new entrants would create approximately 1.27 million jobs in their first year and an additional 300 thousand jobs in their second. By way of comparison, the IDBR data shows that new employers created 1.07 million jobs in 2019.

Row (10) of Table 1 provides the equivalent figure for the COVID period and row (11) the difference between E_a^{COVID} and E_a^{pre} . The message from this figures is that cohort of firms born during the pandemic, despite the cohort's size, generated (on annualised basis) 162,725 fewer jobs in their first year than the pre pandemic cohort and 230,373 fewer in their second year; a respectively 13% and 15% reduction in job creation over the first and second year.

To understand what drives this finding, rows (12)-(15) consider the difference be-

tween E_a^{pre} and four counterfactual values of E_a^{COVID} where individually only one of N_0^i , δ_a^i , p_a^i and s_a^i are allowed to vary from their pre-COVID levels. The message from row (12) is that if the firms created during the pandemic survived and hired workers at the same rate as their pre-COVID counterparts, an extra 184,932 jobs would have been created in their first year relative to the pre-COVID baseline. This amounts to a 15% rise in job creation. However, the fact that fewer firms created during the pandemic sought to hire workers and when they did, hired fewer of them, pushes in the opposite direction leading to an overall reduction in job creation.

Row (16) considers the robustness of our calibration to an alternative where we hold fix average employer-firm size at s_a^{pre} in the Covid period. Firm size is the most uncertain part of calibration as it requires an extrapolation from the limited number of firms that have reported employment data in BVD for the pandemic period. Holding size fixed diminishes the estimated decline in aggregate job creation by around a third and serves for a useful lower bound on our estimates.

As an overall robustness check, in Appendix G we compare these figures to official statistics on job creation from new employers from the ONS IDBR (Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2022a). This data cannot be directly used for our analysis because we cannot track firms through time and it is unclear when the firms that enter the IDBR were first founded. Nonetheless, the number of jobs created by new firms appearing on the IDBR has fallen from just over 300,000 per quarter prior to the pandemic to around 240,000 during and after the pandemic. This 20% decline matches our own estimates from Table 1.

Last, note that our data provides sufficient information to study employment effects in our statistical framework up to two years. The longer run impact beyond this two-year horizon is uncertain and our data is insufficient to shed light on what the consequences will be several years down the line.

4.2 Employment Projections by Ownership and Industry

The statistical framework in equation (3) is clearly non-linear. The initial approach of taking aggregate averages misses composition effects. For example, the analysis in

columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 will underestimate the effect of the pandemic on employment creation if there has been a shift in entrants away from industries that hire more workers or grow more quickly on than the economy-wide average.

Our facts above highlighted two key changes in entry composition during the pandemic. So we now turn to considering how the change in industry and ownership composition among new entrants has affected employment creation. Specifically, we now apply the statistical framework in equation (3) when j indexes firms by (i) each of the seventeen different industry types in Figure 3 and (ii) the 5 different ownership types articulated in Section 1. We focus solely on $a = 4$, data constraints prevent a calibration based on $a = 8$.

4.2.1 Calibration

We calibrate parameters using broadly the same methodology as in our aggregate analysis, except that we now estimate $\{N_{j,a}^i, p_{j,a}^i, \delta_{j,a}^i, s_{j,a}^i\}$ for groups of companies by their industry or ownership structure.

From the Companies House data it is straightforward to directly measure $N_{j,a}^i$ and $\delta_{j,a}^i$ in both the *pre* and *COVID* periods by industry and firm ownership type.

To calibrate hiring rates of live firms, $p_{j,a}^{\text{pre}}$ and $p_{j,a}^{\text{COVID}}$, the ONS data required is only available at the industry-level and not at the ownership-level. For industries, we proceed as before and approximate $p_{4,j}^{\text{pre}}$ using the ratio between employer-firm births by industry in 2019 and company registrations by industry in 2018 adjusted for industry-level dissolutions (described in Section 2.2 and Section 4.1.1). Specifically, this rate for industry j is:

$$p_{4, \text{IDBR}, j}^{\text{pre}} = \frac{\text{ONS IDBR employer-firm births}_{t=2019, j}}{\text{Companies House registrations}_{t=2018, j} \times (1 - \delta_{4, j}^{\text{pre}})}$$

To get a rate by type of ownership we use Indeed relative posting rates by ownership to rescale the aggregate posting rate from the IDBR. Specifically, this rate for ownership

type o is:

$$p_{4,o}^i = \frac{p_{4,o,Indeed}^i}{(1 - \delta_{4,o}^i)} \times \frac{p_{4,IDBR}^i}{p_{4,Indeed}^i},$$

where $p_{4,o,Indeed}^i$ is the job posting rate of ownership type o of cohort i at age $a = 4$.

For the number of workers per employer-firm ($s_{j,a}^i$), IDBR quarterly data is only available for the aggregate. However, our BvD data enables us to calculate employer-firm size in quarter 4, by industry and ownership relative to the aggregate, on average over 2017-2019 and for the 1,7 thousand firms that already filed employment data and were born from 2020q1. We apply these relative sizes to ONS aggregate firm size pre-COVID and during COVID. Specifically, letting $s_{a,BVD}^i$ and $s_{a,IDBR}^i$ be the average number of workers recorded in BVD and IDBR respectively, then our calibration is:

$$s_{j,a}^i = \frac{s_{a,IDBR}^i}{s_{a,BVD}^i} \times s_{j,a,BVD}^i.$$

Since there are only 1,700 firms incorporated during COVID that already declare employment data in BVD, the sample size becomes small as we exploit more granular characteristics to compute $s_{j,a,BVD}^{COVID}$. For example, there are only 31 firms born during COVID and in online retail with employment data. This is the reason we focus only on calibrating to $a = 4$. As above, employer-firm size is the most uncertain element of our calibration. Below, we will also conduct a sensitivity check assuming that the firm size margin does not change, and these do not affect our broad conclusions.

4.2.2 Results

Column (3) of Table 1 presents the aggregate employment creation in the *pre* and *COVID* periods when we account of the industrial composition of start ups. Table 5 (in the appendix) present the underlying calibration and predictions for each industry. The headline result from accounting for the industrial composition of start ups is near identical to the aggregate calibration in column (1): a 12% decline in employment creation (from 1,281,340 to 1,124,738).

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3 However, this total result masks offsetting forces present when one accounts for in-
4 dustrial heterogeneity. The counterfactual where we only allow the number of entrants
5 by industry to change yields 71,934 new jobs compared to the 184,932 new jobs cre-
6 ated in the equivalent exercise in column (1) which just considers aggregate entry. This
7 is consistent with a shift in entry composition towards industry that typically created
8 fewer jobs even to prior to the pandemic. Offsetting this is a reduced role for the decline
9 in the job posting rate. *Ceteris paribus*, the decline in job postings accounts for 93,437
10 few jobs when one accounts for the industrial composition compared to 256,617 fewer
11 jobs from the exercise in column (1). The message being that decline in job postings is
12 concentrated in industries where dissolution rates are relatively high and ex-post firm
13 size is low so the effect is mitigated.

14
15 Column (4) of Table 1 considers the total effects where we account for start-ups own-
16 ership composition. The key result is that change in employment creation from pre to
17 COVID periods is significantly worse when we consider the change in ownership com-
18 position, rather than the change in industry composition or using aggregate data. There
19 is a fall of 1,225,954 to 763,267, a 38% decline.

20
21 Table 2 presents employment projections by ownership structure. Corporate owners
22 (i.e. subsidiaries) are the most important component of total employment in both peri-
23 ods, but they are the least important in terms of registrations. The decline in their size
24 after four quarters is the key factor reducing employment by entrants during COVID.
25 Additionally, there is no offsetting positive effect on employment from increased firm
26 creation which we observe in other categories, in fact entry declines for corporate owners
27 which reinforces the fall in employment creation by 12,851.

28
29 In stylized fact (ii) (Section 3.2), we stress the disproportionate role of “Solo en-
30 trepreneurs (new)” – owners setting-up their first business – in driving the boom in
31 firm creation. Table 2 reiterates the importance of this category in terms of firms cre-
32 ated rising from 253,395 pre-COVID to 314,915 during COVID. However, given those
33 companies are usually very small (1.60 employees on average pre-COVID, vs. 3.56 for
34 the average firm), this surge translates in few jobs –in isolation this channel boosts em-
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Table 2: Employment Projections by Ownership, $a = 4$

		Solo new	Solo serial	Group new	Group serial	Corp.	Other	Total
Pre-COVID								
(1)	$N_{j,0}^{\text{pre}}$ (annualised)	253,395	144,675	83,765	111,669	45,639	340	639,483
(2)	$1 - \delta_{j,a}^{\text{pre}}$	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	
(3)	$p_{j,a}^{\text{pre}}$	0.45	0.61	0.62	0.80	0.69	0.57	
(4)	$s_{j,a}^{\text{pre}}$	1.60	1.51	2.07	2.83	18.14	3.56	
(5)	$E_{j,a}^{\text{pre}}$	177,962	129,833	106,695	246,491	564,298	674	1,225,954
COVID								
(6)	$N_{j,0}^{\text{COVID}}$ (annualised)	314,915	167,315	84,413	96,757	44,600	24,725	732,725
(7)	$1 - \delta_{j,a}^{\text{COVID}}$	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97	
(8)	$p_{j,a}^{\text{COVID}}$	0.38	0.45	0.59	0.67	0.58	0.45	
(9)	$s_{j,a}^{\text{COVID}}$	0.65	1.51	1.81	2.11	12.61	3.42	
(10)	$E_{j,a}^{\text{COVID}}$	75,043	110,572	88,442	133,300	318,603	37,308	763,267
(11)	$E_{j,a}$ Difference	-102,919	-19,261	-18,253	-113,191	-245,696	36,633	-462,688
Counterfactuals								
(12)	Only $N_{j,0}^i$ Changes	43,206	20,317	825	-32,914	-12,851	48,365	66,948
(13)	Only $\delta_{j,a}^i$ Changes	-1,568	-599	-1,091	126	-804	-4	-3,940
(14)	Only $p_{j,a}^i$ Changes	-28,560	-33,760	-5,073	-40,514	-94,705	-136	-202,749
(15)	Only $s_{j,a}^i$ Changes	-105,396	-27	-13,599	-62,483	-171,960	-27	-353,493
(16)	No change in $s_{j,a}^i$	6,075	-19,238	-5,335	-67,927	-106,053	38,219	-154,259

The column headings are abbreviations of: Solo entrepreneur, new; Solo entrepreneur, serial; Group of individual shareholders, all new; Group of individual shareholders, at least one serial; Corporate shareholder, at least one; Other/Missing.

5 Conclusion

We study firm creation in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic. We establish five stylized facts from new data. First, we show that firm creation has been countercyclical during the COVID crisis, and this is at odds with nearly all recessions over the last century in the UK. Then, we investigate the background to this puzzling fact. Our second fact shows that firm creation has been concentrated in specific sectors like online retail, and of that most registrations come through solo entrepreneurs rather than groups of individuals or corporations. Our third fact uses footfall data to identify a mechanism for rising firm creation. We show that as footfall in brick-and-mortar retailers declines, firm entry in all sectors, especially online retail, expands. Our last two facts show that this

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2 boom in firm creation does not have the usual employment effects that we would expect
3 in normal times over a short-run horizon. Using matched data from online job postings,
4 in fact four we show that firms created during the pandemic are less likely to post jobs,
5 and in fact five we show that firms created during COVID are more likely to dissolve.
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10 Given our five facts, we then bring them together into a statistical framework in order
11 to understand what the facts imply for aggregate employment. Our framework divides
12 employment changes into four channels which relate to our stylized facts: registrations
13 of new firms, conversion of registrations to employer firms (i.e. job postings), dissolu-
14 tions and firm employment size changes. The framework shows that despite the surge in
15 business registrations, new firms generated fewer jobs in their first two years than firms
16 born pre-pandemic. This framework highlights the opposing effects of different chan-
17 nels, for example booming firm creation – ceteris paribus – would increase employment,
18 but it is more than offset by lower conversion of registrations to employer firms, higher
19 dissolution rates and declines in firm size.
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30 As a final exercise, we apply our statistical framework to individual ownership types
31 and industry structure. The aim of this exercise is to understand the implication of
32 changing industry and ownership composition during COVID, which we stress in styl-
33 ized fact (ii). The application shows that the change in ownership composition con-
34 tributes more negatively to employment creation than the change in industry compo-
35 sition, though both led to declines in employment creation relative to pre-COVID. The
36 ownership type which experienced a significant boom in firm creation – new solo en-
37 trepreneurs – did little to offset the overall effect, and in fact reinforced it, as the new
38 solo entrepreneurs hire less employees than other groups, and those registered during
39 COVID were even less likely to become employer firms, more likely to dissolve, and less
40 likely to grow.
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52 In summary, the main take-aways of our paper are (i) despite surging firm creation
53 during COVID, the short-run employment effects are limited, and (ii) the change in own-
54 ership composition of new firms during COVID played a significant role in lowering
55 employment creation by new firms.
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Appendix for online publication

The Appendix is divided into the following sections:

- **A:** Comparing data on firm entry in the UK.
- **B:** More details on sector composition of entry during the pandemic.
- **C:** Google mobility data for retail footfall.
- **D:** Local projections robustness.
- **E:** Additional results using Indeed data.
- **F:** Additional results using dissolution data.
- **G:** ONS data on firm births and employment.
- **H:** Employment projections by industry.


A Comparing data on firm entry in the UK

There are two main sources of firm entry data in the UK. First, the Companies House Register which is available directly from Companies House or indirectly through FAME by BvD. FAME allows construction of a time series of the Companies House register. Second, the inter-departmental business register (IDBR) which is accessible in aggregated form via the ONS's official Business Demography statistics.

A.1 FAME entry data

Figure 12 compare our FAME dataset series (black line) with Companies House (CH) official aggregate numbers (green line). Our final series displays less entrants than CH official numbers because we focus on limited companies and exclude shell postcodes (postcodes with more than 500 registrations in a single day). For some of the analysis, we focus on the sample of firms with industry of activity and ownership (blue line) information. The blue line excludes firms indicating “not elsewhere classified (nec)” for either the industry or ownership information.

Figure 12: Annual number of incorporations by data source



Source: Authors' calculations using Companies House and BvD-FAME.


Note: Shell postcodes (pcd) are postcodes with more than 500 registrations in a day.

A.2 Inter-departmental Business Register (IDBR) entry data

The Companies House register differs from the Government's internal register of firms called the inter-departmental business register (IDBR). The IDBR only includes firms that are registered for PAYE tax or VAT tax. That is, a firm employs someone (uses PAYE, i.e. registering payroll with UK HMRC) or if it pays VAT (in 2020 the annual turnover threshold for paying VAT was £85,000). Therefore, entries to the IDBR lag entries to the Companies House register and there are fewer entries as not all companies that register with Companies House grow to meet the IDBR thresholds.³¹

Figure 13 compares IDBR quarterly firm entry from the ONS (green line) to Companies House official numbers (black line). Additionally, we include entry on the VAT register from the ONS (blue line) as the IDBR data only starts in 2018q1. We can see that entry in the IDBR usually lags entry in Companies House by roughly four quarters.

Figure 13: Entry by data source, 4-quarter growth rate 2005q1-2021q3, %




Source: Authors' calculations using Companies House and ONS.

³¹Entry to the IDBR is also lagged relative to registering with HMRC for PAYE or VAT, see [ONS](#).

B More details on sector composition of entry during the pandemic

Figure 14 shows that online retail represents less than 2% of total live firms in January 2020. It also shows that online retail is by far the sector with the largest increase in birth rate over the pandemic, relative to pre-pandemic.

Figure 14: Sector contributions to firm entry during COVID, relative to pre-COVID




Source: Authors' calculations using BvD-FAME.

C Google mobility data for retail footfall

Figure 15 plots Google mobility data for an example region (London). It plots two of Google's defined place categories ([Google Place Category definitions](#)): Grocery & Pharmacy and Retail & Recreation. The remaining categories are Parks, Transit Stations, Residential and Workplaces. The restaurant data is from OpenTable. We measure lockdown intensity using Retail & Recreation footfall data which corresponds to the purple line in the figure. The response of retail footfall is closely correlated with lockdown periods that are indicated by shaded regions.


Figure 15: Retail footfall as an indicator of lockdown intensity: London example



Source: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Mobility Report, Greater London Authority (GLA).

Figure 16 shows the relationship between retail footfall and the annualised birth rate since the onset of the crisis in late March 2020. The footfall indicator is expressed as changes relative to the first five weeks of 2020, and the birth rate is measured as entry relative to the stock of firms in January 2020. Initially, there is a sharp decline in the birth rate but this recovers by June. The birth rate stabilizes around 15% after June 2021 (2021w23). The footfall indicator co-moves with birth rates. When there is a decline in footfall, birth rates decrease with a slight lag.

Figure 16: Annualised birth rate and decline in footfall




Source: Authors' calculations using BvD-FAME, Companies House and Google mobility data.

Note: The footfall indicator is expressed in deviation to the median corresponding day of the week during the five week period Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020; we then take the weekly average of these growth rates. Decline in footfall is the negative of the of the mobility trends for places like cafes, restaurants, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, and movie theaters.

Figure 17 shows that mobility to parks increased whilst mobility to retail declined over the pandemic. This likely reflects that during lockdown, when shops were closed, green spaces were still open and people to allow people to exercise.

Figure 17: Mobility to retail and recreation vs. mobility to parks
 Source: Authors' calculations using Google Mobility data.



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D Local projections robustness

We present robustness results for our local projections. First, we provide additional checks to our main aggregate model. We present IV estimates to address possible endogeneity, and we also present a sensitivity check on our inclusion of lagged dependent variables. Second, we present an alternative model to our aggregate model which exploits the regional panel dimension of our data, such that the source of variation is footfall across regions rather than aggregate variation due to national lockdowns.


D.1 Robustness results using aggregate model

D.1.1 IV estimation with lockdown stringency

Figure 18 presents results for our main local projections regression where we use instrumental variable estimation. Footfall and entry are often considered endogenous because of reverse causality. Entry can cause new footfall to an area, e.g. in the case of a new retail park, or footfall can cause entry as supply responds to demand indicated by people visiting an area. Our main justification for overcoming this endogeneity is that the high-frequency of our data limits the problem. There are time lags in securing a premises, acquiring stock and advertising to customers which suggest it is unlikely for entry to cause footfall within a week. This would not be the case if we had annual data.

An alternative strategy to address this problem is to use lockdown stringency measures as an instrument. Then the entry-causing-footfall channel becomes: new registration generate a change in footfall, which in turn generates a change in disease transmission, and finally a change in lockdown policy. Given the infection lags with the disease this seems implausible to occur within a week. Additionally, it is possible that some of the variation in footfall that we see is due to other shocks unrelated to the pandemic. The IV estimator would also address this concern. We test for the weak instrument problem and find an F-stat exceeding 10.

Figure 18: Instrumenting footfall with a lockdown stringency index




Note: this figure shows the impulse response of the annualized weekly birth rate to a 1% footfall shock using the local projection framework as described in equation (1), and instrumenting footfall with a lockdown stringency index. The response in online retail is expressed as a contribution to the total birth rate. Standard errors are clustered at the week level. The light shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.

D.1.2 Lagged Dependent Variables Sensitivity Check

Figure 19 reports the impulse responses to a negative retail footfall shock for our main model without lagged dependent variables included. They do not affect our conclusions.

Figure 19: Omitting the lagged dependent variables



Note: this figure shows the impulse response of the annualized weekly birth rate to a 1% footfall shock using the local projection framework as described in equation (1), but excluding the lags of the dependent variable. The response in online retail is expressed as a contribution to the total birth rate. Standard errors are clustered at the week level. The light shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.

D.2 Alternative local projections using regional variation

In our main analysis we focus on aggregate data. There is also a regional dimension to our data. However, adding this panel dimension to our model raises econometric challenges. Dynamic panel models with lagged dependent variables and fixed effects are subject to bias. For completeness, we present the results exploiting a regional dimension below. Our results do not vary greatly across specifications.³²

The regional specification of the model is as follows, where subscript k denotes region:

$$\text{Birth rate}_{k,t+h} = \sum_{j=0}^4 \gamma_j^h \text{Footfall}_{k,t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \eta_j^h \text{Birth Rate}_{k,t-j} + FE_k + \varepsilon_{k,t}.$$

The explanatory variable birth rate is:


$$\text{Birth Rate}_{k,t} \equiv \frac{\text{Entry}_{k,t}}{\text{Total Firms in Jan 2020}_k}.$$

³²In order to conduct the regional analysis, we match Companies House incorporations to the local authority where the firm is located using an ONS tool ([ONS region lookup tool](#)). Similarly, the Google mobility data is divided into 381 specific regions which we match using the same tool. This procedure follows Fetzer (2022).

The variable $Entry_{k,t}$ measures the number of entrants in location k in week t . We hold the definition of the denominator fixed as the regional total across all firm types. We do this for comparability and to avoid over-weighting regions with small initial levels of firms in online retail.

Figure 20 presents the impulse response functions following a 1% negative shock to footfall. The left panel shows that following the decrease in footfall, the firm birth rate takes 9 weeks to have a significant positive effect with a peak of 0.075% after 12 weeks. The right panel shows that the reaction of online retail is faster, and at the peak new entrants in online retail explain about a tenth (0.005 out of 0.05) of the increase in the total birth rate, despite accounting for 2% of the pre-pandemic stock.


Figure 20: Estimated coefficient following a 1% decline in footfall from regional data



Note: these figures show the impulse response of the annualized weekly birth rate to a 1% footfall shock using the following extended version of the local projection framework described in equation 1 in the paper, where k denotes region: $Birth\ rate_{k,t+h} = \sum_{j=0}^4 \gamma_j^h Footfall_{k,t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \eta_j^h Birth\ Rate_{k,t-j} + FE_k + \varepsilon_{k,t}$. The response in online retail is expressed as a contribution to the total birth rate. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and week level. The light shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.

Figure 21 shows the impulse responses from our local projection analysis when we include time fixed effects. Relying solely on variation between regions, we find a delayed effect on entry, and the impact of regional footfall shocks on entry is weaker. Therefore, the spillovers across regions that arise from a national lockdown (in other words, the results absent time FE) strengthen the entry response. We do not want to purge these spillover effects since they are an important part of the national lockdown.

Figure 21: Estimated coefficient following a 1% decline in footfall using regional variation (including time fixed effects)




Note: these figures show the impulse response of the annualized weekly birth rate to a 1% footfall shock using the following extended version of the local projection framework described in equation 1 in the paper, where k denotes region: $\text{Birth rate}_{k,t+h} = \sum_{j=0}^4 \gamma_j^h \text{Footfall}_{k,t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \eta_j^h \text{Birth Rate}_{k,t-j} + FE_k + FE_t + \varepsilon_{k,t}$. The response in online retail is expressed as a contribution to the total birth rate. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and week level. The light shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.

E Additional results using Indeed data

E.1 Indeed postings versus ONS vacancy survey

Figure 22 shows that our job postings data from Indeed is closely related to vacancies in the ONS Vacancy Survey (Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2023). This figure shows ONS vacancies and Indeed postings relative to the 2019 average. The Indeed vacancies are for the sub-sample of Indeed postings that match with new firm creation in Companies House. Overall the data shows a sharp decline in job postings from the onset of the pandemic in the first quarter of 2020, and a recovery from Spring 2021. Note that the recovery is stronger in Indeed data relative to the ONS Vacancy Survey. This is because the ONS Vacancy Survey does not include newly incorporated firms, and, as we can see on the figure, the recovery in job postings was strongest for young businesses in Indeed (incorporated within the year of posting the position).

Figure 22: ONS vacancies vs. Indeed job postings, by posting date, 2019=100




Source: Authors' calculations using BvD-FAME, Indeed and ONS Vacancy Survey data monthly experimental data.

E.2 Job postings cohort analysis

Figure 23 plots the cumulative share of firms posting a vacancy for 15 cohorts of firms. That is each quarterly cohort between 2018Q1 and 2021Q3. Consider the first cohort, indicated by the black line that begins in 2018Q1 at 0.5% cumulative share. This shows that of firms born in 2018Q1 roughly 0.5% of them post a vacancy in their first quarter, rising to 1% in their second quarter, and 2% by three quarters in 2018Q3. By the time that cohort of firms is 15 quarters old, in 2022Q3, 6% of the cohort have posted a job. The figure shows that there are quarterly fixed effects in vacancy postings. For example, in 2021Q3 the curves flatten across all cohorts. And, all cohorts flatten around the middle period when COVID began.

Figure 23: Cumulative share of firms posting a vacancy by quarterly cohorts of incorporation



Source: Authors' calculations using matched Indeed and BvD-FAME data. Note: cohorts born before the first red vertical line (2020q1) are firms born pre-COVID, firms born after the second red vertical line (2020q3) are born during COVID-19 (post march 2020).

To control for aggregate trends in vacancy postings, in the main text we do not present this average but a transformed version controlling for sector-time average effects. We plot the age-cohort group fixed effects in Figure 9.

E.2.1 Average posting rate by cohort age

Table 3 presents the data underlying Figure 8 which compares cumulative posting by age for pre-COVID and COVID cohorts. It emphasises the number of observations (cohorts) used to calculate the average and the cohorts that are included. This highlights two points. First, at longer time horizons there are fewer COVID cohorts to include in our average because fewer cohorts have aged sufficiently by our 2022Q3 data cut-off. For example, only two cohorts (2020Q3 and 2020Q4) reach age 8 by the 2022Q3 cut-off, so the average posting rate at age 8 for COVID cohorts is the average across these two cohorts when they are age 8. Second, our pre-COVID control cohorts will include COVID periods as they age. For example, the 2018Q2 cohort is age 8 in 2020Q1. The only cohort which does not overlap with the COVID period by age 8 is 2018Q1. This overlap is unavoidable given our Indeed data begins in 2018Q1. For our analogous dissolution analysis, our data allows us to choose a pre-COVID sample of cohorts that does not overlap with any COVID quarters.

Given posting rates are lower during COVID periods, the inclusion of COVID periods in our pre-COVID cohorts will lower the posting rate of pre-COVID cohorts, and more at higher ages. The downward effect will be stronger at higher ages because at higher ages more cohorts overlap with COVID. For example, at age 8 seven of the eight pre-COVID cohorts are in a COVID period. Whereas at age 2, only the final cohort 2019Q4 will be in a COVID period. Overall, the overlap of pre-COVID cohorts with COVID periods as they age will cause an underestimate of the posting rate relative to if there were no overlap with the COVID period. Consequently, the difference between pre-COVID and COVID cohorts that we report in Figure 8 is a lower bound.


Table 3: Cumulative Share of average posting rate

Age	Cum. avg. post.	Obs.	Cohorts Included
Pre-COVID			
1	0.4	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
2	1.0	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
3	1.4	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
4	1.7	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
5	2.0	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
6	2.2	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
7	2.4	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
8	2.6	8	2018Q1, 2018Q2, 2018Q3, 2018Q4, 2019Q1, 2019Q2, 2019Q3, 2019Q4
COVID			
1	0.2	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
2	0.6	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
3	1.0	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
4	1.4	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
5	1.7	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
6	1.9	4	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2
7	2.2	3	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1
8	2.3	2	2020Q3, 2020Q4

E.2.2 Job postings regressions weighted by cohort size

Note that the regression presented in the main paper is unweighted, meaning each cohort of firms by sector has the same weight not taking into account the cohort size and changing sector composition. We plot in Figure 24 results from a weighted regression using cohort size. This captures compositional effects stemming from different posting dynamics across sectors. The results are very similar to the unweighted ones.

Figure 24: Cumulative share of firms posting a vacancy by quarter since incorporation: average over cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID, weighted regression




Note: The figure on the left-hand side plots the age-cohort group fixed effects from a weighted regression using the demeaned cumulative share of posting in Indeed in each quarter by 2-digit sector. We use the cohort size as weight. The figure shows age effects by cohort group, relative to the pre-COVID cohort in their first quarter, and for an average cohort (absent sector-time trends). Dotted lines plot the 90% confidence intervals. The figure on the right-hand side compares the coefficients for COVID vs. pre-COVID cohorts at quarters 4 and 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference.

E.2.3 Job postings regressions excluding sectoral dimension

Figure 25 shows results using aggregate data. That is, pooling regressions at the quarterly cohort and not sectoral level. This captures compositional effects stemming from different posting dynamics and different average levels of postings across sectors. Results remain broadly unchanged.

Figure 25: Cumulative share of firms posting a vacancy by quarter since incorporation: average over cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID, aggregate regression



Note: The figure on the left-hand side plots the age-cohort group fixed effects from a regression using the demeaned cumulative share of posting in Indeed in each quarter. The figure shows age effects by cohort group, relative to the pre-COVID cohort in their first quarter, and for an average cohort (absent time trends). Dotted lines plot the 90% confidence intervals. The figure on the right-hand side compares the coefficients for COVID vs. pre-COVID cohorts at quarters 4 and 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference.

E.2.4 Job postings probabilities by ownership type


Implicit in our results is the changing composition of cohorts by type of ownership over time. Figure 26 plots the age fixed effects coefficient by type of ownership ($FE_{o,a}$). The results are from the following regression:

$$\tilde{n}_{c,o,a} = FE_{o,a} + \varepsilon_{c,o,a} \quad \text{with} \quad \tilde{n}_{c,o,a} \equiv \tilde{n}_{c,o,a} = n_{c,o,a-1+c} - \frac{1}{C} \frac{1}{O} \sum_c n_{c,o,q} \quad (4)$$

with o the ownership type as defined in Section 2.1. We then get the age-ownership fixed effect for age eight, and compare each groups to the new solo entrepreneur group for the same age. The results show that, controlling for aggregate time trends, all ownership types post significantly more than new solo entrepreneurs at quarter 8. This suggests

that the rising share of new solo entrepreneurs could contribute to a lower probability to post on Indeed for firms born during COVID as opposed to pre-COVID.

Figure 26: Share of firms of posting a vacancy 8 quarters after incorporation, by ownership type, in deviation from new solo entrepreneurs



Note: The figure plots the age-ownership fixed effects from a regression using the de-meaned cumulative share of posting in Indeed in each quarter by cohort and type of ownership. It plots the ownership effect relative to the new solo entrepreneur cohort group at quarter 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference.


F Additional results using dissolution data

F.1 Dissolutions cohort analysis

Figure 27 plots the cumulative share of firms in a cohort dissolving for 23 cohorts of firms. This is each quarterly cohort from 2016Q1 to 2021Q3. This share is strongly affected by the easement period in which Companies House suspended dissolving companies from March to September 2020. For this reason, we compare cumulative shares for cohorts of firms excluding the easement period, that is 2016q1-2017q4 vs. 2020q3-

2021q3.

Figure 27: Cumulative share of firms dissolving by quarterly cohorts of incorporation



Source: Authors' calculations using BvD-FAME. Note: The red vertical lines denote the easing period 2020Q1 and 2020Q3.

F.1.1 Average dissolution rate by cohort age

Table 4 presents the data underlying Figure 10 which compares cumulative dissolution by age for pre-COVID and COVID cohorts. The table emphasises the number of observations (cohorts) used to calculate the average dissolution rate across cohorts at a given age, and it names the cohorts that are included in calculating this average. The table emphasises that at longer time horizons our averages are taken across fewer cohorts because cohorts have not aged sufficiently before our 2022Q3 data cut-off. It also shows the stark increase in dissolution that occurs from age 6 to 8. These quarters correspond to months 18 to 24 of the firms life-cycle when new registrations must submit their first set of accounts, hence many dissolve at this point.


Table 4: Cumulative Share of average dissolution rate

Age	Cum. avg. diss.	Obs.	Cohorts Included
Pre-COVID			
1	0.0	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
2	0.3	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
3	1.2	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
4	2.2	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
5	3.7	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
6	10.0	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
7	25.4	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
8	27.5	8	2016Q1, 2016Q2, 2016Q3, 2016Q4, 2017Q1, 2017Q2, 2017Q3, 2017Q4
COVID			
1	0.0	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
2	0.7	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
3	1.6	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
4	2.8	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
5	5.0	5	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2, 2021Q3
6	16.5	4	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1, 2021Q2
7	30.3	3	2020Q3, 2020Q4, 2021Q1
8	34.1	2	2020Q3, 2020Q4

F.1.2 Dissolution regressions weighted by cohort size

Note that the regression presented in the main paper is unweighted, meaning each cohort of firms by sector has the same weight not taking into account the cohort size and changing sector composition. In Figure 28 we plot results from a weighted regression using cohort size (number of firms). This captures compositional effects stemming from different posting dynamics across sectors. The results are similar to our unweighted regressions.

Figure 28: Cumulative share of firms dissolving by quarter since incorporation: average over cohorts born pre-COVID and during COVID, weighted regression




Note: The figure on the left-hand side plots the age-cohort group fixed effects of a weighted regression of the cumulative share of dissolving in each quarter by 2-digit sector on age-cohort group fixed effects, using the cohort size (number of firms) as weight. The figure shows age effects by cohort group, relative to the pre-COVID cohort in their first quarter, and for an average cohort (absent sector effects). Dotted lines plot the 90% confidence intervals. The figure on the right-hand side compares the coefficients for COVID vs. pre-COVID cohorts at quarters 4 and 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference.

F.1.3 Dissolution regressions excluding sectoral dimension

Figure 29 shows results using aggregate data where we pool sectors together. That is, regressions at the quarterly cohort and not sectoral level. This captures compositional effects stemming from different posting dynamics and different average levels of postings across sectors. Our results remain broadly unchanged.

Figure 29: Cumulative share of firms dissolving by quarter since incorporation: cohort analysis pre/post COVID, regression on aggregate data




Note: The figure on the left-hand side plots the age-cohort group fixed effects of a regression of the cumulative share of dissolving in each quarter on age-cohort group fixed effects. The figure shows age effects by cohort group, relative to the pre-COVID cohort in their first quarter. Dotted lines plot the 90% confidence intervals. The figure on the right-hand side compares the coefficients for COVID vs. pre-COVID cohorts at quarters 4 and 8, and shows the 90% confidence interval around the difference.

F.1.4 Dissolution probabilities by ownership type

All these results implicitly capture the changing composition of cohorts by ownership type. Figure 30 plots the average share of firms that dissolve by quarter 8 since incorporation by type of ownership, in comparison to the new solo entrepreneur group for the same age. The plots show that all ownership types, except serial solo entrepreneurs, dissolve significantly less than new solo entrepreneurs by quarter 8. This supports the hypothesis that the rising share of new solo entrepreneurs during COVID could contribute to a higher dissolution probabilities after the pandemic began.

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Figure 30: Cumulative share of firms dissolving 8 quarters since incorporation, by ownership type, in deviation from new solo entrepreneurs



G ONS data on firm births and employment

Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2022a) presents recent data on employment created by firm births in the UK, where a firm birth is recorded as the day a firm is added to the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR).


There are two notable differences to our analysis of firm creation from Companies House registrations. First, firm entry in the IDBR denotes entry of firms at a later stage of their life cycle as opposed to firm registration in Companies House, as explained in Appendix A. Second, the ONS data from the IDBR only records employments from firm births, at birth. This is what we refer to as the extensive margin, which consists of the number of births multiplied by size at birth. It does not account for the growth of firms once they are born (intensive margin), which we measure in our accumulation exercises.

Despite these differences, the broad message from this data is consistent with our

findings. There is booming firm creation following a sharp decline after the COVID-19 outbreak (Figure 31 and Figure 33), however employment from firm creation is worse after the pandemic begins than pre-pandemic (Figure 32 and Figure 34).

Figure 31: Number of Firm Births


Source: Authors' calculations from ONS 'Business Demography Quarterly Experimental Statistics'



Plot shows number of firms added to the the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) ("firm births"). We plot a four quarter rolling average because seasonality in the raw data masks the trend.

Figure 32: Employment from Firm Births

Source: Authors' calculations from ONS 'Business Demography Quarterly Experimental Statistics'



Plot shows total employment by new firms added to the the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR). We plot a four quarter rolling average because seasonality in the raw data masks the trend.


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G.1 Cumulative Analysis

Figure 33 shows an initial shortfall in firm creation over the first three quarters of the pandemic, but then a strong catch-up such that after four quarters cumulative firm creation is approximately the same as pre-pandemic. Figure 34 shows that cumulative employment from firm creation after COVID-19 (2020Q2) is significantly lower than the two pre-COVID reference periods. The data shows cumulative employment from firm creation only (extensive margin), rather than including subsequent within-firm expansion (intensive margin) in the quarters following birth. The underlying data shows that from 2018Q2-2020Q1 there are 2,299,879 employments from firm births, whereas from 2020Q2-2022Q1, there are 1,942,236 employments from firm births. Therefore, over the eight quarters following the pandemic outbreak there are 357,643 fewer employments than the eight quarters preceding the pandemic outbreak, a decline of 18%. This occurs despite there being cumulatively more firm births over the 2020Q2-2022Q1 compared to 2018Q2-2020Q1 (Figure 33). Therefore, since cumulative firm creation is similar over the two periods but cumulative employment from firm creation is much lower, this implies that firms added to the IDBR have fewer employees registered than in the past.

Figure 33: Cumulative Number of Firm Births


Source: Authors' calculations from ONS 'Business Demography Quarterly Experimental Statistics'



Plot shows cumulative number of firms added to the the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR). Each line represents cumulative births over an eight quarter time period. The two time periods are seasonally-equivalent, each beginning in Q2. The 2019Q2-2021Q2 line is omitted because it includes COVID and non-COVID periods. The 2017Q2-2019Q1 line is omitted because it is very similar to 2018Q2-2020Q1 which worsens clarity.

Figure 34: Cumulative Employment from Firm Births

Source: Authors' calculations from ONS 'Business Demography Quarterly Experimental Statistics'



Plot shows cumulative employment by new firms added to the the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR). Each line represents cumulative employment over an eight quarter time period. The three time periods are seasonally-equivalent, each beginning in Q2. The eight quarter time horizon following 2019Q2 is omitted because it includes COVID and non-COVID periods.

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H Employment Projections by Industry

Table 5 presents employment projections by industry. The projection horizon is four quarters ($a = 4$). The final column “Total” sums the employment creation in each industry and is reported in Table 1. We assume that firms in the the industry “Missing” are the economy average for δ_4^i, p_4^i, s_4^i where $i = \{\text{pre-COVID, COVID}\}$. Importantly, at a granular industry level our size measures s_a^i become more imprecise due to small sample size. We urge caution with individual industry analyses and focus on the total effect across industries in our main results. As we explain below, the main qualitative result is robust: across industries overall employment creation fell during COVID. However, some individual industries are sensitive to our robustness check on the parameterization of firm size.

The total effect from each industry’s employment creation is a decline of 156,602 relative to pre-COVID. This is mostly caused by the Other Business Services sector which is the largest sector in terms of registrations and size, and experienced a big fall in size combined with no increase in registrations. The results show that firm registrations increased in every sector except ‘Other’ and ‘Other Business Services’. Thirteen out of seventeen sectors experienced a decrease in employment creation from pre-COVID to COVID. The four sectors that observed an increase in employment creation are Construction, Accommodation & Food, Production and Public. The increase in Accommodation & Food and Construction are mainly from an increase in firm size. Whereas, for Production and Public the increases in employment are very small and occur because registrations increased, whilst other channels remained near constant.

As a robustness exercise, we hold size constant from pre-COVID to COVID period. This is an extreme assumption. It seems very unlikely that firms did not observe any decline in size during COVID, given all but three industries show a decline. Assuming size is constant switches the sign of five industries. Four switch from employment declines to employment increases, i.e. negative differences to positive differences, and only Accommodation & Food switches from a positive to a negative difference. Nonetheless, the total effect remains negative leading to a decline of 69,750 jobs compared to a decline

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3 of 156,602 when we allow size to change. Hence, we conclude that even if firm size did
4 not change, the contribution to employment from firm creation in different industries
5 fell during COVID.
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9 Lastly, we mention the online retail sector as this was the sector most affected in
10 terms of firm creation (stylized fact (ii)) and responded most to footfall shocks (stylized
11 fact (iii)). Table 5 re-emphasises the change in registrations in this sector was larger than
12 in any other sector, both in absolute terms (23,395 increase) and relative terms (150%
13 increase), and both conversion of registrations to employee-firms and size fell markedly.
14
15 Consequently, despite the strong increase in firm registrations, employment creation fell
16 in online retail during COVID, due to smaller size and lower conversion. If we hold the
17 size change constant, employment creation modestly increased relative to pre-COVID
18 (an increase in employment of 3,892). This remains a strikingly muted response, given
19 23,395 additional registrations.
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Table 5: Employment Projections by Industry, $a = 4$

	Online Retail	Retail ex. online	Real Estate	Wholesale	Construc.	Non-dur. Manuf	Transport	Accom. & Food	Motor Trade	Missing	Dur. Manuf	Educ.	Produc.	Health	Public	Other	Other Bus. Serv.	Total
Pre-COVID																		
N_0^{pre} (annualised)	15,081	34,576	46,269	24,074	67,459	15,678	30,585	44,890	12,711	13,387	13,854	10,437	3,435	24,921	1,810	61,518	218,797	639,483
$1 - \delta_a^{\text{pre}}$	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.96	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
p_a^{pre}	0.76	0.57	0.35	0.42	0.68	0.36	0.83	0.69	0.54	0.57	0.57	0.49	0.63	0.43	0.57	0.24	0.72	0.72
s_a^{pre}	1.32	2.03	1.04	2.78	1.37	2.73	1.79	3.86	2.03	3.56	3.02	4.52	1.55	3.11	1.41	2.64	5.04	5.04
E_a^{pre}	14,861	39,307	16,442	27,743	61,971	15,361	44,722	117,041	13,730	26,552	23,600	22,519	3,316	32,363	1,425	38,441	781,945	1,281,340
COVID																		
N_0^{COVID} (annualised)	38,476	55,585	63,539	36,201	77,397	21,083	35,262	48,976	16,709	15,322	15,475	11,872	4,459	25,259	2,125	57,427	207,559	732,725
$1 - \delta_a^{\text{COVID}}$	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
p_a^{COVID}	0.38	0.29	0.20	0.24	0.75	0.29	1.03	0.50	0.47	0.45	0.47	0.36	0.65	0.39	0.66	0.16	0.72	0.72
s_a^{COVID}	0.60	1.26	1.26	1.56	2.36	0.85	0.75	5.17	0.65	3.42	1.51	0.85	1.21	1.36	1.26	3.97	4.67	4.67
E_a^{COVID}	8,571	19,689	15,997	13,205	134,481	4,991	26,441	123,703	4,974	23,119	10,737	3,575	3,425	12,826	1,709	34,165	683,130	1,124,738
E_a Difference	-6,290	-19,618	-445	-14,538	72,510	-10,370	-18,281	6,661	-8,756	-3,433	-12,863	-18,944	109	-19,537	284	-4,276	-98,815	-156,602
Counterfactuals																		
N_0^i Changes	23,053	23,883	6,137	13,975	9,129	5,296	6,839	10,653	4,319	3,837	2,761	3,097	989	438	248	-2,557	-40,163	71,934
δ_a^i Changes	-222	-610	-116	-404	-559	-212	-599	-539	-252	-152	-366	70	-36	-324	-12	-394	-8,904	-13,630
p_a^i Changes	-7,399	-19,242	-6,761	-11,840	6,463	-3,321	10,497	-32,008	-1,775	-5,372	-4,067	-5,929	123	-3,063	227	-13,862	3,903	-93,427
s_a^i Changes	-8,069	-14,936	3,484	-12,198	45,138	-10,560	-25,896	39,742	-9,304	-1,082	-11,802	-18,266	-744	-18,244	-159	19,391	-57,152	-80,656
No change in $s_{j,a}^i$	3,892	-7,551	-3,242	-4,177	15,837	607	18,089	-24,696	1,697	-2,450	-2,121	-3,589	1,100	-2,964	498	-15,731	-44,948	-69,750