
Contents
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Introduction Introduction
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The Trouble with Behaviorism? The Trouble with Behaviorism?
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Neobehaviourism After Watson Neobehaviourism After Watson
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Why Radical Behaviourism is Truly Radical Why Radical Behaviourism is Truly Radical
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Why Skinner was not a Cognitive Psychologist Why Skinner was not a Cognitive Psychologist
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The Cognitive Revolution? The Cognitive Revolution?
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A Critique of Comparative Cognitivism A Critique of Comparative Cognitivism
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Firing Morgan's Canon: Use Caution Firing Morgan's Canon: Use Caution
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How impoverished is the stimulus? How impoverished is the stimulus?
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Where does Complexity Lie? Where does Complexity Lie?
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Keeping Our Metaphors Under Control Keeping Our Metaphors Under Control
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Broadening The Concept Of Cognition Broadening The Concept Of Cognition
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Conclusions and Future Directions Conclusions and Future Directions
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Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
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Notes Notes
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References References
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2 Why Behaviorism Isn't Satanism
Get accessLouise Barrett Psychology Department, University of Lethbridge, Canada
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Published:18 September 2012
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Abstract
The history of comparative evolutionary psychology can be characterized, broadly speaking, as a series of reactions to Cartesian versus pragmatist views of the mind and behavior. Here, a brief history of these theoretical shifts is presented to illuminate how and why contemporary comparative evolutionary psychology takes the form that it does. This brings to the fore the strongly cognitivist research emphasis of current evolutionary comparative research, and the manner in which alternative accounts based on learning theory and other behaviorist principles generally receive short shrift. I attempt to show why many of these criticisms of alternative accounts are unjustified, that cognitivism does not constitute the radical lurch away from behaviorism that many imagine, and that an alternative “embodied and embedded” view of cognition—itself developing in reaction to the extremes of cognitivism—reaches back to a number of behaviorist philosophical principles, including the rejection of a separation between brain and body, and between the organism and environment.
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