
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
-
2. On Being a Materialist 2. On Being a Materialist
-
3. Realism About Mental States and Consciousness 3. Realism About Mental States and Consciousness
-
4. Where Does Consciousness Fit into the Inventory of Mental States? 4. Where Does Consciousness Fit into the Inventory of Mental States?
-
5. Why the Physical Story Seems to Leave Out the Phenomenal Side of Mental Life 5. Why the Physical Story Seems to Leave Out the Phenomenal Side of Mental Life
-
6. The Knowledge Argument AgainstPhysicalism 6. The Knowledge Argument AgainstPhysicalism
-
7. Why Resist? 7. Why Resist?
-
8. Objections to the KnowledgeArgument 8. Objections to the KnowledgeArgument
-
9. Intentionalism About Sensory Experience: Diaphanousness 9. Intentionalism About Sensory Experience: Diaphanousness
-
10. Varieties of Representationalism 10. Varieties of Representationalism
-
11. From Diaphanousness via Representationalism to Intentionalism 11. From Diaphanousness via Representationalism to Intentionalism
-
12. Intentionalism and the Knowledge Argument 12. Intentionalism and the Knowledge Argument
-
13. Some Outstanding Issues 13. Some Outstanding Issues
-
References References
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
12 Consciousness
Get accessFrank Jackson teaches at Princeton University each autumn and is at La Trobe University or the Australian National University the rest of the year. His publications include ‘Mental Causation: the State of the Art’ in Mind 105 (1996); ‘Causation in the Philosophy of Mind’ (with Philip Pettit) in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 Supplementary (1990); and The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition ( with David Braddon‐Mitchell) (Basil Blackwell, 2nd edn., 2007).
-
Published:02 September 2009
Cite
Abstract
There is a difference between being conscious and being unconscious. This article focuses on that difference. Since the rise of interest in materialist or physicalist theories of mind, theorizing about consciousness has been largely driven by the debate over whether it can be accommodated within materialism. This is because it is widely agreed by materialists and anti-materialists alike that consciousness is the great challenge to materialist theories of mind. This debate is a starting point for a journey through recent philosophizing about consciousness.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 5 |
November 2022 | 8 |
December 2022 | 2 |
January 2023 | 13 |
February 2023 | 9 |
March 2023 | 19 |
April 2023 | 79 |
May 2023 | 3 |
June 2023 | 5 |
August 2023 | 5 |
September 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 3 |
January 2024 | 6 |
February 2024 | 6 |
March 2024 | 7 |
April 2024 | 3 |
June 2024 | 8 |
July 2024 | 4 |
August 2024 | 6 |
September 2024 | 2 |
October 2024 | 2 |
December 2024 | 2 |
January 2025 | 8 |
February 2025 | 5 |
March 2025 | 2 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.