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Introduction: The Messy Landscape of “Moral” Emotions Introduction: The Messy Landscape of “Moral” Emotions
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Situating Emotions in Human Morality Situating Emotions in Human Morality
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The Cognitive Specificity of Moral Representations The Cognitive Specificity of Moral Representations
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The Ultimate Function of Moral Representations The Ultimate Function of Moral Representations
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Moral Emotions in this Context Moral Emotions in this Context
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What Do Moral Emotions Do? What Do Moral Emotions Do?
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Which Emotions Serve a Moral Function? Which Emotions Serve a Moral Function?
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Protecting One’s Social Status vs. Doing One’s Duty: Guilt (Not Shame) as the Main Self-Conscious Moral Emotion Protecting One’s Social Status vs. Doing One’s Duty: Guilt (Not Shame) as the Main Self-Conscious Moral Emotion
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Disentangling Pro-Social Motivation from Moral Obligation: Empathy as a Pro-Social yet Non-Moral Emotion Disentangling Pro-Social Motivation from Moral Obligation: Empathy as a Pro-Social yet Non-Moral Emotion
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At the Proximate Level, Empathy Operates Independently of Moral Representations At the Proximate Level, Empathy Operates Independently of Moral Representations
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Empathy and Fitness Interdependence Empathy and Fitness Interdependence
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Disentangling Morality from Fitness Interdependence Disentangling Morality from Fitness Interdependence
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Moral Indignation (Not Disgust) as the Main Other-Condemning Moral Emotion Moral Indignation (Not Disgust) as the Main Other-Condemning Moral Emotion
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Moral Indignation Is for Enforcing Moral Contracts Moral Indignation Is for Enforcing Moral Contracts
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Evolving Moral Indignation from Competitive Anger Evolving Moral Indignation from Competitive Anger
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Is There Such a Thing as Third-Party Moral Outrage? Is There Such a Thing as Third-Party Moral Outrage?
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Disgust Is (Probably) Not a Moral Emotion Disgust Is (Probably) Not a Moral Emotion
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Disgust Is Not a Moralizing Emotion Disgust Is Not a Moralizing Emotion
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Is Immorality Disgusting? Is Immorality Disgusting?
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Conclusion Conclusion
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Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
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References References
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49 Are There Really So Many Moral Emotions? Carving Morality at Its Functional Joints
Get accessLéo Fitouchi, Département d’études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS
Jean-Baptiste André, Département d’études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS
Nicolas Baumard, Département d’études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS
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Published:22 May 2024
Cite
Abstract
What role do emotions play in moral cognition? Leading accounts argue that a multiplicity of emotions, including guilt, outrage, shame, empathy, and even disgust, play an essential role in moral psychology. Here, this chapter argues that many of these emotions are only superficially associated with moral cognitive contents and adaptive challenges, and that only outrage and guilt rigorously qualify as moral emotions—that is, as computational systems that process distinctively moral representations. Outrage functions to reclaim benefits to which one is rightfully entitled; and guilt to compensate others for violations of one’s duties. Shame, by contrast, tracks representations of one’s social status, not representations of one’s moral obligations. Empathy, similarly, tracks cues of fitness-interdependence—an adaptive challenge that differs from, and in fact often contradicts, the respect of moral obligations. This chapter argues, finally, that both evolutionary rationales and psychological evidence for a role of disgust in moral cognition remain inconclusive for now.
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