To block or not: why the British ruling elite enabled the Industrial Revolution during the 18th century

Abstract

This study explores why the ruling elite in 18th-century Britain not only allowed but actively supported industrialization. Economic rents, political power, and international competition are commonly cited as the reasons, but these explanations lack empirical evidence. By conducting a text analysis of parliamentary legislation and debates on the cotton industry, this study demonstrates that the ruling elite was primarily motivated by keeping unemployment low and sustaining the British economy’s international competitiveness. A favorable political system facilitated the realization of the elite’s objectives.

1. Introduction

For centuries before the Industrial Revolution, ruling elites used their political power to block or constrain technological and economic development in many countries from China to Europe with motivations to protect their power, keep economic rents, or avoid social disturbances. For example, the economic decline of the Middle East between 1000 and 1800 resulted from growth-restraining Islamic legal institutions, which were sustained by ruling elites deliberately or not (Kuran 2004, 2012). Notable technological developments in China during the medieval period fizzled out in the 15th century, partly because the ruling elite prioritized social order over disruptive change (Mokyr 1990, Chapter 9). In early modern Europe, many parliaments, including that of England, controlled by landed or business elites, implemented growth-constraining policies to protect vested economic and political interests (Mokyr 1990, p. 256–257; Ogilvie and Carus 2014, p. 419–426). Even in the 20th century, distributional coalitions with political influence were able to hinder long-term economic growth in Europe by creating social rigidities and institutional sclerosis (Olson 1982; Heckelman 2007).

Considering these historical examples, it can be argued that the British ruling elite’s blocking of industrialization during the 18th century was also likely. Distributional conflicts and rent-seeking activity were integral parts of the British political and economic system during this period (Ekelund and Tollıson 1981; Root 1991; Jha 2015), and they may lead to the persistence of growth-restraining institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2005b; Ogılvıe 2007). For example, Bogart (2018) shows how economic and political interests in Parliament blocked infrastructure improvements in early 18th-century Britain. Similarly, we know how the landed ruling elite tried to sustain its own class interests at the expense of the manufacturing sector with the enactment of the Corn Law in 1815 (Ogilvie and Carus 2014, p. 458–459). Note that when the British political elite were making decisions about the manufacturing sector during the Industrial Revolution, they were not aware that they were in the middle of a wide-scale economic revolution that the whole society would benefit from in the long term. On the contrary, the immediate impacts of the Industrial Revolution were detrimental to the many segments of society, and what the ruling elite were trying to do was to reconcile micro-level conflicting interests from their short-term perspective (Hoppıt 2017, p. 28–33; Frey 2019, Chapter 5).

Considering these factors, it can be argued that it was possible for the British ruling elite to ban technological improvements or sustain growth-restraining institutions during the 18th century to protect their political power, keep economic privileges, or avoid large-scale social unrest, just as their predecessors did in England and other countries. However, during the 18th century, the British ruling elite never tried to block industrialization altogether. On the contrary, they generally promoted it (Mokyr and Nye 2007; Mokyr 2009, Chapters 4 and 17; O’Brıen 2011; Frey 2019, p. xii–xiii). This promotion could be one of the reasons the Industrial Revolution occurred first in Britain rather than in another country (Mokyr 1992, p. 331–332; Crafts 2011).

This raises a question: Why did Britain’s ruling elite behave this way, despite the fact that the opposite was also possible? The literature proposes three explanations. The first one is that the ruling elite benefited from the commercialized and industrializing economy during the 18th century, such as from rising land values in urban areas (Mokyr and Nye 2007, p. 61). According to this explanation, new rising commercial and industrial classes, which emerged as a result of growing international trade, used their economic power to obtain political influence (Landes 1969, p. 7–8; Acemoglu et al. 2005a), and their interests gradually merged with the landed classes, who controlled the political system (for this argument, see Olson 1982; Mokyr 1990, Chapter 10; Mokyr and Nye 2007; Stasavage 2009; McCloskey 2016; Frey 2019, p. 19 and 83; Koyama 2019, p. 745).

The second explanation is that regardless of whether the ruling elite benefited from the expanding economy, the main factor behind their not blocking the Industrial Revolution was that industrialization did not threaten their political power, especially in the short term. The proponents of this “political replacement explanation” refuse the abovementioned “economic rents explanation” and argue that the landed ruling elite did not block the Industrial Revolution despite the decline in land values (Acemoglu and Robınson 2006, p. 5; cf. Mokyr and Nye 2007, p. 61) because landed classes protected their political power in Britain until the early 20th century, including during the parliamentary reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1884 (Acemoglu and Robınson 2000, 2006).

The third explanation for the British ruling elite’s not blocking industrialization is the pressure of international competition. According to this argument, economic and military competition among countries in Western Europe during the 18th century pushed the British ruling elite to support industrialization because they were aware that Britain’s military and economic strength came from its production and export capabilities (Berg 1976, p. 76; Rosenberg and Bırdzell 1986; Mokyr and Nye 2007; Mokyr 2009, Chapter 17; Frey 2019, p. 89–92).

The problem with these explanations is that although they are not necessarily incorrect, they depend on little to no direct empirical investigation. Instead, they are mostly inferences from theorizing or interpreting historical events depending on secondary sources. This study contributes to the economic history literature with a systematic and empirical examination of the firsthand sources of parliamentary legislation and debates on the textile—mainly cotton—industry during the 18th century in Britain to understand the motivations of the ruling elite in their not blocking technological and industrial development and support for it. Thereby, in a way, it aims to test the abovementioned explanations.

British Parliament is the best state institution to focus on for this effort. As Moore and Horwıtz (1971) show, during the 17th century, Parliament gradually became more independent from the Crown with the active participation of MPs. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689, it was the center of the political system, particularly the House of Commons in the second half of the 18th century (Vernon 2017, p. 14–16). Except partly the monarchs, Parliament included all the ruling elite, not just the ordinary MPs and peers but also the ministers, including the prime minister, who were the most influential ruling elite members on the state’s economic policies and legislation. The cotton textile industry was chosen because it was the leading industry of the Industrial Revolution. It can be considered representative of the whole of early British industrialization.

It is possible to approach the British ruling elite as a relatively homogenous group of people coming from similar socioeconomic classes and sharing the same worldview to a certain extent, even if they may differ in the details of matters (for this assumption, see Guttsman 1963; Langford 1990, Chapter 3). Parliamentary legislation was the manifestation of the ruling elite’s decisions, at least the majority of them. In many of these decisions, the ruling elite acted in unity with little or no division. When this was the case, in the study, I exemplified the ruling elite’s motivation on the matter with one or two quotations, mostly from high-ranking figures like ministers, who could be considered better representatives of the ruling elite. However, there were sometimes deep divisions among the ruling elite, which could also lead to adverse economic outcomes (Bogart 2018; Esteves and Mesevage 2021). When this was the case, e.g., in parliamentary reform and corn law bills, I paid attention to these divisions and the factors behind them.

The study focuses on the period from 1700 to 1815. However, special attention is paid to the first decades of mechanization in the cotton industry in the second half of the 18th century (Chapman 1990, p. 45–53; Grıffıths et al. 2008) because they were more critical regarding any possibility of blocking technological and industrial development by the ruling elite. I end the analysis at 1815 because it is not plausible to think that the ruling elite could have blocked the growth of the cotton industry altogether after this point, even if hindering it was still possible. In 1815, the cotton industry’s production was around 8 percent of the total value added in Britain (Chapman 1990, p. 47).

The study uses three types of historical sources: The first is the statute volumes in the parliamentary archives, which include the acts enacted in every parliamentary session (Pickering 1700–1807; Butterworth 1807–1841). This source is the legislative output of Parliament. The second is the volumes of parliamentary sittings, which include the debates of MPs and peers in every sitting (Hansard 1803–2023; Cobbett 1806–1820). This source is crucial for understanding the ruling elite’s motivations in its legislation and policies. The third is the formal record of the House of Commons’ daily business within the Journals of the House of Commons, including submitted petitions, voting, and proceedings (Commons Journal 1700–1815). This source is particularly important to understand lobbying groups’ demands and the ruling elite’s reaction to them¹.

By utilizing these sources, I created quantitative and qualitative databases to conduct a text analysis in the study (for the exact procedure I follow, see Kuckartz 2014, p. 35, 36; also, Ogilvie and Carus 2009; Hoppıt 2017, p. 68–72; Skarbek 2020). The quantitative database depends on counting acts and sittings in the cotton industry, their subject categorization with various criteria, and changes over time. In this categorization, I benefited from the “Legislation Subject Scheme” in Julian Hoppit’s Britain’s Political Economies (p. 327–334; Bogart and Rıchardson (2011) also use a similar method). I also carried out basic quantitative text analysis by counting certain cotton industry-related keywords in the parliamentary acts and debates. Moreover, I used two qualitative databases in the study, the first of which depends on the categorization of ruling elite figures who commented on the cotton industry in Parliament by using the parliamentary debates. The second is a topical categorization of excerpts from notable acts and debates on the cotton industry or manufacturing sector (for this type of qualitative approach in economic history, see O’Brıen et al. 1991; Mokyr 1992; Harris 1997).

The study does not reject that factors such as benefiting from economic rents or keeping political power may have some impact. However, the main motivators of the British ruling elite in not blocking and mostly supporting technological and industrial development during the 18th century were sustaining Britain’s economic competitiveness in international rivalry, particularly against France, and keeping employment levels high to combat poverty and establish social order within the country. However, the dominance of these public motivations became possible with a political system that was undemocratic and pluralist. Also, it was important that the prioritization of landed interests never totally stifled industrialization.

In the following sections, first, I briefly summarize Parliament’s relations with the cotton industry and the state’s supportive policies towards it. In the second section, I examine the two main public motivations of the ruling elite in these policies: employment and international competition. In the third section, I examine the private interests of socioeconomic classes, including the ruling elite, related to the cotton industry and how they were influential in not blocking industrial development in the context of the British political system. I conclude by discussing what my findings mean, considering the abovementioned explanations in the literature.

2. State policy towards the cotton industry

2.1. Parliament and the cotton industry’s growth

The cotton industry entered the British ruling elite’s agenda mainly during the 1770s. The first act of Parliament that was directly about the cotton industry was in 1774, the Duty on Cotton Stuffs Act (Pickering 1774, p. 437), which removed the prohibition imposed on the sale of cotton products in 1720 (Pickering 1765, p. 318). The first time the cotton industry was discussed, although indirectly, in Parliament was in 1774, during a debate on the “state on the linen trade” (Cobbett 1813, p. 1110), and the first time it was the main issue to debate was in 1785, which was about the “repeal of the cotton tax” (Cobbett 1815, p. 478). Before 1774, the cotton industry was mentioned in the parliamentary debates highly indirectly and regulated together with other industries, such as the Frauds by Workmen Act in 1748 (Pickering 1765, p. 306).

Figure 1 shows precisely when and to what extent the cotton industry was on the agenda of Parliament in the second half of the 18th century. The figure shows how many times the word “cotton” was mentioned in every session of Parliament, both in the records of parliamentary sittings and acts from 1747 to 1815. If “cotton” was mentioned more in any parliamentary session, it means that the cotton-related subjects (industry, trade, taxation, raw material and similar) were debated and legislated more; that is, they were more on Parliament’s agenda in that session. It can be observed from the graph that until the 1770s, “cotton” was mentioned highly occasionally. However, after the 1770s, the frequency of mentioning increased suddenly. Especially after 1800, debate and legislation became persistent.

Figure 1

Number of mentions of “cotton” in sittings and acts in every parliamentary session, 1747–1832. Notes: Failed legislation is not included in the analysis of acts. Also, the mentions of “cotton” in routine custom adjustments in the acts are not counted. The graph starts from 1747 because it was the starting date of the 10^th Parliament of Great Britain. Also, in categorising acts and debates, the temporal unit of analysis is a “parliamentary session”, not a “year”. A parliamentary session starts around November–December–January and ends in May–June–July, depending on the session.. Sources: Database constructed by the author from Pickering 1700–1807; Butterworth 1807–1841 for the acts, and Cobbett 1806–1820; Hansard 1803–2023 for the debates. For the innovations, Mokyr 1990, p. 96–104. See also Appendix 2 for details.

The findings in figure 1 regarding the timing and magnitude of the parliamentary debates and legislation align with the general trends in the development of the cotton industry in Britain. We know that the cotton industry started to grow substantially after the 1760s (Broadberry et al. 2015, p. 132–135) with the impact of a series of productivity-rising innovations (Mokyr 1990, p. 96–104). Figure 1 shows that the rise in the parliamentary debates and legislation followed these major innovations in the cotton industry². It can be concluded that when the cotton industry was relatively small, Parliament did not pay much attention to it. However, when its production increased with the impact of mechanization, Parliament started to put it into its agenda in the sittings and acts.

As indicated in the Introduction, the British ruling elite mostly supported the cotton industry after it entered the Parliament’s agenda. To find the motivations behind this support, it is important to understand the details of it. In this direction, table 1 shows the subject distribution of the sittings and acts in Parliament, which were either directly on the cotton industry or involved a debate or a section on the cotton industry, at least in one part of it, from 1747 to 1815. The table shows that the cotton industry was debated in thirty-eight sittings and regulated in forty-one acts. Almost half of these acts and debates were about foreign trade regulations, including duties and subsidies. Internal taxation and subsidies, protection of physical and human capital and labor disputes and regulations were other prominent subjects to debate and legislate about the cotton industry.

Table 1

Number of parliamentary sittings and acts on cotton industry by their subjects, 1747–1815

	Sittings	Acts
Quality of products and preventing frauds		3
Internal duties and bounties	3	9
Protection of physical and human capital	3	5
Foreign trade, duties and bounties	18	19
Patents	1	2
Labor disputes and regulations	5	3
War and peace	1
Colonial administration	2
State budget	1
Banking and credit	4
Total	38	41

Notes: The acts on routine custom adjustments are not included. See Appendix 2B for the complete list of sittings and acts.

Sources: See figure 1.

Although the subject distribution of acts and sittings is important to understand the details of Parliament’s support of the cotton industry, to understand precisely in what ways the ruling elite supported industrialization, it is required to examine the contents of these acts and sittings. In my examination, I determined three policy choices of the ruling elite, which can be deliberate or nondeliberate, to support the cotton industry: protectionist foreign trade policy, avoiding heavy taxation and protecting physical capital. We already know these policies from the existing literature, but they particularly came to the forefront among others in the context of the cotton industry. In the following sub-sections, I summarize them and support with new empirical evidence to lay the foundation for the following parts.

2.2. Foreign trade and taxation

A well-known protectionist policy of the British governments to support not just the cotton industry but also the whole manufacturing sector as a part of the mercantilist mindset of the era was restricting the import and encouraging the export of manufactured goods by adjusting trade regulations and duties accordingly. One of the most notable examples of this policy in the context of the textile industry was the Calico Acts. To avoid the rivalry of Asian textiles in the domestic market, the British Parliament first banned the import of Indian calico and chintz clothes with the Encouragement of Manufactures Acts in 1698 (Pickering 1764, p. 328). Then, it prohibited the sale of most cotton products in Britain with the Woolen Manufactures Act of 1720 (Pickering 1765, p. 318). These acts were repealed in 1774 after the domestic cotton industry started to grow, but the sale of cotton products was permitted only for British manufactured cotton goods (Pickering 1774, p. 437), which shows the ongoing protectionist mindset.

Another mercantilist policy of the era to support the textile industry was preventing physical and human capital from moving abroad. The Artificers Act of 1749 aimed to punish “persons convicted of seducing artificers out of the dominions of the crown of Great Britain; and to prevent the exportation of utensils made use of in the woollen and silk manufactures from Great Britain into foreign parts” (Pickering 1752, p. 14–19). This act was renewed in 1774 (Pickering 1774, p. 433–434), 1781 (Pickering 1781, p. 268) and 1782 (Pickering 1782, p. 84) with the addition of the cotton industry.

British governments also followed the policy of providing raw material for the domestic cotton industry, especially from the colonized territories. As it can be understood from the debates on the loss or capture of colonies after the wars, during this period, the state was considered obliged to provide the conditions to supply cheap and high-quality raw cotton for the industry. For example, in a debate on West Indies in the Commons in 1781, MP Edmund Burke underlined the importance of Tobago by saying, “The capture of that island was of the great consequence to this nation; its cotton was the finest we got from the West Indies; and by the loss of Tobago [the price of] that article had arisen” (Cobbett 1814, p. 778).

Parliament supported the cotton industry also with its tendency to avoid heavy taxation. Parliamentary debates show that MPs and peers were sensitive to any potential excessiveness in taxation not to harm the industry. It is possible to understand this sensitivity particularly in the debate on “the repeal of cotton tax” in the Commons in 1785. When Parliament imposed a new tax on fustians and other cotton goods in 1784 with the Duties on Linens Act (Pickering 1784, p. 595), the cotton manufacturers from different parts of Lancashire submitted a petition to Parliament in 1785, complaining about the tax and demanding it to be repealed (Cobbett 1815, p. 362). In the debate, Prime Minister (PM) William Pitt appreciated the “increasing state of the cotton industry” and indicated that heavy taxation might endanger the industry (Cobbett 1815, p. 363). He also added, “The ease and prosperity of trade and manufacture were objects which no man in that House should ever overlook” (ibid, p. 483). As a result, the tax was repealed with the Repeal of Certain Duties Act in 1785 (Pickering 1785, p. 58 and 298).

At this point, it is important to underline that this study is not interested in the exact effects of these indicated policies on the Industrial Revolution. The policies could be beneficial, ineffective, or even indirectly harmful to industrialization in the end. For example, the impact of the British state’s foreign trade policy during this period is contentious in the literature (O’Brien et al. 1991, p. 412–417; Baıroch 1995, p. 44–50; Parthasarathı 2011, p. 125–131; cf. Allen 2009, p. 129; Mokyr 1999, p. 51). What I am interested in the study is mainly the intentions of the ruling elite. During the 18th century, the British ruling elite did not block industrialization and intended to support it with its trade and tax policy, even if the real outcomes of these policies may not be as supportive as they aimed. However, there was one supportive policy of Parliament, which is difficult to object that it was influential for not just the growth of the cotton industry but also for the whole manufacturing sector: the protection of physical capital and machinery from technologically conservative groups (Mokyr 1992, p. 331–332).

2.3. Physical capital and machinery

During the 18th century, the British ruling elite protected the physical capital in the textile industry from technologically reactionary groups aiming to either ban or destroy the labor-saving machines to protect their handicraft jobs. Resistance to technological improvements did not first emerge with the Industrial Revolution. There were antimachinery riots before the 18th century, too, which were mostly combined with other grievances (Stevenson 1992, p. 144–145). Also, the British state’s attitude was not always supportive of the technological improvements in this period. For example, in 1551, Parliament enacted the Gig Mills Act “for the putting down of [mechanical] gig mills in the workmanship of woollen cloth” (Pickering 1763, p. 388), and in 1638, “an invention for weaving ribbons and laces in great looms, whereby much deceit is practised, is inhibited” with a decree of King Charles I (Bruce 1869, p. 454). However, the ruling elite’s attitude started to change in the late 17th century. When London weaver workers rioted in 1675 to suppress mechanical looms, Parliament rejected their demands with clear support on machinery (Wadsworth and Mann 1931, p. 101–102). This attitude of Parliament continued during the 18th century and the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr 1990, p. 257–258). As a notable example, the petition of cotton spinners to ban the machines in 1780 was directly rejected (Commons Journal 1803, p. 804–805).

In addition to rejecting the demands of technologically conservative groups, Parliament also started to make legislative changes in the early 18th century to protect the physical capital. The first act of Parliament for this purpose was the Woollen Manufacturers Act in 1725, which made “wilfully destroy any tools used in the making any woollen goods, adjudged guilty of a felony, and shall suffer death” (Pickering 1765, p. 361). In the following decades, this act was followed by the Importation Act in 1766, which extended it to silk industry (Pickering 1767, p. 145), Malicious Injury Act in 1769 for the protection of mills and engines (Pickering 1769, p. 211), and Criminal Law Act in 1782, which was “punishing persons wilfully destroying any woollen, silk, linen and cotton goods or implements used in the manufacture thereof” (Pickering 1782, p. 46).

However, it is important to note that none of these mentioned acts were specifically on protecting physical capital. They mainly regulated the industry in general and aimed to protect mills and machinery as a part of it. However, due to more large-scale resistance from technologically reactionary groups after the 1770s in connection with the Industrial Revolution, Parliament started implementing more specific legislation. In this direction, the Protection of Stocking Frames Act in 1788 aimed to punish “persons destroying stocking frames, machines and engines in mills employed in preparing of wool and cotton” (Pickering 1788, p. 550). When the resistance to mechanization in the textile industry reached its peak in the 1810s with the emergence of the Luddite movement, Parliament enacted the Destruction of Stocking Frames Act in 1812, “an act for the more exemplary punishment of destroying any stocking or lace frames machines used in the framework or any goods in such frames” (Butterworth 1812, p. 47-49).

3. Public motivations behind the supportive policies

The British ruling elite had two main motivations in its supportive policies and legislation towards the cotton industry during the 18th century: combating unemployment and sustaining international competitiveness. We understand these motivations from the fact that MPs and peers tried to justify and legitimize their arguments in the parliamentary debates by referring to them very frequently. They were even sometimes directly written in the acts. For these reasons, I call them “public motivations” to distinguish them from private interests.

3.1. Combating unemployment and poverty

Fighting against high unemployment and poverty was one of the responsibilities of the state in Britain during the 18th century (Harling 2001, p. 32). For this reason, it is not surprising that many acts of Parliament mentioned “employing the poor” as a purpose, and many MPs and petitioners justified their policy recommendations with this purpose in the context of the textile industry, as exemplified below.

The employment motivation was particularly noticeable in the protectionist foreign trade policy of the state because it was considered that protectionism would keep domestic industries robust, thereby making employment high and poverty low. The abovementioned two calico acts in 1698 and 1720 were the direct result of this way of thinking of the ruling elite, as it can be understood from the content of the acts: “an act for the more effectual employing the poor by encouraging the manufactures of this Kingdom” (Pickering 1764, p. 328), and “an act to encourage the woollen and silk manufactures of this Kingdom, and for more effectual employing the poor” (Pickering 1765, p. 318).

When the cotton industry entered the agenda of Parliament during the 1770s, the ruling elite approached it with the same motivation. It is possible to observe this in the abovementioned supportive policies of the British state related to the cotton industry, such as the raw material provision from the colonized territories. For example, after Britain lost control of Tobago to France because of a British defeat in 1781, MP Burke stated in the Commons that “It was a fact that 20,000 people in Lancashire got their bread from manufacturing cotton” (Cobbett 1814, p. 778) to express his concern about the industry’s potential contraction and rising unemployment as a result of the decline in raw material supply.

The employment motivation also influenced the ruling elite’s policy of avoiding heavy taxation. In the abovementioned petition of cotton manufacturers about the newly imposed tax in 1784, one of the justifications of the manufacturers for their demand of repealing the tax was that it “would drive their workmen to the necessity of emigration to other countries” because of unemployment (Cobbett 1815, p. 362). During the parliamentary debate after the petition, Lancashire MP Thomas Egerton argued that “if the relief was not granted very speedily, above 40,000 men would be thrown out of employment in Lancashire” (Cobbett 1815, p. 366). We understand from the tax’s repeal in 1785 (Pickering 1785, p. 58) that the grievances of manufacturers, including the decline in employment, were influential on the ruling elite.

The ruling elite’s employment motivation in its supportive attitude toward the cotton industry was directly connected with another key responsibility of the state: establishing social order (North et al. 2009, p. 14–15). This connection is not surprising, considering that bad economic conditions, such as high unemployment and poverty, could easily trigger social disturbances. As an indicator of this, in the abovementioned debate on “the repeal of cotton tax” in 1785, PM Pitt described the cotton manufacturers as “a large body of people, who contributed by their labour so great a portion of the national strength and on whose satisfaction the public tranquillity so much depended” (Cobbett 1815, p. 483).

The employment and social order motivations of the British ruling elite can also be observed in their banning of labor-saving machinery before the 18th century. In the abovementioned prohibition of mechanized looms in 1638, the weavers almost always justified their claims in their petitions by arguing how these looms created unemployment. For example, they wrote, “with devilish invention of looms of 12 to 24 shuttles, worked by one man’s hands, which takes away the work of a dozen men and causes the destruction of many poor” (Plummer 1972, p. 163). Similarly, they indicated that using engine looms was prohibited in Holland “because it took away the living of a great number of poor” (ibid, p. 164). The ban on mechanized looms with a decree of Charles I shows that the ruling elite could meet on a common ground with the weavers (Mantoux 1961, p. 403).

However, the ruling elite’s ban on mechanized looms with the employment motivation raises some questions: If employment and social order were so important, why did the British ruling elite reject the demands of technologically conservative groups starting from the late 17th century? Did they begin not to care about unemployment and social order? The abovementioned examples about how the ruling elite gave importance to the employment and social order in the 18th century show that this cannot be correct. The key parliamentary debates about protecting machinery from technologically reactionary groups in 1788 (Cobbett 1814, p. 391–395) and 1812 (Hansard 1812, p. 807–1086) show that, while employment and social order motivations were still valid³, the perspective of the ruling elite towards the mechanization changed. Two factors influenced this change: the ruling elite’s better understanding of the long-term positive impacts of mechanization and their constant fear of lagging behind other countries⁴.

In the late 17th century, the ruling elite began to notice that even if machines could increase unemployment in the short term, with their positive impact on the economy, they could decrease it after a while. In the debates on the riots of London weavers in 1675 against the mechanized looms, Secretary of State Joseph Williamson said, “If engine looms be encouraged, more poor men, women and children will be employed by them than the single looms can employ” (Wadsworth and Mann 1931, p. 102). This perspective of the ruling elite continued during the 18th century. In the debates of Luddite riots in Nottingham in 1812, Earl of Lauderdale, a peer and a member of the Privy Council, said in the Lords that

nothing could be more certain than that every improvement of machinery contributed to improve the condition of persons employed in the manufactures in which such improvements were made, there being in a very short time after such improvements were introduced, a greater demand for labour than there was before (Hansard 1812, p. 974).

In this regard, the ruling elite perceived the technologically reactionary rioters as shortsighted and mistaken since they were unaware of the beneficial side of machines. Home Secretary Richard Ryder said, “The measures pursued by the rioters could only tend to draw down ruin themselves; and, if permitted to be persisted in, must prevent them from procuring that employment, the want of which was held out as their greatest grievance” (Hansard 1812, p. 810).

3.2. Sustaining international competitiveness

Sustaining Britain’s competitiveness in the military and economic rivalry among Western European countries during the 18th century was a strong motivation for the British ruling elite’s supportive attitude towards the growth of cotton and textile industries. For example, during the Lancashire riots against the cotton-spinning machinery in 1779, justice of the peace at Preston passed a resolution saying

destroying them [new machines] in this country would only be the means of transferring them to another country, and that, if a total stop were put by the legislature to their erection in Britain, it would only tend to their establishment in foreign countries, to the detriment of the trade of Britain (Mantoux 1961, p. 403).

However, this motivation of the ruling elite did not first emerge with the Industrial Revolution. As early as 1675, in his abovementioned speech, State Secretary Williamson said: “If engine looms be put down, the very trade in a short time would be quite lost here. And the Dutch and French will engross it and undersell us at home and abroad” (Wadsworth and Mann 1931, p. 102). This shows that when the Industrial Revolution started around the 1760s, the ruling elite’s mindset was already shaped as not conceding to the technologically resistant groups. This explains why there was no discussion whatsoever about prohibiting machinery in the parliamentary debates of two crucial acts regarding the protection of machinery in 1788 and 1812. These debates proceeded in the context of crime and punishment matters, that is, what would be the fair punishment for the rioters. Regardless of which MP or peer defended what in the debates, banning machinery was already out of the question for them.

It is possible to observe the impact of the competitiveness motivation of the ruling elite in the various supportive policies of Parliament. One notable of them was avoiding heavy taxation related to the potential negative impact of heavy taxes on the export capacity of the cotton industry and manufacturing sector. In the abovementioned petition of cotton manufacturers in 1784, in addition to the unemployment, the petitioners also complained about the cotton tax’s negative impact “on the exportation, which would necessarily deprive them of the markets that they actually had” (Cobbett 1815, p. 362). In the following parliamentary debate on the tax’s repeal, PM Pitt stated that the government chose the cotton industry for taxation because “it has been for a considerable time in an increasing state, (…) hence it naturally appeared to be a proper object of taxation, without any danger of a material injury to the trade, either with regard to home consumption or exportation” (Cobbett 1815, p. 478). Similar to PM Pitt, Charles James Fox, normally the arch-rival of Pitt, supported this argument with an emphasis on “export trade” (Cobbett 1815, p. 486). The repeal of the cotton tax in 1785 shows that, like unemployment, the ruling elite was sympathetic to this grievance of cotton manufacturers, too.

We know from the existing literature that the Indian cotton industry was the most powerful in the world until the first half of the 18th century (Broadberry and Gupta 2009; Parthasarathı 2011, p. 2), and British manufacturers compared the quality of their products to Indian cotton textiles (Raman 2022). As indicated, the Calico Acts were already the reflection of the British Parliament’s aim to protect the domestic industry from this Indian rivalry. However, in the second half of the 18th century, the British ruling elite’s main concern was the French and partly Irish rivalry, not the Indian. There is no sign of concern regarding the competition with India in the textile industry in the parliamentary speeches of MPs and peers from 1750 to 1815. However, there are many indications of concern regarding the competition with France and Ireland. This empirical finding is in line with the global developments in the cotton industry during this period, that is, the shift of the world’s cotton manufacturing center from India to Western Europe (Parthasarathı 2011, p. 89).

The concerns about economic competition with France particularly manifest themselves in the debates on peace treaties. A policy of Parliament, in which this kind of concern was highly noticeable in the context of the cotton industry, was the keeping of raw-material-rich colonies within the British Empire. In adopting this policy, in addition to combating unemployment domestically, the ruling elite tried to sustain Britain’s international competitive power against the French textile industry. This concern could be understood from the debate in the Lords on “the preliminary articles of the peace treaty” with France, Spain and America in 1783 (Cobbett 1814, p. 374). At one point of the debate, Viscount of Stormont, then the Lord President of the Council, said, “We give up Tobago, an island of the utmost consequence of the manufactures of this country. A manufactory of cotton goods lately established in France, which only wanted the cotton of Tobago to make it the rival of Manchester” (Cobbett 1814, p. 399–400).

The competition with France also troubled the British ruling elite regarding technology and machinery, which motivated their policy of preventing physical capital and machinery from moving abroad. In a debate in the Lords on “the treaty of navigation and commerce with France” in 1787, upon some MPs’ defending the treaty as it would be only for twelve years, MP John Anstruther said

if we in twelve years only from the date of our first acquaintance with the art, had brought it to such perfection, what reason had we to imagine that France might not in another twelve years become as expert in it as ourselves, and [it] would have the amazing advantage of all our improvements in mills, machines? (Cobbett 1816, p. 552)

This concern was also shared by Viscount of Stormont, who also objected to the treaty and said, “With regard to the cotton manufactory, there were already two of Arkwright’s machines erected near Rouen. There was little doubt, therefore, but the French might, in a short time, rival us in that manufacture of which we now thought so much” (Cobbett 1816, p. 552). Despite these concerns about France’s technological catch-up, the treaty was ratified by Parliament (ibid), but it can still be concluded that sustaining the leading position of Britain’s cotton industry in international competition, particularly against France, was an important motivation for the ruling elite.

The cotton manufacturers and their defenders in Parliament were also concerned by the rivalry of the Irish textile industry. Their concerns particularly increased when the Pitt government decided to comprehensively restructure the commercial relations between Britain and Ireland in 1785, including granting liberalization to Ireland’s restricted external trade (Cobbett 1815, p. 311–312). The cotton manufacturers in Manchester, together with manufacturers in other sectors, objected to the bill with a petition by arguing that the “advantages appear to be all on one side, all in favour of Ireland” in the proposed resolutions and demanded from the Commons to reject it (Commons Journal 1803, p. 812). However, many MPs, including PM Pitt, objected to the petition in the following debates. Pitt said, “I could not help observing that the fears and apprehensions of the manufacturers were extremely far-fetched and ill-founded” (Cobbett 1815, p. 585). Other MPs, Thomas Orde and William Grenville, also gave speeches in the same direction (Cobbett 1815, p. 613 and 645). However, the manufacturers became successful in the end, and the bill did not pass despite the insistence of the Pitt government (Cobbett 1815, p. 984–985). This shows the ruling elite’s sensitivity to the Irish rivalry in the cotton industry.

4. Private interests and the political system

Public motivations behind the supportive policies of Parliament towards the cotton industry during the 18th century are significant. However, they cannot give the full picture because the private interests of socioeconomic groups also played some role in these policies. Sometimes, it is already difficult to disentangle what is public and what is private interest because private interests could easily disguise themselves under publicly accepted justifications. For this reason, to understand the role of private interests in the policies of Parliament, it is necessary to proceed beyond the public discourse of MPs and peers. To this end, in this section, I focus on the relationship of the ruling elite with the conflicting demands of different socioeconomic groups and the ruling elite’s own demands and internal conflicts related to the cotton industry and manufacturing sector in the context of the British political system.

4.1. Undemocratic system without excessive cronyism

One factor that helped the ruling elite in its policy of protecting the mechanized physical capital from technologically conservative groups was the undemocratic characteristic of the political system. We know that until the reform acts of the 19th century, only 7 to 10 percent of the adult population was enfranchised because of property and gender criteria (Vernon 2017, p. 16). This means that when labor-saving machinery threatened the economic interests of artisans and workers in the traditional textile industry, they had no direct representatives in the political system. For this reason, it was easier for the ruling elite to reject their demands. As a counterfactual, if the political system were more democratic, these groups would have more political power to block the mechanization, and it would have been much more difficult for the ruling elite to ignore their demands (Frey 2019, p. 20; Mokyr 1990, p. 257–258).

The unrepresented segments of society could still influence political decision-making by petitioning to defend their collective interests. However, in practice, there was a bias against the working-class demands in Parliament during the 18th century, compared to the demands of wealthy industrialists and merchants, who potentially had large economic resources for lobbying (Mantoux 1961, p. 403–404). In the context of the cotton industry, among the thirty-eight sittings about it in Parliament from 1747 to 1815, twelve of them started upon a petition of a socioeconomic group. Table 2 shows the distribution of these twelve petitions by their socioeconomic group in every decade. According to the table, only one of them started with the workers’ petition while seven started with either manufacturers’ or merchants’ petition, which is evidence of the asymmetrical treatment of the ruling elite to the working-class demands in the cotton industry.

Table 2

Distribution of petitions by their socioeconomic groups in every decade, 1770–1815

	Merchant/EICa	Statesman	Manufacturer	Worker	Jointb	Inventor	Unanimous
1770–79	1	1	1
1780–89	1		1
1790–99	1		1
1800–09
1810–15			1	1	1	1	1
Total	3	1	4	1	1	1	1

Notes: The petitions only include the ones that started a debate on the cotton industry in Parliament.

^a“EIC” stands for East India Company.

^b“Joint” represents the petitions submitted by the whole industry, including manufacturers, merchants and workers.

Sources: Cobbett 1806–20; Hansard 1803–2023.

As a result of the fact that contrary to the ordinary workers and artisans, the ruling elite was not particularly close to the demands of industrialists and merchants, cotton manufacturers in Lancashire and its environs organized and exerted pressure on Parliament in many instances during the 18th century (Rose 2000, p. 136–137). For example, the Duty on Cotton Stuffs Act in 1774 and the Criminal Law Act in 1782 were passed upon the petitions of cotton manufacturers (Commons Journals 1803, p. 496–497; 1803, p. 687). They also, together with other manufacturers, prevented the passing of Irish commercial resolutions in 1785 (Cobbett 1815, p. 984–985) and persuaded Parliament to repeal the Duties on Linens and Cottons Act (Pickering 1785, p. 58 and 298). These examples show that in the supportive policies of the ruling elite towards the cotton industry, there was a certain impact of the lobbying activities of the cotton manufacturers.

However, the cotton manufacturers were naturally not the only interest group trying to obtain favorable legislation from Parliament. They were in constant rivalry with other groups, especially with other branches of textiles. We know that woolen, as Britain’s staple industry until the rise of cotton, had more lobbying power than the others in the first half of the 18th century (O’Brıen et al. 1991, p. 397). For example, woolen and silk manufacturers were powerful enough to persuade Parliament to prohibit the use and sale of all cotton products in 1720 (Commons Journal 1803, p. 224–225). One possibility was that they could have used their lobbying power to stifle the nascent cotton industry in the 1770s. However, this never happened. When Parliament removed the ban on the sale of cotton products in 1774, woolen and silk manufacturers did not try to prevent it in Parliament, as we understand from no activity in that direction in the Journals of the House of Commons⁵ (Volumes 34 and 35).

It is difficult to guess what would have happened if the woolen and silk interests had tried to prevent the removal of the ban on cotton products. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that during the 18th century, there was no excessive cronyism in the British political system such that Parliament fell under the influence of one or a few interest groups (O’Brıen et al. 1991, p. 416–417; Mokyr and Nye 2007, p. 55–56; cf. Root 1991, p. 338). In line with this, during this period, the British ruling elite acted like an arbiter to find a middle ground among the conflicting interests of various lobby groups of manufacturers and merchants. The decisions of Parliament against the lobbying battles among the different branches of the textile industry during the 18th century are an indicator of this. For example, Parliament prohibited the import of Indian textiles to Britain to appease woolen and silk manufacturers in 1700, but it also exempted the imperial markets as a concession to the East India Company (O’Brien et al. 1991, p. 414). It prohibited the sale of all cotton products in 1721 but also exempted Lancashire fustians and Celtic linens so as not to hurt these industries (ibid, p. 416). When linen manufacturers demanded a bounty from the government as a relief to their declining trade (Commons Journal 1803, p. 522–524), Parliament did not grant it upon the objections of cotton and woolen manufacturers (Cobbett 1813, p. 1151–56).

In this context, when the cotton industry first emerged in the 1770s, Parliament was ready to accept it as another branch of the textile industry without resistance. Figure 2 provides evidence for this claim. Similar to figure 1, it shows how many times the words “wool” and “cotton” were mentioned in the parliamentary acts from 1699 to 1832. If they are mentioned more, it means that Parliament was engaged with regulating that industry more. As can be observed from the figure, not surprisingly, Parliament was highly engaged with the wool industry in the first half of the 18th century but not with cotton. However, when the cotton industry began to grow in the 1770s, it also became part of Parliament’s agenda immediately.

Figure 2

Number of mentions of “wool” and “cotton” in parliamentary acts in every session, 1699–1832. Notes: “Cotton wool” is counted within the “cotton”, not in the “wool”. Also, the mentions within routine custom adjustments in the parliamentary acts are not counted. Sources: See figure 1.

4.2. The ruling elite’s own interests and divisions

So far, the study has examined the private interests of socioeconomic groups outside of Parliament and how the ruling elite reacted to them. But what about the ruling elite’s own interests and divisions? Were they influential in their decisions on the cotton industry? To understand this, the study scrutinizes all the ruling elite figures who spoke on cotton trade and industry in Parliament from 1747 to 1815. During this period, seventy-eight ruling elite figures in the parliamentary debates somehow mentioned the word “cotton” in their speeches. However, only twenty-one of them directly elaborated on the cotton industry⁶. Table 3 ranks these figures according to how much they spoke, measured by how many times they used the word “cotton”, and categorizes them regarding how supportive they were of the cotton industry, derived from the content of their speeches. Among the twenty-one figures, seven of them were very supportive, nine of them were supportive, four of them were neutral, and one of them was opposing.

Table 3

List of ruling elite figures who spoke on cotton trade and industry in parliamentary debates, 1747–1815

Figure	How many mentions?	Level of support	Potential motivation to speak	Governmental position	Party
William Pitt the Younger	17	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	PM (1783–1801)	Tory
George Rose	16	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	Secretary to the Treasury (1783–1801); Vice-President of the BT (1807–12)	No party affiliation
Charles James Fox	14	Very supportive	Public/high-ranking Whig politician	Leader of the Whig opposition (1783–1806)	Whig
Alexander Baring	13	Very supportive	Private/business relations with the USA	MP (1806–35)	Tory
William Grenville	11	Neutral	Public/high-ranking statesman	Paymaster of Forces (1784–89); Leader of the HL (1790–1801)	Both Tory and Whig
Kirkman Finlay	11	Very supportive	Private/textile manufacturer and merchant	MP (1812–20)	Tory
George Dempster	11	Opposing	Private/defender of the linen industry	MP (1761–90)	Whig
Spencer Perceval	10	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	PM (1809–12)	Tory
William Eden	10	Neutral	Public/high-ranking statesman	Chief Secretary for Ireland (1780–82); President of the BT (1806–7)	Both Tory and Whig
William Meredith	8	Very supportive	Private/representative of Lancashire	MP (1754–1780)	Tory
Sylvester Douglas	8	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	Chief Secretary for Ireland (1793–94); MP (1795–1806)	No party affiliation
Henry Bathurst	8	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	President of the BT (1807–12); Foreign Secretary (1809)	Tory
Charles Jenkinson	7	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	President of the BT (1786–1804)	No party affiliation
Samuel Whitbread	6	Very supportive	Public/high-ranking politician	Leader of the Whig opposition after 1806	Whig
Frederick North	6	Neutral	Public/high-ranking statesman	PM (1770–82); MP (1754–90)	Both Whig and Tory
Thomas Stanley	6	Very supportive	Private/representative of Lancashire	MP (1780–1812)	Whig
George Philips	6	Very supportive	Private/textile industrialist	MP (1812–35)	Whig
Charles Pratt	5	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	Lord President of the Council (1784–94)	Whig
David Murray	5	Supportive	Public/high-ranking statesman	Secretary of State (1782–83); Lord President of the Council (1793–96)	No party affiliation
St John of Blesto	5	Supportive	Public/ideological	Peer in the HL (1805–17)	No party affiliation
Robert Peel	5	Neutral	Public/high-ranking statesman	Chief Secretary of Ireland (1812–18)	Tory

Notes: PM: Prime Minister, BT: Board of Trade, MP: Member of Parliament; HL: House of Lords.

In the table, only the ruling elite’s position when he spoke on the cotton trade and industry is written. He may have other important positions at other times.

See Appendix 2C for the full list of 78 ruling elite figures who somehow mentioned the word “cotton” in their speeches.

Sources: Cobbett 1806–20; Hansard 1803-2023; Commons Journal 1700-1815. For the background information on the figures, such as governmental position or party affiliation, see Evans 1996, p. 483–578.

It is important to understand the potential motivations of these figures regarding why they spoke on the cotton industry in Parliament and why they were supportive or not. Depending on their personal profiles, there were three types of “very supportive” figures: Whig politicians like Fox and Whitbread supported the cotton industry with ideological motivations without any direct personal interest. MPs like Meredith and Stanley were the representatives of textile-industry-concentrated regions, and Baring, Finlay and Philips were textile industrialists or businessmen.

All the “supportive” ruling elite figures in the table, except one, were high-ranking statesmen such as prime ministers or presidents of the Board of Trade. There is no reason to think that these figures had private interests in the growth of the cotton industry. They were supportive because of the public motivations. Sometimes, they objected to the demands of cotton manufacturers (that is why they were “supportive” but not “very supportive”) but also underlined that they support the industry in general. I categorize the four high-ranking statesmen who did not specifically indicate that they support the cotton industry in their speeches as “neutral”. There was only one directly opposing ruling elite figure (George Dempster). His opposition was motivated by being a supporter of the rival linen industry.

Bogart (2018) shows that the Whigs were more favorable to river navigation improvements in the early 18th century than the Tories in Parliament. Similarly, the importance of “Whig supremacy” for the financial revolution of Britain in the same period is underlined by many economic historians (Stasavage 2007; Pıncus and Robinson 2011). However, my examination shows that there was no correlation between support for the cotton industry and party affiliation in Parliament in the second half of the 18th century. According to Table 3, of the seven very supportive MPs/peers, four of them were Whigs, and three were Torys. Among the nine supportive MPs/peers, three of them were Torys, one was Whig, and five had no party affiliation.

In sum, examining the ruling elite figures who spoke on cotton trade and industry in Parliament shows that there were defenders of the cotton industry who had a private interest in its growth, but these figures were not a majority. As Table 3 shows, only five of the twenty-one ruling elite figures participated in parliamentary debates with private motivations. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that although the cotton interests were represented in Parliament, the supportive policies and legislation of Parliament were mainly shaped by high-ranking officials with the public motivations of international competitiveness and employment.

However, this was the ruling elite’s behavior if there was no threat to the landed interests. What about their behavior when there was such a threat, considering that most of the ruling elite were big landowners (Thompson 1963, p. 61–62)? In this regard, debates on parliamentary reform bills, which aimed to change the political system mainly to the detriment of landed classes, could be illustrative. As Acemoglu and Robınson (2006), if the ruling elites fear political replacement, they become unwilling to initiate change and may block economic development.

Table 4 shows the 10 debates that the ruling elite discussed about the political reform of the House of Commons from 1780 to 1815. The content of these debates shows that some MPs perceived threat from manufacturing interests. They were aware that the parliamentary reform was mainly demanded by the manufacturing cities such as Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield, as can be understood from the “seditious writings” circulated in these cities (Cobbett 1814, p. 1476 and 1530) and the petitions submitted from there (Cobbett 1814, p. 838; p. 1341; p. 777). In the debates, MP Jenkinson, later to become PM Lord Liverpool, underlined the conflict between the interests of landholders and manufacturers and argued that manufacturing and commercial interests should be secondary to the landed interests (Cobbett 1814, p. 811–813). As a result, Parliament rejected all the proposed motions and bills of parliamentary reform.

Table 4

List of debates on parliamentary reform in parliament, 1780–1815

Year	Debate
1781–82	Debate on Mr. William Pitt’s Motion for a Reform in Parliament
1782–83	Debate on Mr. Pitt’s Motion for a Reform in Parliament
1784	Debate on Mr. Alderman Sawbridge’s Motion for a Reform of Parliament
1792	Debate on Mr. Grey’s Notice of a Motion relative to Parliamentary Reform
1792	Debate in the Commons on the King’s Proclamation against Seditious Writings
1793	Debate in the Common on Sheffield Petition for a Reform in Parliament
1793	Debate on Mr. Grey’s Motion for a Reform in Parliament
1797	Debate in the Commons on Mr. Grey’s Motion for a Reform of Parliament
1809	Debate in the Commons on Mr Curwen’s Reform Bill
1809	Sir Francis Burdett’s Plan of Parliamentary Reform

Sources: Cobbett 1806–20; Hansard 1803-2023.

However, despite some perceived threats to their political power from the manufacturing interests, blocking technological and industrial development was already not a matter of question for the ruling elite related to parliamentary reform. There is not any single indication in the debates of bills that any of the ruling elite figures thought about it. The proposers of the bills, PM Pitt and Earl Grey, already had motivations other than manufacturing interests, most notably eliminating corruption in the political system (Cobbett 1814, p. 1416). The French Revolution also had some ideological influence (Cobbett 1817, p. 867–870).

On the other hand, debates on the Corn Law Bill during 1814–15 were a real confrontation between the landed and manufacturing interests. The bill aimed to impose trade restrictions on the import of grains to keep their price high and protect domestic agricultural producers. However, the manufacturing sector objected to the bill since it would increase food prices and the cost of labor (Wıllıamson 1990). Lord Grenville, an ardent opponent of the bill, described it as “Now, the question was, whether it would be wise on our part to abandon or to hazard the loom, which was found so productive of national wealth, in the speculation of becoming a great agricultural country” (Hansard 1815, p. 201). During the debates, numerous petitions signed by hundreds of thousands of people, mostly from manufacturing cities, were submitted to Parliament, which aimed to prevent the bill’s passing. In one of the sittings, Lord Grenville introduced a petition signed by 52,000 persons, including manufacturers, merchants and cotton spinners in Manchester (Hansard 1815, p. 3–4).

Eleven of the ruling elite figures in table 3 were still in Parliament during the debates of the Corn Bill. Among them, Baring and Rose in the Commons and Grenville in the Lords struggled to prevent the bill’s passing. Also, Philips, Finlay and Whitbread gave speeches against the bill. Some of the arguments of the bill’s opposers were not different from the arguments proposed by the supporters of the cotton industry in Parliament. For example, Grenville argued that if the bill passed, artisans and mechanics would migrate to other countries such as France and the USA (Hansard 1814, p. 1100–1101). After the bill passed, Mr Philips said, “No duty had been imposed in that country [France] on the importation of cotton; and the greatest protection was there afforded to the cotton manufacture, at the very moment that the right hon. gentleman [PM Lord Liverpool] was devising every possible means to bring ours to ruin” (Hansard 1815, p. 172).

The passing of the Corn Bill demonstrates that for the majority of the ruling elite, the landed interests were more important than the manufacturing interests, and the arguments of the cotton industry’s supporters, which were normally effective, were ineffective against them. It also shows that if the landed interests had required the blocking of technological and industrial development, the ruling elite could have done it. However, we know that this did not happen. One potential reason was that although the landed interests were in the highest position for them, the pro-Corn Bill elite was still supportive of industrial development, and the abovementioned public motivations were still valid for them. PM Liverpool said, “I did not mean to undervalue our commerce or our manufactures; but when put in competition with the domestic supply of the first necessaries of life, they were comparatively trifling” (Cobbett 1815, p. 185). Moreover, he underlined the importance of mechanization and energy in industrial development as a response to the opponents of the bill who complained about the rise in labor costs:

It had been argued, that the effect of this measure would be, by raising the price of provisions to raise the price of labour, and thus compel our manufacturers to emigrate, by enabling foreign nations to undersell them. However, the success of our manufactures did not depend upon cheapness of labour, but upon capital, credit and fuel. (…) Our great excellence in machinery gave us likewise a decided superiority (Hansard vol.30 1815, p. 179).

Lord Liverpool’s words show that even if the ruling elite could make decisions undermining the manufacturing sector by prioritizing landed interests, blocking industrial development was not an option for them. Also, there was a possibility that the landed elite was indirectly benefiting from industrial development with the increase in land values. George Phillips, a pro-cotton-industry MP and textile industrialist, claimed that

during the last twenty years, the value of the fee simple had been doubled, and rents had been raised in proportion. Gentlemen had boasted of the superior condition of the agriculturists; but it was the manufacturers who had chiefly contributed to the support of the country. It was by means of the demand for agricultural produce that high rents had been obtained, and that demand had been from the manufacturers (Hansard 1815, p. 62).

5. Discussion and conclusions

This study shows that the cotton industry entered Parliament’s agenda after the 1770s as a result of its growth with the impact of mechanization. After its entrance, Parliament tried to support the cotton industry with protectionist foreign trade policy, avoiding heavy taxation, and protecting machinery from technologically conservative groups. In the ruling elite’s supportive policies, two publicly motivated factors were influential: The first was increasing employment levels and, thereby, combating poverty and potential social disturbances. This motivation persisted in the 18th century with the ruling elite’s understanding of the long-term merits of mechanization despite its adverse short-term impacts on employment. Secondly, the ruling elite was motivated by the fear of lagging behind other countries, especially France, economically and militarily, and supported the cotton industry to sustain the international competitiveness of the British economy.

However, these public motivations could be prevalent only if certain vested interests did not suppress them. In this regard, Britain’s undemocratic political system, essentially closed to ordinary workers and artisans, helped the ruling elite to reject the demands of technologically conservative groups. Moreover, despite intensive lobbying, the political system had no excessive cronyism. Thereby, the ruling elite acted like an arbiter to the demands of industrialists and merchants, eliminating any possibility of blocking mechanization in the cotton industry upon the pressure of other textile branches. The examination of ruling elite figures who actively participated in parliamentary debates on the cotton industry shows that the cotton interests were represented in Parliament, but the majority of the main speakers in Parliament were high-ranking statesmen acting with public motivations. Also, although the majority of the ruling elite prioritized landed interests, this never turned into a total blocking of technological and industrial development.

What do these findings tell us about the proposed hypotheses in the Introduction? I find highly limited evidence regarding the first hypothesis that the ruling elite benefited from the commercialized and industrializing economy. At one point in the debates, Whig MP George Philips argued that the landed elite benefited from the increasing land values thanks to industrialization. However, note that this was just a claim of an MP, who was also a textile industrialist. In none of the debates on the cotton industry was there any discussion on land values.

There is, again, limited evidence regarding the second hypothesis that industrialization was not a threat to the ruling elite’s political power. Actually, as the debates on both parliamentary reform and corn law bills show, there was some threat perceived by the ruling elite from manufacturing interests. However, this perceived threat never resulted in attempting to block technological and industrial development altogether. Although the ruling elite undermined the growth of the manufacturing sector with the enactment of the Corn Law, blocking industrialization was never a matter of question. Moreover, it is important to note that parliamentary debates on the cotton industry never took place in the context of whether the ruling elite would lose their political power.

However, there is clear evidence for the third hypothesis: economic and military competition among countries in Western Europe pushed the British ruling elite to support industrialization. The British ruling elite were motivated by the fear of lagging behind other countries, especially France, economically and militarily, and supported the cotton industry to sustain the international competitiveness of the British economy. It is possible to observe the impact of this motivation in almost all the supportive policies of Parliament: suppressing the anti-machinery riots, avoiding heavy taxation, keeping raw material-rich colonies, preventing physical capital from moving abroad, and protectionist foreign trade regulations.

As a result, what distinguished Britain during the 18th century from its historical precedents that blocked technological and industrial development was the high pressure of international competition, a ruling elite who understood the long-term merits of mechanization related to employment, and a political system that prevented the dominance of private interests over these factors.

Data availability

The data and methods underlying this article are available in the article and in its online supplementary material (Appendix 2).

Conflict of interest statement

None declared.

Acknowledgements

I am especially grateful to my doctoral supervisor Jonas Ljungberg for his guidance and support. I also want to acknowledge my gratitude to Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation for their generous funding. Many thanks to the editors of the European Review of Economic History, in particular Joan Roses, the anonymous referee, examiners in my doctoral defense at Lund University, especially Martin Andersson and Julian Hoppit, as well as the participants of the WINIR Conference in Lund University in 2019, “The European Space” Conference in the Catholic University of Milan in 2023 and the Department of Economic History’s seminars in Lund, for their comments and recommendations.

Supplementary material

Supplementary material is available at the European Review of Economic History online.

Footnotes

1

See Appendix 2 for more information on the data sources.

2

I also checked whether the patterns in parliamentary debates and legislation in Figure 1 are correlated with the major wars during the 18th century, considering that international warfare was one of the most prominent determinants of the state’s economic policy during this period (Brewer 1989, p. 135–136; Karaman and Pamuk 2013; O’Brien 1988). However, my examination did not provide positive results. Check Appendix 1 for details.

3

For example, similar to PM Pitt, the importance of “public tranquillity” was emphasized many times by Mr Leigh Keck (Hansard 1812, p. 816–818), Mr Abercromby (ibid, p. 828–829), and most importantly, home secretary Richard Ryder (ibid, p. 837–838) during the debates on the Luddite revolts in 1812.

4

I also searched the increasing capacity of the British state to suppress rebellions during the 18th century (Vernon 2017, p. 11–12) as another potential factor, but there was no direct evidence of it in the parliamentary debates and other sources.

5

However, representatives of the woollen industry in Parliament sometimes criticized the mechanized production methods of the cotton industry. For example, Yorkshire MP William Wilberforce said in 1800, “Cotton manufacture which contributes largely to the national wealth is highly injurious to the public morals” and “the woollen manufacture [is] superior” in this respect (Cobbett 1819, p. 133).

6

This number may be considered small, but please note that only high-ranking government officials and MPs/peers directly affiliated with the cotton industry actively participated in the debates. The other MPs/peers did not participate because they had no knowledge or interest on the matter. As Moore and Horwitz indicated (1971, p. 226–227), many MPs in the House of Commons were carrying out other parliamentary duties, such as attending second reading committees when they did not actively participate in the debates.