
Contents
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Introduction Introduction
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1. Elements of the Pure Motive of Virtue 1. Elements of the Pure Motive of Virtue
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2. Annas and Kraut on the Motive of Virtue in Friendship 2. Annas and Kraut on the Motive of Virtue in Friendship
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3. The Paradox of Eudaimonism: Desiring Eudaimonia as a By-Product of Virtue 3. The Paradox of Eudaimonism: Desiring Eudaimonia as a By-Product of Virtue
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4. Why the Paradox Cannot Be Solved by Denying that Eudaimonia Motivates Virtue 4. Why the Paradox Cannot Be Solved by Denying that Eudaimonia Motivates Virtue
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5. Magnanimity as Aristotle's Answer to the Paradox 5. Magnanimity as Aristotle's Answer to the Paradox
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6. Why the Paradox Cannot Be Solved by Second-Order Desire Subsuming First-Order Desire 6. Why the Paradox Cannot Be Solved by Second-Order Desire Subsuming First-Order Desire
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7. The Existential Solution: Pure Motives as Projects of the Striving Will 7. The Existential Solution: Pure Motives as Projects of the Striving Will
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8. The Paradox as One of Several Related Objections to Eudaimonism 8. The Paradox as One of Several Related Objections to Eudaimonism
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7 The Paradox of Eudaimonism: An Existential Critique
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Published:July 2007
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Abstract
The Transmission principle and the weak erosiac thesis provide the psychological basis for Aristotle's eudaimonism. Yet when he tries to work out a conception of virtue, Aristotle describes forms of ethical motivation that are ultimately incoherent with his eudaimonist framework. This is evident in the so-called the “paradox of eudaimonism”, which arises from the formal egoism to which Aristotle's psychology commits him. This chapter argues that Aristotle's conception of virtuous motivation as aimed at the noble for its own sake is incompatible with A-eudaimonism. It is concerned primarily with eudaimonist conceptions of virtue and friendship. It argues that virtuous motivation is not only materially unselfish, but also formally non-egoistic. Starting with contemporary efforts by Richard Kraut and Julia Annas to make sense of Aristotle's account of friendship, it argues that Aristotle conflates by-product goods and intentional goals. Aiming at our happiness as our highest end is self-defeating, since our happiness is in large part a by-product of motivating ourselves to pursue self-transcending ends or goals.
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