Diplomacy of Hope: Transatlantic Relations in the Transition from Trump to Biden

Abstract

Despite advances in the study of emotions in international relations, we have a limited understanding of the role hope plays in diplomatic practice. We draw on the scholarship on emotions in IR and psychological studies on hope to theorize the workings of hope in diplomacy. We argue that in times of political change, states are more likely to resort to a novel type of diplomacy—diplomacy of hope—to shape their future relationship. We illustrate our argument with a qualitative content analysis of Twitter communication by high-ranking officials in the Biden administration and the EU after the 2020 US election. We find that both parties engage in diplomacy of hope, expressing enthusiasm, promising to renew the transatlantic relationship, and reaffirming their mutual commitment to achieve common goals. Yet the two parties’ strategic discourses diverge in their preferred pathways to cooperation and their proposed renegotiation of global leadership roles.

A pesar de los avances que se han producido dentro del área de estudio de las emociones en las Relaciones Internacionales, aún tenemos una comprensión limitada del papel que juega la esperanza dentro de la práctica diplomática. Partimos de la base del conocimiento académico en materia de emociones en las RRII y de los estudios psicológicos sobre la esperanza con el fin de teorizar sobre el funcionamiento de la esperanza en la diplomacia. Argumentamos que, en tiempos de cambios políticos, resulta más probable que los Estados recurran a un nuevo tipo de diplomacia, la diplomacia de la esperanza, con el objetivo de dar forma a su relación futura. Ilustramos nuestra hipótesis a través de un análisis de contenido cualitativo procedente de la comunicación llevada a cabo en Twitter por parte de funcionarios de alto rango de la administración Biden y de la UE después de las elecciones estadounidenses de 2020. Concluimos que ambas partes participan en una diplomacia de esperanza, expresando su entusiasmo, prometiendo renovar la relación transatlántica y reafirmando su compromiso mutuo con el fin de lograr objetivos comunes. Sin embargo, los discursos estratégicos de ambas partes difieren en relación con las vías que prefieren en su camino hacia esta cooperación y en su propuesta de renegociación de los roles de liderazgo global.

Malgré des avancées dans l’étude des émotions en relations internationales, notre compréhension du rôle joué par l'espoir dans la pratique diplomatique reste limitée. Nous nous fondons sur la recherche sur les émotions en RI et sur les études psychologiques relatives à l'espoir pour théoriser le fonctionnement de l'espoir en diplomatie. Nous affirmons qu'en période de changement politique, les États ont davantage de chances d'avoir recours à un nouveau type de diplomatie—la diplomatie de l'espoir—pour façonner leurs relations futures. Nous illustrons notre propos à l'aide d'une analyse qualitative du contenu des tweets de fonctionnaires haut placés au sein de l'administration de Joe Biden et de l'UE après l’élection américaine de 2020. Nous observons que les deux parties pratiquent la diplomatie de l'espoir : elles expriment leur enthousiasme, promettent de renouveler leur relation transatlantique et réaffirment leur engagement mutuel quand il s'agit d'atteindre des buts communs. Pourtant, le discours stratégique des deux parties diffère quant à la trajectoire privilégiée de coopération et la proposition de renégociation des rôles de leadership mondial.

Introduction

Two decades after the “emotional turn” in IR, it is now well established that emotions matter in world politics (Crawford 2000; McDermott 2004; Ross 2006; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008). Diplomacy—the study of the daily interaction through communication between states and their representatives—is no exception in this regard. Emotions as personal attributes that drive individual perceptions and behavior are essential in face-to-face diplomacy (Hall 2015; Holmes 2018; Keys and Yorke 2019). But emotions can also structure and shape global politics, including identities, communities, conflict, everyday practices, and foreign relations (Koschut 2022). Bringing back agency to the fore, emotions can also be conceptualized as a tool of statecraft strategically used to achieve foreign policy goals (Hall 2015; Lynggaard 2019; van Hoef and O'Connor 2019).

So far, the concept of emotional diplomacy has been explored in the context of extreme events with an episodic quality (e.g., the crisis between two nuclear-armed powers, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, etc.) (Hall 2015, 189). Answering Hall’s call to explore emotional diplomacy in mundane contexts, we investigate the role of emotions at times of leadership turnovers, as a salient feature of political life with far-reaching consequences for the future of foreign policy. Periods of transition—the time between the announcement of elections’ results and the beginning of the new administration’s foreign policymaking—are important and delicate moments in political life and international politics. They inevitably carry the prospect of political change, which can be both threatening and enticing, featuring risks as well as opportunities (Stuckey 2017). In sum, moments of transition are fraught with emotions, domestically and internationally; as such, they deserve to be scrutinized. Moreover, IR literature has mainly focused on negative emotions like fear, anger, revenge, hatred, or guilt, besides several studies looking at empathy in the context of conflicts and disasters and emotions of joy and contentment related to military successes (Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Head 2012; Crawford 2014; Hutchison 2014; Dolan 2016). Recent studies have shown the importance of friendliness for shaping foreign policy (Heimann and Kampf 2022) and the relevance of considering conflictive emotions (Beauregard 2022). Our study on hope aims to complement the palette of emotions experienced, communicated, and enacted in international relations.

We argue that one of the moments in which leaders can choose to resort to the diplomacy of hope is in times of transition, to set the stage for future foreign policymaking, to mitigate the risk of potential future crises, and to signal strategic intent for a certain change in the direction of diplomatic relations amidst uncertainty. We do not ignore the role that predetermined, structural interest-based calculations might play in foreign policymaking. Nevertheless, we contend that the diplomacy of hope during times of political change can frame subsequent policymaking by preventing further crises between states. Building on the concept of emotional diplomacy—defined as the strategic use of emotions by foreign policy actors to shape the perceptions and behaviors of other actors and achieve desired ends (Hall 2015, 16), we propose an innovative analytical framework to study the undertheorized emotion of hope in international politics. We contend that, like other strands of emotional diplomacy, the diplomacy of hope is a salient form of diplomacy with significant consequences for the future of key strategic relations. We acknowledge that the diplomacy of hope can be deployed in diverse instances (i.e., following all kinds of crises). Yet we argue that the diplomacy of hope is particularly useful and prominent in periods of transition, given the acute uncertainty, early stages of foreign policymaking, and opportunities to reset relationships. It allows political leaders to engage in a positive, forward-looking discourse, contributing to a constructive atmosphere and raising positive expectations for the future, while simultaneously maintaining some ambiguity about the exact diplomatic strategies leading to future cooperation (i.e., the ultimate goal)—thereby strategically shaping the bounds of future diplomatic relations.

Expanding on Snyder’s psychological research on hope (2000), we theorize three main constitutive components of the diplomacy of hope—goals, pathways, and agency—and discuss how they manifest in political transitions from a less cooperative (and sometimes even openly hostile) government that strained diplomatic relations to a more cooperative leader and government that seek to repair broken diplomatic ties. Granted, leaders may deploy different types of emotional diplomacy depending on the type of political transition. We illustrate our argument with a qualitative content analysis of statements in the Twitter accounts of President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on the US side, as well as Ursula Von Der Leyen, Charles Michel, and Josep Borrell on the European side. They are all influential political figures in charge of defining and communicating the contours of US and EU foreign policies, respectively. We chose to examine their statements on Twitter, as it has become the preferred social media medium for diplomats and political leaders to communicate with domestic and international audiences as well as with their counterparts around the world. Twitter is also a very powerful medium that both represents and provokes emotions, leading to the escalation and de-escalation of conflicts (Duncombe 2019). The timeframe for the data—from the 3rd of November 2020 until the 3rd of April 2021—captures the early stages of the transition from the Trump administration to the Biden presidency, illustrating the stated intent for the transformation of the relationship and the rhetoric of hope to frame that intent using Twitter. This is not yet a time for concrete foreign policymaking to take place, but it is a time for the future direction of the relationship to be (re-)defined.

Our content analysis finds that the public communication of European and American leaders in the months following the 2020 US election conveys an unequivocally hopeful mood regarding the future of transatlantic relations. All three constitutive elements of hope—goals, pathways, and agency—feature prominently in the official transatlantic diplomatic discourse. Both US and EU leaders express similar goals in terms of cooperation, insisting on the urgency to tackle common global challenges—particularly climate change, the successful management of the COVID pandemic, and the fight against terrorism and violence. Yet a closer investigation of the rhetorical markers underpinning the diplomacy of hope reveals that both sides refer to different pathways to achieve this goal—corresponding to the restructuring of the transatlantic relationship. While the US insists heavily on the rhetoric of repair through a return to the status quo, the EU uses the rhetoric of change, in which it takes a leadership role both globally and in the transatlantic relationship, emphasizing that things have evolved in recent years. Hence, the diplomacy of hope is not one-dimensional, even through the ultimate shared goal of both parties is cooperation. Our analysis finds that the diplomacy of hope encompasses more than one type of hope and a diverse, nuanced emotional discourse.

This study makes an important contribution to the research on emotions in international relations. It joins the growing scholarship exploring the role of emotions in diplomacy, and specifically the strand of research conceptualizing emotions as a tool of statecraft strategically used to achieve foreign policy goals (Hall 2015; Lynggaard 2019; van Hoef and O'Connor 2019). By contrast to existing research scrutinizing the impact of and use of negative emotions in world politics (i.e., diplomacy of anger, diplomacy of guilt) (Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Hall 2011; Crawford 2014), we explore the positive emotion of hope, which has remained largely undertheorized despite its prominence. Our innovative focus on the online political communication of leaders via social media (Twitter) also emphasizes the relevance of emotions in diplomacy beyond the well-researched traditional face-to-face setting.

The article proceeds with a discussion of the role of emotions in diplomacy, highlighting the need to theorize the pervasive emotion of hope in international politics. Section two draws on studies in psychology to conceptualize hope as a relevant emotion in global politics, particularly in times of political change. It articulates an innovative analytical framework explaining why, how, and to what ends states engage in the diplomacy of hope in times of transition. The analysis illustrates the conceptual framework in the transatlantic context with the case study of the transition from the Trump to the Biden era.

Emotions, Diplomacy, and Hope

Originally, the first wave of scholarship of the emotional turn in IR criticized the discipline’s marginalization of emotions in mainstream IR theories and engaged in fundamental questions such as the level of analysis between individual and collective emotions, the role of cognition and intentionality, and whether emotions are primarily hardwired or culturally constructed (Koschut 2022). By contrast, the second wave of research seeks to integrate the consideration of emotion into specific issue areas and further theorize the myriad workings of emotions and their effects. Studies have examined the effects of emotions on a wide variety of phenomena of international relevance, ranging from war and peace to humanitarian interventions (Fattah and Fierke 2009; Ahäll and Gregory 2015). Diplomacy is no exception in this regard.

The research on the role of emotions in diplomacy has taken three different paths so far. The first one corresponds to the psychological approach to emotions, which conceives emotions as personal attributes that drive individual perceptions and behavior. This approach has been privileged in the study of the role of emotions in face-to-face diplomacy (Hall 2015; Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Holmes 2018; Keys and Yorke 2019), demonstrating the importance of emotional dynamics in the success or failure of diplomatic encounters. By contrast, the sociological or cultural perspective on emotions (as cultural products embedded in social structures and practices) investigates how emotions emerge in international politics at the collective level. It explores how emotion structures and shapes global politics, including identities, communities, conflict, everyday practices, and foreign relations (Koschut 2022). Finally, the third strand of research conceives of emotions as a resource for strategic political activity used by states and NGOs alike (Bilgic et al. 2019; Eberle and Daniel 2019; Hall and Ross 2019; Ilgit and Prakash 2019). It is on the latter conceptualization of emotions that we are first and foremost interested, as it allows to bring agency back and gain a better understanding of the (re)production of emotions and their effects on the overall state of foreign relations.

We therefore view emotions as a tool of statecraft that diplomatic actors use to generate support or opposition to political objectives (Hall 2015; Lynggaard 2019; van Hoef and O'Connor 2019). Internationally, state actors engage in emotional diplomacy for strategic reasons: to frame issues, maintain or alter their state’s image, or even to transform the character of specific relationships (Hall 2015, 2). Emotional diplomacy can be seen as a form of rationalist “signalling” used to project an image about state intentions and behaviors, that will be perceived by diplomatic partners as trustworthy and effective (Schelling 1966; Fearon 1995; Kydd 2005). Yet in a constructivist spirit (Wendt 1999; Adler 2002), emotional diplomacy is a performance made up of a particular discourse and a set of symbolic gestures that imbue foreign policymaking with specific meanings and social expectations. Hence, emotional diplomacy can be considered a “socially thick” strategic action (Hall 2015, 7). So far, the concept of emotional diplomacy has only been developed in relation to anger, guilt, empathy (Hall 2015), and shame (involvement of NGOs in emotional diplomacy) (Ilgit and Prakash 2019)—leaving undertheorized an array of relevant positive emotions that can strategically be mobilized.

We propose that hope—defined as “passion for the possible” (Godfrey 1987, 29)—is an essential emotion in international politics. As such, hope is often strategically used to achieve foreign policy goals through what we call “the diplomacy of hope.” Although several emotions, including negative ones, can motivate foreign policymaking, we contend hope is one of the key emotions driving diplomacy and the pursuit of international cooperation. Studying hope in a diplomatic context offers valuable insights into the role of positive emotions in shaping international relations. Strategically, hope can be used to signal intent for either foreign policy change or for continuity, positively framing the intention to work together to tackle future cross-border problems regardless of possible future differences. In other words, hope can serve the crucial strategic purpose of indicating to international partners that good diplomatic relations are the desired outcome even when diplomatic challenges appear.

Generally, hope arises from a wish to reach a valued goal and from the belief that its attainment is possible as a result of one’s own efforts or due to external factors that may be beyond one’s control (Markwica 2018, 77). Hope presupposes the existence of uncertainty and current adversity—which are key features of world politics (Rathbun 2007). In times of war, individuals feel hope for peace (Staats and Partlo 1993), and hopes for economic productivity emerge in dire economic circumstances, such as during the recession of 1992 in the US (Drahos 2004). More generally, the environmental, social, and economic insecurity we witness in the world today fuels the need for hope. In this era of “un-ness” (Aradau 2014)—uncertainty, unpredictability, and unknowability—hope has increasingly become a mantra reassuring us that all will be well.

Not only is hope a salient emotion in world politics, but it also plays a critical role in maintaining diplomatic relations between allies and increasing the potential for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Hope works as a resource that enables actors (individuals and collectives alike) to persist, improve their circumstances, and even thrive (Kleist and Thorsen 2017). The conditions of uncertainty and adversity at the basis of the emotion of hope can motivate and trigger the formulation of goals and the identification of pathways to reach these objectives. Hope matters in international politics because, if properly mobilized, it can generate collective action and helps move processes forward. It is a form of political discourse that offers a positive, forward-looking vision and confidence that desirable goals are indeed achievable. In diplomatic relations, the pursuit of cooperation can be considered the ultimate goal and an indicator of hope. Diplomacy—as a social institution—is geared toward minimizing frictions between states and advancing cooperation through intense communication processes (Jönsson and Hall 2005; Sharp 2009; Bjola and Kornprobst 2013). Hope is therefore a vital affective element of diplomatic relations. Without hope, diplomacy loses its raison d’être. Even in cases where cooperation is fully or partially achieved (or even delayed), positive emotions like enthusiasm and joy are generated by the belief in future cooperation as a goal filled with hope. Key to reaching these goals is the hope that successful cooperation is possible. The importance of hope for political actors is reflected in the regular appearance of the language of hope in political rhetoric, particularly so in the context of electoral campaigns (Civettini 2011; Stahl 2020).

Hope is not static. Rather, hope can fluctuate over time, stoked by efforts for positive political change and an existing tradition of successful diplomatic relations. But levels of hope can decrease in response to a diplomatic crisis or dramatic political change. We argue that hope is a valuable resource for political leaders in times of transition due to the characteristics of this time of political life. First, as actual foreign policymaking has not started yet, the inherent uncertainty regarding the future of the relationship increases. Against this backdrop, hope becomes a useful political resource for state representatives. It allows them to engage in positive, forward-looking discourse, contributing to a constructive atmosphere by raising positive expectations about the future while remaining ambiguous as to the exact pathways leading to future cooperation. This serves as a strong signal that old pathways might not be relevant any longer and that new pathways need to be discussed and agreed upon by both parties. Importantly, the vagueness surrounding the pathways leading to the goals does not hinder the production of hope (Reading 2004).

The Diplomacy of Hope: Rhetorical Markers of Hope

Hope—like any other emotion—has both a cognitive and affective dimensions. Snyder offers arguably the most widely used definition of hope in the scientific literature, grounded in the cognitivist tradition, identifying three main constitutive components—goals, pathways, and agency (Snyder 2000, 8–13). His definition encompasses a dimension of rationality brought about by the need to have pathways, thus a plan of action, to reach the desired goals. Planning and hope are closely intertwined (Moltmann 1971). Goals are necessary to the development of hope, while pathways refer to the imagined path or sequence of events that gets a person from the present state to the goal, while agency is the perception that it is possible to follow these pathways to reaching the goal (Civettini 2011). According to Snyder (2000), seeing pathways to achieving the goal is central to hope. As hope is based on a positive imagination of the future, it requires creativity and flexibility (Bar-Tal 2001, 601). Along with these cognitive components, the discourse of hope is imbued with positive affective expressions of joy, enthusiasm, excitement, and the associated emotions of cherishing and longing. This is because hope contains an affective element that consists of feeling good about the expected pleasant events or outcomes (Staats and Stassen 1985; Aspinwall and Leaf 2002).

Drawing on Snyder’s (2000) definition of hope, we propose an analytical framework unpacking the workings of the diplomacy of hope articulated around the three components/attributes of hope: goals, pathways, and agency. We focus on the actual production of hope on the international stage through leaders’ public communication by highlighting the rhetorical makers of hope and their intended effect—i.e., shaping the broad contours of the future relationship. In line with the concept of emotional diplomacy developed by Hall (2015), we do not refer to the personal hope of individual diplomats. Rather, we mean the intentional and even strategic performance of hope for diplomatic purposes (i.e., the diplomacy of hope)—public hope used by diplomats and political leaders. By contrast to Hall’s conceptualization, however, we focus mainly on the discursive practice of emotional diplomacy, leaving aside gestures and substantive policy moves, as in times of transition, policymaking has not yet started.

First, hope is goal-oriented. In the conduct of the diplomacy of hope, cooperation by diplomatic means is often the goal of state actors, including the pursuit of shared objectives and the willingness to tackle common threats. In moments of political change, such as the aftermath of an election, state representatives are more likely to turn to sweeping agreements and broad statements of good intentions. If the election brings about change perceived as the end of a political crisis, as was the case with the 2020 US elections, we expect leaders and diplomats to use a discourse of enthusiasm and joy, signaling renewed commitment to existing alliances, future collaboration, and tackling shared challenges through encouragement of progress and a call to bilateral action. The diplomacy of hope in this context refers to many goals that both sides set out to achieve, indicating commitment to future cooperation (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

The components of hope and the discursive markers of the diplomacy of hope.

Second, hope in international relations also entails the formulation of a set of pathways—a sequence of events or an imagined path to get states to reach their goal of cooperation. Such pathways can encompass the individual actions states undertake to facilitate cooperation as well as bilateral action and multilateral efforts as part of larger diplomatic networks. State actors are free to determine the degree of specificity regarding the preferred pathways to advance the goal of cooperation. We distinguish two kinds of rhetorical strategies constructing different pathways leading to cooperation. One way through which states can signal a potential pathway to cooperation in times of political change is through a discourse of repair, announcing a clear break with the policy of the predecessor and a return to older pathways. Like the rhetoric of purification in domestic politics (Stuckey 2017, 675), the rhetoric of repair emphasizes the idea that even if relations have deteriorated, a sound foundation exists on which it is possible to expand moving forward. In this sense, the pathway to renewed and enhanced cooperation (i.e., the goal) entails the acknowledgment that some damage was done but that it is possible to revert to “business as usual.” It corresponds to the optimistic promise of restoration through repair. For instance, at the Munich Security Conference on February 19th, 2021, Joe Biden confirmed that the “transatlantic alliance was back” and remained the “cornerstone of all we hoped to accomplish in the 21st century” (Biden 2021). Discursive expressions, such as the promise to “rebuild” alliances are part of the repertoire of the rhetoric of repair. In a transatlantic context, such discourse refers to a sense of guilt and reparation, to America re-asserting a move away from isolationism and its return to international politics, in particular the restoration of US leadership on the global stage (Figure 1).

State actors can also advance a discourse of change, suggesting the need for new pathways to be defined during times of political change to achieve a goal. A discourse of change highlights that new circumstances call for new pathways, considering potential changes in the distribution of leadership roles. It signals a move away from the status quo or from the previous conduct of diplomatic relations toward a restructured relationship. It is important to note, however, that the two types of discourses linked to pathways are not mutually exclusive. The same diplomats can indicate the intention to restore diplomacy to familiar power dynamics in some areas of foreign policy, while in other areas they can commit to a reorganization of diplomatic relations. As we will discuss in more detail, in the aftermath of the November 2020 elections, both the US and the EU express enthusiasm and optimism at the possibility of a return to a strong diplomatic partnership. EU diplomats signal hope to redefine some dynamics of individual or joint leadership in the transatlantic partnership, particularly in the areas of climate change and pandemic control. On the 5th anniversary of the Paris Agreement, Charles Michel, the President of the European Council tweets: “With our decision to cut greenhouse gas emissions of 55 percent by 2030, Europe is leading in the fight against #ClimateChange and set to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. Now it’s time for others to join the race!” (December 12, 2020).

The third component essential in the production of hope is agency, or the perception by all parties that it is possible to follow proposed pathways to reach the goal of successful cooperation. Here, the primary responsibility for generating an acute sense of agency lies in the political leaders and other key state representatives. Much like the display of all emotions on the global stage, the diplomatic performance of hope can vary depending on the actors involved in its representation. During transitions, the newly elected officials and their counterparts are expected to play a central role in the performance of hope, holding a certain “dramatic dominance” (Goffman 1959, 101), as they are themselves the embodiment of change and uncertainty due to leadership change (Figure 1).

Key to conveying a strong sense of agency is a discourse of assertiveness and determination, which fosters a sense of reliability and confidence that the goal of renewed cooperation is achievable. The analysis of Biden’s discourse abounds with references to the fact that “the US is determined to re-engage with Europe” but not what he called on a “transactional basis, but on the more secure basis of upholding democratic values and democratic principles” (Biden 2021). Similarly, on November 24th, as President Elect, Biden tweets: “This team is ready to lead the world, not retreat from it. Ready to confront our adversaries, not reject our allies. And ready to stand up for our values.” In Europe, HR/VP Borrell echoed this message: “A capable and strategically aware EU is the best partner for the US. We are ready to work together on the wide spectrum of global challenges and advance our partnership” (November 11, 2020). The overemphasis on the readiness of the new administration and of the EU leadership amplifies this strong sense of agency, crucial for publicly generating hope.

A discourse of reassurance is also a way to express agency and cultivate the perception that it is possible to reach the goal of successful cooperation amidst acute uncertainty, emphasizing a sense of familiarity that resonates with the targeted audience. After the election, Biden tried to reassure the old US allies that his familiarity with the pre-Trump era foreign policy tradition from the time he was Obama's vice president has prepared him well for guiding the country back into a global leadership role alongside trusted partners. Against the background of anxiety and uncertainty about the future, a rhetorical emphasis on competency and efficacy helps reassure domestic and international audiences that the situation is under control and that the work needed to achieve desired goals has already started, even as the specific details of policymaking are left out. For instance, President Biden firmly announced: “Today, America is officially back in the Paris Climate Agreement. Let’s get to work” (February 19 2021).

Method and Data

We propose a qualitative content analysis of political communication about foreign policy, centered on the first months following the US election on November 3rd, 2020. The timeframe for the data collection is November 3rd 2020–April 4th 2021. It captures the reactions of both President Elect Biden and of the leaders of the European Union’s institutions immediately after the election, at the time of the presidential inauguration on January 20th, 2021, and over two months in its aftermath. We focus our analysis on the tweets of political leaders—defined here as “responsible decision-makers having a political mandate in one form or another” (Hill 2003) and representing the affective embodiment of interstate relationships (Koschut 2014, 545). The US President—together with the Secretary of State are the two most important political figures defining and communicating the contours of US policy (Peake 2001). As the main transatlantic partner, we focus on the EU itself, which is the most important locus of transatlantic policy cooperation (Peterson 2016). Specifically, we examine the public communication of the European Council’s President, Charles Michel, who represents the EU on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy; the President of the EU Commission, Ursula Van Der Leyen, involved in a wide range of policy areas pertaining to foreign affairs (from trade to pandemics) (Nugent and Rhinard 2015) and of Josep Borell, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), who is in charge of shaping the standing of the European Union on the global stage (Juncos and Pomorska 2020). We coded more accounts on the European side, based on the unique institutional set-up of the EU, to capture the EU’s strategic communication in this context.

We perform qualitative content analysis on tweets from @POTUS, @SecBlinken, @JosepBorrellF, @vonderleyen, and @eucopresident (Table 1) (for similar approaches, see Stier et al. 2018; Lacatus 2019). Coding was carried out using NVIVO, a computer-based content analysis software generating qualitative and quantitative data after coding text (QSR International 1999). Following the principles of qualitative content analysis (Marying 2004), systematic text analysis is based on the creation of categories of text, which are first identified and later revisited. Coding of the data took place in two stages. First, coding of the data was done according to the most appropriate theme, including both themes identified in relevant scholarship and identified by coders. These themes consist of “idea clusters” that share features and resist reductive essentialization (Spiro and Jehng 1990). Coders identified both broader themes and emotional indicators in the Twitter spheres of the various candidates corresponding to the different components of hope (including their rhetorical strategies). Second, individual indicators and coded nodes were grouped in larger thematic categories based on thematic similarity. The online appendix includes details on the coding scheme, frequency tables, and inter-coder reliability tests.

Table 1.

Characteristics of sources for textual data

	Tweets	Nodes	Followers	Account
Joe Biden	69	112	7,700,000	@POTUS
Antony Blinken	313	266	1,700,000	@SecBlinken
Josep Borrell	428	420	376,200	@JosepBorrellF
Ursula von der Leyen	131	156	541,000	@vonderleyen
Charles Michel	102	134	1,300,000	@eucopresident

A Hopeful Mood Across the Atlantic

The public strategic communication of American and European leaders after the 2020 US presidential elections conveys an unequivocal hopeful mood about future foreign policy and the transatlantic relations. On both sides, a shared positive and forward-looking discourse emerges, replete with expressions of enthusiasm, renewed commitment, and assertiveness (Figure 2), indicating the use of the diplomacy of hope. American and European leaders make and reiterate a range of shared commitments to immediate and future action, showing determination in their intention to cooperate to tackle common challenges. In line with our conceptualization of hope, indicators of all three constitutive elements of hope feature among the most frequent themes in the data (Figures 2–4).

Figure 2.

Frequency values of FP-coded nodes occurring in all five Twitter accounts.

Figure 3.

Most frequent coded FP nodes occurring in US officials’ Twitter accounts.

Figure 4.

Most frequent coded FP nodes occurring in EU officials’ Twitter accounts.

Expressing a high degree of assertiveness and commitment, the EU and the US actively engage in the production of hope as they assert their capacity to follow the pathways needed to achieve the end goal of enhanced cooperation. This discourse of hope resonates across the Atlantic—contributing to a constructive atmosphere and raising positive expectations for the future. On January 28th, US Secretary of State Blinken tweets: “I had a good conversation with @JosepBorrellF today. We’re committed to working together to repair, revitalize, and raise the level of ambition in the US-EU relationship. Whether COVID, climate change, or China, we are stronger when we face these complex challenges together.” The President of the European Council, Michel, contributes to this hopeful atmosphere as well: “Welcome back #America! Committed to working with you @POTUS @JoeBiden As close friends, let’s stand up to our common challenges. #EU-US #StrongerTogether #MSC2021” (February 19, 2021).

A comparison of the most frequently coded foreign policy nodes occurring in the US and EU officials’ Twitter accounts reveals some differences in their discourse of hope in foreign policy (Figure 2). On the US side, emphasis is put on the importance of strengthening partnerships and friendships, working with allies, and enhancing cooperation in a clear attempt to signal a break with the unilateral/isolationist tendencies of the Trump administration and to reassure allies around the world. The prevailing expression of enthusiasm is linked to the idea of “being back on the international stage” and of restoring American leadership (Figure 3), referring to the pathway associated with a discourse of repair.

In contrast, the discourse of EU leaders is more diverse, with themes referring to both a broader geographic scope (i.e., Russia, Africa, etc.) and to a wider range of issues (i.e., Covax aid, universal vaccination, etc.). This is not surprising given that European leaders are conducting foreign policy as usual, responding to ongoing events in the international arena, unconstrained by the same imperatives as the newly elected Biden administration, still to begin conducting foreign policy. The EU’s discourse following the American election expressed great enthusiasm about Biden’s victory and the “return of the US” as an international ally (Figure 4). Against the background of enthusiasm and joy, the EU’s discourse is also noticeably assertive of EU’s strong leadership in some areas of international policy, signaling the intention for a subtle renegotiation of the terms of the relationship through a discourse of change as an alternative pathway at this time of transition.

This discursive renegotiation of global leadership gestures to the special historical circumstances (i.e., post-WWII) in which the European integration project was born and which created a fundamental asymmetry in the transatlantic relationship. The European strategic dependency on the US to ensure its security and the massive imbalance in power have become fundamental features of the transatlantic relationship (Cox 2012). Yet throughout decades of competition and cooperation (Smith and Steffenson 2005), the European Economic Community—and later the EU—has tried to impose itself as a relevant, distinct, and independent international actor. So far, it is mainly economically that the EU has succeeded in effectively soft-balancing the US, creating “a partnership of equals” (Elgström 2007, 954; Wright 2011). In the security realm, the EU has lately taken remarkable steps to boost its defense capabilities through the 2016 Global Strategy and its advancement of strategic autonomy (Smith 2018). The EU also developed a comparative advantage in several fields of cooperation, including post-conflict management and relations with Africa (Smith and Steffenson 2005). The EU's bid for climate change leadership since the early 2000s is also worth emphasizing (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe 2017; Walker and Bidenkopf 2018). In spite of the EU’s expertise in these areas, the EU is still struggling to be recognized as an equal actor to the US when it comes to the political-security realm (Blanc 2018).

Hope is Goal-Orientated toward Cooperation

One of the key discursive markers of hope is the expression of goals, including shared diplomatic goals linked to cooperation in the future, bilateral and multilateral agenda-setting, and the sheer expression of positive emotions linked to working collaboratively on foreign policy. The end of the Trump presidency marks a joyous moment of great enthusiasm toward a renewed goal of future transatlantic partnership.

In terms of goals, content analysis reveals both the policy areas that the two sides consider shared foreign policy priorities and the specific policy areas that each side intends to advance independently, calling for action (Table 2). First, the three broad foreign policy areas that both parties identify as key shared goals for foreign policy making are climate action, the successful management of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the fight against terrorism and violence. In the words of President Biden, “my national security and foreign policy team (...) will rally the world to take on our challenges like no other—challenges that no one nation can face alone. It’s time to restore American leadership. I trust this group to do just that” (November 23, 2020). Similarly, Josep Borrell tweets: “To meet the deadly challenges of terrorism, extremism, and hate speech, we cannot succeed alone. We need to work with our partners around the world” (November 18, 2020). In geographic terms, the EU mentions Russia and Ukraine most often as shared geographic areas of foreign policy priority.

Table 2.

Frequency of coded nodes related to goal orientation

European Union		United States
Positive experiences and feelings	Frequency	Positive experiences and feelings	Frequency
Enthusiasm and joy	80	Enthusiasm and joy	58
Biden and Harris	24	Praise	24
Electoral victory	18
Pride	12	The pursuit of shared FP objectives
		Tackle shared challenges	41
The pursuit of shared FP objectives		Climate change action	29
COVID-19/pandemic control	79	COVID-19/pandemic control	22
Climate change action	46	Defend shared values	18
Russia	33	Terrorism and violence	12
Global effort and response	29
Defend shared values	26	Calls for action and progress
Democracy advancement	25	Prosperity advancement	23
Tackle shared challenges	24	Encourage progress and action	19
Security and safety	21	Conflict resolution	14
Terrorism and violence	21	Sanctions	12
Ukraine	12	Release of prisoners	11
Calls for action and progress
Encourage action and progress	64
COVAX aid and advancement	25
Universal vaccination	20
Due electoral process and norms	18
Judiciary reform and anti-corruption	14
Economic cooperation	12
Conflict resolution	12

Yet, the analysis also reveals that each party sets its own priorities, calling for action and progress in different policy areas. They set goals for future action and progress, indicating areas of broad foreign policy interest they seek to pursue. The US prioritizes prosperity advancement, the release of prisoners, and the imposition of sanctions. For instance, on February 19th, Biden tweets: “As vice president, I worked closely with America’s democratic partners to advance our shared vision and values. As president, I’ll work with our partners and allies to defeat COVID-19 and advance peace and shared prosperity around the world. America is back.” In contrast, the EU prioritizes other foreign policy areas, such as universal vaccination, particularly as relates to the COVID-19 pandemic and the successful rollout of COVAX, and measures linked to democracy promotion, fair electoral processes, as well as judiciary reform and anti-corruption. On March 25th, 2021, Michel tweets: “Welcoming @POTUS to the European Council tonight. By standing together, shoulder-to-shoulder, the EU and US can show that democracies are best suited to protect citizens, promote dignity, and generate prosperity.”

The Main Foreign Policy Pathways to Cooperation

Central to the discourse of hope is also the clear specification of pathways making possible the goal of cooperation. The US and the EU rely on a combination of rhetorical strategies to construct these foreign policy pathways. They resort to a combination of a discourse of reparation, advocating for a return to old pathways, and of a discourse of change, highlighting the need to forge new pathways, including through changes in the distribution of leadership roles in specific foreign policy areas (Table 3).

Table 3.

Frequency of coded nodes related to pathways to cooperation

European Union		United States
Discourse of reparation	Frequency	Discourse of reparation	Frequency
Transatlantic alliance	43	Friendship and partnership	35
Friendship and partnership	24	Restore US leadership	27
Dialogue and mutual understanding	11	Working with allies NATO	24 15
		America is back	14
Discourse of change		Transatlantic alliance	14
Multilateralism and its reform	30	Biden administration re-joins international forum	11
Return to joint leadership	16	Guilt and reparation	11
Global recovery	20	Enhanced cooperation	26
New transatlantic agenda	19	Revitalize alliances	7
New solutions to old problems	2	Discourse of change
		Multilateralism and its reform	21
Areas of EU leadership		New environment/world	3
EU leadership	41
Europe-Africa relations	38	Areas of US leadership
Regional security	33	US diplomacy	26
EU partnerships with neighbours	28	Regional security Democracy advancement	25 22
(Financial) support	27	Foreign policy	19
EEAS and EU diplomacy	20	Peace promotion	19
Peace promotion	19	Burma	18
Vaccinations	18	United Nations	17
Foreign policy	16	Political support	16
Europe in the world	16	Human rights defence	15
Human rights defence	16	Canada	14
Political support	16	Free Indo-Pacific region	14
Sustainable peace	15	Japan	13
Trade and investment	15	National security	12
Ethiopia	14
EU defence agenda	13
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12
Turkey	12

It is important to note that in the aftermath of an electoral victory and prior to the inauguration and the official start of foreign policymaking, communication is primarily focused on defining a set of policy priorities, expressing the intention to address these issues coperatively, and drawing the broader outline of future areas of joint and individual leadership. For instance, on March 23rd, Michel tweets: “Looking forward to welcome @POTUS at this week’s European Council meeting. I have invited the President of the US to join our meeting for him to share his views on our future cooperation. Time to rebuild our transatlantic alliance.” A degree of vagueness in the definition of specific bilateral or multilateral diplomatic strategies and mechanisms of transatlantic cooperation is to be expected before (and in the early days of) the official start of foreign policymaking for the newly elected government.

On the American side, officials included in our study resort much more to a discourse of reparation, including reclaiming their leadership roles in a variety of foreign policy domains (Table 3). The motto “America is back” epitomizes the return of the United States to its traditional role as both a leader and multilateral player on the international stage. Even before the Biden administration had the vested power to take specific foreign policy action, its discourse clearly signals a break with the policies of the Trump administration and the intent to return to old pathways—including the active US re-involvement in international and regional fora and a revitalization of past alliances, partnerships, and friendships on the bilateral track. Among the most prevalent nodes coded in the data, the emphasis on friendship and partnership, the reinforcement of cooperation with allies and NATO in particular stand out. As Secretary of State Blinken tweeted on March 23rd: “Today at @NATO I emphasized the value of our alliances and partnerships. We need them now as much as ever. The challenge we face is to adapt and renew our alliances to meet today’s threats and continue to deliver for our people now, as they have in the past.”

The discourse of reparation permeates the public strategic communication of US officials through the implicit recognition that damage was done but that it is possible to re-build a solid foundation of partnership moving forward. This optimistic promise of restoration appears repeatedly in the tweets of US officials, even as concrete strategies about the US’s plans to return to a position of global leadership remain unspecified: “Since taking office, I’ve been calling leaders from around the world with a simple message: America is back. We’re going to rebuild our international alliances and tackle the shared challenges we face” (Biden, March 14, 2021). Concerning global collective problems—such as the fight against climate change—both Biden and Blinken acknowledge that precious time has been lost but infuse the discourse with hope by firmly asserting that this can be amended. On January 28th, Blinken tweets: “Under @POTUS’s leadership, we will do everything in our power to make up for lost time in the fight against climate change. @ClimateEnvoy and the full @StateDept will treat this like the crisis it is.” In addition, the United States makes assertive claims to US leadership as the best way forward through the advancement of democracy and peace promotion, as in the case of Burma.

The discourse of change is present in the American officials’ Twittersphere, referring mainly to the need to reform multilateral institutions but always under US leadership. In the defense of human rights, Blinken tweets on February 8th: “The @UN Human Rights Council is flawed and needs reform, but walking away won’t fix it. The best way to improve the Council, so it can achieve its potential, is through robust and principled U.S. leadership. Under @POTUS Biden, we are reengaging and ready to lead.”

The EU’s rhetoric in the Twittersphere echoes to a large extent this discourse of repair (Table 2), even as the specific diplomatic strategies to breathe new life into the alliance remain vague at this stage: “The United States is back. And Europe stands ready. To reconnect with an old and trusted partner, to breathe new life into our cherished alliance. I look forward to working together with @JoeBiden” (Van der Leyen, January 20, 2021). Yet, in contrast to their American counterparts, EU official discourse puts more emphasis on the discourse of change and insists on maintaining their leadership position in several policy areas that have been neglected by the US during the Trump administration. The theme of the new transatlantic agenda is telling in this regard, with EU officials stressing the need to adapt to new circumstances and higher EU’s ambitions. As the President of the EU Commission put it, “Europe’s ambition is now a global ambition. And by working shoulder to shoulder with an outward-looking US, we can set a new global agenda” (Van der Leyen, February 19, 2021).

EU’s discourse of change highlights that a return to the pre-Trump presidency status quo is not possible and that the EU has changed, and this needs to be reflected in the way both sides pursue their common objectives. In her tweet, Van Der Leyen discursively frames the EU as the initiator, as the leader inviting the US to join its efforts: “2 years ago at @MunSecConf @JoeBiden said: “We will be back.” And the US is back! Europe is already setting global benchmarks for climate action and for a digital world respectful of our values. American friends: let’s join forces. #MSC2021” (February 19, 2021). The isolationism underlying the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy and international alliances brought with it a set of changes that led to a loss of global credibility and the erosion of existing trust in the transatlantic relationship. All these years, the EU continued to pursue global agendas grounded in liberalism and, according to the EU itself, has successfully established itself as a leader in different areas of international politics. On November 10th, 2020, Van Der Leyen tweets: “Health, climate, digital, reform of the multilateral rules-based system. There, I see EU take the initiative & offer a positive new agenda with US. We should provide joint leadership & address today’s global challenges. Not be nostalgic for the world of yesterday.”

Moreover, EU discourse aims to explain (indirectly to their US counterparts) the logic behind the pursuit of its strategic autonomy. The EU aims to play a more significant role in global politics alongside the US while indirectly signaling to the US that the new reconfiguration of the transatlantic relationship will be a longstanding feature of future bilateral relations. In numerous tweets, Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, states unequivocally that “EU wants to be more influential and less dependent” (December 4th, 2020) and that “Strategic autonomy means more resilience, less dependence & more influence. This should be our common goal. It’s good for our transatlantic alliance when both sides are stronger and more robust” (February 10th, 2021). Such statements intend also to dissipate any potential concerns that Europe, in its quest for increased security autonomy and global power, might directly challenge the US.

Globally, the EU asserts a recent consolidation of its leadership. This is mostly evident in the areas of pandemic control, vaccinations, and in the action against climate change. The EU positions itself as the global leader in the fight against COVID-19 and goes as far as to assert its ambition to shape (no less) than the future of the world post-COVID-19. Michel's tweet is instructive in this respect: “The #G20Summit is about what a post-COVID world will look like. And Europe will be a leader in shaping that future. This weekend we will discuss how to make our future—more resilient—more sustainable—more inclusive. #G20. #StrongerTogether” (November 20th, 2020). The EU is proud to take the lead not only in the control and end of the COVID-19 pandemic but also in pandemic prevention globally through the advancement of a treaty on pandemic prevention. As Charles Michel tweets on November 10th, 2020, “During #COVIDー19, decisive European action raised international funds to finance vaccine research. Now Europe should continue to lead. By launching for instance, the idea of an international treaty on pandemics to learn valuable lessons & bolster global resilience.” In the same vein, Von der Leyen is particularly proud of Europe’s ability to lead the global efforts to distribute vaccines to low- and middle-income countries, through COVAX, being its main donor. On March 25th, she tweets: “Europe will always be a fervent support of global cooperation. We invite others to match our openness. Meanwhile, we work hard to roll-out vaccination at home. And we are on track to reach our 70 percent goal by end of the summer. #EUCO.”

Similarly, the discourse emanating from the EU asserts the EU’s lead in the fight against climate change as a shared policy goal. Michel tweets on December 11th, 2020, “Europe is the leader in the fight against climate change. We decided to cut our greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55 percent by 2030 #EUCO.” Insisting on Europe’s key commitment to “lead by example” in the realm of climate neutrality, Van der Leyen asserted on the 16th of March, “In Europe we will cut emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030. We stand ready to show the way on climate action globally. In the run-up to @COP26 we’ll advocate for a shared commitment to a net-zero emissions pathway by 2050. Climate neutrality is the new global benchmark #betd21.”

The Agency of Transatlantic Leaders

Our analysis offers valuable insights into the third constitutive element of hope—agency. Both European and American leaders seek to convey the crucial message that they can lead their states and institutions on these pathways, making successful cooperation achievable. Thus, both the EU and the US resort to the discourse of assertiveness and to the discourse of reassurance (Table 4).

Table 4.

Frequency of coded nodes related to agency

European Union		United States
Discourse of assertiveness and determination	Frequency	Discourse of assertiveness and determination	Frequency
Assertiveness	75	Assertiveness	48
Contempt and condemnation	30	Pride	14
		Contempt and condemnation	11
Discourse of reassurance		Accountability	14
Commitment	85
Promises and reassurance	19	Discourse of reassurance
		Commitment	48
		Competence	20
		Promises and reassurance	14
		Care-taking and empathy/compassion	12

Given the uncertainty and antagonism generated by the Trump administration, it comes as no surprise that the new American leadership chose to embrace a discourse of assertiveness and reassurance, creating a clear rupture with its predecessor and regain the trust of old allies in America’s capacity to be a reliable partner in the post-Trump era. On 24th of November, as President Elect, Biden tweets: “This team is ready to lead the world, not retreat from it. Ready to confront our adversaries, not reject our allies. And ready to stand up for our values.” Importantly, President Biden reassures the old allies of the US that his familiarity with the pre-Trump era foreign policy tradition from the time he was Obama’s vice president has prepared him well for guiding the country back into a global leadership role alongside trusted partners. He is ready to defend shared norms and values and to renew commitments to international treaties and agendas supported by partners such as the EU. One month into his presidential tenure, he tweets: “As vice president, I worked closely with America’s democratic partners to advance our shared vision and values. As president, I’ll work with our partners and allies to defeat COVID-19 and advance peace and shared prosperity around the world. America is back” (February 19, 2021).

Blinken’s tweets also contribute to this discourse of reassurance, highlighting the competency of US diplomacy and praising its unique capabilities. He often tweets along those lines: “Grateful to have met the dedicated foreign policy professionals at @USEmbBrussels, @USNATO, and @US2EU who are focused on our mission and firmly committed to solidifying our relationships with NATO, the EU, and Belgium. Thank you for your service!” (March 25, 2021). He used a similar tone in a different context: “The strength of the U.S.-Mexico relationship stems from the important work our embassy and consulate personnel perform day in and day out. Thank you, @USEmbassyMex, for shaping and leading this complex diplomatic partnership, which is so vital to American interests” (February 26, 2021). Another way through which the US engages in the discourse of reassurance is by expressing empathy and compassion—emphasizing the continuity of US solidarity and support with its transatlantic partners facing similar threats, such as terrorism. On March 22nd, 2021, Blinken tweets: “We honor the victims of the 2016 #BrusselsAttack. The victims, their loved ones, and the Belgian people remain in our hearts. As I travel to Belgium today, what @POTUS Biden & Dr. Biden said five years ago is still true: America and all our people stand with you now and forever.”

The discourse of EU officials very much resonates with the American one—but for different reasons (Table 3). EU officials also engage in a discourse of assertiveness to signal their reliability and commitment to work hand in hand with the United States, if possible, but also alone if necessary. The discourse of assertiveness on the EU side helps to convey the readiness of the EU to play a more important role vis-à-vis the US. On the day of Biden’s victory, Borrell tweets: “The world needs a US ready to listen and a Europe able to act” before further elaborating: “We are going to forge a new alliance with the US. But it is time for the EU to enter adulthood and to develop its strategic autonomy” (November 12, 2020). The discourse of reassurance also conveys a sense of competency that these pathways are indeed possible to take. For instance, Michel likes to emphasize that “Europe can be a global digital leader. We have the innovation; we have the talents. And with #NextGenerationEU, we now have the resources. Today we chart a course for Europe’s Digital Decade” (February 3, 2021). This kind of statements are crucial in the production of hope both toward the European public and toward the rest of the world, including the US, signaling that the EU is well-equipped and capable to cooperate and lead.

Conclusion

Transitional periods mark important moments in the making of domestic and international politics. Public communication in these uncertain periods is critical, carrying important messages about possible new directions of foreign policy and diplomacy before actual policymaking begins. Yet, we know little about the strategic use of diplomatic communication in these periods of transition. In this paper, we argue that in transitional times, leaders are more likely to make strategic use of the diplomatic discourse of emotions—particularly the diplomacy of hope—to set the stage for future foreign policymaking. The public communication of transatlantic leaders in the aftermath of Biden’s electoral victory in 2020 is no exception.

Our analysis of Twitter-based communication by EU and American leaders finds unequivocal evidence of the use of the diplomacy of hope to set the stage for a renewal of transatlantic relations and future foreign policymaking. Following the end of the Trump regime, both parties show great enthusiasm about America returning to the international stage and about the possibility of working collaboratively to address global challenges. European and American leaders propose foreign policy goals to pursue jointly, like the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. At the same time, the two sets of leaders indicate two possible sets of pathways to achieving these goals—a discourse of reparation is more prevalent in the American Twittersphere, showing the intention to restore US leadership globally and to return to the balance of power preceding the Trump administration. In its turn, the European discourse is also enthusiastic about regaining an old ally and the future strengthening of multilateralism but expresses caution about evident changes in the dynamic of global leadership since the Obama presidency. EU leaders assert the EU’s newfound leadership role as a key actor in regional and global security and express the intention to continue leading in policy areas like climate change and the fight against the pandemic. Both parties emphasize their capabilities and willingness to achieve those goals through a discourse of assertiveness and reassurance.

Our study adds valuable insight to the study of emotions in world politics by theorizing and exploring empirically the specific role that the positive emotion of hope plays in diplomatic relations. Our analysis enhances our understanding of how critical the diplomacy of hope is in moments of political change as a key discursive tool to indicate the broader direction of cooperation and future foreign policymaking in a positive, forward-looking fashion. It also shows that the diplomacy of hope can take different forms—revealing divergent paths to reach a shared goal. As such, the diplomacy of hope has important policy implications: it allows to subtly express differences while framing the future of the relationship positively and reducing the risk of tensions further down the road.

Future research might consider the strategic use of the diplomacy of hope in public communication about foreign policymaking in other national and regional contexts. Moreover, future studies could also explore the impact that the diplomacy of hope might have on international politics once the period of political transition ends and actual foreign policymaking begins.