Diversifying the Federal Foreign Office: The German Foreign Policy Discourse on Credibility

Abstract

This article interrogates German foreign policy discourse during 2018–2021, focusing on how the prioritization of gender equality and diversity in German foreign policy was justified by invoking credibility. It shows that the discourse constructs equal and diverse representation at home as necessary for being recognized as a credible foreign policy actor, and credibility as a necessary precondition for foreign policy. Claims to credibility are distinct from rights-based and instrumental arguments about the organizational and state benefits of equal representation previously identified in scholarship on gender in diplomacy. Therefore, this article develops an original classification of discourses on equal representation in foreign affairs. Empirically, it shows that these claims extend constructions of the “good” German state identified in scholarship on German foreign policy. They also constitute a form of governmentality, inciting ministry staff to conduct themselves in line with what it means to be credible: realizing equal representation in the Federal Foreign Office. While this allows the ministry to “diversify,” it masks entrenched inequalities in German society.

Este artículo cuestiona el discurso de la política exterior alemana entre 2018 y 2021 y se centra en analizar cómo se justificó la priorización de la igualdad de género y la diversidad en la política exterior alemana invocando la credibilidad. El artículo demuestra que este discurso construye una representación igualitaria y diversa en el país como algo necesario para ser reconocido como un actor creíble de la política exterior, y que la credibilidad es una condición previa necesaria para la política exterior. Las pretensiones en materia de credibilidad son distintas de los argumentos, instrumentales y basados en los derechos, sobre los beneficios organizativos y estatales de la representación igualitaria, los cuales habían sido identificados previamente en los estudios sobre el género en la diplomacia. Por lo tanto, este artículo desarrolla una clasificación original de los discursos en materia de la representación igualitaria en las relaciones exteriores. De manera empírica, el artículo demuestra que estas afirmaciones amplían las construcciones del «buen» Estado alemán, que ya habían sido identificadas en los estudios sobre la política exterior alemana. Estas, también, constituyen una forma de gubernamentalidad, que incita al personal del Ministerio a comportarse de acuerdo con lo que significa ser creíble: lograr una representación igualitaria en el Ministerio Federal de Relaciones Exteriores. Si bien, por un lado, esto permite al Ministerio «diversificarse», por otro lado, esto oculta las desigualdades arraigadas en la sociedad alemana.

Cet article analyse le discours de politique étrangère allemand de 2018 à 2021, en se concentrant sur la justification de l'accent sur l’égalité des genres et la diversité dans la politique étrangère allemande par l'invocation de la crédibilité. Il montre que ce discours présente l’égalité et la diversité représentative sur le plan national telle une nécessité pour être reconnu comme un acteur crédible en politique étrangère, et la crédibilité comme une condition préalable nécessaire pour la politique étrangère. Les revendications de crédibilité caractérisent les arguments décisifs et fondés sur les droits quant aux avantages étatiques et organisationnels de représentation équitable déjà identifiés par la recherche sur le genre en diplomatie. Aussi, cet article développe-t-il une classification inédite des discours relatifs à la représentation équitable en affaires étrangères. Sur le plan empirique, il montre que ces revendications prolongent les représentations du « bon » État allemand identifiées dans la recherche sur la politique étrangère allemande. Elles constituent également une forme de gouvernementalité, qui incite le personnel du ministère à adopter un comportement conforme à ce que l'on entend par « crédible » : la concrétisation de la représentation équitable au ministère des Affaires étrangères. Bien que le ministère puisse ainsi « se diversifier », cela cache aussi les inégalités profondément ancrées dans la société allemande.

It is a matter of credibility that gender equality be treated as a priority not only in German foreign policy, but also in the Federal Foreign Office itself.

(AA 2020b, 40)

Gender equality and, increasingly, diversity have become a “priority” in German foreign policy (AA 2020b, 2021)—even before the adoption of a feminist foreign policy (FFP) in December 2021. During Foreign Minister Heiko Maas’ term (2018–2021), the German Federal Foreign Office (FFO) centered the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda; increased efforts to combat gender-based and sexual violence in conflict, including sponsoring a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution on the matter; offered more financial support for relevant projects; created new international women’s networks; and issued the first official publication on gender equality in foreign policy (AA 2020b). Gender equality and diversity also became priorities for who makes foreign policy: the Ministry itself. The FFO witnessed the creation of staff organizations for women and People of Color, increased staff diversity and women in leadership positions, the publication of its first diversity strategy (AA 2021), and the creation of a department for equal opportunities and gender justice. Featuring prominently in German foreign policy discourse, equal representation of women and “diverse” folks in the ministry increasingly appeared as central to the conduct of German foreign policy.

This mirrors global trends: A growing number of states have emphasized gender equality and, to some extent, diversity in their foreign policies, either by committing to furthering these issues in foreign affairs¹ or an FFP.² Such commitment is often reflected in staff representation in Ministries for Foreign Affairs (MFAs) (Green, Kozielska, and Smith 2023). Scholarship argues that this is informed by transnational discourses that position gender equality as a regulatory norm and adhering to this as an important signifier of being a “good” liberal state (Aggestam and True 2020; Thomson 2022). Linked to these are national and institutional discourses around gender equality and diversity that govern foreign policy practices and institutions (Neumann 2012; Cassidy 2017; Aggestam and Towns 2018). However, few studies interrogate specific discourses surrounding equal representation in foreign affairs (Lequesne et al. 2020), so it is not all that clear how gender equality and diversity are discursively represented. This is particularly true for Germany, which is understudied in scholarship on gender in foreign policy. At the same time, (German) foreign policy analysis remains remarkably gender-free (Smith 2020; Färber 2022).

Scholars have identified two sets of discursive claims about equal representation in foreign policy: rights-based and instrumental (Aggestam and Towns 2017, 247; 2018, 5–6; Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019, 41). The former is particularly pronounced in relation to women’s representation: If women make up half of the population, they should also be represented equally in foreign policy. Or, as Foreign Minister Maas (2019f) says: “a policy that does not take into account the needs and abilities of half of the people is not only undemocratic in its essence, but it is also antisocial and it is also unproductive.”³ Invoking productivity, this argument also includes an instrumental claim: Equal representation benefits the FFO and the German state. Gender equality and diversity become instruments to realize strategic interests (for critiques, see Brown and Swiss 2017; Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019; Lee-Koo 2020).

In addition, another and, as I argue, more significant instrumental discourse exists: claims to credibility. Hitherto overlooked in relation to gender equality and diversity, these claims regularly appear in German foreign policy discourse. Like the quote at the beginning of this article, they construct gender equality and diversity neither as a matter of rights nor purely as organizational or state benefits. Equal representation is linked to being a credible foreign policy actor, which is presumed to be a necessary precondition for the doing of foreign policy. This constitutes a distinct instrumental discourse. Therefore, I suggest an original classification of discourses in favor of increased gender equality and diversity in foreign affairs. I argue that Germany is an important case study precisely because it allows us to study claims to credibility.

Empirically, the article asks: What political work does the German foreign policy discourse on credibility do in relation to gender equality and diversity? Drawing on a discourse analysis of foreign policy texts published between March 2018 and December 2021, I examine the discursively created social reality that governed German foreign policymaking during Maas’ term. I find that the discourse extends previous constructions of the German Self as a “good” state and credible human rights defender (Roos and Rungius 2016; Drews 2017) to include gender equality and diversity. The discourse further (re)creates spatial configurations of inside/outside, with credibility as fundamentally connected to “what we do at home”: Practices within Germany determine international credibility. The FFO is constructed as mediating between inside/outside as it represents Germany abroad. It becomes the sole locus of foreign policymaking, and thus the source of credibility.

I argue that claims to credibility make possible change “at home” because they position gender equality and diversity as essential for foreign policy. The credibility discourse constitutes a form of governmentality, as it enjoins FFO staff to conduct themselves in line with what it means to be credible: realizing gender equality and diversity in the institution. This allows the diplomatic corps to “diversify,” and more so than rights-based or other instrumental discourses. For, the credibility discourse subverts the belief that only meritocracy—falsely assumed to be neutral—should guide recruitment and career progress. However, it also masks and renders inconsequential entrenched inequalities and violence in German society. Realizing equal representation within the FFO suffices to become a credible foreign policy actor.

This article contributes to scholarship on gender and diversity in foreign policy and German foreign policy discourse. Theoretically, it classifies discourses on equal representation in foreign affairs to provide a more nuanced assessment of discursive representations of why and how equal representation is important. Empirically, it interrogates credibility, gender equality, and diversity, all of which remain understudied in German foreign policy. It shows how the German Self is (re)produced as a “good” liberal state and how the credibility discourse may help govern foreign policy institutions such as the FFO. As discussed in the conclusion, this is relevant for other state and institutional contexts alike.

In the next sections, I review relevant literature and introduce the classification of discourses. I then discuss the conceptual framework, data, and methodology. The remainder of the article develops the argument in more detail. The conclusion elaborates on the limitations of my analysis, how the findings speak to (trans)national foreign policy discourses, and future research avenues.

Key Contributions to Two Foreign Policy Literatures

This article speaks to scholarship on gender and diversity in foreign policy, largely situated within diplomacy studies and FFP analysis, and scholarship on German foreign policy discourse, largely situated within poststructuralist approaches to foreign policy. The latter studies how German foreign policy has been discursively (de)legitimized and made (im)possible over time (e.g., Baumann 2002; Behnke 2006; Stark Urrestarazu 2015; Gaskarth and Oppermann 2021), often focusing on military engagement (e.g., Nabers 2005; Schoenes 2011; Nonhoff and Stengel 2014; Eberle 2019; Stengel 2020; Heck 2024). I am similarly interested in what is rendered possible and necessary through discursive claims, although I interrogate the understudied issues of gender equality and diversity. I build on the above contributions’ insight that multiple and contested German Selves exist, with some becoming relatively stable in certain temporal-spatial contexts. One Self is that of the “good” or “benign” state (Roos and Rungius 2016). Germany appears as fundamentally grounded in ethical, universally valid values such as liberal democracy and human rights. These values often remain “empty” (Drews 2017), which, as argued below, makes possible their extension to include gender equality and diversity.

Scholarship further suggests that credibility has become more central to German foreign policy discourse over the past 20 years. In their study of the semantics of German foreign policy, Hellmann, Weber, and Sauer (2008) do not identify credibility as a key expression and meaning-making structure pre-2002. In the early 2000s, government representatives recognized their credibility as fundamental to successfully negotiating compromises, solving conflicts, and initiating cooperation. German foreign policy language was to be coherent with action (Roos 2010, 136). Claims to credibility were also strategically mobilized in arguing for greater German influence and responsibility as part of rethinking foreign policy in 2013–2014 (Roos and Rungius 2016). This suggests that credibility is invoked to realize instrumental objectives. While I agree, I extend this in a two-fold way: first, by showing that the discourse establishes credibility in relation to gender equal and diverse representation in the FFO, which, second, (re)produces Germany as a “good” state. This also means that credibility claims constitute a form of governmentality (further discussed below).

Credibility further appears as particularly important for German engagement for human rights, requiring a “clear commitment to human rights at home” (Heinz 2007, 692). This presupposes but does not make explicit a relation between “home” and foreign policy, which I explore below. Overall, discursive constructions of credibility remain understudied, as do gender equality and diversity. The article contributes to pluralizing German foreign policy studies (Eberle and Miskimmon 2020) by interrogating these issues, and by bringing scholarship into conversation with international literature on gender and diversity in foreign policy.

The latter maps the presence of women and, increasingly, other folks marked as “diverse” in MFAs (for an overview, see Niklasson and Towns 2022). Historically, MFAs have resisted gender equality and diversity, with representation depending on gender, class, whiteness, and sexuality (e.g., Krenn 1999; Neumann 2012; McCarthy 2014; Cassidy 2017; Aggestam and Towns 2018; McGlen and Sarkees 2019 [1993]; Stephenson 2024). This includes the FFO (Färber forthcoming). Yet, there is growing and significant emphasis on gender equality and diversity in and by MFAs. Representation of women and “diverse” staff has increased globally, although elite men still dominate.

Contributions have attributed change to several and often interlinked reasons: changed state-society relations; pressure from politicians, civil society, MFA staff networks, and diplomatic wives’ organizations; and changed recruitment practices in the twentieth century (Neumann 2012; Enloe 2014; McCarthy 2014; Cassidy 2017; de Souza Farias 2017; Aggestam and Towns 2018; Erlandsen, Hernández-Garza, and Schulz 2022; Kostadinova 2022). MFAs also need to increase their legitimacy vis-à-vis their domestic societies by being in tune with domestic debates about migration, racial discrimination, and representation (Lequesne et al. 2020). Racial diversity has become more important, in addition to women’s representation. The aim, as discussed below, is to “mirror” the public’s composition to better represent a diverse (German) society. This also allows to strategically conduct foreign affairs through strategic postings of queer, Black, and/or women diplomats (Bartonek 2020, 202; Niklasson and Towns 2023).

The symbolic importance of women’s and diverse representation, strongly informed by the global rise of discursively embedded pro-gender equality norms (Haastrup 2020; Lee-Koo 2020; Tryggestad and Skjelsbæk 2020; Aggestam and True 2021), further affects change. These norms find expression in gender mainstreaming, international development assistance targeting gender inequality, women’s human rights and security, and institutional and legislative mechanisms on gender equality (Aggestam and True 2020). The WPS agenda, a German foreign policy priority since 2018, and FFP, adopted by Germany in 2021, have further increased the political salience of gender equality in global affairs (Achilleos-Sarll et al. 2023). In this context, human rights, particularly women’s rights and their inclusion in all areas of public life, have become signifiers of progress, modernity, and a commitment to the international liberal order (Thomson 2022; Zhukova 2023). As pro-gender equality norms are often enacted not in concrete but in “shared abstract understandings” (Towns 2013, 185), they are less important on their own terms than with regards to what they signify: “that the states who deploy them are ‘good’” (Thomson 2022, 4). Appealing to these transnational signifiers allows to (re)create progressive, “feminist” Selves and align with those states that are constructed as “like-minded.” Engaging with equal representation is necessary if states seek to remain viable as liberal subjects and continue to retain influence globally (Lequesne et al. 2020), particularly if they have adopted an FFP.

Existing scholarship is invaluable for understanding why gender equality and diversity have become salient policy issues. However, Germany is almost completely absent from these analyses (Färber 2022), although gender equality and diversity have been a foreign policy priority since 2018. Additionally, the discursive construction of equal representation in specific cases is understudied (Aggestam and Towns 2018; Lequesne et al. 2020), so it is not all that clear how gender equality and diversity become necessary. Interrogating German foreign policy discourse is important because it allows to explore if and how equal representation becomes plausible, valuable, and essential, and because it provides a new empirical case to interrogate the hitherto overlooked credibility discourse. The next section briefly discusses how scholars understand claims to equal representation in foreign affairs and suggests an original classification that includes claims to credibility.

Classifying Discourses on Increased Gender Equal and Diverse Representation in Foreign Affairs

Scholars have identified two sets of discursive claims about gender equal and diverse representation in foreign affairs: rights-based and instrumental (Aggestam and Towns 2017, 247; 2018, 5–6; Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2019, 41). Rights-based arguments emphasize that women and “diverse” folks have a right to equal representation, which is understood as a matter of fairness and representative democracy (e.g., Maas 2019a, b, f; Müntefering 2019a). Instrumental arguments highlight the strategic benefits of increased diversity and gender equality. Different kinds of instrumental arguments have commonly been grouped together; however, I argue that these constitute different discourses.

Specifically, instrumental discourses may be grouped in three categories: (i) claims to organizational benefits, including increased productivity and effectiveness, better decision-making, greater innovation, and being perceived as a modern employer (e.g., Maas 2019f, 2020, 2021e; AA 2020b, 2021; Müntefering 2021a); (ii) claims to state benefits, including more stable, peaceful, and secure societies globally or economic growth (e.g., Maas 2018, 2019f; 2020; 2021e; Müntefering 2019b, 2021a, b); and (iii) claims to increased credibility in foreign policy (see Table 1). Although the latter equally highlights strategic benefits of equal representation for the state, claims to credibility construct gender equality and diversity differently: not as a question of organizational or state value, but as a necessary precondition for the doing of foreign policy. Hence, they constitute a separate discourse.

Table 1.

Classification of discourses on gender equality and diversity in foreign affairs

Rights-based	Instrumental
Gender equality and diversity as …
… just	… valuable		… necessary
• Fairness • Democracy	Organizational benefits: • Productivity/effectiveness • Better decision-making • Innovation • Perception as modern employer	State benefits: • More stable, peaceful, and secure societies • Economic growth/stability	Credibility as a precondition for foreign policy

Credibility Claims as Discourse and Practice

Utterances of credibility are discursive practices embedded in broader German and transnational foreign policy discourses on gender equality and diversity in global affairs. Foreign policy is here understood as a socially produced discourse (Doty 1993; Achilleos-Sarll 2018). Discourses are structures of meaning-making that produce and sustain powerful representations or “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1980)—e.g., credibility is necessary for successful foreign policy—that provide the preconditions for (discursive) action. Temporarily fixing meaning, these “regimes of truth” define knowledgeable practices as the “discourse delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular reality can be “known” and acted upon” (Doty 1996, 6). Hence, discourse produces and renders meaningful and knowable subjects, objects, and (policy) issues (Doty 1993). This includes representations of the Self—e.g., Germany as an international gender equality champion—vis-à-vis different Others to produce discursive closure (Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006)—e.g., Canada as a “like-minded” state. It also includes creating a social reality that, for being a credible foreign policy actor, makes necessary increased gender equal and diverse representation in the FFO, while rendering inconsequential structural violence in German society.

Discourse must also be understood as practice (Neumann 2002). Claims to credibility not only produce meaning but also intertwine discursive and material worlds, as they are a form of enactment (Foucault 1980). Thus, claims to credibility are a form of governmentality or “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 2009). Governmentality is particularly useful for analyzing processes of governance (Sending and Neumann 2006), including through foreign policy discourse and practice (Howell 2005; Neumann 2012), to explain how the fixation of meaning has tangible effects on the material world and the people within it. Here, the credibility discourse incites people to monitor their practices in line with the stories it holds out. Discourse is a means of coordination, regulating what can be written, said, and done—not in the sense of a script, but of sedimented social relations that organize localized action.

This opens space for situated actors: As foreign policy practitioners participate in the discourse on credibility and equal representation, they (re)configure and (re)produce discursive relations. While this means that foreign policy is not limited to those commonly recognized as foreign policy actors (Doty 1993), here we must highlight the agency of the FFO's political leadership,⁴ including Heiko Maas. As the first German Foreign Minister to publicly take up the cause of gender equality and diversity, Maas played a crucial role in making these issues central to German foreign policy discourse. While this does not mean that he was solely responsible for or initiated this change—civil society organizations, activist movements, and groups within the FFO must be credited for that—his subject position as a high-ranking minister and white, able-bodied man enabled him to define new political priorities. Maas also publicly supported FFO staff organizations working toward equality and, through his emphasis on gender equality and diversity, created strong expectations for diplomats to work on the matter. Therefore, he had a high degree of influence over the foreign policy discourse, made possible by his subject position that was imbued with political power, significance, and privilege—unlike those for whom gender equality and diversity policies were being made.

Methodology: Discourse Analysis of Policy Texts

The analysis draws on a discourse analysis of thirty-nine texts, including public statements by the FFO’s political leadership, national action plans, and foreign policy strategies, as well as institutional policies and articles published by the FFO from March 2018 to December 2021 (see annex). This period was chosen because of two interlinked factors:

• (1) There was a notable privileging of gender equality and diversity in German foreign policy discourse and practice, and

• (2) the German foreign policy discourse exhibited notable and repeated mentions of credibility in relation to gender equality and diversity.

Texts were considered if they directly mentioned credibility rather than implicitly tracing the meaning of the term.⁵ This limits the analysis. However, I argue that direct references to credibility matter, as they expressly link credibility to gender equality and diversity, and thus make these issues visible in a particular way. In a second step, texts were reduced to those that also referred to gender equality and diversity. Twenty-two texts included the term credibility, and seventeen mentioned credibility and gender equality and/or diversity. Ten texts established a direct link between credibility and equal representation. To trace nodal points and the broader discourse on gender equal and diverse representation, the analysis also included documents published before 2018 and texts that mentioned gender equality and diversity but not credibility.

The analysis consisted of a double reading (Ashley 1988, 28–9). The first, descriptive reading identified if and how texts referred to credibility and/or gender equality and/or diversity. The second, discourse-theoretical reading focused on the construction of discursive stability around these issues via three strategies:

• (1) Mapping out nodal points, that is, superordinate markers that attach meaning to central terms, create coherence in the discourse, and close off alternative possibilities of action (Shepherd 2008, 28–9) (e.g., being a credible foreign policy actor means equal representation in the FFO, not social justice in German society).

• (2) Presupposition analysis to identify which background knowledge is taken for granted (Doty 1993, 306; 1996) (e.g., credibility is a central foreign policy concern).

• (3) Analysis of predication and subject positioning to interrogate how subjects are created and positioned vis-à-vis Others (Doty 1993, 306; Hansen 2006) (e.g., Germany is a leader in advancing gender equality and diversity like other “like-minded” states).

This approach makes visible how the discourse created relatively stable representations of what it meant to be a credible foreign policy actor and produced “regimes of truth” that made institutional change in the FFO necessary.

Before proceeding to the analysis, a caveat: While speeches are instructive sources of meaning, they should not be understood as communicating the meanings of one speaker. Speechwriting in the FFO is a lengthy process involving regional and specialist units, senior diplomats, speechwriters, and the Ministerial Office. The aim is twofold: establishing in-house rapport to create a consensual text and communicating politically relevant messages to a defined audience. It is thus less likely that the result is “a speech that the entire Ministry may stand for” (Neumann 2007). Instead, speeches are a compromise between the bureaucracy's interests and the leadership's political emphases, both of which are embedded in broader foreign policy discourses (Hellmann, Weber, and Sauer 2008, 11). Therefore, speeches are instructive sources of the objectified forms of knowledge that govern German foreign policymaking. This does not negate the far-reaching influence of the FFO's leadership in shaping this discourse.

German Foreign Policy Discourse on Credibility

The following sections present the analysis and argument. I first discuss how the German Self is constructed as credible by appealing to transnational gender equality norms that signify alignment with “like-minded” states, and by extending established notions of Germany as a human rights defender. I then elaborate on why credibility is presumed to be important for foreign policy, highlighting that credibility affords influence and legitimacy. The following sections establish how the credibility discourse creates spatial configurations of inside/outside and the FFO as mediating between the two. Credibility is attached to the FFO as the sole locus of foreign policymaking. Finally, I compare how gender equality and diversity are invoked differently in relation to the German Self and the FFO. I contend that gender equality—a German “core value”—has a higher discursive status than diversity.

Constructing the Credible German Self

Across texts under analysis, being credible appears as a key descriptor of Germany’s foreign policy Self, alongside adjectives like reliable, democratic, and responsible (on the responsible German Self, see Baumann 2002; Roos 2010; Stengel 2020; Gaskarth and Oppermann 2021). These utterances of credibility take place within two existing discourses: a transnational discourse on pro-gender equality norms (Aggestam and True 2020, 2021), and a national discourse that positions Germany as a “good” liberal state committed to human rights (Roos and Rungius 2016; Drews 2017). As noted above, the former suggests that gender equality and, to some extent, diversity have become signifiers of progress and “goodness” (Towns 2013; Thomson 2022).⁶ Appealing to these signifiers aligns Germany with those constructed as “like-minded.” This includes Canada. Consider the 2018 presentation of the Eric M. Warburg Prize for services to the transatlantic alliance. Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland was the first Canadian to receive the prize—a subtle move to distance Germany from the US under President Trump. In his laudatory speech, Maas (2018) characterizes Freeland, whom he identifies as a key supporter of FFP, as an “ally” and “thought leader” in standing up for gender equality and the WPS agenda globally. Hence, he constructs a subject position both by relying on implicit binary notions of the United States as “non-ally”—the antithesis—and on a depiction of “Canada the good” (Howell 2005). Consequently, Germany similarly appears as an international “do-gooder” and credible foreign policy leader.

Constructions of the credible German Self also have roots in the longstanding German foreign policy discourse on human rights. As Maas (2019e) says in a parliamentary address, “Germany is trusted internationally to play a leading role in strengthening human rights. And we want to play this role. To do that, we have to be credible.” Utterances like these recreate established discursive links between credibility and promotion of human rights as part of a representation of the “good” German Self. Tracing claims to credibility in the pre-2018 period, we find infrequent appearances in human rights policies. The 2011 Human Rights Report offers a page-length, stand-alone section on “Credibility of German Human Rights Policy” (AA 2011, 18). And the 2009 Human Rights Report makes a direct link between Germany as a credible human rights defender and its international influence (AA 2009, 369).

Gender equality first appears in this discourse in the context of Germany’s bid for a nonpermanent UNSC seat in 2019–2020. Here, German engagement for gender equality is explicitly framed as an aspect of its international efforts to further human rights, both of which afford credibility: “A credible human rights policy always starts at home. [. . .] Gender equality and self-determination for all women and girls are among our core values, which we stand up for every day at the global level” (AA 2018). This overlap between human rights and gender equality discourse is, perhaps, unsurprising, given that both policy issues are grouped into one FFO department that is primarily responsible for drafting the above documents. More notable is what made the inclusion of gender equality in the human rights discourse possible: Human rights are an “empty signifier,” waiting to be filled with various other concepts depending on the context (Drews 2017). Gender equality is one such concept. The UNSC bid further allowed to make a discursive link from the national to transnational discourses, positioning Germany not just as a credible human rights defender but also as credible gender equality champion. This extends and reproduces established notions of the “good” German state.

Credibility as Central Foreign Policy Concern

Why is credibility so important? “Credibility is the be-all and end-all of successful policymaking, particularly international policy [. . .],” argues Foreign Minister Maas (2019f). This illustrates a central finding of the analysis: Credibility is presumed to be necessary for the doing of German foreign policy. Two interlinked aspects explain why. First, credibility appears as a precondition for being able to act internationally (AA 2009, 369). This presumes that credibility affords influence (Roos and Rungius 2016), particularly in policy areas that necessitate international cooperation. Beyond international advocacy for gender equality and diversity, this includes efforts for sustainability and against the climate crisis (Bundesregierung 2018, 47; Maas 2019d), defending European values (Roth 2018), and strengthening the international liberal order (AA 2019c).

Second, credibility affords legitimacy, which again strengthens Germany’s ability to yield influence. This link appears to be particularly relevant when defending human rights and gender equality. Explaining that the FFO represents an increasingly diverse German society abroad, the diversity strategy argues: “This also increases the legitimacy of the claim to actively represent the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (AA 2021, 10). In other words, diverse representation allows for Germany to credibly defend human rights, precisely because it reestablishes coherence between foreign policy rhetoric and action (Roos 2010, 136).

The Spatial Construction of Inside/Outside

The credibility discourse further reestablishes spatial configurations of inside/outside, with credibility fundamentally connected to what “we” do internally (Heinz 2007, 692). As Maas (2020) explains:

Only if we implement internally what we propagate externally are we really credible. And that is why we are talking about two sides of the same coin when we use our foreign policy weight for more gender justice and, at the same time, strive for more and more gender justice internally. You can’t have one without the other (see also Müntefering 2020a).

Minister of State Michelle Müntefering (2020b) put it more succinctly: “If we want to be credible in our international engagement, we must also ensure more gender justice at home.” In other words, Germany can only be a credible foreign policy actor elsewhere if it realizes gender equality (as well as diversity) internally.

This link between inside and outside has previously been established by texts on human rights. The FFO's 2011 Human Rights Report states:

Rich and developed states do not have a monopoly on the protection of human rights. […] A credible international human rights policy must therefore begin at home, in Germany. Only if we do our human rights homework can we credibly stand up for our positions internationally (AA 2011, 18; see also Maas 2019e; AA 2020a, 4).

This argument is echoed in the bid for a nonpermanent UNSC seat 2019–2020, reaffirming that “A credible human rights policy always starts at home” (AA 2018). “Home” or the “internal” becomes the site where credibility is made.

Claims to credibility, then, presuppose two distinct spatial domains: the “inside” or “internal,” and the “outside” or “external,” sharply delineated through the implicit drawing of state boundaries (Walker 1992). These two spatial domains, often treated as separate in policy practice and conventional scholarship, appear as intimately connected in the German foreign policy discourse: Internal practices determine external credibility. Inversely, a lack of credibility arises out of inconsistencies between discourse and practice directed at the “outside” and the “inside.” Foreign policy is not merely a bridge between independent states but appears as a reflection of domestic practices.

Mediating Inside/Outside: The FFO as Representing “Home”

If credibility is determined “at home,” we must ask: Where—or what—is “home”? Texts show that “home” means the FFO rather than the whole of German society. Consider Maas’ speech on International Women’s Day 2019, proposing a “foreign policy for women”: “A foreign policy for women can only be a foreign policy by and with women. And this is why our foreign policy, yes, our foreign policy must, too, become more female. Ultimately, this is about credibility” (Maas 2019f). Speaking at an event on women’s representation in corporate supervisory boards, Maas (2021e) further explains:

Diplomacy must become more female. And this starts, of course, in our own ranks. Anyone who stands up for the rights of women and girls worldwide must also be inclusive themselves. Ultimately, this is nothing more than a question of credibility. (emphasis added)

The FFO’s first publication on gender equality in German foreign policy makes the link even more explicit: “it is a matter of credibility that gender equality be treated as a priority not only in German foreign policy, but also in the Federal Foreign Office itself” (AA 2020b, 40).

Similar claims exist in relation to diversity, although diversity is invoked somewhat differently. I will discuss this below and focus here on the discursive construction of the FFO as representing “home.” Reconsider the diversity strategy:

The Foreign Office represents Germany, German interests and common European values abroad. It follows from there that we have a duty to reflect the growing diversity of German society in our own ranks (AA 2021, 10).

Differently put: Only if the main foreign policy apparatus, the FFO, is gender equal and diverse, can Germany credibly stand for gender equality and diversity elsewhere (Green, Kozielska, and Smith 2023, 12).

This constitutes the FFO, particularly the diplomatic corps, as a distinct spatial domain between “inside” and “outside.” The institution represents the former to the latter, mediating between the two. Beyond representation, the FFO appears as the only legitimate locus of foreign policymaking and, therefore, the only space to which credibility is attached. This illustrates a powerful structuring mechanism presupposed in German foreign policy discourse and foreign policy discourse more broadly: the decentralization of government and siloing of policy areas into discrete ministries. Formally, the FFO is responsible for foreign policy only, with little formal influence on other policy areas. Foreign policy is understood to be inward-looking only insofar as it affects the ministry. In practice, the FFO makes use of coordinating mechanisms to streamline policies across ministries. The political leadership also has some leeway to engage with political issues beyond foreign policy, including the human rights situation within Germany. The discourse, however, does not recognize this but positions the FFO as the space in which credibility originates.

Invoking Gender Equality and Diversity

The following section elaborates on how the discourse invokes gender equality and diversity differently in relation to the German Self and to the FFO. I argue that gender equality is normalized as a core value of Germany, whereas German society must first be constructed as diverse for diversity to become a source of credibility. While the latter makes possible calls that the FFO should “mirror” this diverse society, the discourse on gender equality has a higher status than that on diversity.

In Relation to the German Self

The internal space is discursively constructed as characterized by “core values,” including gender equality (AA 2018). As Maas (2018) explains: “Without equality, there is no real democracy. Without women, we lose our credibility and thus also betray part of our values.” Gender equality here appears as fundamentally connected to democracy. Invoked as another “core value” across texts under analysis, democracy appears in rights-based argumentation about equal representation: Women should be equally represented because this is a fundamental aspect of democracy (Maas 2019a, c, f; Müntefering 2019c, 2020b, 2021c, d). Like human rights, democracy is an empty signifier that is left undefined—but appears as a key aspect of what it means to be German. References to gender equality therefore extend previous constructions of the German Self as a “benign” democratic state (Roos and Rungius 2016). Consequently, it appears natural that “Gender equality and human rights belong to the core of German foreign policy” (Müntefering 2019b; see also Gabriel 2017; AA 2019a; see Schoenes 2011).

Diversity is invoked differently. While the term increasingly appears in German foreign policy discourse, its meaning remains elusive. The closest “definition” of diversity can be found in the FFO’s diversity strategy, which lists seven “dimensions of diversity” (AA 2021): disability, gender, age, religion and worldviews, sexual orientation and identity, ethnic origin and nationality, and social origin (in the sense of class). The aim is for those characteristics to be represented equally. The meaning of diversity can be inferred as closely relating to individuated characteristics and representation, rather than belonging. This understanding of diversity and the categories in use originates in a juridic-political discourse rather than lived experiences of marginalized folk in Germany. It specifically draws on the regulatory frameworks of the Equal Treatment Act and the Diversity Charter, a document that signals employers’ commitments to furthering equal opportunities. Mediating the institutional discourses of German foreign policy, the charter and the law produce key nodal points anchoring the representation of diversity.

One nodal point is the representation of German society as diverse. As the charter states, “Social diversity [. . .] shapes the world of work in Germany. We can only be successful economically and as a society if we recognize, promote, and use this existing diversity” (Charta der Vielfalt 2022). This reflects the instrumentalization of diversity present in German foreign policy discourse. Even more importantly it presumes that “German society is diverse” (AA 2021, 2, emphasis added). This is, too, the fundamental organizing principle of the FFO’s diversity strategy. Notably, we do not find similar assertions about gender equality. While the discourse recognizes that “we are not there yet” when it comes to gender equal representation (further discussed below), there are no claims to the existence of a gender equal German society. Gender equality is normalized as a “core value” and left unexplained—diversity is not. Diversity cannot be presupposed; it is not yet taken for granted. Presenting a diverse German society as a social fact—and repeatedly so throughout texts (AA 2021, 3, 7, 10, 27, 28)—is an attempt at normalizing it, both in the national discourse and as an outward-facing construction of international credibility. Diversity must first be affirmed to become a source of credibility.

Consequently, Germany is constructed as having an “essence” in a two-fold sense: It is characterized by core values such as gender equality and by its diverse society. This essence is projected outward, in and through foreign policy. Hence, the underlying concept of foreign policy is “external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic identity” (Campbell 1998, 37). Being credible means simply living already existing values and realizing existing social facts “at home.” This presupposes that the state, or, in this case, the nation, exists prior to foreign policy. Deconstructing the discourse, however, it becomes evident that foreign policy constitutes the nation, the “essence” of what it means to be German: “Foreign policy is deeply implicated [. . .] in the production of [. . .] the nation and national identities” (Howell 2005, 61).

In Relation to the FFO

As noted above, German foreign policy discourse positions representation as a key function of diplomacy. This makes possible calls for equal representation of a diverse German society. As Maas (2019f) states: “Our house must be more colourful and more inclusive, so that we can represent the Germany of today and tomorrow in all of its facets, and visibly so.” Reconsider, too, the diversity strategy:

The Foreign Office represents Germany, German interests and common European values abroad. It follows from there that we have a duty to reflect the growing diversity of German society in our own ranks. This also increases the legitimacy of the claim to actively represent the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (AA 2021, 10).

Invoking the notion of duty, the passage reflects the idea that the federal administration should mirror the composition of society (Lequesne et al. 2020). This becomes a precondition for credibly and legitimately representing Germany to the “outside” and for realizing strategic objectives. Invoking diversity links German society, the FFO, and the “external.”

This link only appears once in relation to gender equality: in Maas’ speech on International Women’s Day 2020. Arguing for more women in the FFO, Maas (2020) says, “But I do think that we must ask ourselves [. . .] if we can really represent Germany in all of its breadth abroad if over 50 percent of the population does not also occupy a corresponding share of our leadership positions?” As the discourse normalizes gender equality as a “core value,” rights-based argumentation is more pronounced, particularly in relation to diversity.

Notable about these claims is, too, their inscribed futurity as they contrast the here-and-now (“we have achieved a lot, but there is no equality yet”) and the imagined future (“we are/want to be a diverse and equal FFO”) (Müntefering 2021c). The present appears to be in need of correction, particularly when it comes to gender equality. Maas’ first speech as newly retired Foreign Minister during the handover to Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock illustrates this:

The likely most important task [for the future] has not only an internal impact, but above all an external impact: we need a diplomatic service that is a mirror of our society. In recent years, we have achieved a lot in terms of equality and diversity. And yet, parity remains one of the most important tasks within the House. Because I am firmly convinced: there is no good policy, no good foreign policy either, that leaves out half of humanity (Maas 2021b).

While the first part of Maas’ argument focuses on the representation of all marginalized folks by constructing the image of a mirror, the second part subtly moves the focus to gender equality by referring to parity and “half of humanity.” The discourse on gender equality, thus, has a higher status than the one on diversity. This reaffirms the ongoing configuration of the German Self as credible via gender equality and, to a lesser extent, diversity—and links this with a call to action to change the FFO.

Consequences of the Credibility Discourse

Two interrelated consequences follow from the credibility discourse: First, it becomes possible to “diversify” the FFO by discursively making gender equality and diversity in the institution appear necessary and inciting self-governance of civil servants. Second, it masks entrenched inequalities in wider German society as it renders their being addressed inconsequential for being a credible foreign policy actor.

Diversifying the FFO

Claims to credibility construct a common understanding of what it means to be a credible foreign policy actor: realizing gender equality and diversity in the FFO. This enjoins staff to conduct themselves accordingly. Such self-governance appears to be particularly useful in the FFO, where staffing decisions are primarily made within the civil service. While the political leadership can decide on political and high-ranking appointments, including Minister of State or State Secretary, they cannot directly influence who becomes, for instance, Deputy Head of Department or is recruited in the first place. Claims to credibility are, therefore, one way of inciting self-governance within the civil service in line with political aims.

Further, the credibility discourse partially subverts the dominant and ubiquitous ruling relation of meritocracy that governs the FFO: the discursive claim that merit, or performance, determines access to and progress in the ministry. This is codified in constitutional law, institutionally sanctioned, inscribed in key diplomatic texts, and regularly invoked by diplomats themselves (Färber forthcoming). This discourse is a key barrier to realizing gender equality and diversity, as it fails to recognize that performance and merit do not exist independent of structural constraints.

Unsurprisingly, the FFO often meets affirmative action with skepticism or resistance. Rights-based arguments that position equal representation as a matter of fairness are not powerful enough to disrupt meritocracy. Even instrumental reasoning that positions equal representation as being in the FFO’s interest hardly challenges the rules of relevance: If only the best access the FFO, they already make the best decisions. Claims to credibility, however, make equal and diverse representation essential to the doing of foreign policy. Not only must the best people make the best decisions, but they must be credible in their international engagement to be able to do foreign policy. This, according to the discourse, requires gender equality and diversity. Hence, linking credibility to gender equality/diversity destabilizes meritocracy in a more subversive and far-reaching way than rights-based and other instrumental arguments can.

Although causality between the credibility discourse and equal representation in the FFO cannot and should not be inferred, statistical data confirms that the FFO has become more gender equal (and diverse) between 2018 and 2021. The proportion of women staff slightly increased from 48.8 percent to 49.4 percent (Meißmer 2019, 2022). While most women worked (and still work) in the FFO's secretariats (AA 2021, 21) and as locally employed staff (AA 2021, 27), there was a slight increase of women diplomats (Meißmer 2019, 2022). This, however, was reflected unequally across levels of seniority. Due to the political leadership’s influence on political appointments, women’s representation notably increased in most senior positions. The FFO witnessed the appointment of its second woman State Secretary (2019) and seventh woman Minister of State (2018). At the Director General and Deputy Director General level, the proportion of women rose from 27 to 50 percent (Maas 2021c, e)—not least due to the creation of more Deputy Director General posts that were then filled with women.⁷ There was also an increase of women in managing positions, from 20.5 percent to 23.5 percent (Meißmer 2019, 2022),⁸ with a significant difference between Berlin and missions abroad: In Berlin, the proportion of women managers rose to just below 40 percent in 2021 (AA 2021, 18); abroad, the number of women heads of missions grew at a lesser rate from 13 percent in 2016 to just below 25 percent in 2021 (Maas 2021c; Müntefering 2019c). Overall, the FFO appears to be fulfilling Maas’ promise of becoming “more female” (AA 2020b, 2).

In terms of diversity, people with a so-called “migration background” are less well represented.⁹ In 2019, one seventh of the FFO’s workforce had a “migration background,” compared to 25.5 percent of the population (Ette et al. 2020, 21; AA 2021, 7). Most staff with a “migration background” were diplomats (AA 2021, 27), in contrast to the rest of the federal administration, where they were more likely to hold temporary contracts or work in the lower three civil service streams (Ette et al. 2020, 25–7). While there is no data on how “diversity” in the FFO developed over time, survey findings indicate that the proportion of public servants with a “migration background” is significantly higher in those below 40 years of age (Ette et al. 2020, 23). These findings seem to be in line with developments in the FFO. The group of attaché(e)s (diplomats in training) has not only become relatively gender equal over the past years, but, according to the annually published CVs, also appears to increasingly incorporate People of Color as well as binational, queer, and disabled folks.¹⁰ Again, this increase cannot be attributed to explicit utterances of credibility as such. However, the discourse creates a social reality in which equal representation becomes both valuable and necessary.

Obscuring Societal Inequalities

Although claims to credibility are powerful discursive moves with regards to change in the space of FFO, they also powerfully obscure entrenched inequalities and histories of violence in wider German society. The focus remains not only on the institutional space, but diversity and gender equality become an exercise in numbers: How many women/“diverse” folks are represented? While representation is unequal in German society as well—only 29 percent of managerial positions are held by women (WEF 2021)—this invisibilizes social injustices and violence against marginalized folks, both of which are widespread. In 2020, German police registered an attempted femicide every day. Every third day, a woman was murdered by a partner or ex-partner (BKA 2021). Physical violence against queer folks was and is at a similar level, with 164 violent crimes related to sexual orientation in 2021 alone (LSVD 2022). And the majority of racialized folks in Germany regularly experience direct, institutional, and structural racism, including acts of violence (Aikins et al. 2021). All of this intersects with and is exacerbated by entrenched class disparities as well as Germany’s colonial history, which continues to influence the lived experiences of Black and Afrodiasporic folks and People of Color in Germany today (Ayim, Oguntoye, and Schultz 2020 [1986]).

Although foreign policy texts recognize the existence of gendered exclusion in art, politics, and economics as well as gendered and sexualized violence—some even speak of a “catastrophic situation” (Müntefering 2020b)—and argue that this must change, addressing these issues remains inconsequential for becoming a credible foreign policy actor. Instead, realizing equal representation in the FFO suffices. Concerns with social injustice in German society disappear, are unthinkable even, as a key source for credibility. Inconsistencies between (gender-equal and feminist) foreign policy rhetoric and practices are concealed.

Excluding these concerns, the discourse reaffirms the spatial boundaries of foreign policymaking and creates limited spatiotemporal options for political transformation. Constructing a schism between wider society and the FFO, the discourse reproduces the compartmentalization of German government and the FFO’s outward-looking role. Other constructions of credibility exist, but do not appear as valid alternatives in the discourse. Here, credibility is attached to the broader domestic sphere, whereby working toward social justice in Germany becomes an urgent foreign policy concern, not least due to the high rates of racialized violence (Habte 2022). However, the credibility discourse does not allow for such action. Loosely paraphrasing Walker (1992, 5), the discourse is interesting less for substantive explanations about existing political conditions than as “expressions of the limits of the contemporary political imagination.”

Interestingly, the German foreign policy discourse on credibility and human rights works differently. Here, being credible means realizing human rights in wider society. Presenting the 2019 Human Rights Report, Maas (2019e) argues:

But credibility also means being credible nationally. Internationally, Germany is trusted to play a leading role in strengthening human rights. And we want to take on this role. To do so, we have to be credible. We must not only point to others, but we must also ensure that the goals we have set ourselves are achieved nationally.

Hence, the human rights discourse merely presupposes a distinction between “inside” and “outside.” The FFO as a separate spatial domain only appears if the empty signifier of human rights is filled with gender equality and diversity.

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the German foreign policy discourse on gender equality and diversity during 2018–2021. In addition to invoking rights and organizational and state benefits, equal representation is justified with claims to credibility. These claims constitute a distinct form of instrumental discourse. Discursively constructing gender equality and diversity as key for achieving credibility and, therefore, a necessary precondition for the doing of foreign policy, these claims produce a social reality that makes equal and diverse representation in the FFO essential. They, too, extend established representations of the “good” German Self and constitute a form of governmentality as they enjoin FFO staff to conduct themselves in line with what it means to be credible: realizing gender equality and diversity in the institution. This may have material consequences on the institutional space of the FFO. For staff marked as “diverse,” claims to credibility are not just symbolic politics but can potentially enable more equal representation. However, the discourse obscures entrenched injustices and histories of violence in German society as their addressing is rendered inconsequential for being a credible foreign policy actor. Instead, realizing equal representation within the FFO suffices as a source of being, or becoming, a credible foreign policy actor.

The analysis is limited in two ways: First, it focuses solely on foreign policy texts and does not interrogate the everyday practices of FFO staff. Studying the latter would help further assess this article’s argument about credibility as a form of governmentality and its effects on representation. Second, data selection only includes texts that directly refer to credibility rather than tracing its meaning. I have argued that direct links between credibility and equal representation matter. Future research could, however, extend this article’s analysis.

Beyond the German case, the article’s findings speak to broader (trans)national foreign policy discourses. For instance, Spain similarly invokes credibility in its FFP, but in relation to coherence across all public policies (MAEUEC 2021, 5). Other states, such as Sweden and Canada, equally obscure injustices within state borders, constructing foreign policy as an outward projection (Bergman Rosamond, Cheung, and Leeuw 2023). However, they also link their international engagement on women’s rights and specifically their FFPs with “domestic credentials,” justifying the former with longstanding engagement in domestic equality initiatives or feminist domestic policy (Thomson 2022; Zhukova 2023). Notably, this presupposes that the domestic sphere incorporates Swedish or Canadian societies. The German case seems to be partially distinct in that the broader domestic context is disconnected from and rendered inconsequential for credibility in foreign policy.

The findings are also significant considering the subsequent government’s FFP. There seems to be a large degree of continuity in the discursive linking of credibility, diversity, and the space of the FFO. The FFP guidelines, published in March 2023, state, “For us, feminist foreign policy means that the diversity of German society is also reflected in our own ranks. Because only in this way can we credibly convey an up-to-date image of Germany” (AA 2023a, 68). While this strongly resonates with the governmentality and discursive logics of previous German foreign policy discourse, the guidelines do not mention credibility in conjuncture with gender equality. The guidelines also claim that the FFO will advocate for diversity and inclusion within Germany (AA 2023a, 61), destabilizing clear politico-spatial configurations of the FFO. At the same time, the broader FFP discourse continues to obscure domestic conditions (Habte 2022).

This raises questions around changes and continuities in German foreign policy discourse: To what extent has the previous discourse on credibility, gender equality, and diversity shaped the conceptualization of FFP? What does diversity mean for and in the FFP discourse? How is the current elevation of gender equality and diversity within FFP discursively legitimized and made possible? Has there been a discursive shift toward diversity as a more central aspect within the German FFP discourse? How do these foreign policy discourses work differently across other states engaged in feminist policies? More research is needed to interrogate these and other questions to shed light on the practices and structuring relations of (German) foreign policy discourse on diversity and gender equality.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the participants of the 2022 Gender and Diplomacy workshop at the University of Gothenburg, particularly Ann Towns, Katarzyna Jezierska, and Bahar Rumelili; Jessica Cheung; Amanda Chisholm; Leonie Ansems de Vries; and three anonymous reviewers for useful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Footnotes

1

For example, Australia, Finland, Norway, UK, USA.

2

Sweden (2014, retracted 2022), Canada (2017), France (2018), Luxembourg (2019, retracted 2023), Mexico (2020), Libya (2021), Liberia (2021), Spain (2021), Chile (2021), the Netherlands (2022), Colombia (2023), Argentina (2023, retracted 2023), Mongolia (2023), Scotland (2023), and Slovenia (2023).

3

All translations by the author.

4

Political leadership refers to the politically appointed executives leading the FFO: the Foreign Minister and the Ministers of State. Ministers of State are seconded Members of Parliament and equal in rank to State Secretaries, the most senior civil servants.

5

Texts referring to credibility in relation to the European Union or the UNSC were excluded from the analysis. This is beyond the scope of this article.

6

Other forms of social inequality become almost completely invisible in this discourse. For example, East German background has, beyond cursory acknowledgments (AA 2021, 34; 2023a, 61), disappeared as a significant factor for limiting meaningful participation in foreign policy.

7

The proportion of women Deputy Director Generals increased from 19.3 percent to 30.2 percent, and the proportion of women Director Generals from 16.1 percent to 24.2 percent (Meißmer 2019, 2022).

8

Managing positions refer to civil service pay grades A16 and above.

9

In German research, cultural diversity has been operationalized by way of “migration background.” This concept describes people residing in Germany who do not have German citizenship through birth (first generation) or whose parent(s) do not have German citizenship through birth (second generation). The term is problematic: Neither does the concept consider heterogenous lived experiences of migration and/or racism and other forms of structural violence, nor the fact that people can experience such violence even if they do not have a “migration background.” It further reduces the meaning of diversity to migration and racialization and negates self-chosen identities. For, the term is commonly used to racialize folks read as “non-white” and, therefore, creates a hierarchy between “visible” and “non-visible” migration backgrounds. Despite my critique, I will refer to data on “migration background” because there are no studies of diversity in public administration that use a different concept.

10

Since 2015, the FFO has been legally required to publish the ratio of men to women staff according to level of seniority. There is no data on gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, racialized identity, or class. This personal data is rarely collected in Germany due to historical reasons: During the Nazi regime, data about religion, racialization, sexuality, political preference, nationality, (dis)ability, and “criminal acts” was used to legitimate mass murder. After 1949, West German law enforcement agencies continued to keep “rosa Listen” (pink lists) as a basis to prosecute gay men until at least the 1960s.