Jihad as grand strategy: Islamist militancy, national security, and the Pakistani state

Extract

When the Soviets departed from Afghanistan in 1989 there was a satisfied feeling in western capitals of a job well done. But there were to be consequences. By 1993 two of the mujahideen groups were fighting for control of Kabul and in Kashmir there were terrorist attacks against Indian forces. What on earth was going on? Over the coming months and years the view developed that Pakistan must have decided, as a matter of national policy, to continue using jihadist groups to further its interests in the region.

In this concise and clearly argued work S. Paul Kapur takes the argument a step further. He argues that jihad is used not only as an instrument of strategy but is a ‘grand strategy’ (p. 8). He traces Pakistan back to its foundation and describes the use of Pashtun raiders in Kashmir in 1947. He explains the roles played by Colonel Akbar Khan and Mian Iftikharuddin (p. 43) and the continuity of Khan's role in the 1965 war against India. Kapur also highlights the failure of Operation Gibraltar (p. 56), in which Pakistan used militants to foment an insurrection in Kashmir. However Gibraltar was a failure (p. 56) and, in 1971, Pakistan did not make use of insurgents during the Bangladesh War in which it suffered a heavy and humiliating defeat.