Extract

For security studies, the western campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11 is one of the most relevant case-studies in conflict, given that it pitted asymmetrically balanced opponents against each other. The United States ended its war in September 2021, and Carter Malkasian's book is an attempt to grapple with its implications. He was an adviser to the United States military in Afghanistan and wrote an earlier book on the conflict (War comes to Garmser: thirty years of conflict on the Afghan frontier, Oxford University Press, 2016). The American war in Afghanistan: a history is a valuable follow-up and its chief strength is its ample provision of context. Echoing the work of Thomas Barfield, the book highlights in its methodology the role of Afghan society.

The work is a post-mortem on the failed US war in Afghanistan. Malkasian blames tribalism and religion, which, he claims, are issues that have not been addressed properly in the academic literature. He argues that the Taliban derived fervour and legitimacy from their particular interpretation of Islam as related to Afghan identity and resistance to occupation; this gave them an advantage over the government, which was seen as aligned with foreign powers and thus less than legitimate. While the government's supporters may indeed have outnumbered those supporting the Taliban, it could not ask them to make the sacrifices that the Taliban expect and get from their followers.

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