The UN and women’s marginalization in peace negotiations


 Although UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for increased participation of women in all stages of a peace process, the number of women who participate in formal peace negotiations is still very limited. In order to augment their number, UN Women and other international organizations have published a series of policy reports in which they argue that women's participation increases the success of peace negotiations and leads to more inclusive peace agreements. However, based on an analysis of relevant policy reports and interviews with women and men involved in peace negotiations, I argue that the policy reports do not lead to women's empowerment. Instead, they contribute to women's marginalization in peace negotiations, because they entrap women between conflicting expectations. The type of behaviour that international advocates of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda expect of women when they participate in peace negotiations limits the women's room for manoeuvre—at best. At worst, this type of behaviour prevents women from participating in the negotiations, because it is dismissed by domestic (male) negotiators. But if women who participate in peace negotiations violate the behavioural script proposed by the policy reports, they are considered as not acting in line with the WPS agenda. Hence, no matter how women behave when they sit at the negotiation table, they either lose the support of international or national gatekeepers.

International Affairs 00: 0,2021 In this article, however, I argue that these policy reports do not lead to women's empowerment. Instead, they promote a particular understanding of women in peace processes in the sense of a powerful narrative. 5 This narrative has consequences for the ways in which peace negotiations are designed and carried out, and contributes to women's marginalization in peace negotiations. In order to identify the understanding of women in peace negotiations that is put forward in the policy reports, I turn to those strands of feminist thinking that conceive of the roles of women and men as being socially constructed, based on particular understandings of masculinity and femininity. To date, most research on institutions related to war and security focuses on men, and conceives of women solely in terms of (hegemonic) masculinities and complementary femininities, without properly theorizing femininity. 6 Given the focus of the WPS agenda on women and on what can be considered femininity, I argue, with gender sociologists such as Mimi Schippers, that 'femininity must be placed back into the theory', 7 in order to analyse the multiple hierarchical relations in and beyond the field of peace negotiations. I therefore use the concept of 'hegemonic femininity' developed by gender scholars, 8 and reformulate it for application in analysis of issues related to peace and security, where it has hitherto been neglected.
Having analysed twelve policy reports on women in peace negotiations and conducted twelve interviews with women and men involved in past or more recent peace negotiations all over the globe, I show that the reports incorporate a particular and narrow understanding of what international actors consider to be women's appropriate and normal behaviour when they participate in peace negotiations. This understanding regulates the social practices of peace negotiations and hence has a hegemonic significance. If women perform hegemonic femininity-that is, if they behave in accordance with the expectations of the international actors as articulated in the policy reports-their room for manoeuvre in the negotiations is limited at best. At worst, they might even be excluded from the negotiations, because what international actors consider to be appropriate behaviour for women is considered inappropriate by national negotiating parties. While the reports acknowledge that their conception of what the ideal woman in peace negotiations looks like is devalued by those actors on the domestic level International Affairs 00: 0, 2021 who decide on women's participation in the negotiations, the reports nevertheless maintain their 'gold standard' and downgrade women who do not live up to it. Hence, the policy reports translate into power inequalities by contributing to the practice of keeping women in subordinate positions and maintaining the existing international order. This finding is of broader relevance, because peace negotiations and resulting agreements often lay the groundwork for a country's subsequent political order.
The article thereby contributes to those strands of critical feminist reasoning that interrogate the conceptual groundings and practical implications of UNSCR 1325 and of subsequent related resolutions. 9 It sustains the argument made in this body of literature that the UN's WPS agenda 'has not lived up to the resolution's transformative promise', 10 and instead, has converted gender 'from a critical to a problem-solving tool, which does not challenge prevailing practices in response to armed conflict, peace, and security'. 11 In particular, my analysis resonates with Nina Wilén's argument that international actors' instrumental approach to including women in peacekeeping, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of peace operations, constitutes a burden for women and-given that such expectations are not put on male peacekeepers-contributes to 'gender inequality and a backlash against female participation in peace operations'. 12 By shifting the focus to peace negotiations, the article shows that it is not only reluctant and 'manly states' that can be blamed for the lack of gender mainstreaming. 13 Non-state actors' expertise, as reflected in the policy reports studied here, also serves-whether consciously or not-to reproduce gender(ed) roles and hierarchies. The article provides new empirical data on experiences of women who participated in peace negotiations and thereby advances the relevant academic literature, 14 which is-in contrast to the huge number of policy reports-still very limited. By spelling out the concept of hegemonic femininity-as used in other disciplines-for use in the analysis of peace processes, the article also offers a theoretical framework for studying how gendered expectations increase gender inequality. First, the concept of hegemonic femininity uncovers hierarchical relations not only between women and men, but also between different  (groups of ) women. Second, it allows us to carve out the scope of behaviour for women that is approved by those in (decision-making) power, and on the basis of which women are given access to, but little impact on, decision-making. Applied to peace negotiations, the concept of hegemonic femininity allows us to explain how exactly Resolution 1325 'reconfigures the gendered binaries of international security by reinscribing racialized and sexualized hierarchies in the conceptualization and practice of international security'. 15 The article is organized as follows. On the basis of a discussion of the relevant literature on masculinities and femininities, and on gender and hierarchy, I formulate a concept of hegemonic femininity. I then describe the methodology and sample, after which I apply the concept of hegemonic femininity to peace negotiations and present the results of my analysis of both the policy reports and the interviews. The article ends with a summary and discussion of the findings.

Hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity
Drawing on the work of gender scholars such as Laura Sjoberg, I consider that the relationships between gender and hierarchy in global politics are multiple and include 'gender hierarchies, hierarchies as gendered, and hierarchies as gendered institutions'. 16 I conceive of gender as a hierarchy in the sense of a structural inequality, 17 and as a relational and binary 'structural ordering principle of global politics'. 18 On the basis of this work, and on that of Raewyn Connell, 19 masculinity and femininity can be understood as socially constructed categories associated respectively with men and women, 20 although 'women are not necessarily feminine and men not necessarily masculine'. 21 Masculinity and femininity are performative and productive, 22 because they imply sets of characteristics and practices that, if embodied by individuals, position those individuals in the social order, and, if embodied collectively, have social and political effects. 23 Masculinity and femininity encompass a range of possible positions, identities and performances that are historically, socially and geographically contingent, may be contradictory, 24 and are shaped by and intersect with other identity-forming categories. 25 In this sense, hierarchy 'structured by another principle of differen-International Affairs 00: 0, 2021 tiation (be it race, religion, class, nationality, or something else) is often nevertheless framed in gender terms and enacted at least in part through gender-associated valorizations and devalorizations'. 26 Thinking of masculinity and femininity in the plural, and as expressions as well as performances of productive power that 'define[s] the (im)possible, the (im) probable, the natural, the normal', 27 allows us not only to examine the hierarchical relations between different masculinities and femininities, but also to conceive of them as 'an important component of complex struggles to define and control individual and collective identities as well as domestic and international political orders'. 28 In this sense, 'hierarchies in global politics [are] gendered'. 29 Yet, on the basis of Connell's seminal work, scholars in the field of peace and security 'focused more or less entirely on masculinities, with a strong emphasis on hegemonic forms'. 30 This approach, I argue, is too narrow to enable us to understand the multiple and possibly contradictory hierarchical relations of the global gender order, the ways in which hierarchies are gendered and 'work ... on gendered logics'. 31 In line with gender scholars, I criticize the failure of the concept of hegemonic masculinity to conceive of masculinity and femininity together; instead, it 'start[ed] with ... masculinity and then tr[ied] to fit femininity around it'. 32 In this sense, hegemonic masculinity is 'one type of identity construct, at the top of a hierarchy that includes subordinate masculinities and femininities'. 33 In this context, femininities are conceived of solely in difference from and as inferior counterparts of hegemonic masculinity. 34 Given that, drawing again on Connell, hegemonic masculinity implies the 'maintenance of practices that institutionalise men's dominance over women', 35 embodying hegemonic masculinity does not have the same effects for women and men. 'For men, performing hegemonic masculinity gives them power over other men enacting lesser forms of masculinity (subordinate masculinities) and over all women.' 36 For women, performing hegemonic masculinity does not give them such power; nor does performing a particular type of femininity because, as Connell notes, 'there is no femininity that holds among women the position held by hegemonic masculinity among men'. 37 Hence, there is no proper standard for women's behaviour, no set of characteristics and practices that constitute the ideal woman and that, if performed by women, gives them power. Yet even within a male-dominated world order there is no 26 34 Connell, Gender and power, pp. 183-8. 35 Connell, Gender and power, p. 185. 36 Annes et al., '"A woman in charge of a farm"', p. 31. 37 Connell, Gender and power, p. 187.
International Affairs 00: 0, 2021 reason to exclude a priori the idea that a particular type of femininity confers power on those who perform it; nor is there any reason to assume that any type of femininity is always inferior to masculinity. In other words, the framework of hegemonic masculinity as it is used in research related to peace and security thus far lacks a theorization of hegemonic femininity.
I therefore turn to the work of gender scholars more broadly, 38 especially those who have theorized the concept of hegemonic femininity and applied it in fields such as rural sociology, 39 or education and childhood. 40 On the basis of this work, hegemonic femininity can be understood as an identity construct at the top of a hierarchy that includes at least subordinate femininities and may also include subordinate masculinities. It refers to a set of practices and characteristics that confers on those who perform it power over those who perform lesser forms of femininity. Thus, it allows us to conceptualize hierarchical relations between different femininities, and to conceive of subordinate forms of femininity without using masculinity as a reference point. The valorization of a superior femininity creates a standard or norm which 'serve[s] the interests of those in power', 41 and to which-as in the case of hegemonic masculinity-individuals aspire, 'because normativity makes certain practices appear "natural," beyond discussion', 42 and even to be in the interest of the subordinated-who can, indeed, be policed through this standard. 43 In this sense, superior femininity gains hegemonic quality. Such hegemonic power is diffused through discourses, 44 including symbols and practices, and also, as in the case studied here, through policy reports.
The concept of hegemonic femininity also enables the definition of how the ideal woman should act and behave, and the creation of a concept of the ideal woman, embodied in hegemonic femininity, as superior to the ideal man, incorporated in hegemonic masculinity. Otherwise there is no reason for individuals to invest in hegemonic femininity. On this point I disagree with those who argue that hegemonic femininity always 'operates in ... subordination to hegemonic masculinity'. 45 We can also think of constellations in which hegemonic femininity is superior to hegemonic masculinity in one context and simultaneously inferior to hegemonic masculinity in another context. Taking into account the multiple relationships between gender and hierarchy allows us to understand that although the ideal woman-in terms of a gender hierarchy-might be considered superior to the ideal man, hegemonic femininity nevertheless contributes to maintaining the existing male-dominated world order, because hierarchies in global politics are gendered and peace negotiations are embedded in hierarchies that function on the basis of a logic of force, as I will show. Although in this article I apply the concept of hegemonic femininity to study the role of women in peace negotiations, there is no reason to assume that hegemonic femininity is performed only by women and not by men. Before discussing the conception of the ideal woman in peace negotiations that can be found in the policy reports, and its effects in terms of hegemonic femininity, I will explain the sample and choice of methodology for my study.

Sample and methodology
The study involved an analysis of twelve policy reports and twelve interviews with women and men involved in peace negotiations. The policy reports were identified on the basis of a literature review, and were limited to those dealing with what are called 'track one' peace negotiations-that is, official and formal negotiation processes that result in a peace agreement, including (sub)commissions whose work feeds into the agreement. My study focuses on women who represent or work for track one domestic negotiating parties. Although the sample may not be complete and may inadvertently overlook some reports, it covers policy reports published on behalf of relevant and influential actors between 2004 and 2018, as follows: • Two reports were written by the staff of an international governmental organization (UN Women) and published by the organization. 46 • One report was written by academics and jointly published by an international governmental organization (UN Women) and an academic institution (Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative). 47 • One report was written by an independent consultant and published by a governmental agency (GIZ). 48 • One report was written by an academic and published by a public think tank (Institut Català Internacional per la Pau). 49 • Two reports were published by international not-for-profit think tanks, namely the International Peace Institute (written by staff members and academics), and the Council on Foreign Relations (written by staff members). • Three reports were published by NGOs, namely the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, SwissPeace (both written by the NGOs' staff ) and the Initiative for Quiet Diplomacy (written by an independent consultant). 51 • One report was written by academics and published by an academic institution, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. 52 • One report was written by academics and civil society activists, and jointly published by an academic institution (the MIT Center for International Studies) and an NGO (the International Civil Society Action Network). 53 Taking into account the principle that hegemonic power is exercised discursively, I carried out a qualitative content analysis of the policy reports, searching for assumptions about women's and men's behaviour, and identifying the types of behaviour that are considered acceptable and unacceptable.
In addition to analysing the policy reports, I carried out a series of twelve interviews between March 2019 and February 2020. Most of the interviewees (nine), all of whom were women, had themselves participated in peace negotiations. For reasons of triangulation, I also carried out three other interviews with two women and one man who were members of international organizations' delegations that facilitated peace negotiations and were therefore close observers of and advisers to (domestic female) peace negotiators, often in more than one peace process.
The interviews were open-ended but were guided by some core questions. 54 Because I was interested in how the interviewees experienced peace negotiations and what they considered important, I asked them first to recall listening and talking to others while sitting at the negotiating table or in advisory committees, and then to tell me what I would have heard and observed had I been in their place. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and then anonymized in such a way that they could be attributed to a particular negotiation but not to a particular person. I then subjected the interviews to a qualitative content analysis in order to identify what was considered appropriate behaviour of women in the negotiations, and by whom, as well as the effects of these views for the women.

Policy reports' conceptions of the ideal woman in peace negotiations
My analysis reveals a conception of how the ideal woman in peace negotiations should behave that is dominant across the policy reports-with the exception of one report that critically assesses generalizing assumptions found in the others. This conception of the ideal woman requires a male 'other' against which it can be constructed.

Different understandings of peace and security (the content dimension)
In ten of the twelve reports analysed, women were said to have different experiences of war from those of men. 56 Although the reports, with two exceptions, 57 avoid calling women 'victims', women are nevertheless presented as such, for example because conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is mentioned in connection with women as the sufferers of such violence. 58 This is in line with the focus of the WPS agenda on the experiences of women as victims of CRSV, 59 and also with the 'globally dominant "sexual violence as a weapon of war" narrative', which is criticized by scholars for neglecting 'structural gender inequalities and patriarchal relations' as root causes of violence and for not systematically taking into account violence against men. 60 Implying that experiences of CRSV result in women raising the issue during negotiations, a report published on behalf of UN Women states that 'women's absence from the peace table is a major reason why negotiations rarely cover this topic', while acknowledging that 'gender expertise ... can be supplied by men too'. 61 Overall, on the basis of their alleged experiences, women's understandings of security, war and peace are said to differ from men's. As a consequence, the majority of the reports analysed claim that during past negotiations it was women-not men-who brought to the negotiating table 'issues at the heart of achieving durable peace and stability such as the promotion of human rights, education, social service provision and security issues such as disarmament and reintegration'. 62 Thus, it is the women and not the men who are-most of the time implicitly-said to comply with the UN's agenda. 63 One of the reports, although not written on behalf of a UN agency, even explicitly states that women 'frequently marry the three pillars of the United Nations 56  (human rights, security, and development) in their approach'. 64 In this respect, women are also expected to lobby for 'women's rights and gender equality provisions' to be included in peace agreements, 65 as happened, for example, in the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). 66 Hence, according to the policy reports, it is the women who help advance negotiations with respect to content.

Different abilities (the process dimension)
Half of the reports consider female negotiators to have abilities that are beneficial in procedural terms when compared with those of male negotiators. 67 Women 'seem less threatening to conflict parties, ... thus, promoting a less aggressive atmosphere' during peace negotiations. 68 In this sense the added value of including women in the negotiations is that they 'make people comfortable, promoting good relationships and an atmosphere of warmth and humour', 69 which allows them 'to push for the commencement or finalization of negotiations when momentum [is] stalled'. 70 One report explains that women have gained these competencies 'through daily interactions within their families and communities'. 71 This view is in line with assumptions formulated in respect of peacekeeping. 72 Two examples of women's abilities to overcome tensions between conflicting (and negotiating) parties given in the reports are the negotiations in the Philippines in the 2008-2012 peace process, 73 and the negotiations in Northern Ireland that led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. As to the latter, one report states: 'When other parties refused to engage in dialogue, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition representatives took on the task of engaging them all ... They eased tensions and addressed their concerns but also held them accountable for moving the process forward.' 74 Hence, according to the policy reports, women are said to advance peace negotiations by helping to defuse and overcome conflict between participants and/or their interests.

Different relationships with others (the outreach dimension)
Third, the majority of the reports analysed consider women to have different relationships from men with society at large and/or with stakeholders who are not present at the negotiating table. 75 In general, 'on average women are more likely to be perceived by fellow citizens as members of society that can be trusted; they are more likely to serve as caregivers and place more emphasis on social and civic responsibilities compared to men'. 76 In particular, women are expected to represent women's civil society groups and their specific interests as a way of ensuring that large societal groups will abide by the terms set in the agreement. 77 One report, for example, links the neglect of 'many issues of concern to civil society' in the memorandum of understanding resulting from the Aceh peace talks to the lack of women's participation in the negotiations. 78 Overall, representing women's groups' and/or civil society interests is said to give women at the table greater legitimacy, 79 while lacking the support of such a broad constituency was said in one report to have the opposite effect. 80 The majority of the reports analysed reflect a tension between, on the one hand, acknowledging that women are not a homogeneous group and rejecting essentialist assumptions and, on the other hand, making generalizing arguments about women's participation in peace negotiations based on assumed differences between women and men. For example, in one report it is admitted that although assumptions that women are caregivers 'stem from socially constructed gender roles and are not essential to all women's identities, such attributes and perceptions make women logical contenders for leadership roles in peacemaking, with complementary skills and approaches to their male counterparts'. 81 This narrative can be seen to reflect a gender hierarchy in which the ideal woman is superior to men, because her influence on the negotiations 'increases the likelihood that an agreement will be reached in the short term while also making it more likely that the peace that results will be more sustainable'. 82 This narrative seems to empower women. In the following section, however, I will show that it can in fact have the opposite effect.

Hegemonic femininity and its effects
Conceiving of women in peace negotiations from the perspective of hegemonic femininity makes visible the way in which the concept of the ideal woman allows International Affairs 00: 0, 2021 the practice of peace negotiations to be regulated and women to be policed, and uncovers hierarchical relations between different women, some of whom are considered superior to others, as well as the effects of this on women's access to decision-making forums. The analysis thereby fills a gap in the literature that has criticized the WPS agenda for its differentiation of women from and subordination to men, but has neither theorized nor systematically analysed differences and inequalities among women.

The international level: reducing women's room for manoeuvre
Hegemonic femininity translates into what international actors consider appropriate behaviour of women. Two women are frequently (in five reports each) presented as role models because of their performance of hegemonic femininity: Luz Méndez, a delegate to the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) and an adviser to the peace negotiations in Guatemala in the mid-1990s; 83 and Graça Machel, mediator in the peace negotiations in Kenya that led to the signing of the 2008 agreement on the principles of partnership of the coalition government. 84 Méndez is said to have represented women's issues that 'went beyond her own view by drawing on the perspectives of women and society writlarge', 85 thereby having negotiated 'not only on behalf of her own party, but on behalf of all women'. 86 She is even seen as standing for the global women's movement in general, as she was said to have been 'influenced by her strong ties to civil society and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995'. 87 According to the interviews I conducted as part of this study, the behaviour of Méndez corresponds to the dominant view among international actors in terms of how women should behave in peace negotiations.
Yet the interviews revealed that hegemonic femininity leaves women little room for manoeuvre in the negotiations, because it limits the scope of issues that women are expected to deal with-an observation that was also made by Wilén with respect to women in peacekeeping. 88 It was admitted that women were often told by representatives of international organizations and of states that were supporting the negotiation processes, and who were generally considered to be very important linchpins in pushing for the participation of women, 89 'to just talk about one or two women's issues, but [not to] talk about the whole security problem that's out there'. 90 This was considered as 'kind of a burden for most International Affairs 00: 0, 2021 women ... because ... I mean all issues were women's issues . . .'. 91 Furthermore, women are not expected to raise divergent opinions. In contrast, 'internationals have kind of a preconceived idea ... that women are gonna be peace lovers, and they're all gonna come holding hands singing "Kumbaya" ... Which is really harmful to everybody.' 92 It is on the basis of this assumption that international actors seek to organize women's participation in peace processes; and yet, as two interviewees stated with respect to the Syrian case, it is 'very unlikely for women to actually come together across the dividing lines', 93 so that 'putting all of them in the same bag and asking [them] to speak with one voice just because they share the same sex is the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard,' 94 as it ignores not only different political standpoints, but also markers of identity other than gendersuch as those of class, race or religion. 95 In the policy reports, appropriate behaviour in terms of hegemonic femininity is contrasted with, and defined in relation to, subordinate forms of femininity and related behaviour that are considered inappropriate and therefore devalued. Hence, when women do not represent women's groups and do not claim to be advocates of women's issues, the policy reports deemed their behaviour to be deviant. For example, not only is Luz Méndez considered a poster child for hegemonic femininity, in one report her behaviour is also contrasted with that of Raquel Zelaya, a negotiator on behalf of the Guatemalan government. Zelaya, who is said 'not [to] come out of the women's movement', 96 is criticized for not having actively promoted gender equality and women's rights, and for not having had close links to women's civil society groups. 97 According to the policy reports, such deviant behaviour is considered excusable only if it is the result of structural barriers that prevent women from raising women's issues. One such barrier is said to be the participation of women in negotiating delegations other than women's groups. 98 In these cases the women 'are bound to their particular party's interests', 99 and/or might even be included as 'tokens' only. 100 'When women are in such a significant minority in a peace process, it can be difficult to articulate a different set of views from the dominant narrative or to make their voices heard.' 101 In other words, the existing structures can prevent women from performing hegemonic femininity; but if the structures were different and women were given the opportunity and freedom to do International Affairs 00: 0, 2021

The domestic level: silencing and excluding women
While most of the policy reports argue that women's alleged experiences, abilities and links to women's groups make it necessary to include women in peace negotiations, at the same time, nine of these reports cite such factors as the reason for women's marginalization and even exclusion from peace negotiations at the domestic level, a finding that was confirmed in the interviews.
According to those nine reports, the alleged experiences of women that are presented as an asset in peace negotiations in the eyes of international actors become a hindrance for women's participation at the domestic level. Given that women do not represent armed groups per se (although they might be members of such groups), they are 'unlikely to be considered legitimate participants' by the male-dominated domestic negotiating parties, who consider women's experiences during war to be unimportant. 108 Hence, not only their gender but also their status as civilians excludes women from these negotiations. This intersectionality was confirmed in the interviews. For example, one interviewee explained that in the negotiations in which she took part, neither the 'main negotiators' nor the civil servants who were administratively supporting the negotiations saw women 'as serious players'. 109 The civil servants' attitude was: 'They [the women] don't have any arms. So, therefore, minister or ... negotiator, why would you waste your time meeting them?' 110 Overall, while some policy reports praise women's experiences in the private realm, for example as mothers, as beneficial to peace negotiations, 111 interviewees explained that being reduced to their private roles was the very reason why they faced resistance from the male negotiators. 112 Conceiving of women as civilians is linked to the expectation that women will put forward issues such as women's rights, human security or positive peace. Although, according to the policy reports, international actors consider this to be another advantage to including women in peace negotiations, in six reports the domestic actors were said to see it as another reason to marginalize women, because they conceive of such issues as a diversion that will overstretch the agenda or 'derail the entire process'. 113 One interviewee admitted that 'most of the issues specifically in relation to women were seen as, you know, private issues basically', 114 and that she and her female colleagues were told that 'they're not issues for a peace agreement. They're issues that you can actually come back to after we have some sort of settlement.' 115 Another interviewee confirmed that as long as women International Affairs 00: 0, 2021 although even then not necessarily on an equal footing-women must seek to embody a masculine identity. This strategy is exactly the opposite of the WPS agenda's core claim that women should be seen as complementing men's skills and approaches, and that it is women's complementary experiences, skills and social ties that help bring about better peace agreements and more durable peace.

Conclusions
In this article I have presented the concept of hegemonic femininity and argued that its added value is threefold: first, to uncover hierarchical relations between different forms of femininity; second, to identify the form of femininity that is considered superior to others and the basis on which women are policed; and third, to study the effects that embodying hegemonic or subordinate forms of femininity have for those who perform them. Applying the concept to peace negotiations shows that what is considered appropriate behaviour for women, and therefore boosts their position if they perform it, and whether hegemonic femininity trumps hegemonic masculinity or not, depend on the context.
In the case studied here, hegemonic femininity puts women into a trap. It purports to confer power on women if they embrace it, but actually has the opposite effect: it denies these women power. Although hegemonic femininity can be considered superior to hegemonic masculinity-because it is the ideal woman it incorporates that makes peace negotiations successful-it contributes to maintaining the male-dominated global order, because peace negotiations themselves occur within a hierarchy that is gendered. The peace table is a structure that is built on the logic of force. 130 Admission to the body of people round the table is based on having arms and being able to spoil the process, whereas the participation of non-armed actors (women) is at the discretion of the arms-bearers (men). This gives potential (male) spoilers, when sitting at the table, the freedom to say whatever they want, whereas women are confined to meeting the expectations of others. Hegemonic femininity entraps women between the contrasting expectations of what is considered appropriate behaviour at the international and the national levels. If women perform hegemonic femininity, they fulfil the expectations of international actors and gain the latters' support; but their scope of action and capacity for change will be limited and the male-dominated status quo will be maintained. At the same time, performing hegemonic femininity at the national level becomes a reason for women's marginalization in or even exclusion from peace negotiations, because domestic actors tend to expect women to adopt a masculine identity. Thus women not only risk losing the support of the international actors, whose pressure on national actors can be important in ensuring that women can participate in these negotiations in the first place, but they again contribute to reproducing a male-dominated world order.
The authors of the policy reports analysed here seem to be well aware of the different expectations of women's behaviour in peace negotiations at the inter-