Transnational identity and the Gulf crisis: changing narratives of belonging in Qatar


 What does the recent Gulf diplomatic crisis of June 2017 to January 2021 mean for the future of the region's signature transnationalism: the khalījī [Gulf] identity? This identity narrative encompasses the shared sociocultural backgrounds of the people of the region, but the unprecedented separations, caused by the regional crisis, may have shifted the discourse of belonging in the Gulf. To investigate the impact of the recent crisis on regional identity narratives, this article explores the new National Museum of Qatar's presentation of Qatar's political history from 1848 to 1868, as well as museum-goers' reactions to this presentation, through original fieldwork and ethnographic interviews with Qatari and expatriate residents. The analysis highlights the museum's purposeful portrayal of parallels between intra-Gulf conflicts of the past and the recent crisis, a presentational choice that stands in sharp contrast to previous regional norms of tactful diplomacy. Further, museum-goers recognized the linguistic and symbolic parallels, provoking both engagement with and rejection of the concept of khalījī identity. In summary, this analysis suggests that the crisis has shifted the norms of discourse in the region in ways that may make social reconciliation difficult, even as political bonds resume. As the region moves forward from crisis, policy-makers should reduce the tension between national and transnational identity narratives by creating space for the renewal of khalījī ties.

International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 Regional conflicts: the old and the new Most analyses of the establishment of the GCC in 1981 focus on the common security concerns of the six Arab monarchies of the Gulf. 13Major events in the late 1970s and early 1980s-the Iranian Revolution, the siege of the Great Mosque of Mecca, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War-changed the security dynamics of the Gulf region and convinced these monarchies that a communal organization would help 'maintain their grip on power through security and economic means'. 14he monarchies themselves chose to emphasize the unified brotherhood of the Gulf region in the GCC charter.For example, the preamble notes 'the ties of special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam which bind them', and states that the GCC is meant to facilitate 'the path to unity of their States'. 15This rhetoric of brotherly unity may have been used to obscure a conflict-ridden reality.The nineteenth century witnessed frequent territorial encroachments on neighbouring states by Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 16 continuations of which can be seen in the modern period, from fatal skirmishes on the Qatari-Saudi border in 1992, 1993 and 1994, 17 to the internationally mediated conflict (1991-2001) between Bahrain and Qatar over territorial borders. 18Tension and conflict in the Gulf have also been fuelled by nation-building narratives, including national appropriation of Gulf-wide cultural heritage such as camel racing, falconry and pearling. 19The Gulf monarchies have also clashed over the proper place and roles of women in the region, 20 and over hosting rights to prestigious sports events. 21nternational Affairs 97: 4, 2021 These conflicts were rarely discussed in public or highlighted through open antagonism. 22Yet the recent regional conflict of June 2017 to January 2021 has upended the previous pattern of behind-the-scenes diplomacy and face-saving manoeuvres.The public severing of all ties between Qatar and its GCC neighbours came as a surprise to Qatari government officials. 23This stands in sharp contrast to past patterns of GCC diplomacy: even during the 2014 Gulf diplomatic crisis, in which Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recalled their ambassadors from Qatar, lower-level political contact was sustained, along with continuation of economic ties and freedom of regional movement for citizens. 24The scale of the recent crisis brought a new set of challenges and changed realities to the regional scene and to the institution of the GCC in particular. 25hese challenges reverberated across regional economies and societies in unprecedented ways, particularly with regard to the daily social interactions between the peoples of the Gulf states.Not only were direct airline flights between Qatar and its neighbours cancelled, but Qatari citizens found it difficult to obtain entrance visas to these countries. 26Most importantly from a human rights perspective, because of Gulf nationality laws that prohibit dual citizenship and pass citizenship through the father but not the mother, 27 the regional crisis resulted in long-term family separations between husbands and wives, parents and children, and extended family branches, violating 'the right to family life'. 28ashed, a 31-year-old Qatari man, recounted a Bahraini friend's forced separation from his family in Qatar, and his own separation from his Gulf friends: Actually, the day that happened, it was around five or six in the morning.I was driving around with my friends at the Pearl [a luxury residential and commercial island to the north of Doha].One of my Bahraini friends who works in the military was there to visit me.When we found out the news, we went back to my house directly.He got really upset because his family is also from Qatar so he comes here a lot to visit them.Because he is in the military, he had to leave directly.He got a ticket and flew back, and ever since then, it hasn't been the same.It's been over a year and he hasn't gone back to Qatar, not even to see his family.I used to go to the UAE every weekend, sometimes Bahrain, either by car or International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 plane.I remember once, I went to Saudi Arabia just for lunch for bukhari [a type of rice] and they have the best kind.I have friends in all of the three countries, and I can't see any of them.The prices of flights also became insane.[Pause.]It affected me in so many ways. 29e khalījī people also found it difficult to communicate openly during the crisis: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE interpreted their media laws to forbid criticism of their governmental actions in the crisis and to make public expressions of support for Qatar punishable with fines and time in jail. 30Amnesty International quoted one Qatari woman, separated from her Emirati husband and four children, as saying: 'When we get through, we are very careful as to what we say, only speak about how much we miss each other and hope that the crisis is resolved, nothing else.' 31 Despite the tensions, some families quietly planned get-togethers in one of the two neutral Gulf countries, Kuwait and Oman.Yet other individuals found that the forced separation, and the accompanying feelings of jingoism and suspicion, drove their families apart.

(Trans)nationalism in the Gulf
How did this public conflict affect the salience of transnational identity in the Gulf ?With four of the six Gulf Arab monarchies waiting until 1971 to solidify their independence and sovereign borders, 32 transnational identities have always been important in the region. 33While these cross-border identities may take many forms, including Arabism, tribalism and sectarianism, 34 this article focuses on the salience of the khalījī identity in the context of the recent Gulf crisis.
Scholars agree that the notion of the khalīj was a political construct introduced for strategic reasons by the Gulf rulers in the early 1980s alongside the development of the GCC, but they differ on whether this identity has been internalized by the people of the Gulf.On the one hand, Partrick argues that the existing sense of a 'Gulf personality, i.e. common cultural traits', is not the same as a deeply felt 'Gulf identity'. 35Legrenzi disagrees, arguing that 'the notion of a "GCC" popular identity ... is working its way into the political and economic landscape of the six Gulf monarchies'. 36For their part, Barnett and Gause emphasize the unintended societal consequences of the creation of the GCC: indications have grown that increasing numbers of citizens of these states see themselves as having common interests and a common identity as 'khalijiin' (literally, 'residents of the Gulf '). 37 Regional socio-economic developments across various arenas have indeed helped to construct and solidify the 'common interests and ... common identity' of the khalīj.Recordings from as early as 1904 document the 'shared musical heritage' of the Gulf. 38Beginning in the 1990s, regional satellite media organizations such as Al Jazeera (Qatar), Al Arabiya (Dubai) and MBC (Saudi Arabia) brought Gulf Arabs 'together in real time and in a common language alongside intense images and a shared political discourse'. 39With the rise of the internet, there is now a defined Gulf Arab social media scene, with regionally recognized social media influencers. 40Scholars have tracked the development of a khalījī 'capitalist class', 41 khalījī literature, 42 a khalījī 'sports culture', 43 and even a khalījī 'animalscape' of cultural icons such as falcons. 44he extant literature on the salience of the khalījī identity aligns with Koch's argument that state-based nationalisms and khalījī transnationalism exist side by side in the Arab monarchies of the Gulf.She writes that 'the supranational identity narrative remains important in how Gulf nationals imagine themselves as sharing a commonality with their neighbours, [even as] the governments have overseen the development of strong, state-based nationalisms since independence'. 45hus, irrespective of the corporate beginnings or ideological flimsiness of the concept of the khalīj, the shared sense of khalījī identity was nevertheless strong enough to create feelings of shock and betrayal at the onset of the regional crisis among our interlocutors in Qatar, whether citizens or expatriates.Khaled, a 34-year-old Qatari man, stated: 'If you want to attack someone, attack them under sunlight, at noon, "face to face".But to do it in the middle of the night, while people are sleeping, and do something of this atrocity, it's utter betrayal.' 46xpatriates agreed.Mona, a 40-year-old Lebanese woman, said: 'It was a shock.I felt shocked ... It is still a shock.I cannot believe that family can do this to each International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 other.' 47 Likewise, Ameen, a 20-year-old Sudanese man who was born and raised in Qatar, explained his reaction: I was really sad and disappointed.I mean, you know it wasn't, 'Egypt has cut ties with Qatar', or Sudan, or any other country.It was the Gulf, your neighbouring countries cutting ties with you.And it was done in an instant.I say it's sad and disappointing because the GCC is one, so it was like a brother cutting ties with a brother, and that is what I felt. 48me Qataris indicated that the extent of the crisis made them question whether the khalījī identity remains a relevant concept.Mitchell and Allagui quote Abdelkarim, a 25-year-old Qatari man, who directly criticized the transnational khalījī identity: As khalījī we have something we call al-bayt al-khalīj [the Gulf house] because we are all related to one another, and I have a lot of relatives in the UAE, as well as some in-laws in Bahrain.It became a pain trying to communicate with them.Some of them even turned against us.Some of them don't even care.So, where is the Gulf house now? 49 Mitchell and Allagui argue that this insight highlights 'how political crisis can cause rupture as well as belonging, as the imagined khalījī community becomes less salient to the Qatari nationalist narrative'. 50It is within this 'shifting space of nationalist narratives' that this article now turns to an analysis of the new National Museum of Qatar. 51Within this context of regional crisis and disruption of transnational identity narratives, how does the museum portray relations between the Gulf countries?And how have museum-goers, both citizens and expatriates, responded to these narratives?

Methodology and case-study: the National Museum of Qatar
To investigate these questions, this article draws on original fieldwork conducted in Doha, including nine separate museum visits by the author; conversations with museum curators, consultants and academics; 32 ethnographic interviews with Qatari and expatriate residents on post-blockade nationalism (conducted between March and September 2018); and 23 ethnographic interviews with museum-goers (conducted between March and May 2019).The museum, developed under the auspices of Qatar Museums, 52 can be read as a state-approved narrative of the Qatari nation.My focus here, however, is not on the intentions of the planners so much as on the responses of the museum-goers.To modify an old adage, if a national narrative appears in a museum, but no one understands it, does it make a difference?This article highlights the ways in which the museum's narrative International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 both engages with the concept of khalījī identity and provokes responses among its audience.
The two sets of ethnographic interviews followed Bernard's guidelines on conducting semi-structured interviews. 53All interviews were conducted face to face or through mobile communications, in the interlocutor's language of choice. 54The 55 interviewees comprised 31 citizens and 24 expatriates; 37 were male and 18 female, and their ages ranged from 18 to 49 years.To protect privacy, identifying details were removed during the translation and transcription process; and, as noted above, pseudonyms are used where interviews are cited.As some of the respondents were selected on grounds of convenience, this article's findings do not claim to be representative but rather contextual, serving as a foundation for further exploration of the theme of transnational identity in times of crisis.
Why focus on the national museum?Museums are crucial tools of nationbuilding; as Levitt notes, 'ever since France's new leaders opened the doors of the Louvre to the public in 1793, museums have played a starring role in producing and representing the nation'. 55Anderson includes the museum in his 'three institutions of power' (along with the census and the map) that profoundly shape the way the 'state imagined its dominion-the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry'. 56In this 'formation of a new identity', the history that is forgotten-deliberately omitted-is as important an area of focus as that which is publicly remembered. 57In sum, 'museums, and the museumizing imagination, are both profoundly political'. 58he Arab monarchies of the Gulf have long been aware of the political usefulness of national identity, and for decades have invested heavily in museums and other heritage projects to reshape their cultural, historical and religious narratives in ways that promote their preferred social and political goals. 59Qatar is no exception; as Crystal notes, despite the multiple and pressing needs of the newly independent and rapidly modernizing state, Qatar opened its national museum within five years of its formal independence. 60Yet over the following years, Qatar's original national museum came to be overshadowed by the rising Doha skyline and the opening of prestigious showcase museums such as the Museum International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 of Islamic Art, designed by I. M. Pei.Beginning in 2007, Qatar's leadership, through Qatar Museums, commenced the reconstruction of its national museum and, concurrently, the reimagination of its national identity. 61After more than a decade of construction, the new National Museum of Qatar finally opened on 27 March 2019.
The new museum has received much attention for Jean Nouvel's innovative 'desert rose' architectural design, 62 a sprawling complex of interlocking discs intended to resemble the crystalline formations of calcium sulphate that can be found just beneath the surface of inland salt flats in Qatar. 63My focus in this article, however, is on the interior of the museum, specifically its intentional choices of content and narration.
The museum interior guides its visitors on a 1.5-kilometre walk-through of eleven permanent gallery spaces and one temporary exhibition space.The building itself curves around an open-air courtyard, and the exit connects back to the entrance after the visitor wanders through the renovated palace grounds of Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani (r.1913-49), part of the original National Museum complex.The eleven permanent galleries are organized around three themes, referred to by the museum as 'chapters': beginnings; life in Qatar; and the modern history of Qatar.All of these galleries contain intriguing messages about Qatar's modern nation-building narrative, supported by beautifully displayed artefacts and dioramas, subtitled oral history videos, electronic podiums with interactive information and archival materials, dedicated children's spaces, and clearly written captions in Arabic and English.Among the unique aspects of the museum are the commissioned 'art films': floor-to-ceiling, wall-to-wall moving images that are meant to immerse museum-goers visually in a cinematic experience in each gallery.Figure 1 (overleaf ) gives a sense of how the gallery's walls are used for visual effect.
This article explores the 'Modern history of Qatar' chapter, which introduces the political history and socio-economic growth of Qatar from the 1500s to the present day, with a particular focus on the textual depiction of Qatar's political history from 1848 to 1868.two sides agreed to a peace treaty, forming an alliance to end Al Khalifa interference.This provoked the rulers of Bahrain, who allied with Abu Dhabi and blockaded Qatar.However, they feared the Qatar-Saudi alliance and backed down, agreeing to allow Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani to collect the tribute of Qatar.66This panel's concise summary of the 1851 conflict conveys several powerful points to its audience.Museum-goers come away with the idea that Qatar has been beset by its regional neighbours for nearly 200 years-making the recent conflict less of a surprise in this context.This text also makes it clear that Bahrain and the UAE (through its capital, Abu Dhabi) have long had an alliance in the Gulf and have used their alliance as a basis for aggression against Qatar.
Finally, the presence of the word 'blockade' is not accidental.The term 'blockade'-in Arabic, ḥiṣār-is Qatar's preferred word for the recent Gulf crisis, as seen in the prevalence of the term in Al Jazeera media articles, Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and even the 'blockade' library guide at the Qatar National Library. 67There are other Arabic words that could be used to characterize this conflict, and indeed, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE preferred to describe it in their official communications as a 'boycott', a 'cutting of ties' or 'the Qatar crisis'. 68The word 'blockade' in the museum (both in English on the left side of the panel and in Arabic on the right) avoids the use of synonyms or euphemisms that would soften the bluntness of the term, and instead intentionally evokes a connection to the recent conflict.
As discussed in the previous section on transnationalism in the Gulf, feelings of shock and betrayal have been an important part of the Qatari narrative of the recent Gulf crisis.It is interesting to note, in the concise summaries of the historical events between 1848 and 1868, whose feelings of betrayal are recognized and whose are not.Mariam Al-Hammadi, professor of history at Qatar University, notes that the panel on the 1851 Battle of Mesaimeer omits the background that explains why Bahrain was so 'provoked' by the Qatar-Saudi peace treaty.Before this treaty, Qatar and Bahrain were allied against the Second Saudi State and working together to prevent Saudi territorial encroachment.Thus, Qatar's abrupt decision to ally with the Saudi State, against 'Al Khalifa interference', was perceived by Bahrain as a surprising act of betrayal. 69Yet while Bahrain's feelings of betrayal are not acknowledged in the museum's summary of the 1851 conflict, Qatar's feelings of betrayal are certainly International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 acknowledged in a subsequent series of captions that describe a serious conflict between Bahrain and Qatar in 1867 and 1868.
The first three panels describe the deterioration of relations between Bahrain and Qatar in 1867, capped by a betrayal of trust that leads to the capture of Sheikh Jassim and the destruction of both Doha and Al Wakrah, as follows:

1867: Al Wakrah incidents
Tensions between Qatar and the rulers of Bahrain continued for many years as Bahrain continued to try and control Qatar.In 1867, the people of Al Wakrah, supported by Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani, attacked the deputy governor of Bahrain and forced him out of Al Wakrah.

1867: Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani captured
The ruler of Bahrain sent an invitation to Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani, urging him to continue his yearly visits to Bahrain despite the ongoing conflict.When Sheikh Jassim went to Bahrain, he was captured and imprisoned.This incident was documented in poetry written by Sheikh Jassim.

1867: The second destruction of Doha
After Bahrain captured Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani, they wanted to demonstrate their strength in Qatar.The ruler of Bahrain, supported by the ruler of Abu Dhabi, destroyed Doha and Al Wakrah in 1867.
While the Qatari people are portrayed as ousting the Bahraini presence in Al Wakrah in a justified act of independence against foreign interference, Bahrain's ruler is portrayed as a wicked and untrustworthy entity who lured Sheikh Jassim to his territory only to capture and imprison him.The Bahraini ruler's subsequent decision to ally himself with Abu Dhabi's ruler and 'demonstrate their strength' by destroying two towns is further proof of the misguided leadership of these two neighbours.Here, the museum is telling history in such a way as to evoke feelings of shock and betrayal among visitors.
In addition, these three panels emphasize the differences between the actions of the various states, depending on who is acting on behalf of each political entity.In the three 1867 panels, the captions ascribe agency to the rulers of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, a pattern also seen in the 1851 panel, in which specific leaders of the Second Saudi State and Bahrain chose aggression against Qatar.In contrast to the agency of the 'rulers' in neighbouring states, the first 1867 caption makes it clear that the Qatari rebellion against Bahrain was a bottom-up effort by 'the people of Al Wakrah', and that Sheikh Jassim 'supported' the people in their efforts but was not the primary instigator of conflict.So while in 1867 Bahrain's and Abu Dhabi's actions are ascribed to their rulers, Qatar's actions are described as a unified, grassroots effort, led by the people with support from their leadership.This theme continues in the panels that conclude the account of hostilities between Qatar and Bahrain from 1867 to 1868: Thani.A bloody battle took place against the Bahraini forces.The Qataris were defeated, and many were killed.

1868: Battle of Jebel Wakrah
Following their defeat at the Battle of Damsah, the Qataris withdrew.The Bahrainis pursued them to Al Wakrah.Here, the Qataris made a stand, surrounding the Bahraini forces and capturing two leaders.After the battle, both sides agreed to an exchange of prisoners, and Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani returned to Doha.Despite the cruelty of these events, they brought the people of Qatar together, and paved the way for Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani's future leadership.
In this retelling of the historical narrative, the museum appears to be deliberately emphasizing particular themes that would resonate with a Qatari audience during the recent crisis, including regional aggressors attacking the Qatari leadership, 'all' the Qatari people rising to defend the leadership in response, and the idea that a unified Qatar will prevail, despite the odds, in the fight against injustice and cruelty.Through a historical narrative that highlights parallels with the recent conflict, the museum evokes corresponding feelings of betrayal and empathy.In many ways, the museum's narrative is using the museum-goers' familiarity with the khalījī identity to create the desired response of both astonishment and an increased historical understanding that present-day events are a continuation of past patterns.
Before turning to the responses of museum-goers to these historical narratives, it is important to emphasize the relative bluntness of these panel captions when discussing sensitive historical conflicts.According to Al-Hammadi, the original National Museum did not include mention of any of these regional conflicts. 70Some of our interlocutors expressed surprise at the way these sensitive topics were now openly discussed in the new museum, with the rulers and entities associated with various conflicts explicitly named.As Nora, a 29-year-old Qatari woman, commented: 'The information and wording of sensitive topics ... was written in a more honest tone that we did not know of before.' 71 This newfound honesty was attributed to the recent crisis.Fatima, a 22-year-old Qatari woman, admitted: I was surprised to see that there were some mentions of controversial historical events that took place between the monarchies in the Gulf, such as the conflicts between the Al Thanis of Qatar, Sheikh Zayed in Abu Dhabi, and Al Khalifa in Bahrain.I do not think they would have included this bit had the blockade not taken place. 72nternational Affairs 97: 4, 2021 and educated and kept whatever was related to the history of the GCC without neglecting it.It was part of our history and, yeah, I don't think they were biased. 73e decision of the new museum to portray these conflicts so directly, and the acknowledgement of interviewees that this choice might be justified, speaks to the changing diplomatic norms arising from the regional crisis.
The portrayal of historical conflict: museum-goers' responses and suggestions Given the museum's expansive footprint of galleries, an old palace, and multiple cafés, gift shops and outdoor spaces, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see 'everything' the first time one visits the new National Museum of Qatar.Many of our interlocutors noted their inability to respond to the museum in full; many of them had visited only once, and owing to crowds or time constraints were often unable to look at every aspect in detail.Nevertheless, many of them noticed that the new national museum highlighted historical conflicts between Qatar and its regional neighbours.Many commented that they had learned for the first time that tensions between Qatar on the one hand and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other were part of a larger historical pattern stretching over the centuries.Oryx, a 38-year-old South African man who has lived in Qatar for eleven years, said that he had 'absolutely' learned something new by visiting the museum: 'The conflict of the neighbours is very deep-seated and goes back very far.It didn't happen overnight, you know.I already knew that, but when I started reading the timeline, I realized how far back this actually went.'74Qataris expressed similar realizations.Nora described how the information presented by the museum on these historical conflicts had changed her perceptions of both the region and the present-day crisis: It [the museum] showed how we, the people of Doha, faced attacks from Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, which destroyed Al Wakrah and Doha.This was new information for me, which was explained in great detail, like I had always heard of it but never really saw it in the previous museum before ... The part about the bloody history of the GCC with Qatar was very interesting to see, because I did not know of it before, and I did not expect to see it so boldly displayed in our national museum.All our lives, we have been living under the impression that they were our neighbours and our brothers that we shared a history with.And that the conflict that arose only came to be in the last twenty years.But the story turned out to be much different, and the situation was bigger than we thought.The conflict is much deeper than we thought and not just between the royal families of the Gulf and that's it.The attack was clearly aimed against Qatar and its people. 75hers commented specifically on the parallels between the 'blockade' of the past and the recent crisis, demonstrating that they noticed the purposeful use of this term.Sandarin, a 49-year-old French woman who has lived in Qatar for one year, noted: 'I learned a few things, like, for instance, this gallery where you have 943 International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 a bit of the history of Qatar, that there was already a blockade in Qatar, which I did not know.'76And Sabicha, a 20-year-old Qatari woman, explained further: There were several things [I learned] but I think [pause] what really, really had an impact on me was truly, truly learning about how Qatar developed and how, like [pause] like learning about previous blockades and such stuff, and how we managed to create this country.I never knew that we had two like, not wars but, like, conflicts with Bahrain, and I never knew that Saudi Arabia was on our side, so this really had an impact on me to understand, like, how things are today. 77r many museum-goers, the use of the term 'blockade' to discuss historical conflicts in the region helped them connect the recent experience to a pattern of behaviour between Qatar and its neighbours.As Sara, a 22-year-old Qatari woman, noted: 'The blockade, it is part of the story.'78

Conclusion
This article began with the assumption-based on the development of the new National Museum of Qatar by Qatar Museums, an entity headed by the Amir's sister and seen as part of the cultural arm of the Qatari government-that the contents of the museum, and especially its portrayals of transnational relationships between the Gulf countries between 1848 and 1868, have been carefully chosen, along with the words, examples and messages used to describe them.The panel captions discussed in this article describe themes of cruelty and aggression perpetrated by misguided external rulers, and the unity of Qataris in their attempts to secure independence and justice for themselves and their leaders, despite hardship and betrayal.These historical conflicts have obvious parallels to Qatar's narrative of the recent Gulf crisis of June 2017 to January 2021, including the purposeful use of the word ḥiṣār [blockade], and these parallels are recognized by Qatari citizens and expatriate residents alike.
What, then, does the National Museum's portrayal of the khalīj mean for the continued salience of this transnational identity in the aftermath of regional crisis?On the one hand, the projection of khalījī 'unity' is certainly questioned, if not dismissed outright, through the museum's narrative of the conflict-ridden political history of the Gulf region.The bluntly portrayed historical facts, in and of themselves, are also indicative of a new pattern of discourse in which the national museum now includes political disputes in its displays and narratives for public discussion.The recent Gulf crisis has shifted the norms of discourse to allow for the public airing of sensitive histories and political differences in a much more open manner than previously.
Yet it is also important to recognize the distinction between 'misguided' rulers and 'brotherly' peoples that the museum has purposely created with its narratives of agency.Throughout the historical disputes, the focus is consistently on the International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 aggressive actions of the 'state' or the 'ruler' of Bahrain, Saudi or Abu Dhabi, but never on the Bahraini, Saudi or Emirati people.The only people with agency are the Qatari people, who unify to fight against these states or rulers.The distinction between leadership and people is an important-perhaps crucial-one, as it creates the necessary space for reconciliation and renewal of khalījī ties, once the misguided leaders reconsider their actions.
The implicit message that the people are not to blame for the unwise decisions of their leaders resonates strongly with people throughout the region, especially those who were separated from their families and friends during the recent crisis.Abdullah, a 33-year-old Qatari man, recounted his experience in Saudi Arabia on the day that the crisis began: I was in Madina El Monawara [in Saudi Arabia] at that time.That is when I got a message from one of my friends.I did not believe it at the beginning, and I was shocked and sad because of what happened between us and our neighbours in other GCC countries ... They [the Saudis] were very respectful and nice to me, and, even in the airport, they said to me that 'you are our brothers and our beloved ones'.Their reaction made me hope that the crisis would end in just a few days. 79ories like Abdullah's support the conclusion reached in the extensive scholarly literature that the khalījī identity was indeed strongly felt among the peoples of the Gulf.In fact, the museum seems to be counting on its audience's familiarity with the khalīj to create feelings of shock and betrayal in response to the museum's historical narratives, on the one hand, as well as to create the space for expressions of brotherly love to become the norm in the Gulf region once again, on the other.
The immediate reaction of the khalījī people to the Al-Ula reconciliation agreement in January 2021-as captured on social media-indicated that the reunification of families across the Gulf was cause for intense celebration. 80Yet 'deep skepticism among Gulf Arab citizens' remains, owing to the 'painful' fraying of social ties. 81As one Qatari citizen, Ajayan al-Hebabi, told Al Jazeera: 'I was happy to hear [about the reconciliation] but I worry because of the trust ... the trust is not there anymore.' 82 While the Al-Ula agreement resolves diplomatic, economic and legal issues between the countries, the social consequences of the blockade will take longer to resolve. 83In the end, despite government proclamations that the reconciliation 'strengthens the bonds of friendship and brotherhood between peoples', 84 this unprecedented conflict may have deeply engraved new historical captions that will change the nature of khalījī transnationalism as the region moves forward.

Figure 1 :
Figure 1: The cinema-scape of Gallery 2: Qatar's natural environments 1867: Battle of DamsahAll the Qatari tribes rallied in a campaign to liberate Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/4/929/6314271 by guest on 31 July 2021 International Affairs 97: 4, 2021 64 61 Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, 'We're all Qataris here: the nation-building narrative of the National Museum of Qatar', in Erskine-Loftus et al., eds, Representing the nation, pp.59-72. 62Alexandra Bounia, 'The desert rose as a new symbol for the nation: materiality, heritage and the architecture of the new National Museum of Qatar', Heritage and Society 11: 3, 2018, pp.219-22; Suzi Mirgani, 'Consumer citizenship: national identity and museum merchandise in Qatar', Middle East Journal 73: 4, 2019, pp.563-4. 63While most of our interlocutors expressed enthusiasm for the architecture of the new museum, Layla, a 36-year-old Qatari woman who has fond memories of the original National Museum, questioned the authenticity of the desert rose design: 'The fact is that I, as a Qatari, I've never-and I've lived here all my life-I've never heard of this desert rose until it was announced as the design of the new museum, and I asked everyone around me about this desert rose, and they're Qataris and they've lived in the desert, and they have no clue what it is [laughs].'Personal interview, Doha, 6 May 2019. 64Three of the four galleries in this chapter were open at the time of writing; the final gallery, 'Qatar today', which covers the reign of the current amir, including the blockade, opened in December 2019.The shutdown of the museum in March 2020 owing to COVID-19 has delayed further research on the general public's perceptions of this gallery.Accordingly, this article focuses on the museum's presentation of the political history of Qatar from 1848 to 1868, and public reactions to this presentation, leaving the analysis of the presentation of modern events for future work.