New Zealand's ‘Maori foreign policy’ and China: a case of instrumental relationality?

Abstract

In 2021, Aotearoa New Zealand's Foreign Minister, Nanaia Mahuta, sketched out a kaupapa Māori (collective Māori vision) foreign policy for New Zealand based on four tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours): manaakitanga (hospitality), whanaungatanga (connectedness), mahi tahi and kotahitanga (unity through collaboration), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship and the protection of intergenerational wellbeing). This article makes a novel contribution to the global International Relations body of literature by questioning to what extent New Zealand's ‘Māori foreign policy’ has been applied to its relationship with China. Through assessing the communications of Mahuta and other officials, it is found that New Zealand is utilizing a kaupapa Māori framework towards China: ‘the taniwha and the dragon’. It is argued that New Zealand is attempting to consolidate the maturity of the Sino-New Zealand relationship, as well as differentiate itself from the other Anglosphere countries that have recently pushed back on China. In doing so, not only is New Zealand something of an outlier, it is demonstrating how eschewing a western-centric understanding of foreign policy for a more relational view based on indigenous knowledge and perspectives (in this case, from te ao Māori: the Māori worldview) can be applied at a time of increasing great power competition.

Foreign policy-making in Aotearoa New Zealand (henceforth: New Zealand) has come under significant pressure in recent years, particularly as the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region has become more testing due to the ongoing deterioration of the Sino-American relationship. New Zealand's predicament is that while it has strong hard security links with the United States, China is easily its most important trading partner. Unlike Australia, which has taken a conventional balancing approach by deepening ties with the US at the expense of its relationship with China, New Zealand has chosen a more ambitious and independent option of attempting to maintain good relationships with all. A key aspect of this choice has been New Zealand's decision, since 2021, to embrace kaupapa Māori (collective Māori vision) foreign policy for New Zealand guided by tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours)—what this article terms a ‘Māori foreign policy’.

New Zealand's relationship with China undoubtedly presents the biggest area of potential uncertainty for foreign policy-makers in Wellington. New Zealand's dependence on China as an export market (the latter taking around 28 per cent of total exports from New Zealand), coupled with its relatively high external trade-to-GDP ratio (around 49 per cent),¹ has left it vulnerable to any potential disruptions in its relationship with China, as have been experienced in recent years by Australia, for example. While New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn has the Pacific as its focal point, the relationship with China has also come under this umbrella. Using the Indigenous allegory of ‘the taniwha and the dragon’, New Zealand has sought to solidify the relationship as being a mature one where differences of opinion can be respected. Furthermore, it is argued that by embracing a kaupapa Māori foreign policy, New Zealand is attempting to differentiate itself from the other Anglosphere countries in its relationship with China and, in doing so, is exhibiting a relational view of international relations.²

This article adopts the global International Relations (global IR) aim of seeking ‘new understandings and approaches to the study of world politics’³ by examining the increasing influence of tikanga Māori on New Zealand's foreign policy-making. The article is developed in four sections. The first section examines New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn by dissecting Nanaia Mahuta's inaugural speech as minister of foreign affairs of New Zealand. It also engages with a comparison with Sweden's ‘feminist foreign policy’ turn. The second section looks more closely at New Zealand's relationship with China in light of the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. The Sixth Labour Government's China strategy and the shrinking options for New Zealand, in terms of the near future, are weighed. The third section assesses how New Zealand has attempted to tailor its Māori foreign policy to China with an examination of the ‘taniwha and dragon’ framework. Lastly, after identifying that Māori ontology is fundamentally relational, a case for New Zealand's Māori foreign policy as an instrumental use of relationality is made by engaging with the relationality IR literature. Ultimately, New Zealand is demonstrating how a non-western-centric foreign policy—although still in its relative infancy and facing potential future hurdles—can be applied at a time of increasing great power rivalry and competition, when most other states, and in particular the US and Australia, are seemingly beginning to embrace older Cold-War style modes of operation.

New Zealand's ‘Maori foreign policy’ turn?

Since the commencement of Jacinda Ardern's second term as prime minister, which began in late 2020 after Labour's victory in the 2020 New Zealand general election, the aim and scope of New Zealand's foreign policy has become a particularly important issue. New Zealand is facing an increasingly challenging geopolitical setting brought about by the rise of China and the subsequent pushback by the US and its allies, especially Australia and the UK.⁴ Furthermore, the country has had to grapple with the global challenges brought about by the COVID–19 pandemic and the longer-term issue of climate change, particularly in the Pacific. Arguably, New Zealand is at a critical juncture in its foreign policy-making as it seeks to navigate these challenges. One of the most important drivers of New Zealand's evolving approach to foreign policy is Minister of Foreign Affairs Nanaia Mahuta, who took office in 2020. Mahuta has the distinction of not only being New Zealand's first female foreign minister but also the first female Māori foreign minister. Incidentally, while New Zealand previously had a Māori minister of foreign affairs in Winston Peters (who held this office in 2005–08 and in 2017–20), he had downplayed his whakapapa Māori (Māori genealogy) in his political career (particularly in the later years).⁵ Mahuta, on the other hand, is someone who has long embraced her whakapapa Māori, notably displaying a moko kauae tattoo on her face.⁶

Mahuta's inaugural speech as foreign minister in 2021 offered a clear blueprint for what a revamped New Zealand foreign policy might look like. Notably, this speech took place at Waitangi, the home of te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi, hereafter known as te Tiriti)—a core foundational document of the New Zealand ‘nation’.⁷ As Mahuta stated, Waitangi represents ‘the recognized birthplace of Aotearoa New Zealand’. In her speech, Mahuta clearly articulated a desire to bring tikanga Māori to the fore of New Zealand foreign policy, stating that ‘the principles of partnership and mutual respect embodied in the Treaty provide the foundation for how New Zealand conducts its foreign policy today’.⁸

Mahuta identified four key tikanga Māori that she deemed crucial to underlying the values-based approach she intended to take in directing New Zealand's foreign policy: manaakitanga; whanaungatanga; mahi tahi and kotahitanga; and kaitiakitanga.⁹ These are explained below.

• Manaakitanga is the Māori concept of hospitality. Manaakitanga is regarded as a ‘core Māori value’ which combines the root word mana (power, prestige or authority) with aki (‘reciprocal action’).¹⁰ In terms of guiding basic intergroup interaction, manaakitanga involves ‘pōwhiri (welcoming ceremonies) and a meal shared between tangata whenua (people of the land) and manuhiri (guests) on the marae’¹¹—the latter meaning a communal meeting place. In the foreign policy context, Mahuta cited the value of manaakitanga as signifying ‘kindness or the reciprocity of goodwill’.¹²

• Whanaungatanga is the Māori word for kinship. Whanaungatanga is an emphasis on ‘establishing extended family-like relationships’ based on values such as ‘warm interpersonal interactions, group solidarity [and] shared responsibility for one another’, among others.¹³ In the foreign policy context, Mahuta delineated whanaungatanga as an acknowledgement of ‘connectedness or shared sense of humanity’.¹⁴

• Mahi tahi is the Māori phrase for collaboration, while kotahitanga is the Māori word for unity. Unity built off collaboration is seen as a fundamental aspect of Māori culture.¹⁵ At various points, kotahitanga has been used in the naming of political movements (such as in the late 1890s and 1980s) that have sought to give Māori a stronger voice in New Zealand.¹⁶ In the foreign policy context, Mahuta identified mahi tahi and kotahitanga as the values of ‘collective benefits and shared aspiration’.¹⁷

• Lastly, Kaitiakitanga is the Māori word for guardianship or stewardship. In the foreign policy context, Mahuta outlined kaitiakitanga as an acknowledgement of New Zealand as the ‘protectors and stewards of our intergenerational wellbeing’. Intergenerational wellbeing is central to te ao Māori (the Māori world-view), as ‘Māori view themselves as only the current holders of taonga [the material world] received from their ancestors, with a duty to protect and eventually pass the knowledge on to the next generation’.¹⁸  Kaitiakitanga also stems from a belief that humans are part of the natural world.¹⁹

In concluding her outline of the key tikanga of New Zealand's foreign policy, Mahuta stated that ‘our lived experience, our values, our deep conviction of what we stand for as a nation means that we will stand for what we believe is in our interest, unafraid to hold our course when the tide turns to navigate towards our destination’.²⁰ Indeed, such a stance evokes New Zealand's so-called ‘independent foreign policy’ which has long been a cornerstone of the country's strategic culture, even if, much like the idea of American isolationism, it has not been consistently adhered to. However, rather than naive idealism, McKinnon argues that New Zealand's insistence on pursuing an independent foreign policy was a product of interplaying dissent and interest born from an overarching fear ‘of the country's external relations being dominated by power considerations’.²¹ And although New Zealand had to accept the reality of power after the backlash it suffered in the wake of Prime Minister David Lange's decision in 1985 to ban US nuclear-powered ships from entering New Zealand's waters, its role identity of being an independent international actor became embedded in its strategic culture.²² Incidentally, in her articulation of New Zealand's independent foreign policy in 2022, Ardern cited te Tiriti as an important aspect of what makes New Zealand independent.²³

Mahuta's inaugural speech elicited significant media and scholarly coverage, and her appointment has been seen by some as the start of a shift on the part of the New Zealand government to adopting a Māori foreign policy.²⁴ Blackwell situated Mahuta's appointment within a broader ‘Indigenous foreign policy’²⁵ discourse, stating: ‘Not only did her appointment break barriers for Indigenous women in international affairs, she has also begun to outline a stunning example of what an Indigenous foreign policy approach can look like.’ Blackwell went on to call this ‘foreign policy's ‘Indigenous moment’.²⁶

However, rather than representing a revolution, New Zealand's recent experimentation with a Māori foreign policy is more evolutionary, as it is the product of significant changes domestically in New Zealand over the last few decades. Notably, there has been a clear deepening of te Tiriti in New Zealand's governance, making it a social contract of far-reaching ‘political and jurisprudential significance’.²⁷ Whether increased adherence to the principles of te Tiriti sufficiently provides rangatiratanga (Māori self-determination), as laid out in the Māori language version of the Treaty, is debatable. But, at the very least, recent trends portend ‘loftier nation-building outcomes’, such as becoming a ‘truly post-colonial government’.²⁸ More recently, beyond the confines of te Tiriti (which is, after all, a bicultural document), there has been an increasing embrace of te ao Māori perspectives as regards governance and public policy.²⁹ Evidence of this can be found in the proliferation of kaupapa Māori frameworks to guide policy-making at all levels, from local-level councils to national ministries such as the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment and the Ministry of Social Development.

Mahuta's Māori foreign policy framework should be seen within this broader evolution. Although Mahuta's speech signalled the first instance of a New Zealand foreign minister openly espousing a Māori foreign policy framework to guide New Zealand's international actions, Māori interests have been a part of New Zealand's foreign policy-making for some time. One clear example of this has been the insistence on the inclusion of a ‘Treaty of Waitangi exception clause’ in any free-trade agreement (FTA) signed by New Zealand with another country, in order to protect the ‘government's ability to adopt policies that fulfil its obligations to Māori’.³⁰ Starting with the FTA that New Zealand signed with Singapore in 2001, te Tiriti exception clauses have been part of all its FTAs, including the FTA with China (2008), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (2018), and the FTAs with the UK and EU (both concluded in 2022, but only the UK one is in force as of writing).³¹

Another area where New Zealand has demonstrated elements of a Māori foreign policy over the past few years is in its international advocacy of Indigenous rights. Although New Zealand's track record in its engagement with Māori is peppered with instances of colonial exploitation and ongoing inequalities,³² internationally, New Zealand's more recent engagement with its Māori population is often seen as a template for other countries to follow.³³ In the 2013 agreement on economic cooperation between New Zealand and Taiwan, a specific chapter on ‘Cooperation on Indigenous issues’ was included.³⁴ More recently, the New Zealand government has signed Indigenous collaboration arrangements (ICAs) with the governments of Australia (2020) and Canada (2022).³⁵ ICAs focus on collaboration on social, cultural, economic and political themes, with the aim of creating a relationship bridge between Māori and the Indigenous peoples of Australia and Canada.

New Zealand's putative steps to formalize its ‘Māori foreign policy’ evoke a comparison with Sweden, which formally adopted an explicitly ‘feminist foreign policy’ in 2014.³⁶ Although there are significant differences between gender and indigeneity, such foreign policy ‘turns’ should be viewed as a conscious effort to adopt (as Mahuta explicitly stated) a more values-based approach in foreign policy-making. Like Mahuta's outlining of four key tikanga Māori for New Zealand's foreign policy, the Swedish government identified the ‘three Rs’ of ‘Rights, Representation and Resources’ as being central to Sweden's feminist foreign policy.³⁷ However, the Swedish experience suggests that New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn is likely to encounter significant challenges when put into practice.

While Sweden had some initial success in pursuing a feminist foreign policy—notably revoking a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation between Sweden and Saudi Arabia in 2015 due to alleged human rights abuses in the latter state—achieving consistency in its application was to prove a difficult endeavour.³⁸ In addition, domestic criticism of the approach grew louder. In October 2022, after a new centre-right coalition came to power in Sweden, the policy was officially brought to an end. The new foreign minister, Tobias Billström, stated: ‘[We're] not going to use the expression “feminist foreign policy” because labels on things have a tendency to cover up the content’.³⁹

The Swedish experience raises significant questions as to whether New Zealand's nascent Māori foreign policy turn will survive beyond Mahuta and the Labour government. Is Mahuta (like former Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström, who launched her government's feminist foreign policy) pushing a framework that is close to her heart but perhaps lacks wider resonance to survive beyond her tenure? Obviously, such questions are hard to answer. New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn should be seen not as ephemeral, although the potential for it to recede post-Mahuta is real. The elevation of te Tiriti in New Zealand's governance and the increasing embrace of te ao Māori perspectives largely transcends mainstream party politics, so even if the centre-right National Party were to assume power from Labour, its longstanding rival, some form of Māori foreign policy will remain in place, such as the continued advocacy of Indigenous rights and the centring of te Tiriti in New Zealand's trade agreements.

New Zealand's relationship with China amid the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific

For New Zealand's foreign policy-makers, the question of its relationship with the People's Republic of China undoubtedly looms very large in terms of strategizing for the altering geopolitical environment in which New Zealand finds itself.⁴⁰ Over the five decades since New Zealand and China formalized relations in 1972, China has unequivocally become one of New Zealand's most important partners. Although relations were rather modest at first, the two countries opened negotiations on an FTA in 2004. At the time, Prime Minister Helen Clark remarked that New Zealand was ‘the first developed country to conclude a bilateral market access agreement with China for its entry to the World Trade Organization; the first to recognize China's status as a market economy and the first country to enter FTA negotiations with China’.⁴¹ The FTA came into force in 2008 and was formally upgraded in 2022. Unsurprisingly, it has significantly boosted New Zealand's trade with China. In 2008, China took a mere 5.8 per cent of New Zealand's exports, but that share had risen to 28.15 per cent by 2022—only slightly less than New Zealand's combined exports to Australia, Japan and the US, which accounted for 28.6 per cent.⁴² For a country like New Zealand which has few serious geopolitical concerns, maintenance of trade is arguably its foremost security concern, especially as trade accounts for roughly 49 per cent of New Zealand's GDP. On this point, Young argues that New Zealand's identity as a small trading nation is embedded in its ontological security-seeking.⁴³

The swearing-in of the Sixth Labour Government of New Zealand in October 2017 occurred shortly before the 45th anniversary of official diplomatic relations between China and New Zealand. During a speech to mark the latter occasion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters remarked that the relationship in that period had evolved into something akin to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ and that ‘New Zealand and China have grown beyond the business and institutional contacts’.⁴⁴ However, in Ardern's first term as prime minister, the issues of Huawei (especially related to perceived threats related to cybersecurity and intellectual property), Xinjiang (human rights) and, emerging later in 2019, the protests in Hong Kong threatened the health of the bilateral relationship.

New Zealand also faced some peer pressure from other countries in the Anglosphere to join in with increasing public criticism of China—especially as part of a united ‘Five Eyes’ front.⁴⁵ New Zealand did issue public criticisms of China at times, most notably regarding its human rights record in Xinjiang and its alleged engagement in cyber attacks.⁴⁶ However, New Zealand—to the chagrin of much of the Anglosphere⁴⁷—often refused to jointly admonish China and instead chose to use softer language when responding, such as refusing to refer to the situation in Xinjiang as a ‘genocide’.⁴⁸ Perhaps the most glaring example of this was when New Zealand refused, despite a personal call from Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, to join in the global condemnation of the imprisonment of two Canadian citizens in China.⁴⁹ Ultimately, New Zealand remained committed to pursuing strategic communications with China that helped maintain the semblance of ‘constructive “bedrock” bilateral relations’.⁵⁰ In particular, its commitment was greater than that of Australia, particularly under the Liberal government headed by Scott Morrison (2018–22).⁵¹

Thus, by 2020, the last year of Ardern's first term as prime minister, New Zealand had started to walk something of a ‘tightrope’ between the US and China. This situation continued into her second term as further issues arose, especially emanating from Sino-American contestation over the COVID–19 pandemic. Adding to the emergent challenges of the Sino-New Zealand relationship was the changing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific is arguably the area of the globe that has experienced the greatest geopolitical shift over the last decade—a trajectory which is likely to continue into the next decade. Beginning with US President Barack Obama's decision in 2011 to ‘pivot to Asia’—which was disrupted somewhat by events that occurred elsewhere, most notably Russia's resurgence and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2013–14—it has been clear for some time that China and the US have been on a collision course.⁵² More recent security-focused efforts by the US include resurrecting and strengthening the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (colloquially known as the ‘Quad’, a dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US) and establishing the AUKUS trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US.⁵³ In the economic sphere, in 2022 the US also launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEFP) to solidify a ‘commitment to a free, open, fair, inclusive, interconnected, resilient, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region that has the potential to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth’.⁵⁴ Although the IPEFP is still in its relative infancy and hard to gauge, it appears an ambitious economic initiative as it portends greater US involvement in 13 Indo-Pacific partners, including New Zealand.

China too has sought to maximize its regional influence over the last decade, most notably through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative, a grand strategy that uses massive infrastructure investment to try and embed positive trade links between China and the rest of the world.⁵⁵ Furthermore, this has coincided with China adopting a far bolder stance under the presidency of Xi Jinping—built off the back of a significant increase in military expenditure and capabilities and evident in more assertive action regarding territorial claims, such as in the South China Sea and on China's border with India.⁵⁶ Although New Zealand is geographically far away from these major flashpoints, China's growing assertiveness in the Pacific is of great geopolitical importance to New Zealand.⁵⁷ Indeed, China's conclusion in 2022 of a security agreement with the Solomon Islands and its pursuit of a Pacific-wide security pact have caused consternation not only in Washington and Canberra, but also in Wellington.⁵⁸

At the very least, it appears that the Indo-Pacific ‘super-region’ is an area where no agreed security architecture exists (thus it is increasingly anarchic), and in which there are growing levels of enmity and increasing bipolarity—although the US still has a significant power advantage over China. For smaller powers like New Zealand that are caught in the middle, this is likely to create significant foreign policy headaches as well as shrinking policy options, at a time when unprecedented global issues such as the COVID–19 pandemic and the effects of climate change have already created serious challenges.

To this end, a major question remains as to where China fits into New Zealand's long-term foreign policy direction. Currently, New Zealand is showing resilience in attempting to maintain robust relationships with both China and the US (and the US's key Indo-Pacific allies) despite the increasing geopolitical challenges and the shrinking room for independence.⁵⁹ This much can be seen in Ardern's statements in her second term. For example in a speech in 2021, after saying that New Zealand had adopted an ‘Indo-Pacific outlook’—in line with the US, the UK and Australia—she stressed that New Zealand was against the use of ‘geographic frames’ such as the Indo-Pacific concept ‘as subtext, or a tool to exclude some nations [meaning China] from dialogue’ and went on: ‘Our success will depend on working with the widest possible set of partners’. China, for Ardern, remained ‘an engine of global growth and one of our most significant, but also one of our increasingly complex relationships’.⁶⁰ More recently Chris Hipkins, Ardern's successor as prime minister, stated that China is ‘a very important relationship to New Zealand’ and that it is ‘important that we re-establish those in-person opportunities to engage country-to-country’.⁶¹

New Zealand and China as the ‘taniwha and dragon’

The focal point of New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn is undoubtedly the Pacific region, especially given the strong historical and cultural links New Zealand has with many of the region's states. Indeed, Mahuta highlighted the importance of the Pacific to New Zealand's Māori foreign policy in her inaugural speech, stating: ‘Aotearoa has historical, cultural, social, linguistic and kin connections across the Pacific, all of which links us to the significant diaspora communities here. We refer to the Blue Pacific Continent as Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa.⁶²

New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn should be seen as a further effort to recalibrate its relationships with the Pacific states away from the previously paternalistic (some would argue colonial/neocolonial) tone, by emphasizing a ‘strong Pacific identity and interconnectedness with the region’.⁶³ Furthermore, given the central importance of kaitiakitanga in New Zealand's Māori foreign policy, addressing the existential challenges of climate change is one of the core aims of the ‘Pacific reset’ that has been underway since 2018.⁶⁴

While the Pacific is an obvious target for a Māori foreign policy approach, New Zealand's relationship with China has also, perhaps surprisingly, come under the umbrella of New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn. This was clearly illustrated in 2021 when Mahuta spoke of New Zealand's relationship with China by using an Indigenous allegory: the taniwha and the dragon. A taniwha is a mythical creature—a kind of river-dwelling serpent—central to Māori mythology.⁶⁵ As Mahuta explained:

Taniwha are protectors or guardians, often of water, and hold dominion over rivers, seas, lands and territories. Deeply steeped in culture, they are spiritual and one with nature. They symbolize a sense of guardianship for our people and our land and a strong belief in self.⁶⁶

Interestingly, Mahuta has only ever used the taniwha description of New Zealand when talking about China and, in general, New Zealand has largely eschewed the use of Māori foreign policy language when interacting with its Anglosphere partners—making the Pacific and China somewhat special cases. As Young notes, a taniwha is known for its ability to ‘adapt to and survive changing conditions’; thus, New Zealand's adoption of the spirit of a taniwha might be seen as an acknowledgement of the difficult times it is facing, particularly with respect to how it deals with China.⁶⁷

In the context of China, Mahuta compared the taniwha to the importance of the dragon in Chinese mythology, stating that ‘like the Dragon, they are powerful, auspicious and embedded in our epistemology [mātauranga Māori]’. In explaining the allegory further, Mahuta underlined that New Zealand and China ‘are two peoples—with characteristics and symbolism unique to our respective countries’. However, Mahuta stressed that such differences should not be seen as an obstacle to a fruitful relationship, explaining: ‘I see the Taniwha and the Dragon as symbols of the strength of our particular customs, traditions and values, that aren't always the same, but need to be maintained and respected.’⁶⁸ Concluding the allegory, Mahuta noted that the taniwha and the dragon, although different in many ways, had developed a ‘mature relationship’ through respect, cooperation and cultural interactions.

The timing of this speech was particularly noteworthy, as it came during a period when China was coming under significant global scrutiny for its alleged crimes against humanity in the province of Xinjiang, culminating in the issuing of sanctions against four Chinese officials by the EU, Canada, the UK and the US.⁶⁹ New Zealand chose not to sanction China, but did sign a joint statement condemning China's ‘human rights violations’ in Xinjiang.⁷⁰ Mahuta mentioned this in her taniwha and dragon speech, stating that sometimes New Zealand ‘will … find it necessary to speak out publicly on issues, like we have on developments in Hong Kong, the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and cyber incidents’, and that ‘[at] times we will do this in association with others that share our views and sometimes we will act alone’.⁷¹

Importantly, Mahuta's evocation of the taniwha and dragon framework was not the first time it had been used in the context of the Sino-New Zealand relationship. In 2013, the Taniwha and Dragon Festival, organized in part by the minister of Māori affairs, Pita Sharples, was held at Orakei Marae in Auckland to commemorate historical interactions between Māori and Chinese migrants in New Zealand.⁷² Four years later, in 2017, a two-day ‘Taniwha Dragon’ economic summit was held in the city of Hastings to connect Māori and Chinese businesses.⁷³ Nonetheless, Mahuta's speech should be viewed as an important juncture, as it was not only the first time the ‘taniwha and dragon’ allegory was used as a framework for talking about the Sino-New Zealand relationship in general (i.e. not just for Māori–Chinese relations) but it was also the first time it was used at the highest diplomatic level.

Since her first ‘taniwha and dragon’ speech in April 2021, Mahuta has reused the framework a number of times, most notably in a speech in November 2022 commemorating the 50th anniversary of New Zealand's diplomatic relations with China. On this occasion, Mahuta introduced three additional Māori concepts—tangata (people), aorangi (the planet) and tōnuitanga (prosperity)—stating: ‘These themes are woven through our shared history and achievements, and have helped maintain rich and vibrant connections’.⁷⁴ However, the extent to which the taniwha and dragon framework has become embedded in the Sino-New Zealand relationship outside of Mahuta's strategic communications is questionable. For example Ardern, as prime minister, never referred to the taniwha and dragon in any of her communications, although she did, on occasion, use some of the tikanga Māori sketched out by Mahuta when communicating with China—mostly manaakitanga⁷⁵—while, later on, also reiterating the three Māori themes Mahuta highlighted in late 2022: tangata, aorangi and tōnuitanga.⁷⁶

New Zealand's Maori foreign policy as a form of instrumental relationality

To shed further light on how New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn is affecting its relationship with China, it is important to discuss the ontological—te ao Māori—underpinning of a kaupapa Māori foreign policy. Importantly, Winter likens Māori notions of ontology to a series of ‘entanglements’:

[H]uman with human, human with nonhuman, nonhuman with human, human and nonhuman with transcendent. It does not conceive of an individual sitting outside of these webs, nor somewhere along a continuum of individual to community. What is important here … is the entanglement.⁷⁷

Delineating the ontological basis of te ao Māori as a series of entanglements evokes the concept of relationality:⁷⁸ a belief that the social world should not be conceived as ‘consisting primarily in substances or processes, in static “things” but as a web of “dynamic, unfolding relations”’.⁷⁹

The ‘relational turn’ that has occurred in the last decade has been of particular importance to the social sciences considering more seriously non-western and indigenous ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies.⁸⁰ Relationality is often presented as a challenge to the dominant western-centric ontologies which stem from a Cartesian/Newtonian world-view that sees reality as a set of ‘intrinsically independent units whose relations, treated as a derivative phenomenon, are mechanistic and compositional in nature’.⁸¹ Kurki argues that relationality breaks from ‘“modern” understandings of science and the cosmos by facilitating engagement with situated knowledges and deep-going relationalities across “nature” and “society”, “human” and “non-human” communities’.⁸²

Given the strong relational underpinnings of te ao Māori, drawing insights from relational IR—part of the broader global IR movement⁸³—makes a lot of sense in providing a lens to assess New Zealand's Māori foreign policy.⁸⁴ In IR, relationality delineates a belief that international relations is not a static system in which isolated actors independently make choices, but rather a complex network of co-constituted relationships.⁸⁵ Relationships between unique actors, therefore, are the basic ontological building blocks of international politics because ‘[a]ctors that are not in relations are non-actors and events that are not in process are non-existent’.⁸⁶

Often, relationality has been associated with Chinese foreign policy because China, in its foreign policy-making, is said to draw heavily on Confucian and Daoist thought as well as its culturally embedded social practice of guanxi—ideas which are strongly relational at their core.⁸⁷ Importantly, however, relationality should not be seen as simply a China-specific concept, as it has an illuminating broader application for assessing the diplomatic activities of states. As Qin argues, ‘once diplomacy is defined as relational practice, MFAs [ministries of foreign affairs] are, practically, pivotal relators’ because their ‘action rests on the nature of relationships its own state has with the target state’.⁸⁸ Strong relationships are important to this end, because when a state manages to create a robust, mature relationship, the practice of diplomacy between the two is much easier to undertake. Such relationships might be termed friendships. A state with many friends—especially if they are friends that are important powers—is likely to wield significant relational power in international politics.⁸⁹

Furthermore, relationality is naturally suited to examining specific value-based foreign policy turns that states have undertaken in recent years, as it is ontologically more flexible than more western-centric IR theories. Indeed, returning to the case of Sweden's feminist foreign policy turn, Aggestam et al. use relationality as an ontological base to theorise feminist foreign policy as representing a shift in focus away from the structural bias of traditional understandings of foreign policy to centring moral relations between human beings.⁹⁰ Similarly, New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn entails a shift in thinking. As Blackwell argues, Mahuta's announcement is ‘a radical departure from traditional thinking’, moving from individualism and state-centrism to a focus ‘on shared goals, shared custodianship and shared responsibility’.⁹¹

Therefore, an argument can be made that in embracing a Māori foreign policy, New Zealand is instrumentally following a kind of relational understanding of foreign policy which incorporates tikanga Māori principles, thereby enabling it to develop unique relationships with selected partners. This is, at its heart, relational because New Zealand's Māori foreign policy is not a rigid one-size-fits-all approach, but rather a far more agile framework which can be carefully used via two-way dialogue and interaction with partners to create unique relationships, as evident in the different ways in which this Māori foreign policy has been used depending on the context. Notably, Mahuta stated that when tikanga Māori is ‘expressed within a relationship’ it ‘gives a sense that everything is connected and purposeful’.⁹² Therefore, when interacting with states from the Pacific, New Zealand is likely to focus more on whanaungatanga, kotahitanga and kaitiakitanga, given the cultural links and climate change issues that arise.⁹³ On the other hand, when interacting with China, New Zealand may emphasize more manaakitanga and mahi tahi in the relationship, given the differences of opinion that often emerge between the two. Incidentally, during Mahuta's official visit to Beijing in March 2023, she tweeted the hashtag ‘#manaakitanga’ when commenting on a visit to the National Museum of China.⁹⁴

The instrumental use of a kaupapa Māori relational foreign policy partly helps to explain how the Sino-New Zealand relationship has developed atypically compared to China's relations with other Anglosphere countries. While China's relationships with Australia, Canada, the UK and the US have notably soured in recent years, Chinese officials, including former foreign minister Wang Yi, continue to routinely refer to the bilateral relationship with New Zealand as ‘mature’.⁹⁵ As the Auckland-based Chinese consul general Ruan Ping is reported to have remarked: ‘China and New Zealand have developed into comprehensive strategic partners with close cultural exchanges, and the level of development and cooperation is ahead of China and other developed countries in many areas’.⁹⁶ Furthermore, China's state-run media has not only typically applauded New Zealand for maintaining an independent stance but has often presented New Zealand as a model ‘that other countries could learn from’.⁹⁷ Of course, New Zealand is not immune from strong rebukes by Chinese officials or media, but generally, it has etched out a position of privilege in China relative to other Anglosphere countries.

In conjunction with a desire to draw inspiration from te ao Māori, there are also notable strategic reasons for New Zealand embracing a Māori relational approach with regard to China. Firstly, emphasizing New Zealand's Māori foreign policy in its interactions with China is likely seen in Wellington as a subtle way of differentiating New Zealand from other countries of the Anglosphere that have adopted a much more critical China stance in recent years. Given that New Zealand has a lot to lose if its relationship with China sours, maintaining a robust, mature relationship is undoubtedly seen as the optimal strategy on the table. Furthermore, a relational approach is likely to register positively with China, given the purported relational underpinnings of their own diplomacy and international action. Secondly, given that New Zealand has long self-identified as being ‘independent’ in its foreign policy, adopting a more Māori-centred outlook is in some ways an extension of that as it allows for New Zealand to take its own unique stances on international issues. Thus, a Māori foreign policy is arguably a way for New Zealand to maintain positive relations with China while also avoiding joining an emerging anti-China bloc under the leadership of the US. Whereas Australia has chosen to unequivocally balance China with the US, New Zealand still covets a middle-ground position where it does not have to pick a side.

However, as the case of Sweden hints, pursuing a values-based foreign policy is difficult when perceived national interests come into conflict, and despite New Zealand's best efforts to cultivate unique relationships informed by tikanga Māori with the different key actors in its foreign policy purview, challenges will continue to arise. An example of such a challenge occurred in mid-2022 when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi embarked on a Pacific-wide tour to try and finalize a ‘pact’ to facilitate cooperation between China and ten Pacific island states on issues such as policing, security and data communications.⁹⁸ While Australia undertook a proactive role by immediately re-engaging with the Pacific through high-level diplomatic trips, New Zealand faced some criticism for adopting a much lower profile as the furore developed.

At the Pacific Islands Forum Summit shortly after Wang's visit, in July 2022, Ardern stressed that the increasing assertiveness of superpowers in the Pacific—meaning both China and the US—meant that the Pacific should adopt a ‘family-based approach … where we try and iron out where we have differences’ through the process of ‘talanoa’ (a Pacific concept of conversation leading to consensus-building and decision-making).⁹⁹ Later, on a visit to Australia, Ardern stated that there needed to be an ‘opportunity for our Pacific neighbours to speak for themselves’ on the issue of China. Such statements highlight the inherent relationality of New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn, which sees the Indo-Pacific as a series of relationships rather than a setting predetermined to become something of a new Cold War. On the other hand, Australia and the US increasingly view the Indo-Pacific through a reductive western-centric Cold War prism and are seemingly—especially in the eyes of China—taking steps to ‘contain’ China.¹⁰⁰

Despite New Zealand's demonstrations of its commitment to maintaining an independent position in the Pacific, the recent geopolitical challenges brought about by China's increased interaction with the region (and the US's response) also highlight the inherent difficulty of undertaking the kind of multivocal signalling—‘projecting different identities and commitments to discrete audiences’¹⁰¹—that this kind of relational approach necessitates. In this regard, New Zealand's limited use of its Māori foreign policy at the time this article was written—mainly in its relations with the Pacific and, to a lesser extent, with China—illustrates that it has yet to become an overarching approach from which to apply multivocal signalling. Consequently, it can only offer so much, especially if the Sino-American relationship continues to deteriorate and the room for independent foreign policies shrinks, likely due to emerging bipolarization in the Indo-Pacific and increasing pressure from friends to join a western bloc.¹⁰² If New Zealand is faced with a choice between China and the US, the taniwha and dragon framework will likely be supplanted by a more conventional approach to China that more closely resembles Australia's putative (western-centric) balancing strategy.¹⁰³ Indeed, in a joint statement released during Ardern's US visit in 2022, New Zealand and the US acknowledged that ‘as the security environment in the Indo-Pacific evolves, so must our defense cooperation’ as well as a need for ‘shared commitment among New Zealand and AUKUS partners to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region’.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, in early 2023, the new minister of defence of New Zealand, Andrew Little, also stated that New Zealand would be ‘willing to explore’ participating in the non-nuclear aspects of AUKUS (known as ‘pillar two’).¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

This article assessed New Zealand's apparent Māori foreign policy turn in the context of its relationship with China and the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. With the appointment of Nanaia Mahuta as foreign minister, New Zealand has taken perceivable steps to implement a kaupapa Māori foreign policy. Mahuta outlined four key tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours): manaakitanga (hospitality), whanaungatanga (kinship), mahi tahi and kotahitanga (unity through collaboration) and kaitiakitanga (guardianship or stewardship in relation to the protection of intergenerational wellbeing). It was argued that New Zealand's Māori foreign policy turn might face similar challenges to those faced by Sweden's feminist foreign policy, particularly when given a choice between values or interests. Indeed, New Zealand's foreign policy-making has come under significant pressure in recent years due to the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, which has seen it becoming caught in the middle of the increasing Sino-American rivalry. Consequently, New Zealand's relationship with China, a state which is a significant export market for New Zealand, has become of particular concern for the Sixth Labour Government.

Importantly, however, it was argued that New Zealand's growing embrace of te ao Māori (Māori world-view) perspectives, together with the continued role of te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi) in its governance and public policy-making, suggest that this nascent Māori foreign policy turn is substantive and not just a case of window-dressing. Engaging a kaupapa Māori foreign policy has potentially significant implications, because it breaks from the dominant western-centric ontologies embedded in the foreign policy-making of not only New Zealand but the other Anglosphere countries. Te ao Māori is strongly relational, and from this ontological base a Māori foreign policy naturally views international relations as an intergenerational entanglement of different relationships between ‘human with human’ but also ‘human with nonhuman’. To date, New Zealand has been inconsistent with its use of tikanga Māori to guide its foreign policy, as it has mainly been used in its interactions in the Pacific and more sparingly in its interactions with its friends in the Anglosphere. Thus, it currently serves as an instrument rather than representing an overarching framework from which all New Zealand's foreign policies stem.

However, it was observed that the relationship with China has come under the umbrella of New Zealand's Māori foreign policy in recent years. Mahuta framed the relationship using the Indigenous allegory of the taniwha and the dragon, and it is argued that, by doing so, New Zealand was instrumentally using a relational understanding of foreign policy (guided by te ao Māori) to attempt to build a unique relationship with China. The benefit of this approach for New Zealand was that it could differentiate itself from the other Anglosphere countries that have experienced souring relationships with China while also maintaining its long-held ‘independent’ foreign policy. Ostensibly, this approach has been quite successful as New Zealand has etched out something of a privileged position in China relative to other Anglosphere countries. However, as evidenced by the increasing issues in the Pacific, New Zealand is facing increased pressure to join the collective pushback against China. It is argued that if the geopolitical room for independent foreign policy-making should shrink further—or, equally, should Mahuta leave her post, or the National Party accede to power at the next election—New Zealand's Māori foreign policy is unlikely to remain as prominent as it is today, and it will be forced to choose a more conventional foreign policy approach, such as following Australia's apparent balancing strategy.

Footnotes

1

All trade statistics were sourced from UN Statistics Division, ‘UN Comtrade database’, https://comtradeplus.un.org/. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 4 May 2023.)

2

This article borrows the designation of the Anglosphere put forward by Michael Peters as being chiefly a conglomeration (solidified by the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance) of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US. See Michael A. Peters, ‘The geopolitical rebirth of the Anglosphere as a world actor after Brexit’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2021, pp. 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2021.1991791.

3

Amitav Acharya, ‘Advancing global IR: challenges, contentions, and contributions’, International Studies Review 18: 1, 2016, pp. 4–15 at p. 5, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv016.

4

Nicholas Ross Smith, ‘New Zealand's grand strategic options as the room for hedging continues to shrink’, Comparative Strategy 41: 3, 2022, pp. 314–27.

5

Notably, Winston Peters is against the increasing use of the name ‘Aotearoa’ instead of New Zealand and the use of te reo Māori (Māori language) on public radio. See Henry Cooke, ‘Winston Peters attacks Labour, “cancel culture”, and te reo usage in comeback speech’, Stuff, 20 June 2021, https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300337617/winston-peters-attacks-labour-cancel-culture-and-te-reo-usage-in-comeback-speech.

6

Khylee Quince, ‘Moko kauae: a mark of diversity and democracy’, Stuff, 1 May 2021, https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/124983132/moko-kauae-a-mark-of-diversity-and-democracy.

7

Philip A. Joseph, ‘The Treaty of Waitangi: a text for the performance of nation’, Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 4: 1, 2004, pp. 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2004.11421434.

8

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’, speech by Hon Nanaia Mahuta, 4 Feb. 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/inaugural-foreign-policy-speech-diplomatic-corps.

9

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

10

Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, ‘From mainstream to manaaki: indigenising our approach to immigration’, in David Hall, ed., Fair borders? Migration policy in the twenty-first century (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2017), p. 40.

11

Rhonda Tibble, ‘Manaakitanga—more than just hospitality’, On MAS, March 2021, https://on.mas.co.nz/issues/march-2021/manaakitanga-more-than-just-hospitality.

12

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

13

Russell Bishop, James Ladwig and Mere Berryman, ‘The centrality of relationships for pedagogy: the Whanaungatanga thesis’, American Educational Research Journal 51: 1, 2014, pp. 184–214, https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831213510019.

14

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

15

Cleve Barlow, Tikanga whakaaro: key concepts in Māori culture (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1991).

16

Lindsay Cox, Kotahitanga: the search for Māori political unity (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993).

17

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

18

Tania Waikato, ‘He kaitiaki matauranga: building a protection regime for Maori traditional knowledge’, Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 8: 2, 2005, p. 352.

19

Te Ahukaramū Charles Royal, ‘Kaitiakitanga—guardianship and conservation’, in ‘Te Ara: the encyclopedia of New Zealand’, Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga, 2007, https://teara.govt.nz/en/kaitiakitanga-guardianship-and-conservation.

20

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

21

Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and foreign policy: New Zealand in the world since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), p. 35.

22

László Szöllősi-Cira, New Zealand's global responsibility (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7349-8.

23

Government of New Zealand, ‘A Pacific springboard to engage the world: New Zealand's independent foreign policy’, speech by Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, 7 July 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pacific-springboard-engage-world-new-zealand's-independent-foreign-policy.

24

Tess McClure, ‘From tribal politics to the world stage: New Zealand's pioneering foreign minister’, Guardian, 27 May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/27/from-tribal-politics-to-the-world-stage-new-zealands-pioneering-foreign-minister; Sam Sachdeva, ‘The move towards a more Māori foreign policy’, Newsroom, 5 Jan. 2022, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/the-move-towards-a-more-maori-foreign-policy; Jayden Evett, ‘Does New Zealand's Indigenous diplomacy measure up?’, Policy Forum, 7 Oct. 2022, https://www.policyforum.net/does-new-zealands-indigenous-diplomacy-measure-up/.

25

There is a small but vibrant body of literature on Indigenous foreign policy, with most of the earliest works being on Bolivia's foreign policy under Evo Morales. See Robert Albro, ‘Bolivia's Indigenous foreign policy: vivir bien and global climate change ethics’, in Evan Berry and Robert Albro, eds, Church, cosmovision and the environment (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 99–122.

26

James Blackwell, ‘Foreign policy's “Indigenous moment” is here’, The Interpreter, 12 Feb. 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/foreign-policy-s-indigenous-moment-here.

27

Dominic O'sullivan, Sharing the sovereign: Indigenous peoples, recognition, treaties and the state (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021), p. 107, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4172-2_5.

28

Dean Cowie, ‘The treaty settlement process’, in Janine Hayward and Nicola R. Wheen, eds, Treaty of Waitangi settlements (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012), pp. 34–49, https://doi.org/10.7810/9781927131381.

29

Karen Webster and Christine Cheyne, ‘Creating treaty-based local governance in New Zealand: Māori and Pākehā views’, Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online 12: 2, 2017, pp. 146–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2017.1345766.

30

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, ‘Preserving our right to regulate’, undated, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/preserving-our-right-to-regulate.

31

Bonnie Holster and Matthew Castle, ‘Between innovation and precedent: the Treaty of Waitangi exception clause in Aotearoa New Zealand's free trade agreements’, Policy Quarterly 18: 4, 2022, pp. 26–32, https://doi.org/10.26686/PQ.V18I4.8014.

32

Nicolas Pirsoul, The theory of recognition and multicultural policies in Colombia and New Zealand (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

33

Dominic O'sullivan, ‘Why the Indigenous in New Zealand have fared better than those in Canada’, The Conversation, 15 Oct. 2017, https://theconversation.com/why-the-indigenous-in-new-zealand-have-fared-better-than-those-in-canada-84980.

34

The agreement is known as ANZTEC—the Taiwan–New Zealand Economic Cooperation Agreement: New Zealand Commerce and Industry Office Taipei, ‘About ANZTEC’, undated, https://www.nzcio.com/en/anztec/about-anztec.

35

Jason Mika, ‘Culture and commerce: a unique Kiwi twist on how we can trade with the world’, Stuff, 18 Oct. 2022, https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/opinion-analysis/300714128/culture-and-commerce-a-unique-kiwi-twist-on-how-we-can-trade-with-the-world.

36

Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman Rosamond, ‘Swedish feminist foreign policy in the making: ethics, politics, and gender’, Ethics & International Affairs 30: 3, 2016, pp. 323–34, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679416000241.

37

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Handbook: Sweden's feminist foreign policy (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, 2019).

38

Srdjan Vucetic, ‘A nation of feminist arms dealers? Canada and military exports’, International Journal 72: 4, 2017, pp. 503–19, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017740156.

39

AFP, ‘Swedish government scraps country's pioneering “feminist foreign policy”’, Guardian, 18 Oct. 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/18/swedish-government-scraps-countrys-pioneering-feminist-foreign-policy.

40

Jason Young, ‘Seeking ontological security through the rise of China: New Zealand as a small trading nation’, The Pacific Review 30: 4, 2017, pp. 513–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1264457; Reuben Steff and Francesca Dodd-Parr, ‘Examining the immanent dilemma of small states in the Asia-Pacific: the strategic triangle between New Zealand, the US and China’, The Pacific Review 32: 1, 2019, pp. 90–112, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1417324; Robert Ayson, ‘New Zealand and the great irresponsibles: coping with Russia, China and the US’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 74: 4, 2020, pp. 455–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1734773; Patrick Köllner, ‘Australia and New Zealand recalibrate their China policies: convergence and divergence’, The Pacific Review 34: 3, 2021, pp. 405–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1683598; Smith, ‘New Zealand's grand strategic options’.

41

Xinhua, ‘New Zealand aims to conclude FTA talks with China first’, People's Daily Online, 2005, http://en.people.cn/200505/31/eng20050531_187594.html.

42

UN Statistics Division, ‘UN Comtrade database’.

43

Young, ‘Seeking ontological security’.

44

Government of New Zealand, ‘Anniversary of diplomatic relations with China’, speech by Rt Hon Winston Peters, 5 Dec. 2017, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/anniversary-diplomatic-relations-china.

45

Anne-Marie Brady, ‘Drawing a snake and adding feet: New Zealand avoids offending China, ends up offending closest partners’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 2021, https://www.smh.com.au/national/drawing-a-snake-and-adding-feet-new-zealand-avoids-offending-china-ends-up-offending-closest-partners-20210423-p57lzk.html.

46

Tess McClure, ‘New Zealand and China clash after West condemns “malicious” cyber activity’, Guardian, 20 July 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/20/new-zealand-and-china-clash-after-west-condemns-malicious-cyber-activity.

47

Patrick Wintour, ‘New Zealand's stance on China has deep implications for the Five Eyes alliance’, Guardian, 23 April 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/23/new-zealands-stance-on-china-has-deep-implications-for-the-five-eyes-alliance.

48

Tess McClure, ‘New Zealand draws back from calling Chinese abuses of Uyghurs genocide’, Guardian, 4 May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/04/new-zealand-draws-back-from-calling-chinese-abuses-of-uyghurs-genocide.

49

Evan Dyer, ‘New Zealand—the Five Eyes ally that came up short in Canada's Huawei dispute’, CBC News, 27 April 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/huawei-new-zealand-1.5113504.

50

Corey Wallace, ‘Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand's layering of strategic communications (2016–2020)’, Asian Perspective 45: 3, 2021, pp. 587–620, https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0028.

51

Bates Gill, ‘Explaining the troubled Australia–China relationship: a perspective from Australia’, China Review 23: 1, 2023, pp. 243–75.

52

Georg Löfflmann, ‘The pivot between containment, engagement, and restraint: President Obama's conflicted grand strategy in Asia’, Asian Security 12: 2, 2016, pp. 92–110, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1190338.

53

Van Jackson, ‘America is turning Asia into a powder keg: the perils of a military-first approach’, Foreign Affairs, 22 Oct. 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-10-22/america-turning-asia-powder-keg.

54

The White House, ‘Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity’, 23 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity.

55

Michael Clarke, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: China's new grand strategy?’, Asia Policy 24, 2017, pp. 71–9, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2017.0023.

56

Feng Liu, ‘The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China's responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge’, International Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 9–27, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz226.

57

Joanne Wallis, Henrietta McNeill, James Batley and Anna Powles, ‘Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 23: 2, 2022, pp. 263–96, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005.

58

Eva Corlett and Daniel Hurst, ‘Jacinda Ardern questions motive for China–Solomons security pact’, Guardian, 21 April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/21/jacinda-ardern-questions-motive-for-china-solomons-security-pact.

59

Köllner, ‘Australia and New Zealand recalibrate their China policies’.

60

Government of New Zealand, ‘Prime Minister's Speech to NZIIA Annual Conference’, speech by Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, 14 July 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/prime-ministers-speech-nziia-annual-conference.

61

Tess McClure, ‘New Zealand foreign minister to visit counterpart in China’, Guardian, 20 March 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/20/new-zealand-foreign-minister-to-visit-counterpart-in-china.

62

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

63

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual report 2018–2019 (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019), p. 24.

64

Government of New Zealand, ‘Kaitiakitanga: protecting our planet’, speech by Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, 25 Sept. 2018, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/kaitiakitanga-protecting-our-planet-0.

65

Basil Keane, ‘Taniwha’, in ‘Te Ara: the encyclopedia of New Zealand’, 2007, https://teara.govt.nz/en/taniwha.

66

Government of New Zealand, ‘He taniwha he tipua, he tipua he taniwha—the dragon and the taniwha’, speech by Hon Nanaia Mahuta, 19 April 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/%E2%80%9Che-taniwha-he-tipua-he-tipua-he-taniwha-dragon-and-taniwha%E2%80%9D.

67

Jason Young, ‘Chapter 7: Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia in the “new era of Chinese diplomacy”‘, in Linda Jaivin, Esther Sunkyung Klein and Sharon Strange, eds, China Story Yearbook 2021: Contradiction (Canberra: ANU Press, 2022).

68

Government of New Zealand. ‘He taniwha he tipua’.

69

Jeannette Muhammad, ‘US joins EU in sanctions against China over treatment of Uyghur Muslims’, NPR, 22 March 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/22/980090541/u-s-joins-eu-in-sanctions-against-china-over-treatment-of-uyghur-muslims.

70

McClure, ‘New Zealand draws back from calling Chinese abuses of Uyghurs genocide’.

71

Government of New Zealand, ‘He taniwha he tipua’.

72

Karina Abadia, ‘Festival strengthens ties’, Stuff, 24 April 2013, https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/east-bays-courier/8585289/Festival-strengthens-ties.

73

Patrick O'sullivan, ‘Success for Taniwha Dragon Summit on day one as $50m in Chinese–Maori deals achieved’, Hawke's Bay Today, 20 Feb. 2017, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/hawkes-bay-today/news/success-for-taniwha-dragon-summit-on-day-one-as-50m-in-chinese-maori-deals-achieved/HOPVYDDL4ZOGQ5AS3KRQNKAKJU/.

74

Government of New Zealand, ‘Fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations with China’, speech by Hon Nanaia Mahuta, 28 Nov. 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/fiftieth-anniversary-diplomatic-relations-china.

75

Government of New Zealand, ‘PM speech to China business summit’, speech by Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, 1 Aug. 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pm-speech-china-business-summit.

76

Government of New Zealand, ‘50th anniversary of New Zealand China diplomatic relations’, speech by Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, 9 Dec. 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/50th-anniversary-new-zealand-china-diplomatic-relations.

77

Christine J. Winter, Subjects of intergenerational justice: Indigenous philosophy, the environment and relationships (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 100, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003097457.

78

The idea of te ao Māori being relational is strongly supported in the literature. See Te Kawehau Hoskins and Alison Jones, ‘Māori, Pākehā, critical theory and relationality: a talk by Te Kawehau Hoskins and Alison Jones’, New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies 55: 2, 2020, pp. 423–9, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40841-020-00174-0; Christine J. Winter, ‘A seat at the table’, Borderlands Journal 20: 1, 2021, pp. 116–39, https://doi.org/doi:10.21307/borderlands-2021-005.

79

Mustafa Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto for a relational sociology’, American Journal of Sociology 103: 2, 1997, p. 281, https://doi.org/10.1086/231209.

80

Lauren Tynan, ‘What is relationality? Indigenous knowledges, practices and responsibilities with kin’, Cultural Geographies 28: 4, 2021, pp. 597–610, https://doi.org/10.1177/14744740211029287.

81

Chengxin Pan, ‘Toward a new relational ontology in global politics: China's rise as holographic transition’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18: 3, 2018, pp. 339–67 at p. 342, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcy010.

82

Milja Kurki, ‘Relational revolution and relationality in IR: new conversations’, Review of International Studies 48: 5, 2022, pp. 821–36 at p. 821, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210521000127.

83

Acharya, ‘Advancing global IR’.

84

Yaqing Qin, ‘A relational theory of world politics’, International Studies Review 18: 1, 2016, pp. 33–47, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv031; Acharya, ‘Advancing global IR’; Emilian Kavalski, ‘Guanxi or what is the Chinese for relational theory of world politics?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18: 3, 2018, pp. 397–420; Kurki, ‘Relational revolution and relationality in IR’.

85

Nicholas Ross Smith and Tracey Fallon, ‘The importance of bona fide friendships to international politics: China's quest for friendships that matter’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2022, pp. 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2022.2044757.

86

Yaqing Qin, ‘International society as a process: institutions, identities, and China's peaceful rise’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3: 2, 2010, pp. 129–53 at p. 138, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poq007.

87

Kavalski, ‘Guanxi or what is the Chinese for relational theory of world politics’.

88

Yaqing Qin, ‘Diplomacy as relational practice’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 15: 1–2, 2020, pp. 165–73 at pp. 168–69, https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-15101092.

89

Smith and Fallon, ‘The importance of bona fide friendships to international politics’.

90

Karin Aggestam, Annika Bergman Rosamond and Annica Kronsell, ‘Theorising feminist foreign policy’, International Relations 33: 1, 2019, pp. 23–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117818811892.

91

Blackwell, ‘Foreign policy's “Indigenous moment” is here’.

92

Government of New Zealand, ‘He taniwha he tipua’.

93

Government of New Zealand, ‘Inaugural foreign policy speech to diplomatic corps’.

94

Nanaia Mahuta (@NanaiaMahuta) via Twitter (2023), ‘E kau i te wai e. We recalled the migration of the kūaka as I visited the National Museum of [China] to view the Kahu Huruhuru gifted in 1957 by Kiingi Koroki to Chairman Mao Zedong, in recognition of the relationship that was being forged between Aotearoa [New Zealand] and [China]. #manaakitanga’, 24 March 2023, https://twitter.com/NanaiaMahuta/status/1639106253099270144.

95

CGTN, ‘Wang Yi: China–New Zealand relations are “maturing and resilient”’, 14 June 2022, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-06-13/Wang-Yi-China-New-Zealand-relations-are-maturing-and-resilient--1aPXE48Dl9S/index.html.

96

Miao Wang, ‘NZ has mature ties with China that allow for disagreement: PM’, Global Times, 7 Nov. 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1238356.shtml.

97

Caleb Hoyle, A model relationship? Chinese media coverage of New Zealand–China relations (Wellington: New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, 2021).

98

Nicholas Ross Smith and Henrietta McNeill, ‘Furore over Pacific nations' China deals puts focus on security instead of climate change’, South China Morning Post, 2 June 2022, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3179809/furore-over-pacific-nations-china-deals-puts-focus-security-instead.

99

Michael Neilson, ‘Pacific Island Forum 2022: Ardern calls for Pacific “family” approach as China, US circle’, New Zealand Herald, 13 July 2022, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/pacific-island-forum-2022-ardern-calls-for-pacific-family-approach-as-china-us-circle/LJB773JQ67W7OYHHGPUKFA2XRE/.

100

Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley, ‘The new “multiplex” Cold War in the Indo-Pacific’, in Doyle and Rumley, eds, The rise and return of the Indo-Pacific (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198739524.003.0004; Alica Kizeková, ‘Taking stock of Australia's asymmetrical relations with China: interdependence, tensions, and new dimensions’, Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia 20: 2, 2021, pp. 197–209, https://doi.org/10.17477/jcea.2021.20.2.197; Suisheng Zhao, ‘The US–China rivalry in the emerging bipolar world: hostility, alignment, and power balance’, Journal of Contemporary China 31: 134, 2022, pp. 169–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.1945733; Feng Liu and Kai He, ‘China's bilateral relations, order transition, and the Indo-Pacific dynamics’, China Review 23: 1, 2023, pp. 11–43, muse.jhu.edu/article/883825.

101

Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, ‘What's at stake in the American empire debate’, American Political Science Review 101: 2, 2007, pp. 253–71 at p. 254, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070220.

102

Alexander Korolev, ‘Shrinking room for hedging: system-unit dynamics and behavior of smaller powers’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19: 3, 2019, pp. 419–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz011.

103

Smith, ‘New Zealand's grand strategic options’.

104

The White House, ‘United States–Aotearoa New Zealand joint statement’, 31 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/31/united-states-aotearoa-new-zealand-joint-statement/.

105

Jane Patterson, ‘AUKUS participation talks highlight New Zealand's nuclear-free status’, RNZ, 29 March 2023, https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/486980/aukus-participation-talks-highlight-new-zealand-s-nuclear-free-status.

Author notes

The authors would firstly like to thank Ben Paki and Maia Te Koha from Te Puni Kōkiri for their engagement and korero. Also, thanks to Tracey Fallon for reading over an early version of the article and thanks to Michael Reiterer for initially suggesting this area of research. Lastly, thanks to the three wonderful anonymous reviewers who helped push this article to new heights.