Abstract

In my “Covid story,” I would like to present some reflections on the effects of the pandemic on global structural inequalities. Based on my personal experiences in Italy and Guatemala, I chronologically present the differences between the two countries in tackling the pandemic. In particular, I focus on the right to health, including access to hospitals, testing, and vaccinations. I also discuss how the justice system reacted to the pandemic, including the management of prisons and the investigations on the actions of the two governments. Public demonstrations in the streets and violent protests in prisons are the background against which I present the legislative measures adopted to curb the pandemic. Farce and tragedy are intended to depict the distance between public institutions and the people they represent. Between the failures of temporary hospitals in Guatemala and Italy’s draconian regulations to enter the country, the very concept of law and public institutions assumed different connotations.

1. Introduction

When the pandemic hit Italy in February 2020, I was in Milan, where I work at Bocconi University as a research fellow in public international law. My partner was on the other side of the world, in Guatemala, where she had recently moved for a new job. I was supposed to fly on March 13, 2020 for a short visit, but our plans got overturned a few days before due to border closures. Once Guatemala airports reopened in September 2020, I spent several months in the country, taking advantage of the new virtual reality and avoiding the cyclical European lockdowns and related measures. I managed to fly back and forth several times when the situation in Italy allowed it and whenever I was required to teach and attend to other in-person commitments.

In this short “Covid story,” I will present some reflections, based on my experiences over the past two years, on the effects of the pandemic on structural inequalities. Straddling two different worlds led me to confront the ways in which people in Europe and Central America experienced the pandemic. The growing relevance of a third—online—world, will also be at the center of my thoughts, as it was at the center of my life during these years. More often than not, I could make sense of reality only in the virtual space, while surrounding events became more and more surreal. Farce and tragedy alternated with unusual rapidity, leaving no time to understand my feelings or realize what was going on. This article represents a first attempt to pause and analyze my chaotic environment, composed of news, laws, and emotions.

I will use Italy’s and Guatemala’s legislative initiatives aimed at curbing the pandemic as a pretext to revisit the past two years in a chronological order. My primary focus will be on the right to health, including access to hospitals, testing, and vaccinations, and the reactions of the justice system to the management of the pandemic by the governments of the two countries. I will also reflect on the different perspectives towards law and legal institutions in Italy and Guatemala, and analyze my own perception, and that of those around me, of legal institutions on the two states and their use of legal instruments.

I should note at the outset that the first striking inequality between the two countries concerns the availability of information and data. Italian regulations are easily accessible online and subject to an ongoing discussion as to their effectiveness and legitimacy.1 Data concerning the pandemic have been shared, often contested, and analyzed by a multitude of scholars.2 Conversely, it is not easy to find all Covid-related regulations concerning Guatemala.3 Most of what I am describing here is based on personal memories, newspapers, and feedback from friends in the country. Official data were obscurely obtained, and having lived in the country, I had the sense that they do not provide a real picture of what the actual situation is.4 In Italy, the normalization of the pandemic after the first emergency gave the impression that the data painted a picture that was far worse than what people had experienced. In contrast, in Guatemala, the lack of trust in the institutions and the lack of clarity surrounding the gathering of information gave the impression that the situation in the country was in fact far worse than what the data revealed.

2. March–August 2020

After the initial local restrictions in northern regions, Italy’s first national lockdown lasted two months, from March 9 to May 3, 2020.5 In Guatemala, a formal lockdown, like those introduced in Europe, was never declared, but a series of very strict measures were adopted over a period of seven months, from March to September. The first Covid-19 cases were diagnosed in Guatemala by mid-March, after which progressively restrictive measures were adopted. The first response was the closure of borders and the imposition of a curfew from 4:00 pm to 4:00 am.6 This was followed by the imposition of additional measures, including a ban on interdepartmental travel.7 In May, people were not allowed to leave their homes on weekends.8 In July, a risk classification system was introduced, with four levels of measures. Borders remained closed until the end of September, when the main airport in Guatemala City reopened.9 Guatemalan measures were de facto very similar to a countrywide lockdown by the end of April.10

As an indicator of the disparity as regards gathering and managing information in the two countries, it is useful to refer to the official data on the progression of the pandemic. In its first six months, Italy (60 million people) registered almost 270,000 cases based on a total of almost 9,000,000 tests, and 35,477 deaths.11 Guatemala (20 million people) registered fewer than 74,000 cases based on 240,000 tests, and 2740 deaths.

In a matter of days, in February 2020, the international community seemed to be following the worst instincts. Despite the calls for the respect of international obligations, the first reaction of many states was “every man for himself” (a gender-neutral expression would be less appropriate here).12 I learned it the hard way, when I naively included ten surgical masks in a care package sent to Guatemala, together with home-baked biscuits and other little presents. In a farcical email exchange, the Italian customs agency informed me that I could not ship my ten masks without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of the first measures established by EU Regulation 2020/402 was the implementation of a general ban on the export of medical equipment, which included the most basic personal protective equipment, irrespective of quantity or purpose.13 Beyond my risible individual experience, there was an abyss of laws blocking the ordinary exportation of medical equipment in the initial stages of a global pandemic. For the first time in what was to become a long journey, I felt how surreal Italian regulations were becoming, as if the pandemic initiated a stress test on public institutions. The inception of a new “rule of bureaucracy” and its farcical consequences have a link, at least in my personal memory, with fear and tragedy. At the same time as an office was set up in Rome to process the exportation of ten masks, news on TV showed the images of the military convoys transferring coffins from Bergamo to neighboring towns to help with incineration.14

In Guatemala, the situation was possibly even more dramatic. A post-apocalyptic siren that had not been heard since the time of the internal armed conflict, which had ended in 1996, sounded every day to instruct the citizens of Guatemala City to run home, on pain of facing a relevant fine or imprisonment if they failed to do so. During the first six months, in Italy we laughed at police running after people jogging on deserted beaches,15 whereas in Guatemala more than 40,000 people were arrested and detained for breaching Covid-19 regulations.16 In May, during a revolt in a prison in Quetzaltenango, inmates killed and decapitated at least seven members of a rival gang, which is something not uncommon in Guatemala.17 In Italy, below the superficial sentiment of unity, which included patriotic chants from balconies and applause for health workers, violent revolts also erupted in prisons, causing thirteen deaths. Nine of these occurred in Modena alone, where inmates allegedly stormed the pharmacy and died of overdoses.18 Several days later, in the prison of Santa Maria Capua Vetere, penitentiary police officers carried out a punitive action against inmates; they are currently on trial for torture.19 Prison revolts raised several questions concerning organized crime taking advantage of the pandemic to demand alternatives to imprisonment.20 In Italy, the release of mafia bosses for health reasons was the object of a heated public debate.21 In both countries, the first way of adapting to the pandemic appeared to be to seek a way to take advantage of the new conditions for personal gain. I was not exempt from this. Setting aside what was happening next door, or on the other side of the city, or across the world, my lockdown could not have been easier. I continued my job and kept receiving my salary, and I could spend time with my parents for the first time in years. However, loneliness, for being far away from my partner and for lacking a connection with what was happening, was the main feeling that accompanied my transition into the full virtual world of work, where interactions with friends and family were all mediated by the computer screen.

In Italy, a gradual reopening of the country took place during the spring of 2020, and no major restrictions were imposed the following summer. In the continuing process of the bureaucratization of the pandemic, the government required any movement outside the home to be justified in written form. In case of a police inspection, each person had to be ready to certify that they were going to the supermarket, to work, or that they fell within other limited exceptions. The peak of the farce was reached when the government faced the question of how to define “family” for the purposes of allowing visits.22 In a legalistic turn, the use of the old-fashioned word congiunti (the best translation is probably “loved ones”) was employed to leave a margin of opacity and freedom of interpretation in the implementation of the measure. My best reading of the situation is that since the government knew very little of what was actually happening, it tried out the unusual new power it had gained rather as a blindfolded child does when hitting a piñata.

3. September–December 2020

In September 2020, Italian schools and universities resumed in-person teaching, but only for a short period. Guatemalan public schools have not reopened as of the time of writing, two years into the pandemic, while private schools resumed in-person activities in mid-2021.23

The second wave of pandemic hit Italy in October, and new measures were initially imposed by local governments. At the same time, Guatemala was lifting its original stricter measures, and I arrived in Central America just in time to escape the new restrictions in Europe. I did not realize at that time that this trip would mark the first fissure in a growing gap that would radically separate my experience of the pandemic from that of family and friends in Europe. Traveling became, and still is, a privilege or a necessity, with nothing else in the middle. My partner and I managed to travel without too many difficulties, apart from the requirement to quarantine at home following each arrival in Italy, which was not a major problem for my job. The expanding virtual world allowed me to do my work unhindered. My reality moved online, thus distinguishing the way the academic profession (and a few other professions) experienced the pandemic from the way the vast majority of the world’s population did.

In November, Italy introduced a three-zone system corresponding to different restrictions, which, with major reforms, is still in place at the time of writing. All high school and university activities were moved back online, and all theatres, museums, and cinemas were shut down. By the end of the year, several regions were already under lockdown, which was extended to the entire country for the winter holidays. In Guatemala, the reopening of the country brought many restrictive measures to an end. A negative test taken within seventy-two hours prior to arrival was enough to enter the country, and quarantine was not required.24 A curfew remained in place from 9:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. until October 2020.25 To mark the end of the restrictions, the President affirmed that the government had done what it could, and the pandemic was now the people’s problem: “si se quieren cuidar, se cuidan.”26

At that time, protests erupted in both Italy and Guatemala. An excessive state intervention in the former and its total absence in the latter motivated the two very different protests. In Italy, peaceful as well as violent demonstrations against the new closures took place in the main cities, but the economic aid implemented by European governments cannot be compared with the absolute inaction in this regard in Guatemala.27 In a country struggling with malnutrition, in which informal workers constitute the majority of the population, the lockdown meant a humanitarian crisis of tragic proportions. As early as May, people gathered in the empty streets carrying white flags as a request for help.28 In Guatemala, peaceful protests erupted in the country when the government sought to pass further cuts to the health and school system. In November, a violent demonstration of unidentified protestors stormed the Congress and set fire to it.29

The gap between the two countries is also revealed in the official data provided on the pandemic. By the end of year, Guatemala reported 138,000 cases on the basis of 600,000 tests, and 4813 deaths.30 Italy reported just over 2 million cases on the basis of 27 million tests, and 74,159 deaths.31

4. January–June 2021

The new year and the normalization of the emergency brought the differences between the two countries further into relief. In Guatemala, no significant measure was implemented. Life in the wealthy districts of Guatemala City reverted to pre-pandemic times, except for the rarely respected use of masks in public spaces. A differentiation between risk zones did not really cause the application of different restrictions, but functioned only as a warning. Far away from the main cities, January began with the humanitarian crisis of a convoy of 6000 migrants seeking to cross the country by foot to reach Mexico and the United States. Guatemala has always been essential to the US interest in impeding direct access to its borders, and a friendly government allowed the Trump Administration to conclude a safe third-country agreement in 2019, requiring migrants coming from Honduras and El Salvador to seek asylum in Guatemala.32 The convoy was blocked by Guatemalan police with the brutal use of wooden bats.33 Needless to say, Europe is not dealing with the migrant crisis very differently, by designating Libya a safe third country.

In Italy, a third national lockdown was imposed during Easter, a ban on traveling between regions was in place until May 2021, and a curfew from 22:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. was in force until June. In Lombardy, the second semester started with in-person teaching, went online from March to April, and resumed in person in May. Beginning in May, restrictions were gradually reduced, and all regions reached the lower risk zone by the summer, when virtually all measures had been lifted. In March, a new, complex discriminatory system was put in place for those entering Italy from abroad. As of the time of writing, entry restrictions depend on the place of origin of travel, and range from the requirement of a negative test, to demonstrating a valid reason for travel, to quarantining for ten days. Countries of origin are divided into five categories, the first including micro-states in the territory of the Italian peninsula, for which no travel restrictions are envisaged, the fifth including most African, Asian, and Latin American states, travel to and from which is allowed only for specific reasons, and entry requirements include a negative test, quarantine, and a second negative test.34 These categories are constantly updated on the basis of unclear criteria, sometimes privileging luxury tourist destinations which are not affected by any strict measures.35

The new year also brought the start of the vaccination campaign and the hopes for a rapid solution to the pandemic. Of course, the development of vaccines and their inequal distribution had a major impact on the effects of the pandemic in Italy and Guatemala. Italy began a vaccination campaign in line with the rest of the European Union. I was teaching in Milan and received my first jab at the beginning of March. School and university staff were initially included in a special category and allowed to receive the vaccine immediately after health workers. In certain regions, other powerful lobbies, such as lawyers, managed to be included in the same category. The shortage of doses in the initial stage of the campaign caused the postponement of vaccinations for older people. My parents’ turn, for instance, came only in the early summer.

Until that time, my small community of family and friends was spared by the pandemic. It was very rare to hear of someone in my bubble being sick with Covid-19, and it was always in a milder form. Things changed drastically in April with the relaxation of measures. The father of a very close friend got sick at work and died three weeks later in intensive care. That was the first tragic case that shocked my small community, all the more painful since the vaccine was already being distributed but had not arrived in time for his age group and profession. At that time, I, thirty-seven years old and in good health, had already been vaccinated thanks to the fact that I was giving a few lectures, some of which were online.

The Guatemalan Parliament funded a vaccination program in January, and the government concluded an agreement with Russia for the delivery of 16 million doses of Sputnik V. The vaccines never arrived, or only in small quantities, and the money disappeared.36 The vaccination campaign took place mainly thanks to donations from foreign countries. In February, Israel was the first state to donate 5000 doses of vaccine to Guatemala. A historical ally going back to the time of the civil war, Guatemala was the second state after the United States to move its embassy to Jerusalem.37 However, since very few doses were initially donated, and the government remained uninvolved, the vaccination campaign never really began until the summer, when the Delta variant ravaged the country and more donations arrived. Needless to say, those who could afford it did not wait for the vaccine to arrive to Guatemala but flew to the United States and Mexico when they began vaccinating anyone independently of citizenship. The vast majority of the population does not have access to the vaccine, nor the cooperation of the Government.

Data indicate that by the end of June, Italy had registered more than 4.2 million cases, based on over 70 million tests, and 127,542 deaths; more than 34.4 million people had received the first dose of the vaccine.38 Guatemala reported fewer than 300,000 cases, 1.5 million tests, 9215 deaths, and almost 800,000 first doses.39

5. July–December 2021

The bureaucratization of the pandemic continued in Italy, as it did in many other parts of Europe, with the introduction of a Covid-19 certificate (the “green pass”).40 Initially, the certificate was issued after vaccination, recovery, or a negative test, and its use was incrementally imposed on every aspect of social life. At the time of writing, the green pass cannot be obtained with a negative test, and it is required for any social activities, excluding going to the supermarket and a few other exceptions.41

Despite the Delta variant, Italy did not experience another lockdown, and the high vaccination rate prevented the catastrophic third wave experienced in other countries. Data based on 93 million tests indicate that cases in Italy reached 4.6 million by the end of September, causing 130,870 deaths. More than 45 million first doses had been provided, inoculating 80% of the population.42 In contrast, by the end of September, Guatemala reported 500,500 cases, as per 2.5 million tests, and 13,525 deaths, and administered 4.5 million first doses (less than the 40% of the population).43 The adoption of the green pass and new stricter regulations caused a surge in testing that reached 1 million per day on average.44 In comparison, Guatemala reached a peak of 17,000 tests per day during the summer.45

In Guatemala, the Delta variant ravaged the country, despite what official data may have said. While European countries were easing Covid-19-related measures, in Guatemala, the new variants and the lack of vaccinations caused a surge in Covid-19 cases that paralyzed the activities of public hospitals. By August, only 10% of the population had received at least one dose of vaccine, and the campaign began at a point at which the situation was already unsustainable. In August, photos published on Twitter denounced the lack of beds, oxygen, and medical attention.46 A CNN investigation reported that the lack of drugs to treat critical patients led doctors to restrain intubated patients to prevent them from hurting themselves.47 At the end of August, the main temporary hospital in Guatemala City closed its doors to new patients.48 No news arrived from outside the city or from more remote communities. What I experienced during the few road trips in the country was the impossibility of obtaining a test when I contracted a 37°C (98.6ºF) fever at a popular tourist destination, and the continuous advertising of discounts for funeral services along the roads.

I was in Guatemala City at that time, living no more than ten minutes away from the temporary hospital. My partner and I were both fully vaccinated, while Guatemalan friends who could not afford to go abroad were getting sick and infecting older relatives. I was caught between three very different lives, with Italy seeking to return to an ordinary life, the academic bubble beginning to organize first in-person conferences, and the nightmare that was unfolding in Guatemala. In this context, very limited measures were reintroduced by the Guatemalan government, such as the closure of shops and restaurants at 9:00 p.m., and a general prohibition on selling alcohol after 9:00 p.m. These restrictions only fueled corruption, with a few bars and restaurants being allowed to work past 9:00 p.m.

During the summer, public gatherings and demonstrations were further restricted, when new protests against the government erupted.49 The peak of the protests, involving road blockades throughout the country, was reached when the Attorney General fired an anti-corruption public prosecutor, who was forced to leave the country the same night due to threats to his life.50 A scoop by the New York Times linked his departure to an investigation he was conducting against the President of Guatemala for a bribe he had allegedly received from Russian businessmen.51 In September 2021, the President asked the Congress to ratify its declaration of a state of emergency that would have given the government greater leeway in public procurement. The Congress rejected his request and annulled the declaration.52 In terms of Covid measures, the state of emergency would have reintroduced a 10.00 pm–4.00 a.m. curfew.53

Italian prosecutors are also dealing with cases concerning the role of the government during the pandemic and its lack of preparedness.54 An investigation is ongoing regarding a conflict of interest between the World Health Organization and the Italian government, which prompted the organization to invoke its immunity before Italian courts.55 To my knowledge, this is the only attempt to demand accountability for any Covid-19-related measures adopted by the Italian government over the last two years. The debate appears to be polarized between the establishment that does not welcome criticism and a radical minority of anti-vaccination, anti-conspiracy campaigners who are not doing a good job in challenging it.

The autumn and the Omicron variant brought a new rise in cases, but Italy did not introduce another lockdown. Since May 2021, no Italian region has been included in the high-risk zone, and the system was subjected to continuous reforms to guarantee that this was the case. The use of the green pass has been extended to resemble a de facto vaccine mandate, which was finally imposed for those aged over fifty in December 2021.56 At the time of writing, no restrictive measures are being applied in Guatemala apart from a ban on selling alcohol after 9.00 p.m., which sustains a corrupt lucrative industry. Entry into the country is now permitted from any state of origin, the only requirement being proof of vaccination and a negative test.

6. Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic hit my world with a constant flux of contrasting news from different jurisdictions, causing an unusual combination of farce and tragedy. Farce, in the attempt to develop and apply rules and regulations. Tragedy, in the differential effects of the pandemic. The divisions between continents grew, and very different perspectives fragmented a global event into irreconcilable experiences. The gap between what the pandemic meant for each of us has widened to cover all aspects of social life. In my lifetime, institutions at the national and international level alike have never been so distant from the people and appeared so lost in their attempt to manage events. That, at least, we all have in common.

Footnotes

1

See, e.g., COVID-19: Raccolta degli atti recanti misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell’emergenza epidemiologica, Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale, www.agenziacoesione.gov.it/covid19-atti-emergenza-epidemiologica/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (a chronological list of all Covid-19 related regulations in Italy).

2

For instance, up to August 2022, the medical journal Lancet published thirty articles with both “Italy” and “Covid-19” in the title, zero on Guatemala.

3

For the list of Guatemala legislative measures to which I will refer throughout the article, see Decretos Gubernativos—Disposiciones Presidenciales, Gobierno de la Guatemala, https://sgp.gob.gt/decretos/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).

4

See Situación de COVID-19 en Guatemala, Gobierno de la Guatemala, https://tablerocovid.mspas.gob.gt/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (official Guatemalan data on the pandemic).

5

For a timeline, see COVID-19 lockdowns in Italy, Wikipedia (last updated July 17, 2022), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_lockdowns_in_Italy.

6

See On March 16, Guatemalan President Giammattei Announced Four (4) Additional Confirmed Cases of COVID-19, Bringing the Total Number of Confirmed Cases to Six, U.S. Embassy in Guat. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://gt.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-guatemala-city-guatemala-march-16-2020/;Guatemala Extends Curfew to Avoid Spread of Coronavirus, Reuters (Mar. 29, 2020), https://reut.rs/3QaMG9W.

7

See Guatemala Bans Internal Travel for Easter to Curb Coronavirus Spread, U.S. News (Apr. 4, 2020), www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-04-04/guatemala-bans-internal-travel-for-easter-to-curb-coronavirus-spread.

8

See On Thursday, May 14th, Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei Announced the Imposition of New Restrictions to Movement and Activities, to Prevent the Spread of the Covid-19 Virus, U.S. Embassy in Guat. (May 14, 2020), https://gt.usembassy.gov/update-for-u-s-citizens-changes-to-covid-19-restrictions-by-the-government-of-guatemala/.

9

See Guatemala’s International Airport to Resume Flights on Sept. 18, Reuters (Sept. 1, 2020), https://reut.rs/3BKHi9f.

10

For a full list of measures in force by the end of April, see Health Alert: Guatemala, Updated Information on Restrictions in Guatemala by Government, Overseas Security Advisory Council (Apr. 7, 2020), www.osac.gov/Content/Report/ca1ece66-ab53-40cf-9202-188c6a49e4a7.

11

For pandemic data, see Coronavirus (COVID-19): Italy, Google News, https://news.google.com/covid19/map?hl=en-US&mid=%2Fm%2F03rjj&gl=US&ceid=US%3Aen (last visited Jan. 30, 2022); Coronavirus (COVID-19): Guatemala, Google News, https://news.google.com/covid19/map?hl=en-US&mid=%2Fm%2F0345_&gl=US&ceid=US%3Aen (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).

12

Roojin Habibi et al., Do Not Violate the International Health Regulations during the COVID-19 Outbreak, 395 Lancet 664 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30373-1.

13

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/402 of 14 March 2020 making the exportation of certain products subject to the production of an export authorization, 2020 O.J. (L 771) 1 (no longer in force), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/402/oj.

14

See Italian Army Takes Coffins as Virus Deaths Mount, BBC (Mar. 19, 2020), www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0872zh9.

15

See Coronavirus: inseguimento runner poliziotto a Pescara, YouTube (Apr. 9, 2020), https://youtu.be/lipVg-St79s.

16

See Press Release, Más de 41 mil personas detenidas a nivel nacional por incumplimiento de restricciones en Estado de Calamidad, Gobierno de la Guatemala (Sept. 20, 2020), https://mingob.gob.gt/mas-de-41-mil-personas-detenidas-a-nivel-nacional-por-incumplimiento-de-restricciones-en-estado-de-calamidad/.

17

See Guatemala: Al menos 7 muertos, la mayoría por decapitación, tras un motín en una cárcel, BBC News Mundo (May 20, 2021), www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-57186027.

18

See Lorenza Plueteri, Rivolta nel carcere di Modena: dubbi e contraddizioni sulle morti dell’8 marzo, Osservatorio Diritti (June 7, 2021), www.osservatoriodiritti.it/2021/06/07/carcere-modena-rivolta-8-marzo-indagini-decessi-detenuti-morti-pestaggi/.

19

See Fulvio Bufi, Carcere Santa Maria Capua Vetere: Pestaggi, torture, la barba strappata. Il film dell’orrore dietro le sbarre, Corriere (July 1, 2021), www.corriere.it/cronache/21_luglio_01/carcere-santa-maria-capua-vetere-video-pestaggi-polizia-74f14218-d9e6-11eb-9b34-ea2fae57adbd.shtml.

20

See Carlo Bonini & Fabio Tonacci, La storia taciuta delle violenze del marzo 2020 nelle carceri italiane, Repubblica (Jan. 14, 2021), www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2021/01/14/news/da_modena_a_foggia_la_rivolta_delle_carceri_dopo_il_lockdown_che_a_marzo_fece_13_morti_tra_i_detenuti-301050639/.

21

See Liana Milella, Boss scarcerati per l’emergenza Covid, Bonafede: “Non decide il ministro chi deve rientrare in cella, Repubblica (Sept. 30, 2020), www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/09/30/news/bonafede_carceri_boss-268966929/.

22

Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri del 26 aprile 2020, G.U. April 27, 2020 n. 108, www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2020/04/27/108/sg/pdf. See also Alessandra Ziniti, Coronavirus, Conte sul rebus congiunti: “Affetti stabili o parenti, non gli amici.” Mobilità vietata verso le seconde case, Repubblica (Apr. 27, 2020), www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/04/27/news/coronavirus_il_rebus_del_nuovo_decreto_chi_sono_i_congiunti_che_e_possibile_vedere_il_giallo_delle_seconde_case_dal_test-254997521/.

23

See Ana Lucía Ola, Guatemala puede perder 1.5 años de escolaridad por el cierre de escuelas, Prensa Libre (Apr. 16, 2021), www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/comunitario/guatemala-puede-perder-1-5-anos-de-escolaridad-por-el-cierre-de-escuelas/.

24

See Health Alert: Guatemala, Airport Reopening and Entry Requirements, Overseas Security Advisory Council (Sept. 19, 2020), www.osac.gov/Content/Report/5f7ab8aa-66b9-4aa2-adbe-19b3ef54a084.

25

See COVID-19 Pandemic—Guatemala, A3M Global Monitoring (last updated July 21, 2022), https://global-monitoring.com/gm/page/events/epidemic-0002105.u4ujttezp5QC.html?lang=en.

26

See Irving Escobar, Giammattei afirma que ahora el coronavirus en Guatemala “ya es problema de la gente, Prensa Libre (Aug. 6, 2020), www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/giammattei-afirma-que-ahora-el-coronavirus-en-guatemala-ya-es-problema-de-la-gente-breaking/.

27

See Covid, manifestazioni di protesta in diverse città: 5 arresti a Torino, 28 in Questura a Milano, RaiNews (Oct. 27, 2020), www.rainews.it/archivio-rainews/articoli/Covid-manifestazioni-di-protesta-in-diverse-citta-04d612ae-a5f9-4439-9d4c-3c91ee7b92fe.html.

28

See Jeff Abbott, Guatemala’s White Flags Indicate Pandemic’s Deadly Side-Effect: Hunger, Guardian (May 22, 2020), www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/22/guatemala-white-flags-hunger-coronavirus.

29

See Guatemala: Congress on Fire after Protesters Storm Building, BBC (Nov. 22, 2020), www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-55031455.

30

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Guatemala, supra note 11.

31

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Italy, supra note 11.

32

See Lauren Carasik, Trump’s Safe Third Country Agreement with Guatemala Is a Lie, Foreign Pol’y (July 30, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/30/trumps-safe-third-country-agreement-with-guatemala-is-a-lie/.

33

See Caravana de migrantes: la violenta represión en Guatemala contra grupos que se dirigen caminando a EE.UU., BBC News Mundo (Jan. 17, 2021), www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-55698861.

34
35

See Italy Gives COVID Green Light to Six Non-EU Tourist Destinations, Reuters (Sept. 28, 2021), www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-gives-covid-green-light-six-non-eu-tourist-destinations-2021-09-28/.

36

See Veronica Smink, Sputnik V: Por qué hay escasez de la vacuna rusa y qué pasará con los que recibieron la primera dosis y no pueden acceder a la segunda, BBC News Mundo (Aug. 5, 2021), www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-58076494.

37

See Patrick Kingsley, Israel Gives Vaccine to Far-Off Allies, as Palestinians Wait, N.Y. Times (Feb. 23, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-vaccine-diplomacy.html.

38

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Italy, supra note 11.

39

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Guatemala, supra note 11.

40

Introduced for the first time by Decreto legge n.52 del 22 aprile 2021, G.U. April 22, 2021, n. 96, www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2021/04/22/96/sg/pdf.

41

See Attività per le quali è richiesto il possesso del green pass “base”/“rafforzato, Governo Italiano (May 2, 2022), www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/documenti/documenti/Notizie-allegati/tabella_attivita_consentite.pdf.

42

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Italy, supra note 11.

43

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Guatemala, supra note 11.

44

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Italy, supra note 11.

45

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Guatemala, supra note 11.

46

See @mmendoza_GT, Twitter (Aug. 11, 2021, 10:20 p.m.), https://twitter.com/mmendoza_GT/status/1425552692219457542.

47

See Michelle Mendoza, Falta de medicamentos orilla a médicos de Guatemala a amarrar a intubados por covid-19 para que no se lastimen, CNN Espanol (Aug. 24, 2021), https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/guatemala-casos-covid19-aumento-medicos-falta-medicinas-amarrar-pacientes-pkg-michelle-mendoza-redaccion-mexico/.

48

See Julio Román, Maria Andrea Dominguez Velasco, & Paula Ozaeta, Hospital Temporal del Parque de la Industria llega a su máxima capacidad y no recibirá más pacientes covid-19, Prensa Libre (Sept. 1, 2021), www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/comunitario/hospital-temporal-del-parque-de-la-industria-llega-a-su-maxima-capacidad-y-no-recibira-mas-pacientes-covid-19-breaking/.

49

See Sofia Menchu, Guatemala Tightens Restrictions after COVID-19 Cases Surge, Reuters (July 14, 2021), https://reut.rs/3P6QMyo.

50

See Gerardo Lissardy, “La ilegalidad con la que fui destituido es un mensaje directo para el que se atreva a desafiar al regimen”: Juan Francisco Sandoval, exfiscal anticorrupción de Guatemala, BBC News Mundo (July 28, 2021), www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-57993177.

51

See Natalie Kitroeff, Biden Faces a Trade-Off: Stop Corruption, or Migration?, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/08/24/world/americas/guatemala-corruption-migrants.html.

52

See El Congreso de Guatemala rechaza el estado de calamidad impuesto por el president, EFE (Sept. 7, 2021), www.efe.com/efe/america/sociedad/el-congreso-de-guatemala-rechaza-estado-calamidad-impuesto-por-presidente/20000013-4623844.

53

See El Congreso de Guatemala rechaza el estado de calamidad ordenado por el presidente Giammattei, EuropaPress (Aug. 24, 2021), www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-congreso-guatemala-rechaza-estado-calamidad-ordenado-presidente-giammattei-20210824125813.html.

54

See Coronavirus: Italy Prosecutors Quiz PM Conte on Crisis, BBC (June 12, 2021), www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53006166.

55

Luca Pasquet, The WHO and the Italian Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic on Trial, Blog van het Utrecht Centre for Accountability and Liability Law, Blog van het Utrecht Ctr. for Accountability & Liability L. (Jan. 25, 2021), http://blog.ucall.nl/index.php/2021/01/the-who-and-the-italian-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-trial/.

56

Decreto legge 7 gennaio 2022, G.U. Jan. 7 2022, n. 4. https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2022/01/07/4/sg/pdf.

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