Winning Hearts and Minds: Soft Power, Cinema, and Public Perceptions of the United States and China in Brazil

Abstract

In this article, we explore the relationship between soft power projection and public opinion, specifically investigating how cinema as a soft power resource can shape people's positive perceptions about a country. While soft power has been defined as a form of persuasive power associated with intangible resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions, the link between these resources and public opinion has received limited attention in previous research. This study aims to fill this gap by using the film industry as a proxy for soft power projection. We compare the United States’ and China's soft power sources and projections through an online survey with 908 participants in Brazil. Our findings indicate that exposure to soft power via films can shape people's positive perceptions of countries. However, some dimensions of soft power appear to be more challenging to activate than others, such as patriotic films’ association with admiration for US military power. The study also discovered that soft power activation may be context dependent, with greater knowledge of a country's soft power resources in a particular context leading to increased soft power projection/activation. We contribute to research by empirically expanding our understanding of soft power dynamics and how power resources can be converted into public opinion in world politics.

Resumen Dans cet article, nous analysons la relation entre la projection de « soft power » et l'opinion publique, en nous intéressant plus particulièrement à comment le cinéma, en tant que ressource de soft power, façonne la perception positive d'un pays au niveau individuel. Bien que le soft power ait été défini comme une forme de pouvoir de persuasion associé à des ressources intangibles comme la culture, l'idéologie et les institutions, les travaux de recherche antérieurs se sont assez peu attardés sur le lien entre ces ressources et l'opinion publique. Cette étude souhaite pallier cette lacune en utilisant l'industrie du film comme support de projection du soft power. Nous comparons les sources et projections de soft power des États-Unis et de la Chine à l'aide d'un sondage en ligne soumis à 908 participants au Brésil. Nos résultats indiquent que l'exposition au soft power par le biais des films est susceptible de façonner la perception positive d'un pays au niveau individuel. Cependant, certaines dimensions du soft power semblent être plus difficiles à activer que d'autres, comme le fait d'associer des films patriotiques à l'admiration de la puissance militaire américaine. L’étude a également observé que l'activation du soft power peut dépendre du contexte : une connaissance approfondie des ressources de soft power d'un pays dans un contexte donné engendre une intensification de la projection/l'activation de ce pouvoir. Notre contribution à la recherche élargit empiriquement notre compréhension de la dynamique de soft power et de la conversion des ressources de pouvoir en opinion publique dans le domaine de la politique mondiale.

Résumé En este artículo, exploramos la relación existente entre la proyección del poder blando y la opinión pública, a través de la investigación, en concreto, sobre cómo el cine, en su carácter de recurso de poder blando, puede contribuir a moldear las percepciones positivas de las personas sobre un país. Aunque se ha definido el poder blando se ha definido como una forma de poder persuasiva asociada con recursos intangibles tales como la cultura, la ideología y las instituciones, las investigaciones anteriores han prestado una atención limitada al vínculo entre estos recursos y la opinión pública. Esta investigación tiene como objetivo llenar este vacío a través del uso de la industria cinematográfica como una representación de la proyección del poder blando. Comparamos las fuentes y las proyecciones de poder blando de Estados Unidos y China mediante una encuesta en línea con 908 participantes localizados en Brasil. Nuestras conclusiones indican que la exposición al poder blando a través de películas puede moldear las percepciones positivas de las personas con relación a los países. Sin embargo, algunas dimensiones del poder blando parecen ser más difíciles de activar que otras, como, por ejemplo, la asociación entre las películas patrióticas y la admiración por el poder militar de los EE. UU. La investigación también concluyó que la activación del poder blando puede depender del contexto y que un mayor conocimiento de los recursos de poder blando de un país en un contexto particular provoca una mayor proyección/activación del poder blando. Contribuimos al mundo de la investigación a través del aumento en términos empíricos de nuestra comprensión de la dinámica del poder blando y de cómo los recursos de poder pueden llegar a convertirse en opinión pública en la política mundial.

Soft power has been theorized as a type of persuasive power—usually associated with intangible resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions—that helps a country gain legitimacy in the eyes of other states (Nye 1990, 2005, 2011, 2021). Several studies have analyzed how the United States (e.g., Sun 2008; Aydemir 2017) and China (e.g., d'Hooghe 2011; Brady 2015; Peng and Keane 2019) put their soft power resources into play and how the public perceives these two countries (Jhee and Lee 2011; Carreras 2017). The link between soft power resources and variations in public opinion, however, has received scant attention (e.g., Jhee and Lee 2011; see for a review by Li 2017). More specifically, we have little knowledge of how soft power projection of a country shapes public perceptions. In the globalized information era, films are an entertainment vehicle that broadcasts culture and values to worldwide audiences, that is, they project soft power and can be a good proxy to study the relationship pointed out above (Nye 2005).

Latin America, and, more specifically, Brazil, presents a unique case study of how cinema can be converted into soft power projection and shape public perceptions. Since the early 2000s, Beijing and Washington have been quietly competing for regional influence. Cepik et al. (2021; see also Cui and Cepik 2023) observe that China has emerged as a significant economic power and has acted toward Latin America as a component of its global development strategy. Notably, although Chinese economic involvement in the region has surpassed that of the United States, Beijing has deliberately refrained from transgressing the strategic and military engagement boundaries that the Washington administration views as red lines in its foreign policy. Brazil, as a pivotal actor in the region, has drawn attention from both sides—with very unequal achievements on each side (see Cepik et al. 2021)—and is somewhat the epitome of how the so-called Chimerica (Ferguson and Schularick 2007) dispute materializes in Latin America.

In this article, we investigate how soft power resources can influence public perceptions of countries using the film industry as our proxy. We conducted an online survey in Brazil (N = 908) and found that exposure to soft power via films contributes to shaping perceptions about the United States and China. An important nuance in our findings, however, refers to the fact that although films may tap into several dimensions of soft power, some of them seem to be more difficult than others to be activated (e.g., patriotic films and their association with admiration for the US military power). In addition, we find evidence that soft power activation may be contextual, that is, the more one knows about the soft power resources projected by a country in a given context, the more it can increase the reach of such soft power projection/activation. We contribute to research by expanding empirically our understanding of the dynamics of soft power and how it can be converted from power resources into positive public perceptions in world politics.

In the following sections, we critically review the literature on soft power and how it has been projected via cinema. Next, we analyze the structure of the Brazilian film market and the roles the United States and China have played in it. In the following sections, we present our methods, results, and discussion.

Cinema and Soft Power

Nye (1990, 2005, 2011, 2021; see for a review Chitty et al. 2017) proposed that power should be divided into soft and hard halves. Soft power refers to the ability of a country to influence the behavior of other countries or actors through noncoercive means, such as culture, values, and ideology. Soft power is often contrasted with hard power, which involves the use of military or economic coercion to achieve foreign policy goals. Nye argues that a country's soft power can be an important source of influence in international relations and that it can be built through a variety of means, including diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and development aid. In sum, soft power is seen as a way for countries to achieve their objectives through attraction and persuasion, rather than through force or coercion.

The production of soft power, Nye (2011) notes, depends on both the qualities of the agent (sender) and how these are perceived by the target (receiver). A country's possession of power resources may not be automatically converted into a preferred outcome given that the conversion process is influenced by a variety of variables, including context, relationships between agents and subjects, strategies, and the means that agents deploy (see also Li 2017). Later, Nye (2021) suggested that decision-makers should combine and refine the use of soft and hard power resources to achieve an optimum (or quasi-optimum) balance and exercise smart power, through which they generate trust and mobilize public opinion and other leaders around forward-looking agendas.

Miller's (2021) critique of the concept of soft power is powerful in that the definition and measurement of influence can be subjective and difficult to quantify. Central to her critique is the fact that there is no clear consensus on what exactly constitutes “attraction” or “persuasion” in the conceptual definition, and how much of it is needed to be considered a significant source of power. Moreover, the concept of soft power can be problematic because it assumes that influence can be measured as a single variable, which is not always the case.¹

Films, being a typical medium of soft power, may enable us to overcome these limitations. Thanks to the globalization of information technology, films have become the most viable means of communication by transmitting images, stories, culture, and values to worldwide audiences (Crane 2014; Vlassis 2016). Many countries have invested in their film industries to build soft power (Jacob 2017). Hollywood has long been the world's most popular film industry, thrilling generations everywhere. At the same time, some rising film industries in other countries have also been promoting their national cultures through mass communication. Examples include Bollywood in India (De Zoysa and Newman 2002), Nollywood in Nigeria (Ojo 2017), and China's film coproduction model (Peng and Keane 2019).

Hollywood's Influence over the World

Nye (2008, 2010) argues that the Hollywood film industry is a typical example to illustrate how the United States can effectively promote a model of its society and values abroad. Films demonstrate that the United Sates is a “universal nation” made up of immigrants familiar with cultural exchange (De Zoysa and Newman 2002) and that foreign lifestyles in the social and political fields can be fitted into American values (Sun 2008; Aydemir 2017). In this way, Hollywood cinema depicts the American lifestyle as a kind of global culture and shows that liberty is a universal value (Crane 2014), which has increased global awareness of and openness to American ideals (Keohane and Nye 1998).

De Zoysa and Newman (2002) observe that American films have become part of the socialization process for worldwide audiences, with their idioms, basic assumptions, and subtext becoming increasingly familiar to all—even to those who have never set foot in the United States (Jacob 2017). Sen (1993) also notes that the consumption of American films signifies a higher social status for the consumers, especially in the developing world, as it is considered a privilege of the rich and the urban elite.

Hollywood has been historically politicized during certain periods, and the US image projected on the cinema screen followed changes in foreign policy. The golden years of Hollywood—spanning from 1938 to 1960—projected a uniform vision of the United States to the world: “faith in the democratic order, the classless society, heroic individualism, and the golden opportunities offered by the capitalist work ethic and enterprise” (De Zoysa and Newman 2002, 188). In the 1940s, Hollywood was used by the Office of Wartime Information (OWI) as an effective propaganda tool. During the Cold War, Hollywood took on a mission to disinfect communist ideas and polish the official state ideology (Nye 2008). American films then conveyed messages to large audiences that freedom is a symbol of democracy, and that totalitarian and fascist governments should not be tolerated (Aydemir 2017). In the détente period (1969–1979), American exceptionalism was globally propagated through Hollywood films (Hobsbawm 1994; Westad 2005; Güzelipek 2018). Since the 1980s, Hollywood has pursued a “world cinema” strategy based on three key mechanisms: the development of world films, the development of a global approach to the market, and the establishment of horizontal cooperation among companies centered on entertainment activities (Michalet 1987). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, President George W. Bush encouraged Hollywood to sell the war on terror overseas by orchestrating cinema as a propaganda strategy (De Zoysa snd Newman 2002).

A number of US advantages can explain Hollywood's dominant position in the global film industry. First, the growth of the English language during the British Empire's heyday gave the American film industry a significant advantage in terms of language dissemination (De Zoysa and Newman 2002). Second, Hollywood's economies of scale are the result of its unparalleled expertise, global distribution strategies, international stars, capacity for innovation, strategic adaptation to new technological forces, and generous funding (Vlassis 2016, 2021; Rosen 2021). Third are cultural policies backed by the US government that guarantee Hollywood films’ dominant global status despite increasing competition from other countries—for instance, the US government has been devoted to negotiating with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other countries to eliminate film quotas and ensure the presence of American films in those markets (Crane 2014).

China's Soft Power through the Film Industry

To tell “China's story well”² and challenge American soft power influence, films have become an important focus of the Chinese government in fostering cultural diplomacy. Under President Xi Jinping's leadership, China's foreign propaganda efforts have been pushed to a new level of assertiveness, confidence, and ambition, aiming at renewing China's cultural self-confidence and challenging Western values (Brady 2015; Chen 2016).

Despite an outstanding dedication of funds to film production, Chinese films have generally not been well accepted abroad, making it hard to exert cultural influence over overseas audiences (Peng and Keane 2019). Vlassis (2016) points out that China's cinematic industry cannot yet be considered a regional cultural power, let alone a global one. This becomes more evident when compared with India, the world's largest film producer and the largest film exporter to Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Screen Australia 2014). Even though there is occasional success for some Chinese films abroad, most directors are not considered true mainlanders by some foreign critics (Peng and Keane 2019).

Besides, China's experiment in film coproduction with Hollywood, regardless of exchanges of ideas, technology, knowledge, and professional skills, was not successful (Brady 2015; Su 2016; Peng and Keane 2019). For instance, the unsatisfactory performance of The Great Wall (2016) revealed the difficulty in finding stories that meld Eastern and Western characters and appeal to the audience on both sides. Faced with all these challenges, Rosen (2021) believes that China has redirected its film production toward the domestic audience, placing greater emphasis on domestic political and social stability as well as ensuring youth patriotism. At the same time, China has been relatively content with Hollywood making films that portray China in a positive light as a substitute for Chinese-made films.

Cinema Attendance in Brazil

A national survey conducted in September 2020 showed that going to the cinema was the most engaged activity before the COVID-19 pandemic and was also an activity that Brazilians missed the most during the lockdown (Itaú Cultural and Datafolha 2020). According to the Brazilian National Film Agency (ANCINE), in 2021, only 477 of 5,570 Brazilian municipalities (around 8 percent) have cinemas, and Brazilian filmgoers concentrate more on the wealthy and well-educated part of the population (Nishijima et al. 2020). Much like Sen’s (1993) findings, watching films in cinemas is considered a privilege of the upper-middle class as a means of entertainment in Brazil.

Brazilian filmgoers mostly prefer foreign films to domestic ones. In another survey carried out in 2021 (Itaú Cultural and Datafolha 2021), 19 percent of Brazilian filmgoers admitted that they had never watched any national films. Of those who have watched national films, most (39 percent) watched them on TV, and only 12 percent watched them in cinemas. The survey also revealed that Brazilians are not interested in national films mostly because of their content—chiefly because of the excess of coarse language and violent scenes in national productions.

Brazilians consume mostly American films in cinemas due to distribution and preference. Figure 1 shows that available films in Brazilian cinemas during 2009–2019 were mainly American (1,665), Brazilian (1,380), and European (1,252) releases, with each occupying around one-third of the Brazilian cinema market share.³ Nevertheless, despite relatively diverse options to choose from in cinemas, Hollywood films override those produced locally and in Europe. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, ticket sales were highly concentrated on American films, which occupied the predominantly largest share (77.58 percent) of the box office in Brazilian cinemas (USD 1.4 billion). Although Brazilian and European films had distribution proportions similar to American films, they sold disproportionately fewer tickets than the latter, which are, respectively, USD 240 million (13.87 percent) and USD 95 million (6.91 percent).

Figure 1.

Film distribution in Brazil by country of origin (2009–2019).

Figure 2.

Box Office in Brazil by country of origin (2009–2019).

Chinese films, however, play a very minor role in Brazilian cinema. Figures 1 and 2 show that Chinese films had a very small share of film releases (forty-four releases) and box office (USD 19 million) in the country between 2009 and 2019. Despite China's efforts to promote the “Chinese dream,” few Chinese films were screened (0.73 percent) and few tickets were sold (1.08 percent) in Brazil. Among the forty-four Chinese films released between 2009 and 2019, thirty-six belonged to fiction, six to animation, and two to documentaries, according to data from the Brazilian National Film Agency (ANCINE).⁴ Interestingly, the top three releases with the highest box office numbers are films that China coproduced with Hollywood: Iron Man 3 (2013), Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014), and Kung Fu Panda 3 (2016).

The Present Study

In this study, we test whether cinema as a form of soft power projection may shape how the public (i.e., Brazilians) perceives other countries (i.e., the United States and China). Our overarching hypothesis (H1) is that individuals who are more (and continuously) exposed to films (i.e., exposed to soft power) originating from a specific country (e.g., the United States) tend to bear more favorable views about the standing of that specific country in the world.

Soft power might be exerted by several means (Nye 1990, 2011) and tap into the several aspects that move public opinion (Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Shapiro and Page 1988). We have theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that cinema, as a proxy for soft power projection, may reflect political, economic, cultural, and even military values and interests (Chitty et al. 2017). In this context, we expect (H2) that cultural and political values exhibited in films will be the main drivers of soft power projection. Economic and military aspects, however, may be contextual and intertwined with other more structural variables (e.g., historical patterns of friendship or rivalry). Hence, we refrain from hypothesizing about such aspects of soft power and approach them from a more exploratory angle.

Still, hinged on the possibility that some dimensions of soft power projection are contextual—as much as their consequential positive attitudes—and the fact that previous knowledge of the soft power emission country may affect such perceptions, we hypothesize (H3) that there will be an effect size inflation for the cases in which individuals hold previous knowledge about the soft power emission country. Considering the historical foothold that the United States has established in world culture after the Second World War—and that this cultural influence has not only extrapolated to printed and broadcast media but also spilled over to streaming and other digital media—we use the United States as our control variable and test H3 only for China.

Regarding our case study choice, Brazil's peculiar standing between both great powers makes it an ideal case study to understand soft power projection and its proxies. On the one hand, Brazil shares with the United States its Western roots⁵ and has historically been under the American political, economic, cultural, and military orbit of influence. On the other hand, China has over the past decades grown in economic importance to Brazil, for example, overtaking the United States as Brazil's largest trade⁶ partner in 2009. Above and beyond, these characteristics also allow us to understand how historical ties and more newly formed linkages can influence how public opinion reacts to soft power projections.

Methods

To study public perceptions of the projected American and Chinese soft power via film consumption/cinema attendance, we collected our data over 5 weeks between March and September 2020 in Brazil. The Institution's Human Ethics Board approved our study. We report complete question wording in the online appendix to save space.

Power Analysis and Sampling

We conducted an a priori sampling using R software⁷ seeking high power (0.95) to detect small effect sizes (β = 0.20) at α = 0.05 (two-tailed) in multiple linear regressions (with five tested predictors). Set according to Cohen's ƒ² = 0.10 for small effects, which equates to regression standardized coefficients ranging from β = 0.04 to 0.25 (Cohen 1988), results indicated a minimum required sample size of 105 participants. We decided to collect more data, respecting our sampling threshold.

Recruitment and Demographics

We recruited participants using an exponential nondiscriminative snowball sampling technique via email and social media. Snowballing was a possible method to recruit participants due to the COVID-19 pandemic social distancing measures we faced. Participation in our research was entirely voluntary. Nine hundred and eight participants participated in our research (M_age = 24.60; 46 percent female; further descriptive statistics described in table 1).

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation
China
Politics	4.62	1.53
Economy	4.42	1.72
Military	4.65	1.90
Culture	3.91	1.46
United States
Politics	3.75	1.63
Economy	2.33	1.59
Military	3.60	1.97
Culture	3.49	1.77
Cinema attendance	2.15	.91
Age	24.60	7.41
Income	0.73	0.39
Gender	0.46	0.49
Education	0.77	0.41
Conservatism	3.03	2.41

Note: Gender = male (0); female (1).

Procedure

Participants who expressed interest in participating in our research were directed to the web-based Google Form survey platform to read the plain language statement and the informed consent form. Next, they answered demographic questions (age, gender, and income) and indicated their cinema attendance levels. In the following, participants completed questionnaires assessing their perceptions of the United States and China (evenly and randomly assigned to participants), their general knowledge about China, and finally their self-placement regarding political orientation. After completing and submitting their responses, participants were debriefed.

Measurements

Film consumption/cinema attendance was measured by a four-point scale in which participants described their frequency of going to the cinema each year as a proxy for soft power exposure. Figure 3 shows the students’ cinema attendance frequency by their income class.

Figure 3.

Cinema attendance per year by income class in Brazil.

To assess Brazilian perceptions about the United States and China's soft power projection, we ask participants about their agreement on statements (seven-point Likert scale) about the two countries regarding soft power in political, economic, military, and cultural dimensions.

To measure previous knowledge about China, we asked participants on a seven-point Likert scale (from 1 = “very little” to 7 = “very much”) how much they knew about aspects of Chinese society (e.g., cultural, economic, military, or political aspects). See figure 4 for their distribution.

Figure 4.

Self-reported degree of knowledge about China.

Control Variables

We also added covariates that may affect how soft power shapes public opinion's perceptions of countries, such as demographic variables (age, gender, and income), to control for these effects. Last, we measured participants’ political orientation as a covariate to establish the unique contribution of cinema attendance to positive attitudes toward the United States and China. Participants placed their ideological preferences on an eleven-point scale (0 = left; 10 = right).

Analytical Strategy

We estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) to study whether film consumption relates to Brazilian public opinion toward the United States and China. Our model is represented by:

$$\begin{equation}{y}_i = {\beta }_0\ + {\beta }_1{\rm{cin}}{{\rm{e}}}_i + X^{\prime}B + {\mu }_i\end{equation}$$

(1)

where |${y}_i$| are a set of variables that measure participants’ attitudes i toward the United States or China regarding each of the four aspects (politics, economics, military, and culture); thus, we have eight dependent variables. The variable cine_i describes the frequency with which the participant i goes to the cinema each year, and the associated |${\beta }_1$|is our interest coefficient to be estimated; X is a set of control covariates as described above and B is the vector of their associated coefficients. Finally, |${\mu }_i$| is the orthogonal error. We employ robust errors to estimate our models to avoid potential heteroskedasticity problems.

Results and Discussion

Our results show (table 2), as hypothesized, significant positive associations between cinema attendance by Brazilians and positive attitudes toward American cultural and political values. Two main factors may explain why such associations happen. First are the abundant soft power resources the United States brings to the Brazilian cinema market, where Hollywood productions take up about one-third of film releases. Second is the fact that US productions enjoy overwhelming popularity, winning nearly 80 percent of the Brazilian box office.

Table 2.

OLS models for soft power influence via cinema attendance

	United States				China
	Politics	Economy	Military	Culture	Politics	Economy	Military	Culture
Cinema attendance	0.14*	0.07	0.003	0.15**	−0.03	0.11*	−0.05	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
N	882	882	882	882	882	882	882	882
R2	0.25	0.34	0.39	0.25	0.24	0.13	0.06	0.07

Note: All covariates were included. Sample size reduction due to missing data in the income variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

We found evidence of previous soft power theorizations (Nye 1990, 2011), showing that through more contact with films, Brazilian filmgoers become familiarized with—which transfers to positive attitudes toward—American culture and political values. Since Hollywood films depict the American lifestyle as a global culture and present liberal democracy as an ideal model (Crane 2014; Aydemir 2017), the American film industry is still winning over hearts and minds in Brazil as it did during the Cold War across the world (Nye 2005). Moreover, our results corroborate De Zoysa and Newman's (2002, 187) argument that “the cultural reach of Hollywood opens the doors to cross merchandising, endorsing the values of consumerism and commodification globally.”

We adopted a more exploratory approach regarding the associations between soft power projection and film consumption for the military and economic dimensions of soft power. A possible explanation for the lack of significant effects between the military dimension and the United States or Chinese soft power projection may be that films portraying military actions include violence and may not attract crowds to cinemas due to age restrictions or limited interests, among others—and may be less likely to be box office major successes (Crane 2014), making them less powerful as a soft power projection tool.

On the other hand, although we observed no significant associations between soft power projection via film consumption and the economic dimension of soft power for the United States—even though every Hollywood film portrays American wealth and lifestyle (see Sen 1993)—that was not the case, however, for China. This is indeed surprising, but this finding may lend some support to our H3 showing that continuous exposure to soft power resources may not change attitudes and that the economic dimension of soft power may be better activated by other contextual factors. We observed significant positive associations between cinema attendance by Brazilians and positive perceptions of the economic dimension of China. One possible explanation for such an association is that Brazilian filmgoers, who are more engaged in cultural activities and more exposed to entertainment media, are likely to be better informed than the average individual, and therefore better understand the importance of China in the national economy.

To test this possibility, we controlled our regression model for previous knowledge about Chinese society (table 3). Much in line with our hypothesis, we observed an effect size inflation for the cases in which individuals held previous knowledge about China. Although the effect size inflation was robust across the board, there were no changes in significant associations (cinema attendance–economic dimension) previously observed.

Table 3.

OLS models for soft power influence via cinema attendance weighted by knowledge about China

	Politics	Economy	Military	Culture
Cinema attendance	−0.08 (0.08)	0.13* (0.07)	−0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)
N	882	882	882	882
R2	0.25	0.34	0.39	0.25

Note: All covariates were included. Sample size reduction due to missing data in the income variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

The US film industry has had outsized success on a global stage, with American films dominating the top-ten list of global film markets (Crane 2014). During the Cold War, Hollywood was a key piece in the US strategy to win over hearts and minds across the world for Western values such as human rights, liberal democracy, and free markets (Hobsbawm 1994; Aydemir 2017). In a more perennial fashion, Sen (1993, 213–17) notes that the US media machine has successfully promoted “the luxurious lifestyle and technological superiority of the US.”

China's transition into a global power over the past four decades has been built upon unprecedented economic growth and expanding political and military capacities (Kim and Gates 2015), but Chinese leadership still feels that the country needs to build a positive image—via the dissemination of its culture and civilizational values—to legitimize its new major power status (Nye 2012; Peng and Keane 2019; Pu 2019). This urge becomes even more imperative under the pressure generated by the worldwide influence of the US cultural industry (Nye 2005) and its immediate neighbors’ success in projecting soft power—Japan's anime and South Korea's K-pop (see Keane 2010).

Although the Chinese government has been promoting the country's presence in the world with language projects (e.g., Confucius Institute), global mass media (e.g., China Daily, People's Daily, China Global Television Network), and sports (e.g., the 2008 Summer and 2022 Winter Olympics), among others, real Chinese soft power is still in its “embryonic phase” (Wu 2018). From a resource-based perspective, China still lacks competitive popular cultural products that can help it build an appealing global image (Gill and Huang 2006; Peng and Keane 2019).

China's film industry development is far from compatible with its fast economic growth (Peng and Keane 2019; Rawnsley 2021). Many believe that China's media control is the most significant impediment to the success of locally produced films in China. Peng and Keane (2019, 914) claim that “China offers unique challenges such as strict censorship, government intervention, unclear regulations, and underdeveloped industry mechanisms,” and film producers tend to “self-censor prior to submission of the projects to the state regulatory agency.”

A strictly state-oriented cultural policy is likely to stifle creativity because “cultural engagement works best when governments leave the cultural industries alone to produce appealing, and sometimes challenging works of art” (Rawnsley 2021, 196), while censorship will only undermine the credibility of Chinese cinema and its soft power potential (d'Hooghe 2011; Lovric 2018). The nondemocratic nature of China's government and its opaque political decision-making are likely to raise questions about the legitimacy of the Chinese government to speak for its people (d'Hooghe 2011). For China to achieve better recognition of culture and values through films, Nye (2021, 205–206; see also Nye 2012) argues that “China should realize that most of a country's soft power comes from its civil society rather than from its government,” and that the country needs to consider how to “reconcile with tight party control” and “give more leeway to the talents of its civil society.” In sum, in contrast to the United States, the state-oriented model accompanied by strict media control has been attributed as the most important factor in the unsatisfactory performance of Chinese films overseas.

Limitations

Although our findings have clear implications, there are also some potential limitations to address. Concerns may be raised about our sample. Although we do not have a nationally representative sample, its statistical power is sufficient to detect the small effect sizes needed. Furthermore, regarding the quality of our data, Chang and Krosnick (2009) note that volunteer samples produce cleaner data that display less measurement error due to social desirability bias and being intrinsically motivated.

The nature of our study presupposes a causal order that cannot be directly established. We cannot rule out claims of reverse causality (soft power projection predicting film consumption). However, it is more plausible to assume that individuals go to films due to personal interests than because of the attractiveness of the country where the piece screened has been produced. Notwithstanding, we acknowledge that individuals’ political experiences may impact their film consumption, and future research could explore potential causal relationships. In order to address this potential limitation, we employed a variety of third-variable explanations, such as age, gender, income, and ideology, in our regression models to enhance the internal validity of our study.

A final limitation may refer to the media through which films have been broadcast recently. The focus of this article is on cinema, the traditional form of film consumption. Considering the increasing popularity of the online streaming platform, further studies are encouraged to investigate the soft power implications of this new media form. We also expect to see empirical studies on other popular cultural programs such as music and TV shows.

Conclusion

In this article, we provide a much needed and novel empirical link between soft power resources and public opinion. Resources and outcomes consist of two important aspects in assessing a country's soft power (Nye 2021). They are the two ends of the soft power process, where resources are converted into desired outcomes in a voluntary manner (Li 2017).

Our study reveals the connection between resources and outcomes: more exposure to American films in cinemas was proved to be related to more positive perceptions of the United States regarding its political and cultural influences. While this is more limited in the Chinese case—perhaps due to the lack of Chinese films in cinemas. Furthermore, our results show that the disparity of films as soft power resources between the United States and China may influence a third country's public opinion. American films not only have an advantageous distribution in Brazilian cinemas but also outpace other countries’ films in terms of popularity. China, despite being the most important trade partner for Brazil since 2009, has very limited film resources in Brazilian cinemas.

Films are only a small part of a broader package of popular cultural industries. While the United States seems to have well-established soft power channels using its film industry, China, to establish itself as a major player, must develop a brand that appeals worldwide, similar to Hollywood, Japanese anime, and Korean pop music (Nye 2012; Brady 2015; Wu 2018; Peng and Keane 2019). What is more, while economic investments and partnerships may improve China's image in Latin America, negative stereotypes and misunderstandings about Chinese culture and society prevail without the influence of popular culture (see Armony and Velásquez 2015; Maggiorelli, Pino Uribe, and Cifuentes 2023).

Footnotes

1

Nye (2005) in earlier works, however, recognized that different states may value and respond to different forms of influence, and what works for one state may not work for another. Additionally, the effectiveness of soft power strategies can vary depending on the cultural, political, and economic context in which they are used.

2

“Jiang Hao Zhong Guo Gu Shi” was introduced by Xi Jinping to strengthen and innovate China's propaganda abroad (China Daily 2016; China Media Project 2021).

3

Brazilian local film screenings have been guaranteed by a quota for national productions that must be displayed by cinemas every year.

4

Accessed April 26, 2023. https://www.gov.br/ancine/pt-br.

5

Some authors dispute this idea, stating that Brazil is part of the “inverter mirror” of Latin American culture (Morse 1988) or the “Other West” (Merquior 1991).

6

In 2002, 5 percent of Brazilian exports went to China; in 2022, 26 percent of Brazilian exports went to the country—against 11 percent going to the United States. Between 2005 and 2022, Brazil has solidified its position as the fourth country in terms of receiving investments from China, behind only the United States, Australia, and Great Britain. During this period, Brazil has accumulated $66.1 billion in investments, with a particular focus on the energy and electricity, information technology, and oil and gas industries (AEI 2023).

7

R package pwr (Champely et al. 2020).

Acknowledgments

We thank several professors and staff of the university who supported and helped the conduction of this study. We also thank the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) (Grant numbers: 88882.378011/2019-01) for supporting the study under the Master's Scholarship

Funder Information

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior Grant numbers: 88882.378011/2019-01.