https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8452-2118
Abstract
The article explores how and why communities of practice (CoPs) of international organizations (IOs) work together effectively despite the rigid formal bureaucratic and institutional borders they inhabit. The manuscript explains how four informal mechanisms combined to enable CoPs embedded in the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the United Nations (UN) Organization to resolve political crises in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo between 2016 and 2022. The informal mechanisms allowed CoPs to overcome their institutional limitations, cross rigid organizational borders, and work together to resolve different political crises in the six countries. Some of the informal mechanisms were cultivated by CoPs, while others emerged organically from activities and interactions of these like-minded professionals. The informal instruments that were developed and used to resolve the crises provide a telling illustration of how CoPs create global governance norms, practices, processes, rules, and structures from below. The enabling role that informality played in the six conflict theaters suggests that paying close attention to the informal dimensions of CoPs has enormous analytical benefits.
L'article examine comment et pourquoi les communautés de pratiques (CDP) des organisations internationales (OI) travaillent efficacement ensemble, malgré les frontières institutionnelles et bureaucratiques formelles rigides qui les entourent. Il explique comment quatre mécanismes informels se sont combinés pour permettre aux CDP implantées dans l'Union africaine (UA), la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Cédéao) et l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) de résoudre des crises politiques au Burkina Faso, en Gambie, au Ghana, en Guinée, au Mali et au Togo entre 2016 et 2022. Les mécanismes informels ont permis aux CDP de surmonter leurs limites institutionnelles, de traverser des frontières organisationnelles rigides et de travailler ensemble pour résoudre différentes crises politiques dans six pays. Certains mécanismes informels ont été cultivés par les CDP tandis que d'autres sont issus de façon organique des activités et interactions de ces professionnels de même sensibilité. Les instruments informels qui ont été mis au point et employés pour résoudre les crises fournissent une illustration révélatrice du processus de création de normes, pratiques, procédés, règles et structures par le bas dans les CDP. L'importance du rôle joué par le caractère informel dans ces six conflits suggère qu'un intérêt particulier pour les dimensions informelles des CDP comporte des avantages analytiques considérables.
Este artículo estudia cómo y por qué las Comunidades de Práctica (CdP) de las organizaciones internacionales (OOII) pueden trabajar juntas de manera efectiva a pesar de las rígidas fronteras burocráticas e institucionales formales por las que se rigen. El manuscrito explica cómo se combinaron cuatro mecanismos informales para permitir que las CdP integradas dentro de la Unión Africana (UA), la Comunidad Económica de los Estados de África Occidental (CEDEAO) y la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) pudieran resolver las crisis políticas en Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Malí y Togo entre 2016 y 2022. Los mecanismos informales permitieron a las CdP superar sus limitaciones institucionales, cruzar las rígidas fronteras organizativas y trabajar juntas con el fin de resolver diferentes crisis políticas en estos seis países. Algunos de estos mecanismos informales fueron puestos en marcha por las propias CdP, mientras que otros fueron surgiendo orgánicamente de las actividades e interacciones de estos profesionales de ideas afines. Los instrumentos informales que se desarrollaron y utilizaron para resolver las crisis proporcionan una ilustración reveladora de cómo las CdP pueden crear normas, prácticas, procesos, reglas y estructuras de gobernanza global desde abajo. El papel facilitador que desempeñó la informalidad en estos seis escenarios de conflicto nos sugiere que el hecho de prestar mucha atención a las dimensiones informales de las CdP proporciona unos beneficios analíticos enormes.
Introduction
Many International Relations (IR) scholars agree that communities of practice (CoPs) work across formal organizational borders (Græger 2016; Banerjee and MacKay 2020; Schulte, Andresen, and Koller 2020; Sondarjee 2021). It is very common to find United Nations (UN) economists working effectively with counterparts embedded in regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Similarly, climate governance research shows that environmental CoPs employed by different international organizations (IOs) work closely together to create environmental standards and to put environmental ideas and issues on the agenda for global and state actions (Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass, and Benson 2020). Negotiations to resolve climate emergencies are primarily driven by CoPs operating across institutional borders. In many instances, CoPs work together precisely to overcome limitations imposed by organizational borders (Hildreth, Kimble, and Wright 2000; Roberts 2006). Many CoPs work seamlessly and effectively as if those hardened organizational borders do not exist (Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass, and Benson 2020). This begs the question of what makes constellations of CoPs hang together so effectively.
Drawing on collaboration among CoPs embedded in the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN, we argue that informality is the glue that holds them together. Informality, defined as unofficial processes, norms, rules, practices, actors, and decision-making structures that make up the social world, provided the key mechanism for mediation CoPs in the three organizations to work effectively across their formal organizational borders in conflict theaters in West Africa.1 For illustrative purposes, we show how unofficial processes, norms, actors, and decision-making practices enabled the three organizations to mediate an end to political crises in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo between 2016 and 2022. First, we demonstrate that even though the three organizations do not have formal agreements outlining their working relations, the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs have cultivated informal processes, such as unofficial joint working timetables, missions, and informal desk-to-desk interactions at both the political and technical levels, to mediate conflicts in West Africa. We draw on the mediation that ended the 2016 political crisis in Ghana to demonstrate the importance of informal processes to the work of CoPs in mediation theaters.
Second, we show how informal norms shaped CoPs’ selection of mediation leadership in conflict theaters. The mediation CoPs have an informal understanding (norm) that the dynamics of each conflict would determine the selection of mediation leadership. On the ground, this organically developed informal norm often trumps the primacy/leadership role granted to the UN by international law. To determine the best organization to lead a particular mediation process in West Africa, CoPs in the three organizations assess each conflict in terms of nature, drivers, and parties involved. Based on informal backchannel discussions, the three organizations then decide which among them has the appropriate leadership skills set to lead the mediation team. The UN sometimes takes a backseat or supporting role to either ECOWAS or the AU on the ground in mediating West African conflicts. It usually takes the lead role in formalizing and presenting the outcome of the mediation to the international community through the UN Security Council. We draw on the resolution of the Gambia political crisis between December 2016 and January 2017 to illustrate the importance of informal norms to CoPs in mediation settings.
Third, although the three intergovernmental bodies are designed to work with state or government officials, the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs have developed a habit of building close working relationships with informal actors in mediation theaters. The informal practices of working with parties who may not hold official state positions and using nonconventional means of communicating with parties have become defining features of the work of mediation CoPs. The working relations with non-state actors allow the CoPs to connect effectively with ordinary people and key non-state stakeholders in conflict zones. We use the resolution of the Togolese crisis in 2017 and 2018 to demonstrate the importance of informal actors to CoPs in conflict zones.
Finally, we show that CoPs in the three organizations cultivated and used informal decision-making structures in mediation theaters. Informal decision-making involves unofficial consultations, committees, and decision-making on the sidelines of official meetings. The informal decision-making processes allowed the mediation CoPs to access similar information, prevent miscommunication, and enable them to make quick decisions. For illustrative purposes, we draw on the mediation to end military rule in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali between 2021 and 2022 to show the importance of informal decision-making to CoPs in mediation settings.
Methodologically, the cases used to illustrate the argument are hard ones. The political crises CoPs addressed in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo were not just security-related, but required delicate balancing acts. CoPs and the three IOs they inhabited had to walk a fine line, as any major missteps could have led to bloodshed and protracted violence. As many IR scholars have observed, the so-called high political issues are anything but epiphenomenal (Cox 1981; Baun 1995; Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Thus, the cases were selected primarily because they were hard ones. What else can possibly evade the influence of informality when its impacts can be seen in such high-stake politics?
The rest of the article is organized into four sections. The section following this introduction provides a theoretical grounding for the paper. It is followed by an outline of key mechanisms of informality and how they allow CoPs to work effectively across international institutional boundaries. The next section explores how informality helped the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs to work together in mediation theaters in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo. The final section provides a succinct summary of the central argument and its implications for further CoPs research.
Theorizing CoPs from an Informality Perspective
The informality perspective suggests that the social world is fundamentally driven or shaped by unofficial rules, norms, practices, processes, actors, and decision-making structures (Azari and Smith 2012; Tieku 2019b; Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2021). The informal, as the Venn diagram shows, is the large swath of the social world in which governments and/or IOs have not established formal rules, norms, practices, processes, and decision-making structures. It is the part of the social world that is not subject to the double consent of states. Informal spaces dominate the social world. Attempts by actors, such as governments and IOs, to impose formality in pockets of the social world that humans inhabit remain patchy, uneven, and a work-in-progress. These actors have yet to replace the default state of the social world, which is informal in nature. Remnants of informality still reign supreme, even in areas where governments and IOs have tried to impose formality. Numerous IR studies show that informality permeates even the most formalized spaces of the social world (Gifkins 2021; Tieku 2019b; Tieku et al. 2020; Tieku 2020. Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2021). As Gifkins’ (2021) research on the UN demonstrated, informality drives activities of formalized spaces such as the Security Council.
The informality perspective does not in any way imply that formal, official, or state-based rules, norms, practices, processes, actors, and decision-making structures are epiphenomenal. In some cases, the formal trumps the informal. This is especially the case during interactions between state representatives. In other cases, especially in IO settings, the two work together to shape the social world (Grzymala-Busse 2010; Fiori 2018).
However, most often, the formal is a product of, depends heavily on, and acts as a camouflage for informality (Grzymala-Busse 2010; Hardt 2013). Even though states are trying to develop formal rules, norms, practices, processes, actors, and decision-making structures to replace informal practices in many parts of the universe where humans operate, informality still dominates large parts of the social world. The small part of the social world that IR scholars call the international system is not an exception to informal domination.The figure 1 below provides a diagramtic representation about how informality drives the social world. As Figure 1 below suggests, informality domnates the social world, including formal global organizations such as the UN, continental bodies like the AU and regional institutions such the ECOWAS.
Informality in the social world
From an informality perspective, the key to understanding and theorizing CoPs is to pay close attention to their informal dimensions. Emanuel Adler recognized this when he conceptualized CoPs as “like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice” (Adler 2008, 196). Federica Bicchi (forthcoming) argued that informality was at the heart of the original conception of CoPs by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, but the “concept’s early informal streak was overruled by the desire of business management to harvest the innovative potential of CoPs for the benefit of the broader organization or institution.” In the view of Bicchi, the business management scholars saw the most salient aspect of CoPs to be “the tools (especially cognitive ones) that CoPs hone as they go about their business” (p. 5).
The need to harvest CoPs’ tools for broader organizational and societal use led major IOs such as the EU and the UN to try to cultivate CoPs. The emphasis on the informal, organic, and spontaneous in the early conception of CoPs gave way to the practice of CoPs cultivation. CoPs were now seen as something that had to be nurtured, nourished, and promoted. CoPs were no longer treated as a group of practitioners informally and organically bound together by common practices. Rather, they were being seen as something that should be grown, ideally formalized, and harnessed for organizational needs.
Bicchi’s review of CoPs literature, especially in Europe, indicated that whereas the business management literature placed the analytical weight on CoPs tools and cultivation, most of the IR scholarship on CoPs highlighted the practice aspects of CoPs as the most salient. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the development of the CoPs literature occurred amidst the so-called practice turn in IR (Cornut 2015; Willie 2015; Standfield 2020). The result is that the IR scholarship on CoPs centered and fronted the practice part of CoPs at the expense of the informal. The informal became a residual category at best, or, in some cases, it dropped out entirely from the analysis in many CoPs analyses. When it comes to CoPs analysis, the informal does the heavy lifting from the background or as a subtext.
The insightful recent article by Kiran Banerjee and Joseph MacKay (2020) provided a good illustration of how the informal often drives CoPs analysis from the back seat. Even though they relied on Adler’s definition of CoPs, the authors fronted learning and knowledge in their discussions of military attachés and wartime observers. In their view, the superior claim to practical military knowledge makes military attachés transnational CoPs. But a careful reading of the article showed that the military attaches would not have been able to use their practical military knowledge to become an effective transnational community of military experts without the informal work ethos, practices, norms, and interactions that allow the attaches to work outside of the strict organizational borders that they inhabited.
The subtext role that the informal plays in IR analysis sharply contrasts with the way other disciplines, such as anthropology and development studies, among others, treat the informal. In these disciplines, the informal is a primary analytical tool or fronted independent variable rather than “a residual category, a backstop source of explanation” (Azari and Smith 2012, 39). The work of British and Cambridge anthropologist Keith Hart in Ghana is primarily credited with making the study of informality a fashionable and respected area of study in Western social sciences.
To be sure, Hart was not the first to deploy the concept of informality or recogn
ize its analytical utility. The importance of informality was acknowledged in development and modernization scholarship (Inglehart, 2020) as far back as the 1950s and 1960s. Modernization scholars associated it with traditional societies and treated it as an impediment to development and modernity (Hardt 2013; Tieku 2019). For modernization scholars, replacing informal norms, beliefs, and practices, which they call traditional institutions, with modern and enlightened ones is the key to development and progress (Rostow 1960; Parsons 1972). Others even saw informality as a threat to the creation of stable, liberal international order (Weil 1983). The work of modernization scholars pathologized the idea of the informal, making it unattractive to social scientists. The pathologization of the informal made it difficult for mainstream scholars to deploy it as an analytical and useful term for explaining and understanding the social world. Hart’s key contribution was to make it palatable to mainstream social sciences and humanity scholars. He first used the concept of informality as an analytical concept at a conference on urban unemployment in Africa, held at the University of Sussex in 1971 (Allen 1998). Based on a study of Frafra migrants in Accra, Hart challenged the then-widespread view in development economics that the people outside of the state employment system are unemployed. Instead, Hart argued that the Frafra migrants, who are not employed by the state, are gainfully employed but in the informal sector. He followed it up with an article in 1973 in the Journal of Modern African Studies, where he laid out the conceptual framework for studying the informal sector (Hart 1973).
As a conceptual tool, Hart saw the informal as the sphere of society not regulated or governed by the state. The informal spheres are not necessarily illegal, but they cannot be accounted for or captured as part of the official activities of the state. Examples of these activities include street hawking and street begging. The article and Hart’s future work laid the foundation for the study of informality in the West, especially in Europe and North America. Hart’s work led to the emergence of the research program on informality in several social science disciplines in Europe and North America from 1970 onward (Allen 1998; Yusuff 2011).
Informality gained currency in political science, especially in comparative politics, in the early 2000s. Several comparative political science works on informality in politics, especially that of the politics of the Global South, appeared in mainstream Anglo-American publishing outlets in the 2000s (see Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Their IR counterparts explicitly embraced the informal language in the 2010s, although some IR scholars, such as regime, CoPs, and feminist theorists, had implicitly used it in different contexts (Krasner 1982; Lipson 1991). However, unlike their counterparts in fields such as anthropology, development studies, and even comparative politics, IR scholars tend to use informality as a dependent variable rather than as an explanation of the social and political world. The article by Charles Lipson (1991), which sought to explain why some international agreements are informal, and that of Charles Roger (2020), which explored why the legal foundations of global governance are becoming increasingly informal, are classic examples of the ways IR scholars have generally treated informality.
IR scholarship’s increasing interest in informality within the last decade may have encouraged scholars to revisit the informal roots of CoPs (Bicchi 2022; Bueger et al. 2023, this Special Forum). In particular, the turn of attention by IR practice scholars toward borders of CoPs has brought the informal side of CoPs into sharp focus (Bremberg 2016; Græger 2016; Sondarjee 2021; Bueger et al., this Special Forum). Sondarjee’s exploration of practices and spaces in-between two or more CoPs, and Bicchi’s discussion of CoPs in terms of sense of timing, place, and humour, show how central the informal is to CoPs’ analysis. As the introduction to this Special Forum made it clear, CoPs are by default informal in nature. In their words, CoPs are more than “mere groups of people acting together[.] [T]hey refer to social processes of negotiation of meaning, competence, and background knowledge that are often informal in nature. Moreover, they do not necessarily correspond to the reified structures of institutional affiliations and boundaries” (see the introduction to this Special Forum). Building on the insights that CoPs are by definition informal, the section below shows that prioritizing the informal (as much as the cognitive tools, competence, learning, and knowledge) in the study of CoPs has an enormous analytical payoff. The informal does not only allow CoPs to deploy their tools but also to engage in meaningful practices across rigid structures of institutional affiliations and boundaries.
What Informality Gives to CoPs in Mediation Theaters
In the peace and security arena, informality gives CoPs many tools in mediation practices. It provides soft laws that CoPs can and often use to fill gaps created by governments when establishing formal IOs to mediate global conflicts. This is often called incomplete contracting in international law and organization scholarship (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Oestreich 2012). As a result of incomplete contracting, CoPs have a plethora of informal rules in formal organizations to take advantage of to guide their work.
The AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs have taken advantage of the incomplete contracting between the three organizations to cultivate a plethora of unofficial rules, norms, processes, practices, and decision-making structures to govern their various activities. The main international law governing the relationship between the UN and regional organizations is Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The chapter, a classic example of incomplete contracting, vaguely and scantily treats regional organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS as mere “regional arrangements or agencies” (United Nations 1945). The chapter sees regional organization as agencies that states, and UN Security Council, can use to address “matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (United Nations 1945 [Article 52(1) of the UN Charter]). According to Chapter VIII, states making use of “such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes” (United Nations 1945 [Article 52(2) of the UN Charter]). The Security Council is encouraged to “utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (United Nations 1945 [Article 52(3) of the UN Charter]).
Besides these generic references to regional arrangements or regional agencies, there are no international legal instruments, not even a memorandum of understanding (MoU), outlining how the AU, ECOWAS, and UN should work together. In the absence of formal rules governing cooperation among the three organizations, several informal norms, rules, practices, processes, and decision-making structures have organically emerged or been cultivated from the bottom up to govern relations between the AU, ECOWAS, and UN. As the Venn diagram shows, the relationship between the AU, ECOWAS, and UN is mostly governed by informality. In the case of mediation, the absence of meaningful contracting between the AU, ECOWAS, and UN has allowed CoPs in the three organizations to invent their own informal rules to govern their mediation work. One such informal rule that has emerged is the invitation rule. The three organizations are required to invite each other to their meetings and events. The unwritten rule covers both political and technical meetings and events. Thus, for instance, the AU and ECOWAS are required to invite UN representatives to the summit of heads of state and government. The UN also does the same. This rule is not subject to the double consent by member states of the three organizations, nor is it written in any of the statutes or founding documents of the three organizations. Nevertheless, as we will see in the Gambia case, the invitation rule invented by CoPs was key to resolving the conflict.
The flexible nature of informality enables CoPs to fine-tune their practices and expertise to meet the dynamic nature of contemporary meditation. In some instances, informal norms are developed by CoPs to overcome the static nature of some international laws. The flexibility of informality allowed the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation to develop informal norms, rules, practices, processes, and decision-making structures to overcome the rigidity of international law. One of such informal norms that CoPs in the three organizations developed is selecting mediation leadership based on the dynamics of each conflict rather than sticking to the formal rule of international law that gives the UN primacy over international peace and security. Not only has this norm been helpful to CoPs in the field of mediation, as we will see in the Togolese and Ghanaian cases, but the UN has also been encouraging its use even though it contravenes the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter.
Informality also enables CoPs to develop ad hoc decision-making structures to compensate for the lack of formal decision-making bodies in some mediation settings. Ad hoc approaches have limitations, but they are extremely helpful when addressing time-sensitive issues. Since many aspects of mediation are time-sensitive and delicate, informality allows CoPs to create ad hoc decision-making bodies to meet the fragile and urgent nature of issues that are usually on the table during mediation. For example, the ad hoc decision made over the hurriedly arranged dinner meeting was the key that unlocked the impasse between key political players in the resolution of the 2016 Ghanaian preelection dispute.
Finally, informality allows CoPs to work beyond the restrictive borders that formal protocols tend to create. Informality provides the necessary tools for CoPs to work effectively with non-state actors without worrying about official protocols. As we will see in the Togolese case, the ability of CoPs in the three organizations to work with non-state actors, even sometimes against the explicit rules of their respective organizations, has been central to their effectiveness in the area of mediation. Thus, without informality, the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs would have found it almost impossible to cultivate their partnership, perform their practices, and work together in the field of mediation. The discussions below provide empirical analysis and support for the argument.
Empirical Analysis
This section explores how unofficial processes, norms, actors, and decision-making practices gave CoPs the tools to mediate an end to political crises in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo between 2016 and 2022. First, we use the mediation of a potentially dangerous political crisis in Ghana in 2016 to illustrate the enormous value of informal processes to CoPs in mediation theaters. Second, we draw on the resolution of the Gambia political crisis between December 2016 and January 2017 to show the importance of informal norms to CoPs in mediation settings. Third, we explore the resolution of the Togolese crises in 2007 and 2018 in order to demonstrate the importance of informal actors to CoPs in the resolution of conflict. Finally, we discuss the mediation to restore constitutional order in Guinea and Mali between 2021 and 2022 to show the importance of informal decision-making to CoPs in mediation theaters.
Informal Processes in Mediation Theaters
This subsection, empirically shows how CoPs created unofficial joint working processes, including the coordination of working timetables, missions, and desk-to-desk interactions at political and technical levels to mediate West African conflicts. The informal joint working processes compensated for the absence of a formal tripartite working arrangement between the three organizations. Moreover, the informal joint working processes provided the necessary institutional flexibility for CoPs to do their best work in mediation theaters. The informal working arrangement involves CoPs in the three organizations doing a careful analysis of the work plans of the other organizations in order to find synergies and areas of cooperation (United Nations 2016a; United Nations 2017). The careful analysis of formal documents and work programs allows mediation CoPs in the three organizations to create joint working timetables and to organize regular coordination meetings at both the political and technical levels (Interview with UN officials on March 15, 2020). These informal joint working processes emerged largely because of the absence of formal agreements, such as an MoU, that CoPs in the three organizations can use to align their work timetable or even coordinate their activities at both technical and political levels. There are also no formal interdepartmental agencies that allow CoPs in the three organizations to coordinate their mediation activities. CoPs in the three organizations developed these informal working processes to compensate for the incomplete contracting between the UN and regional organizations.
The practical impact of the alignment of activities and work timetables is that CoPs in the three organizations know what the other organization is doing, the political dynamics of each organization, and the schedule of staff of each organization (United Nations 2018b; United Nations 2019a). It also enables them to invite each other to key meetings (Interview with UN officials on March 15, 2020; Interview with AU officials on June 13, 2022). Furthermore, the informal working processes meant that the CoPs in the three organizations are in a pole position to share information, including the political positions of each organization, promptly. Timely exchange of information and alignment of work schedules became the critical pieces of the jigsaw in resolving the preelection political stalemate in Ghana in 2016.
The 2016 political crisis in Ghana emerged prior to Ghana’s general election. Before each general presidential and parliamentary election in Ghana, contesting candidates usually sign a Code of Conduct (Botchway and Kwarteng 2018; IDEG 2016; United Nations 2016a). The Code of Conduct, widely documented by journalists and perceived by many Ghanaians as a peace agreement, gives the contestants a chance to pledge their commitment to ensuring peaceful elections and peaceful resolution of any election-related disputes (Botchway and Kwarteng 2018). The 2016 signing ceremony, organized by the National Peace Council of Ghana (NPC), the National House of Chiefs, and the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), was scheduled to occur at the University of Ghana, Legon, in Accra on November 23, 2016 (Ghanaweb, November 23, 2016). Two thousand guests were invited, including representatives from the AU, ECOWAS, UN, and Commonwealth of Nations (IDEG 2016; University of Ghana 2016). Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, UN Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, and Ambassador Marcel Alain de Souza, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, were to represent the UN and ECOWAS, respectively (African Union 2016).
As Tieku and Payler (2021)documented, both the sitting president (now former president) and the leading opposition leader, Nana Akufo-Addo, had planned to boycott the event. They did not plan to attend the event because their parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), had agreed not to sign the 2016 Code of Conduct. The candidate for the ruling party had lost trust in key members of IDEG, while the main opposition candidate had lost faith in the NPC (Interview with UN official on February 21, 2020). Perhaps fearing possible media backlash and inquisitions, the two parties did not communicate their planned boycott to the organizers. The absence of leaders of the two political parties, who are likely to win over 90 percent of the electoral votes in Ghana, would effectively kill the event and the signing of the Code of Conduct. The planned boycott occurred amid heightened tensions and inflammatory discourse, especially on radio and social media platforms.
The AU, ECOWAS, and UN, who have been monitoring the situation, sensed danger when the leadership of their CoPs arrived in Accra a few days before the signing event. The UN’s CoPs, which arrived on November 21, 2016, were led by Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the then UN Special Representatives for West Africa, and Sahel. ECOWAS sent a delegation led by the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Marcel Alain de Souza. The AU CoPs were already on the ground as part of the AU’s long-term observer mission.
Fearing that the absence of the two candidates could create conditions for electoral-related violence, they set up a joint mediation working group to get the two candidates to sign the Code of Conduct (Interview with UN official on February 21, 2020). The signing of the Code of Conduct had become critical to reducing tension and ensuring a peaceful election. Based on the dynamics of the crisis, the AU, ECOWAS, and UN CoPs ceded the leadership of the working group to Dr. Chambas (Interview with ECOWAS official on February 20, 2020). The AU and the ECOWAS retreated to the background and assumed the role of supporting casts to Dr. Chambas. As a highly respected Ghanaian diplomat with an unparalleled connection to the NPP and the NDC, Dr. Chambas had the required skills set to lead the process of getting the two candidates to change their positions (Interview with AU and ECOWAS officials on February 20, 2020).
To give the AU-ECOWAS-UN team time to negotiate with the two key players to attend the signing ceremony, Dr. Chambas tactfully pushed the organizers to postpone the event without disclosing that the parties were boycotting the event and without appearing to take over the process (Interview with Ghana official on February 29, 2020). As a result, the AU-ECOWAS-UN mediation CoPs met with Most Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of NPC and Dr. Emmanuel Akwetey, the Executive Director of IDEG, during an “emergency meeting” in the evening of November 22, 2016, where a decision was made to postpone the event indefinitely (IDEG 2016).
To get the two-leading contestants to a meeting, the team explored various options, including holding a meeting at the residence of Chief Imam of Ghana Osman Nuhu Sharubutu. Dr. Chambas proposed that they invite a high-profile sitting president to Ghana and use the occasion to get the two contestants into a meeting. As an experienced diplomat, Dr. Chambas knew that the president of Ghana would be forced to come to Accra should any major sitting president visit Ghana during the period. He also correctly calculated that a chance to meet a high-profile president prior to elections will be too good an opportunity for a leading opposition leader to ignore (Interview with UN official on September 18, 2019). Based on the alignment of work plans and the timetable between his office and ECOWAS, Dr. Chambas knew that Liberia President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the then Chairperson of ECOWAS, was scheduled to be in London during the first week of December 2016. Dr. Chambas reached out to President Johnson-Sirleaf to do a stopover in Accra on the night of November 29, 2016 (Interview with Ghana official on February 29, 2020).
Dr. Chambas then used the impromptu visit to arrange an informal dinner for the four of them (i.e., President Johnson-Sirleaf, President Mahama, Nana Akufo-Addo, and himself) in Accra on November 29, 2016. He arranged for a deftly choreographed call from the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, during the informal dinner. The Secretary-General urged the two candidates to sign the “Code of Conduct, which would greatly assist in lowering tensions and preventing electoral violence” (United Nations 2016b). The two leaders agreed at the informal dinner to sign the Code of Conduct, which was done at a hurriedly arranged event in Accra’s Movenpick Hotel on December 1, 2016 (Ghanaweb, December 2, 2016; Interview with a UN official on September 17, 2019).
Informal Norm in Mediation Theaters
Another tool that the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs have used to a great effect in mediation theaters is the informal norm. In some cases, the informal norm has been used to go beyond the limits imposed on the three organizations by international law. A good example is the informal understanding (informal norm) on the ground that mediation leadership will be determined based on the dynamics of the conflict and on a case-by-case basis rather than strictly following the dictates of the principle of the UN over international peace and security matters as provided for in the UN Charter. Thus, if the conflict dynamics are such that ECOWAS is seen as the most well-equipped organization to take the lead, the UN and the AU will quietly follow ECOWAS’ lead or let ECOWAS play the dominant role in the mediation processes. The determination of the mediation leadership on a case-by-case basis is partly a pragmatic move and partly a recognition of the agency of African regional organizations in peace and security issues.
The resolution of the postelection political crisis in Gambia between December 2016 and January 2017 provides a telling illustration of the importance of this informal norm in AU-ECOWAS—UN CoPs mediation. In the Gambian case, the UN and the AU ceded the leadership of the mediation that ensured the transfer of political power from Yahya Jammeh to Adama Barrow to ECOWAS (United Nations 2016b; Interview with UN official on September 18, 2019).2 ECOWAS’ Chairperson, President Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia, led the joint AU-ECOWAS-UN CoPs to mediate with the then President Jammeh in the Gambia’s capital, Banjul, on December 13, 2016 (United Nations 2016b). Other team members included Dr. Chambas, President Koroma of Sierra Leone, outgoing President Mahama of Ghana, President Buhari of Nigeria, and a representative of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs (United Nations 2016b).
In addition, both the UN and the AU allowed ECOWAS to take the lead in making a major political decision on the crisis, including the decision to intervene militarily to resolve the crisis (ECOWAS 2016, 8). The UN and AU mostly played behind-the-scenes roles when making decisions and resolutions on the crisis at the level of heads of state and government. The ECOWAS summits, rather than the AU and UN summits, became the main forum for making a political decision on the crisis. The three organizations communicated on the issue mainly through ECOWAS. On the few occasions that the AU and UN made a public pronouncement on the issues, it was done through a joint statement issued by the President of the ECOWAS Commission, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel. A classic example is the joint statement issued by the three organizations on December 10, 2016 (ECOWAS 2016). The statement expressed concern about the rejection of the outcome of the elections and called on the government of the Gambia to “abide by its constitutional responsibilities and international obligations; to respect the verdict of the ballots, and to ensure the security of President-elect Adama Barrow and all Gambian citizens” (ECOWAS 2016).
The decision by the three organizations to cede the leadership of the Gambia mediation to ECOWAS based on the dynamics of a conflict is not an exception but a common practice. The AU has, in many cases, taken the leadership role in mediation involving the UN. The literature on African mediation provides many examples where the UN ceded the leadership of mediation to the AU (Snodgrass and Achieng 2019; Tieku 2019a). A good example occurred in 2007 when the AU led the mediation process that resolved the 2007 postelections violence in Kenya (Karongo 2018); Tieku 2019a). Similarly, the UN ceded to the AU the leadership of the mediation that led to the signing of a peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, on November 2, 2022, between the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to end their bloody two-year war (African Union 2022).
Informal Actors in Mediation Theater
Informal actors, including civil society players, are essential enablers of the work of CoPs. The AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs used private actors to gain leverage in troubled spots in West Africa. Although their organizations are built to work with official state representatives, the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs have developed the habit of working closely with non-state actors. Organizing informal meetings with non-state actors, including community organizations, youth groups, and women’s associations, has become a signature feature of the work of these CoPs in conflict zones (Interview with former UN officials on August 13, 2019; Interview with AU official on June 14, 2022). The three organizations they are embedded in have a standard way of seeking entry into countries. The organizations are required by formal rules to seek permission from and work with official state representatives and agencies to gain the necessary entry permits. And protocols compel them to make ministries of foreign affairs their first point of contact and to allow state officials to manage their movements. Yet, the CoPs have developed the habit of going beyond officials to work closely with non-state actors, including civil society groups, retired public officials, former diplomats, and even celebrities, in mediation settings.
The mediation of the 2017 Togolese crisis illustrates how CoPs work with non-state actors in conflict theaters. They used informal actors to resolve the standoff between Togolese protestors, who sought the resignation of President Faure Gnassingbe, and the Togolese government, which met the demand of the agitators with repressive tactics. These repressive tactics included cutting off the internet, banning WhatsApp as a communication tool, and monitoring international calls (Dahir 2017). In addition, several opposition members were arrested, and some of the protesters were reportedly killed (Janjevic 2018).
The mediation CoPs’ first substantive consultative meetings on the crisis were with representatives of civil society groups (Ghanaweb 2017). They met civil society first, even though the standard operating procedure for IO entry into any country is to hold talks with governments. The CoPs thought it would be better to meet with non-state actors to get a good sense of the situation (interview with former UN officials on August 13, 2019; interview with AU official on June 14, 2022). Subsequent meetings were held with members of the political parties, including leaders of the opposition.3 An interesting dimension to the mediation was the decision to meet with leaders of the opposition in their homes and make the meeting as informal as possible (interview with UN official on February 12, 2020). The team used the meetings to calm the protesters and nudge the opposition to agree to formal talks with the Togolese government (Shaban 2019). It was only after meetings with non-state actors and the opposition agreeing to hold constitutional reform talks that the delegation met with Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe to explore the possibility of holding a formal Togolese national dialogue (Zodzi 2017, 7; Interview with UN official on February 12, 2020). After a series of backchannel negotiations with Togolese and the leadership of the AU, ECOWAS, and UN, the CoPs got the UN leader to select the President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, and the AU and ECOWAS to nominate the President of Guinean, Alpha Conde, to cofacilitate the Togolese national dialogue on constitutional reforms. The three organizations released a joint statement on October 4, 2017, urging “all Togolese political stakeholders to pursue dialogue . . . in line with the legitimate aspirations of the Togolese people” (United Nations 2017). The talks started with a fourteen-member opposition coalition and government representatives on Monday, February 19, 2018 (Shaban 2019). The partnership that CoPs built with non-state actors paid off when the Togolese opposition “announced a cessation of protests” on February 19, 2018, marking the end of the political crisis.
Informal Decision-Making Structures
Informal decision-making mechanisms have become major tools used by CoPs to settle disputes in West Africa (Interview with UN officials on March 15, 2020; United Nations 2016a, 2023). Besides the flexibility and enormous room for maneuvering that informality offers to CoPs, the absence of a formal agreement establishing a standing mediation decision-making structure played a central role in making AU-ECOWAS and UN CoPs find their own ways to make joint decisions on the field. To be sure, each organization has its own mediation or conflict prevention decision-making body.4 But they do not have one that allows them to make joint decisions at either the political level in the headquarters or the technical level on the ground. Only the AU and the UN have something close to a joint decision-making body through the annual informal joint consultative meeting between members of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. So far, sixteen such joint informal consultations have been held since the first one took place in 2007 (Security Council Report 2020).5 The sixteenth joint consultative meeting occurred in New York on October 14, 2022 (AU-UN 2022).6 The AU-UN consultative body, as the name implies, is informal and an annual affair. Moreover, its decisions are nonbinding. Critically, ECOWAS is not part of this body, and there is no other standing structure that brings the three organizations together to make joint decisions on mediation-related issues.
The lack of a tripartite mediation decision-making body and the intrinsic value of informality made AU-ECOWAS and UN CoPs resort to various informal (mostly ad hoc) mediation decision-making structures ranging from “liaison cells”7 meetings to joint informal workshopping, retreats, consultations, taskforces, and decisions made on sidelines of formal summits (Interview with AU and ECOWAS officials on January 22, 2023). The power to coordinate, convene, and chair these informal decision-making bodies is determined by issues and on a case-by-case basis (Interview with AU and ECOWAS officials on January 22, 2023). The AU CoPs often take the lead and coordinate the rest of the CoPs on electoral observation matters, while the ECOCWAS CoPs usually pick up the leadership role on political matters, such as mediating an end to military regimes. For instance, the AU CoPs convened and chaired all meetings related to the observations of Liberia and Sierra Leone elections in 2017 and 2018, respectively, while the ECOWAS CoPs led the mediation to end military governments in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali ( African Union 2017, 2018; Interview with UN official on February 12, 2020).
The UNOWAS CoPs chaired the coordination meetings related to long-time preventative diplomacy, good offices, and counter-terrorism dialogue and facilitation efforts in West Africa. They also step into situations where both AU and ECOWAS rules do not allow their CoPs to engage with parties or where the two African regional organizations are in a standoff with any of the conflicting parties. A classic case in point is the mediation aimed at restoring democratic government in Guinea. Under normal circumstances, ECOWAS CoPs would chair the informal tripartite mediation decision-making structure in Guinea from the beginning until constitutional order is restored in Guinea. However, a dispute between the regional body and the National Rallying Committee for Development (CNRD), established by the military junta led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya after overthrowing elected president Alpha Conde in September 2021, meant that UNOWAS had to take over the mantle of coordinating the Guinea mediation process for a while.
The impasse was heightened by the long thirty-nine and later thirty-six-month transitional timetable that the military government proposed to the AU and ECOWAS. The two African regional organizations rejected it outright (Reuters 2022). The AU, through its chairperson, President Macky Sall, called the Guinea transitional timetable “unthinkable.” ECOWAS showed its anger toward the proposed transitional timetable by adding economic and financial sanctions to the suspension of Guinea from its activities (Africanews 2022). The Junta, in turn, rejected ECOWAS’ mediator for Guinea, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Boechat 2021; GhanaWeb, 2022).
The standoff compelled UN CoPs led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the then-head of UNOWAS, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, to take over the coordination of the tripartite informal mediation decision-making structure. They first had to “facilitate constructive dialogue’ between the junta and ECOWAS on a new timetable and the appointment of a new mediator (United Nations 2022a). After meeting with Guinea authorities prior to the 61st ordinary summit of ECOWAS on July 3, 2022, the UN CoPs secured agreement for the appointment of a new mediator by ECOWAS and a technical team from ECOWAS to work with the military government on the new timetable (United Nations 2022b). This paved the way for ECOWAS to appoint a new mediator in the person of the former President of Benin, Thomas Boni Yayi, to replace Dr. Chambas. The technical team appointed by ECOWAS worked with Guinea authorities to shorten the transitional period from thirty-six months to twenty-four months. ECOWAS endorsed the new timetable at its 62nd summit held in Abuja on November 4, 2022 (Reuter 2022; United Nations 2023). In keeping with the unformal understanding between the three organizations, President Boni took over from UNSRSG Annadif as the coordinator of informal decision-making on the Guinea transition. The handover from UNSRSG Annadif to President Boni brought the Guinea process in line with mediation processes in Burkina Faso and Mali, where ECOWAS CoPs led by former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, coordinate and chair the “committee on the transition, composed of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the representatives of ECOWAS and the African Union in the country” (United Nations 2022b).
Conclusion and Implications
The article sought to explain how and why CoPs embedded in IOs work together despite the rigid formal bureaucratic and institutional borders they inhabit. We draw on the works of CoPs housed by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN to show that informality is the main connecting thread. The effective way that the AU, ECOWAS, and UN mediation CoPs worked together to resolve delicate and challenging political crises in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo between 2016 and 2022 is a hard case to study. The six different mediation cases used to illustrate how and why CoPs worked across rigid formal IOs borders were hard ones. The issues addressed revolved around serious security and political concerns. They were hard politics in nature, and touched on existential concerns in some instances. CoPs had to resolve these serious political problems in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo despite the absence of formal working arrangements between the three IOs that they inhabit.
The absence of a formal working arrangement between the three organizations is a function of the UN Charter, which did not anticipate that regional arrangements like ECOWAS and AU would be primary political players in mediation theaters. The Charter only envisaged a conflict resolution role for regional organizations within the context of UN leadership or supervision (Ajayi 2008; Murithi 2008; Bah 2013; Tieku and Hakak 2014). Regional arrangements were supposed to carry out of wishes and directives of the Security Council. Yet, the dynamics of modern conflicts and the evolution of international institutions have turned regional entities such as the AU and ECOWAS into more than implementation agencies. Even though regional entities recognize the primacy of the UN as a matter of international law, the AU and ECOWAS see themselves as major political players in their own right. Accordingly, they conduct themselves as organizations that share primary responsibilities with the UN in the mediation of conflicts in West Africa. Like adults, both organizations crave ownership and leadership in the resolution of conflicts in West Africa. Given the different understandings of mandates, interpretations of political roles, and positionality of the three organizations, one would have expected frequent clashes and turf wars among CoPs in mediation theaters. However, as the empirical discussions showed, CoPs in the three organizations work together very closely and cordially for the most part in mediation theaters in West Africa.
The key resource that CoPs draw on is informality. Informality, which is socially generated and often contested, became the primary organizing principle for CoPs in the West African mediation theaters. CoPs drew on four key informal resources to mediate the conflicts. First, informal processes allowed the CoPs to develop dynamic, ad hoc, and tailor-made responses to crises. As seen in the Ghanaian case, informal processes enabled CoPs to resolve the potentially dangerous preelection political crisis in Ghana in 2016. The flexibility of informal processes enabled CoPs to invent informal joint working processes used to cajole the two leading presidential candidates to sign a Code of Conduct on December 2, 2016. The Code of Conduct was instrumental in lowering tensions and preventing electoral violence prior to and during the general elections in Ghana in 2016.
Second, the availability of informal decision-making structures enabled CoPs to work together in mediating an end to military rule in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali between 2021 and 2022. Key decisions by CoPs on transitional arrangements were made in informal settings, including unofficial consultations, workshops and retreats, ad hoc committees, and the sidelines of summits.
The use of informal processes and decision-making structures, either in the form of joint informal working arrangements or making critical decisions on the sidelines of summits, is not peculiar to these cases. Tom Sauer (2019)described in a fascinating way how informal processes and decision-making structures were used to produce negotiation outcome that likely prevented an attack on Iran by the United States during the Iranian versus the UN standoff on Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Sauer pointed out that the informal processes and decisions provided the necessary flexibility that formal fora often lacks but which is badly needed for delicate diplomatic dance.
In addition to informal processes and decision-making structures, CoPs made good use of informal norms and actors to resolve political crises in Gambia and Togo. Informal norms allowed CoPs to select the leadership of each mediation to suit the context of a particular crisis. In Gambia, the informal norms enabled CoPs to select the ECOWAS president to lead the mediation efforts that ensured a peaceful transfer of political power from Yahya Jammeh to Adama Barrow between December 2016 and January 2017.
The selection of the ECOWAS president as the leader and coordinator of the mediation team involving the UN is out of step with the spirit and letter of the UN Charter, which grants primacy over peace and security matters to the UN. Put differently, the operation of the informal norm over selection of mediation leadership trumped the international law that grants the UN the exclusive right to lead in matters of that nature. It can also be argued that the strong working relationship CoPs built with non-state actors in West Africa is out of character with the way the three IOs traditionally work. The rules of the AU, ECOWAS, and UN discourages their staff from working with non-state actors, especially on political issues as it is often interpreted by governments as interference in internal affairs of states. The CoPs did not only work with informal actors in West Africa, but also teamed up with them to resolve a political crisis between the government of Togo and the Togolese opposition.
The informality that enabled CoPs to resolve these crises was not faultless. Informality has both analytical and normative drawbacks. As already indicated, informality was pathologized for many years in Western social sciences, and some scholars still treat it as a residual analytical category. The reliance of informality on social forces such as trust, social ostracism, shaming, and the court of public opinion as enforcement mechanisms makes it unattractive as an explanatory variable for some IR scholars, many of whom are conditioned and socialized to be skeptical of the explanatory power of nonmaterial resources. Also, the absence of coercive enforcement of informal decisions creates the impression that actors, especially powerful ones, can easily ignore those that do not suit their interests. Thus, it is easy to consign informality to the category of backstop variable. As Azari and Smith (2012) noted, some scholars reluctantly embrace informality as an explanatory variable only when all other possible explanations have failed them. At the normative level, informal processes can sometimes be exclusionary, elitist, and usually lacks the double consent of states. Informal processes, especially in mediation settings, can also lack transparency since most of them are conducted in secrecy and outside of the media’s prying eyes.
The drawbacks of informality notwithstanding, informality is an indispensable commodity in activities of CoPs. As shown in the six West African states, informality became the most effective organizing tool for CoPs. The four informal mechanisms combined to enable like-minded professionals embedded in the AU, ECOWAS, and UN to resolve political crises in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo between 2016 and 2022. Some of the informal mechanisms were intentionally cultivated as improvised responses to the dynamics of crises. Informality such as unofficial joint working timetables, joint missions, and informal desk-to-desk interactions at both the political and technical levels were cultivated to enable CoPs to share information and prevent forum shopping by disputing parties. Others emerged spontaneously and organically as part of the work of CoPs. The informal understanding (norm) that notches CoPs to select their lead mediator based on the dynamics of each conflict, rather than follow the rule of the UN primacy principle enshrined in international law, is an organic outgrowth of CoPs interactions and socialization. In addition to the empirical demonstration of the power of informality, the manuscripts shed light on six empirical mediation stories that are largely unknown to the IR community.
The manuscript thus advanced the CoPs research agenda by, first, placing the analytical weight on informal tools that CoPs develop and use as they go about their business; second, showing how like-minded professionals embedded in different formal IOs use informality to hang together effectively; and third, demonstrating how CoPs act as “instruments for cultivating global governance’s norms, values, and practices from the bottom up” (see introduction to this Special Forum, 5). Informal tools complement and enhance other CoPs resources, such as expertise, cognitive practices, knowledge, and social learning, that CoPs scholars often prioritize in their analysis. Prioritizing the informal or making it the analytical baseline can only enhance CoPs scholarship.
Thomas Kwasi Tieku is a Professor of Politics and International Relations at King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario (UWO) and a Visiting Scholar in the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy at the University of Ghana, Legon. A former Director of African Studies at the University of Toronto, Tieku has published over forty-five refereed journal articles, book chapters, and five books. His current research, which is supported by Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), focuses on informal international relations, mediation, and international organizations, especially the African Union and the UN.
Afua Boatemaa Yakohene is a Research Fellow at the Legon Centre of International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana, Legon. She teaches Gender and International Relations, International Political Development, Africa in World Politics, and Research Methodology, inter alia. Her research and publication areas include peace and security, governance, and gender issues in Africa. She has experience in consultancy, advocacy, research, training, and workshop facilitation for states and national and international organizations. She is a member of the Greater Accra Regional Peace Council of Ghana’s National Peace Council. Afua has had the privilege of being a part of various trainings, workshops, and rostering exercises of the African Union.
Thomas Kwasi Tieku is grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding the Informal IR Lab at King’s University College, where the bulk of the research was produced, and to the 2023-2024 Lab members, namely Ricardo Alejandro Soto Canales, Barbara Christensen, Kaygen Dache, Victoria Hinkson, Cindy Kasanga, Eunice Oladejo, Eleanor Emily Summers, Julia Wainwright and Eliasu Yakubu. Both authors are grateful to the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy and the Carnegie Diaspora Linkage Program at the University of Ghana, Legon for giving Tieku the space to complete the manuscript, anonymous reviewers for the excellent comments on an earlier draft of this article, and the entire editorial team of this journal for making the production process hassle-free. The views expressed here and any errors in the article are solely ours.
Footnotes
Unofficial used here means that the processes, norms, rules, actors, practices, and decision-making bodies lack double consent of states. Informal processes are uncodified methods or procedures used by actors to guide their activities or actions in order to achieve a particular outcome. Informal norms are unwritten shared beliefs that tell people what they ought to do in social settings. Informal rules are unwritten guidelines that direct activities of actors in a given social setting. Informal practices are unofficial routinized activities or actions that shape the day-to-day work of actors in a social setting. In Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s (2014) words, practices take the form of socially recognized competence, which is locally generated, contested, and played out, to eventually affect actions in the social world. Informal actors are entities that do not hold official state offices or titles but whose actions have consequences in social settings. Informal decision-making structures are unofficial steering arrangements that actors use to make decisions in social settings. The six dimensions of informality are analytically distinct but not mutually exclusive. affect world policy. Tieku (2019) argued that these elements of informality have both international and domestic components. The domestic aspects of informality are well documented by scholars in fields such as development studies, anthropology, sociology, and comparative politics (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2010; Azari and Smith 2012; Waylen 2014). The international dimensions are understudied and not well understood.
The former president of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, who had ruled the county for twenty-two years, refused to step down after the December 1, 2016, loss to opposition leader Adama Barrow.
He visited Agbeyome Kodjo (leader of the Patriotic Movement for Democracy and Development, who came a distant second in the 2020 presidential elections) and Jean-Pierre Fabre (leader of the National Alliance for Change, who placed third in the 2020 elections).
The UN Security Council, through UNOWAS, is the main decision-making organ of UN mediation in West Africa, while the AU Peace and Security Council, through AU’s Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is AU’s key decision-making body on AU mediation activities. The Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, through ECOWAS’ Department of Political Affairs, is the decision-making organization of ECOWAS mediation.
The consultations became a yearly affair in 2016.
The 17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting is scheduled to take place in the second half of 2023 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
These are short-term staff sent by senior bureaucrats from one organization to another to participate and report on activities of the other organizations. They are mostly paid by donors, and their appointments are not officially sanctioned by member states of the organization. These ad hoc informal bureaucratic arrangements help the three organizations make relatively quick decisions in response to the dynamic nature of West African conflicts. For instance, UNOWAS often sends liaison cell officers to the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja (United Nations 2023).
References
