https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1089-1009
Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that climate change can escalate the risks for violent conflict through various pathways. Existing evidence suggests that contextual factors, such as migration and livelihood options, governance arrangements, and existing conflict dynamics, can influence the pathways through which climate change leads to conflict. This important insight leads to an inquiry to identify sets of conditions and processes that make climate-related violent conflict more likely. In this analytic essay, we conduct a systematic review of scholarly literature published during the period 1989–2022 and explore the climate-conflict pathways in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Through the systematic review of forty-one peer-reviewed publications in English, we identify that society’s ability to cope with the changing climate and extreme weather events is influenced by a range of factors, including preceding government policies that led to the mismanagement of land and water and existing conflict dynamics in the MENA region. Empirical research to unpack the complex and diverse relationship between the climate shocks and violent conflict in the MENA region needs advancing. Several avenues for future research are highlighted such as more studies on North Africa and the Gulf region, with focus on the implications of floods and heatwaves, and exploring climate implications on non-agriculture sectors including the critical oil sector.
Investigaciones previas que han demostrado que el cambio climático puede llegar a aumentar la probabilidad del riesgo de conflictos violentos a través de diversos mecanismos. Las pruebas existentes sugieren que los factores contextuales, tales como la migración y las opciones de medios de subsistencia, los acuerdos de gobernanza y la dinámica de conflicto existente, pueden influir en las vías a través de las cuales el cambio climático conduce a los conflictos. Esta percepción motiva una investigación con el objetivo de identificar una serie de condiciones y procesos que hacen que incrementan la probabilidad de conflictos violentos relacionados con el clima. En este ensayo analítico, llevamos a cabo una revisión sistemática de la literatura académica publicada durante el período entre 1989 y 2022. El estudio explora las vías de conflicto climático en la región de Oriente Medio y el Norte de África (MENA, por sus siglas en inglés). A través de la revisión sistemática de 41 publicaciones en inglés revisadas por expertos, fenómenos meteorológicos extremos está influenciada por una serie de factores, que incluyen tanto las políticas gubernamentales precedentes que condujeron a la mala gestión de la tierra y el agua como la dinámica de conflicto existente en la región MENA. Es esencial avanzar en la investigación empírica para poder desentrañar la compleja y diversa relación existente entre las perturbaciones climáticas y los conflictos violentos en la región de Oriente Medio y el Norte de África. Destacamos varias vías de investigación futura, como la realización de un mayor número estudios sobre el norte de África y la región del Golfo, con un enfoque en las implicaciones de las inundaciones y las olas de calor, así como la exploración de las implicaciones climáticas en los sectores no agrícolas, incluido el sector petrolero, de crítica importancia.
Des travaux de recherche antérieurs ont montré que le changement climatique pouvait aggraver les risques de conflits violents de bien des façons. Les éléments probants existants indiquent que les facteurs contextuels, comme les possibilités d'immigration et de moyens de subsistance, les arrangements gouvernementaux et les dynamiques de conflit existantes, peuvent avoir une incidence sur les mécanismes par lesquels le changement climatique peut créer des conflits. Cette information importante nous pousse à chercher les ensembles de conditions et de processus qui augmentent la probabilité des conflits violents en lien avec le climat. Dans cet article analytique, nous conduisons un examen systématique de la littérature académique publiée entre 1989 et 2022 pour nous intéresser aux liens entre climat et conflits dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord (MENA). En examinant de façon systématique 41 publications en anglais vérifiées par des pairs, nous remarquons que la capacité d'une société à gérer l’évolution du climat et les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes est liée à un éventail de facteurs, y compris les politiques précédentes du gouvernement qui ont engendré une mauvaise gestion des terres et de l'eau et les dynamiques de conflit existantes dans la région MENA. La recherche empirique pour décortiquer la relation complexe et plurielle entre les crises climatiques et les conflits violents dans la région MENA doit avancer. Plusieurs pistes de recherches ultérieures sont présentées, comme davantage d’études dans la région de l'Afrique du Nord et du Golfe, en se concentrant plus particulièrement sur les implications des inondations et des vagues de chaleur, et l'analyse des conséquences climatiques sur les secteurs hors agriculture, notamment le secteur décisif du pétrole.
Introduction
Climate change contributes to conflict risk and undermines livelihoods and human security. The impact of climate change overburdens countries in demanding security environments and exacerbates political instability, which may lead to violent conflict. Researchers have sought to explain the relationship between climate change and violent conflict and climate change as a growing factor for security risks (Gleditsch 2012; Meierding 2013; Sakaguchi, Varughese, and Auld 2017; Ide 2018; Van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018). There is a greater consensus that climate change has an impact on human security and sustaining peace (Abrahams 2020; Black et al. 2022; Morales-Muñoz et al. 2022). The evidence has been gathered on the physical changes in diverse livelihood systems and human migration and the negative effects on human adaptation capacities (IPCC 2022). The debate may have to move on from whether climate change has been the primary cause of a war or not (Verhoeven 2011; e.g., Selby et al. 2017). Our understanding of what context climate change matters for conflict and security and how relevant factors play out in local contexts should be based on comprehensive and systematic research that considers various scales, time periods, and localities.
Moreover, existing evidence suggests that climate-related security risks are context specific, and there are multiple pathways by which climate change influences the onsets and patterns of armed conflict (Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016; Mobjörk, Krampe, and Tarif 2020). The “climate insecurity pathway” framework assumes that climate change may not be the only contributor to violent conflict but also other factors leading to insecurity such as internal and international migration, livelihood options, and governance arrangements (Van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018). Existing conflict dynamics and security environments can exacerbate climate-related security risks. This analytic essay contributes to the debate on how climate change affects the risk of violent conflict by conducting a systematic review of the literature directly or indirectly linking climate change of violent conflict focusing on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region that has been severely impacted by both.1 By conducting a systematic literature review, we are particularly interested in synthesizing existing evidence to better understand the climate-conflict links in the MENA region. We included forty-one peer-reviewed articles published between 1989 and 2022 in the analysis. Based on the review, we conclude that the relationship between climate change and violent conflict is predominantly indirect and diverse, highlighting the need to avoid oversimplified assumptions. Climate change’s contribution to conflict risk in the MENA region is further mediated by political economy, institutional weaknesses, elite competition, and existing socio-political relations. A careful examination of evidence is crucial for comprehensive climate security discussions in general and policy considerations for the MENA region. The following systematic review of literature showcases the linkages between climate exposure and various sources of vulnerability in the MENA region.
Climate Exposure and Social Vulnerability in the MENA Region
The MENA region is facing major security challenges from its vulnerability to climate change and violent conflict. The region is the world’s most water-stressed region, hosting thirteen of the world’s twenty most water-stressed countries, with currently over 82 percent of its terrain covered in desert (Sieghart and Betre 2018). Indeed, water rationing and the limitation of water supplies are already a reality in parts of Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan (Sowers, Vengosh, and Weinthal 2011). Recent climate science predicts an average global warming of 1.5°C under the business-as-usual scenario, while in the MENA region, it is expected to increase up to 4°C (Gaub and Lienard 2021). Furthermore, the level of mean precipitation is also expected to decrease in the region (Zittis,et al. 2020). By the end of the century, about half of the MENA population could be annually exposed to super- and ultra-extreme heatwaves (Zittis et al. 2021). In essence, the region is likely to become drier and experience extremely high temperatures, followed by extreme and chronic water shortages becoming more frequent.
Many countries in the MENA region are vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to their weak adaptive capacity (Sowers et al. 2011; Namdar, Karami, and Keshavarz 2021). The adaptive capacity to climate change varies across the MENA region. While oil-exporting Gulf states have the financial resources for investments in water desalination and wastewater technologies, others suffer from a lack of financial resources and water conservation policies (Sowers et al. 2011). The adverse effect of climate change on agricultural productivity is likely to affect the livelihood conditions of rural populations and may contribute to rural-to-urban migration in some cases (Waha et al. 2017). Changes in precipitation and extreme weather events can reduce the region’s agriculture yields, as up to 70 percent of the crops are rain-fed (Waha et al. 2017). Climate change impacts present a threat to food security in the MENA region and exacerbate the vulnerability to global food price volatility, including Egypt and Lebanon. Countries with a high level of imported grain dependency witness significant inflations in cereal prices that can be a source of political instability (Tanchum 2021). Food price volatility has contributed to political stability in the past, especially during the Arab Spring, and the combined effect of reduced water discharge with the demographic trend of the youth bulge could present a challenge to the political stability of a region (Borghesi and Ticci 2019).
Over the past decade, several of the world’s deadliest conflicts flared up in the MENA region, particularly in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Turkey (Palik et al. 2020). The intractable conflict between Israel and Palestine has caused immense human suffering and disrupted regional stability. These conflicts are linked to long-running inequalities and grievances and economic and political instability, which make conflict resolution exceptionally challenging. Deterioration of the physical environment and land degradation further exacerbate risks of communal conflict and political instability in the future. Violent conflict, on the other hand, has been destructive to the adjoining environment. For instance, the effect of intense armed conflict has been significant in Syria’s already declining land and water resources (Mohamed, Anders, and Schneider 2020). Environmental degradation leading to water and food insecurity has adversely affected the livelihoods of the population.
The linkages between conflict and the environment are an integral component that constitutes peace and security in the MENA region. The arid natural environment of the region and the changing climate are part of consideration when analyzing conflict in the region (Smith and Krampe 2019). This article focuses on the MENA region and analyzes the role of climate-related environmental factors in violent conflict by drawing evidence from existing research. This systematic review provides an overview of conditions and processes in the climate-conflict nexus. The findings demonstrate that indirect pathways between climate change and violent conflict that are found in other regions such as East Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, and West Africa are also applicable to the MENA region. In addition, downstream impacts of water development projects such as dams and irrigation projects in transboundary river basins, weaponization of water by armed groups, and the government’s mismanagement of water and land have particularly affected vulnerability to climate change in the MENA region. Climate change exacerbates water scarcity in the MENA region, which in turn can incentivize policies such as unilaterally building water storages and weaponization of water as an instrument for leverage during armed conflicts. These MENA region-specific dimensions of climate-conflict pathways appear to be influenced by the region’s internal politics, relations between neighboring countries, and conflict dynamics.
The article is organized in the following order. We present the analytical framework of a set of pathways that connects climate change and violent conflict and then an outline of the methodology for a systematic review, which includes the operationalization of the variables and the sampling strategy. This is followed by the description of the methodology for conducting a systematic review. The review of literature is organized into four categories that are specified in the analytical framework, and then a synthesized analysis is detailed. Finally, we conclude by summarizing policy and research relevant implications from the finding in the MENA regional contexts with a set of recommendations.
The Analytical Framework: Linking Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Conflict
The climate-conflict nexus is complex. Climate change has implications for various forms of interstate and intrastate conflict, including communal violence, insurgencies, mass civil resistance campaigns, protests, and interpersonal disputes (Hendrix et al. 2023). Specific contexts of environment, socio-political systems, and pre-existing conflict matter when examining the connection between climate-related environmental changes and conflict. The analytical framework is based on a premise that the relationship between climate change and conflict is mediated by social, political, and ecological vulnerability (Daoudy 2021). When climate impacts contribute to social outcomes such as deteriorating livelihood conditions, migration, escalation of armed groups’ tactics, and elite capture, risks of violent conflict can increase. The following outlines four “pathways” between climate change and conflict (Figure 1).
A framework of climate insecurity pathways
The deterioration of livelihood conditions is a centerpiece in linking environmental changes and violent conflict. Climate-exposed sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism are highly likely to suffer from economic damages from climate change (IPCC 2022, SPM-11). Consequently, people whose livelihoods are dependent on the natural environment are subjected to additional economic burdens due to the changing climate or climate shocks. Extreme weather events such as droughts, heatwaves, sandstorms, flooding, and long-term changes in the environment can affect the income from the aforementioned sectors (IPCC 2022, SPM-11). Populations with low adaptive capacity including marginalized groups are disproportionately affected and vulnerable to short-term economic damages related to climate change (IPCC 2022, SPM-8). Demographic changes may accelerate the deterioration of livelihood conditions. Population growth in the MENA region has been rapid from 105 million in 1960 to 486 million in 2021 (World Bank 2022), which means more land and water are required for livelihoods. Climate change can worsen coastal erosion and decline tin he productivity of coastal plains in Israel and Morocco, which are important for food production. Sea-level rise has negative impacts on deltas, coastal plains, and human settlements, and tourism and industrial activities are also expected to decline due to heatwaves and worsening water shortages (Sowers et al. 2011).
Existing studies focus on various socio-economic outcomes of climate and environmental changes and their implications on conflict mobilization. Agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors are particularly susceptible to the loss of income due to climate shocks such as prolonged droughts (von Uexkull 2014; Schmidt and Pearson 2016). Loss of income due to the deterioration of livelihood conditions can lead individuals to seek alternative sources of livelihood, and some may turn to illicit activities, including joining non-state armed groups (Barnett and Adger 2007, 644; Seter 2016, 5).
Another category of social outcomes includes changes in migration and mobility patterns. Migration is one of the climate adaptation strategies, and subsequent socioeconomic and political impacts of migration can be linked to conflict. Declining livelihood conditions can trigger rural-to-urban migration in search for alternative livelihoods (Rüttinger et al. 2015, 27). Long-term climate change and weather shocks may accelerate environmental degradation and declining livelihood conditions. The increased migration flow accelerates urbanization and creates instability in hosting cities with inadequate infrastructure for public services (Balsari, Dresser, and Leaning 2020).
Changing migratory patterns of pastoralist or agropastoral groups, influenced by the availability of grazing land and water, can be linked to clashes with other communities (Abroulaye et al. 2015; Mohammed Ali 2019). Violent communal clashes and livestock raiding, which have become increasingly lethal, are linked to intensified competition over scarce resources for pastoralist populations (Detges 2014). For instance, farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel region have become increasingly lethal during recent decades, especially in areas with a higher population and livestock density.
Previous research also focuses on the role of elites who have leveraged social outcomes of climate change for their benefit. Here, elite actors include traditional elites, privileged groups with economic and political power, and even armed group leaders. More frequent and intense climate-related extreme weather events can provide additional opportunities for local elites to capture resources. When climate-induced disasters such as droughts and floods cause humanitarian crises, their basic needs and post-disaster reconstruction would bring in additional resources to the disaster-hit regions, which can be exploited by local elites. Humanitarian aid delivery often needs to cooperate with local elites, whose influence over the aid provision can further strengthen the client-patronage relationship, which is a source of tension (Uson 2017). Elite capture of resources, particularly land, is likely to generate strains within and between communities (Zaman 1991). Local grievances over land rights can be exploited in intercommunal conflict or national conflicts (Chavunduka and Bromley 2011). National elites can exploit local grievances of a population segment that are closely related to climate change. Inadequate government responses to Cyclone Bhola in 1970 led to a devastating human toll in the Bay of Bengal and contributed to the rise of the independence movement, which subsequently led to the secession of Bangladesh (Busby 2022, 181).
Changing environmental conditions by climate change may influence armed group tactics and behaviors. Armed groups have utilized the local grievances for a recruitment drive for the youth (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019). Climate change also affects the way of wars are to be fought. In warm climates, prolonged and unpredictable rainy seasons can alter the fighting season and patterns. Due to the reduced water availability in some areas, the strategic importance of water access points and infrastructure may have become more salient. Armed groups can escalate the conflict by weaponizing water by flooding farmland and cities or depriving the population of water (King 2015). Amid droughts and unreliable rainfalls, armed groups may consider water weaponization as a more effective tactic in order to influence and control communities already experiencing water scarcity.
The analytical framework of climate-conflict pathways is applied to analyze findings from existing research relevant to the MENA region. The following details a method of a systematic review of the literature.
Methodology: A Systematic Review
This paper leverages from existing evidence by conducting a systematic review of existing studies. Systematic review method has been extensively employed in examining the linkage between climate change and violent conflict (Ide 2018; Nordqvist and Krampe 2018; Van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018; Tarif 2022). Systematic reviews differ from a traditional sense of literature review in a way that it is “focused” and “systematic”; it zooms on a specific research question; and is based on pre-established sets of principles for literature selection. Systematic and focused nature of the review is helpful to “locate previous research, select relevant literature, evaluate contributions and analyses, and synthesize data” (Denyer and Tranfield 2009, 671). This approach is particularly useful to yield new insights and provide clarification on frequently debated issues (Dacombe 2018, 155). In addition, the method is a highly relevant policy tool that promotes evidence-based policymaking.
We have used the following set of principles for locating, selecting, and evaluating the literature. A Boolean search string containing keywords was composed with keywords from climate change and violent conflict.2 Search words for climate-related environmental conditions include terms related to the effects of extreme weather events or long-term environmental changes on nature-based livelihoods and water and food insecurity, involuntary displacement, which are adopted from previous research done in a similar scope (Nordqvist and Krampe 2018; Van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018; Tarif 2022). Several social outcomes are theorized as consequences of climate change such as internal and cross-border migration and elite exploitation of changing environmental conditions. In the paper, violent conflict is defined as the situation when one or more actors engaged in violence against hostile groups due to incompatibilities. This broad definition allows include interstate wars, terrorism to communal clashes involving violence. The definition does not include protests and non-violent actions, which are a crucial class of social phenomena leading to political instability and violence. We paid attention to this element in the analysis but excluded studies exclusively focusing on non-violent conflict (e.g., Ide et al. 2021). We used specific keywords relevant to conflict actors and types of conflict in the MENA region.
The Boolean search string was used in searching the abstracts of existing studies in English published during 1989–2020 from Web of Science, a major database of scholarly literature. From the search results, we read the abstracts and selected items with relevance to the relationship between climate-related environmental changes and conflict. The initial screening found 141 articles, which then were reviewed manually for their relevance to the inquiry (see the Online Appendix). In the screening process, we excluded a number of studies that focused on the impact of armed conflict on the environment and studies that did not explicitly focus on violent conflict. Similarly, studies that do not explicitly focus on climate change as in long-term climate trends, climate hazards, and weather events were excluded. Another set of articles that were removed from the list were commentaries and reviews that were not based on either qualitative or quantitative empirical material. While all the selected articles either have at least one country in the MENA region or adapt a regional focus on the MENA, the specific definition of these regions varies. In our literature review, we adhere to a specific list of countries that we recognize as part of the region.3 After the screening, we manually searched the bibliographies of the selected articles and included eleven relevant articles. In total, forty-one articles are reviewed with a focus on a set of categories stemmed from the analytical framework for explaining the relationship between climate-related environmental change and violent conflict (Figure 2).
Peer-reviewed articles reviewed
The geographical focus of the reviewed studies demonstrates that much of the scholarship focuses on Syria and Iraq. In contrast, North African countries and Gulf countries have received relatively limited attention (Figure 3). The high number of research works focusing on Syria can be explained by the high profile of the contested linkage between climate change and the Syrian civil war. While media narratives have regarded Syria as a prime example of an armed conflict fuelled by climate change and several prominent public figures have publicized it as an illustration of the nexus, it is worth noting that scholarly research has presented differing perspectives on the direct causative role of climate change in conflict escalation (Miller 2015; “Climate Wars - Syria” with Thomas Friedman 2017; VICE 2017).
The distribution of geographical focus of the reviewed studies
Source: a map drawn by authors.
Pathways between Climate Change and Violent Conflict in the MENA Region
In this section, we discuss existing explanations from previous research that connect climate-related environmental changes and violent conflict in the MENA region. The linkages between the environmental changes related to climate change and violent conflict constitute a complex chain of events (e.g., Gleditsch 1998). Most empirical research contributes to examine parts of the chain under specific temporal and spatial scopes, and this is one reason why it is important to consider the broader implication of each piece of evidence, which then can contribute to the better understanding of the climate-conflict pathways as a larger phenomenon. For clarity and focus, we organized a set of findings from previous studies under four pre-determined analytical categories: worsening livelihood conditions, migration and mobility, armed groups, and elite exploitation. As explained earlier, these categories are not mutually exclusive; rather, explanations under different categories are interlinked and can mutually reinforce each other in different stages of mobilization and conflict.
Direct Link between Climate Change and Violent Conflict
Scholars have examined whether climate impacts such as warmer temperatures and precipitation anomalies are statistically correlated to violent conflict, and several studies have focused on specific countries within the MENA region (Feizi, Janatabadi, and Torshizi 2019; Döring 2020; Helman and Zaitchik 2020; Helman, Zaitchik, and Funk 2020; Sofuoglu and Ay 2020; Linke and Ruether 2021). Findings from existing research on the direct impact of climate-related factors on violent conflict and political instability suggest that the relationship is not always linear and varied in specific country contexts (Helman and Zaitchik 2020; Helman et al. 2020). Water scarcity, for instance, is not only associated with increased communal conflict but also cooperation (Döring 2020). Warming did not unitarily increase or decrease conflict risk—warmer temperatures increased risks of violence in Africa but decreased in the Middle East, and warming did not have a linear effect but had a greater effect on conflict risk in warmer regions (Helman et al. 2020). Increased temperatures and rainfall anomalies are positively associated with political instability in the MENA region (Helman and Zaitchik 2020; Sofuoglu and Ay 2020). These findings caution against generalized or simplistic assumptions about the relationship between climate change and violent conflict.
Studies have found an insignificant relationship between water scarcity and violent conflict. Precipitation levels and droughts do not have a direct impact on communal violence in a model including the Middle East and Africa (Döring 2020). The same study also found that communal conflict is more likely to occur in areas with lower rainfalls and limited groundwater availability. Groundwater is less affected by short-term droughts, but prolonged droughts and unsustainable extraction can lead to groundwater shortages, which is the case in northern Syria (Kelley et al. 2015) and Yemen (Weiss 2015). Rainfall variability does not seem to have significantly affected the intensity of civil war violence during the 2011–2019 Syrian civil war (Linke and Ruether 2021). The discussion on climate change’s impact on armed group tactics and behavior is followed in the later part of the paper.
Droughts and water scarcity seem to be a source of social disputes and non-violent conflict (Feizi et al. 2019; Bijani et al. 2020; Ide et al. 2021). Whether the tension over water scarcity escalates to non-violent conflict or not seems to be contingent on the pre-existing negative socio-political relationships between groups and the types of political systems (Ide et al. 2021). In Iran, irregular rainfalls and water scarcity at the local level are linked to interpersonal conflict and communal tensions and can degrade state legitimacy and contribute to political instability (Feizi et al. 2019; Bijani et al. 2020).
Evidence from existing studies on the direct climate-conflict link also alludes to the need to further explore the mechanisms between physical environmental changes and social outcomes. Both large-N and small-N studies can contribute to the understanding of the underlying mechanisms or indirect pathways connecting climate change and conflict. The following sections discuss livelihoods, migration, inadequate management, and armed group behaviors as the pathways between climate-related environmental changes and violent conflict.
Deteriorating Livelihood Conditions
Several studies evaluating the worsening livelihood mechanism in the MENA region focus on the relationship between droughts’ impacts on agriculture and conflict. Severe and frequent droughts due to climate change may affect the region’s food security and livelihoods. In the MENA countries, agriculture, fisheries, and livestock accounts for roughly 15 percent of the total population’s livelihood (World Bank 2023). Agriculture dependency is one of the best predictors of violent conflict (von Uexkull et al. 2016). Indeed, evidence from a study focusing on the MENA region and Africa shows a consistent result that conflict risk is higher in areas where the population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods (Helman and Zaitchik 2020).
Droughts’ impact on agriculture is an important area of research in the implications of the changing climate on the deterioration of livelihood conditions. During the last three decades, droughts in the MENA region have become more frequent and severe. Three out of four most severe multi-year droughts in the Fertile Crescent region referring to parts of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt occurred during 1990–2015 (Kelley et al. 2015, 3243). The sub-region has historically witnessed periodic droughts; therefore, their agricultural systems are to a degree adaptive to drought conditions and low rainfalls. More frequent and intensifying droughts and drying conditions may jeopardize the population’s adaptive capacity, leading to far-reaching and consequential disruptions in societies. In particular, the 2007–2008 drought severely affected the agricultural production in the Fertile Crescent region. Annual wheat production in Iraq during 2008–2009 declined by 35 percent (Selby 2019, 264). Jordan and the West Bank in Palestine also experienced a reduction in agricultural production after the 2007–2008 drought (Feitelson and Tubi 2017). However, none of these countries experienced the same extent of “shock” as in Syria, whose effects some refer to as the “collapse” of the agricultural sector. The 2007–2008 drought is considered “the worst drought in the instrumental record, causing widespread crop failure” and decimation of livestock populations in northeast Syria (Kelley et al. 2015, 3241).
A dozen of the reviewed authors have probed the linkage between the 2007 and 2008 multi-year droughts and their impacts on agricultural and livestock production and the Syrian conflict using quantitative and qualitative methods (De Châtel 2014; Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Eklund and Thompson 2017; Selby et al. 2017; Ide 2018; Karnieli et al. 2019; Ash and Obradovich 2020; Daoudy 2020a, 2021; Eklund et al. 2022). These reviewed research works have disagreed on what extent the drought’s contribution to the sharp decline in agricultural production and rural livelihood in Syria. Kelley et al. (2015) is one of the major empirical studies that argues for the linkage between the multi-year drought and the political instability, which argument is similar to Gleick (2014). Other studies have refuted the causal linkage between the drought and the Syrian civil war, but their core reasons for arguing against it have varied.
Several authors point out that the impact of climate shocks on livelihoods is mediated by water governance decisions. This argument downplays the role of climate change as the main driver of livelihood deterioration rather than a contributing factor. Despite being affected by similar rainfall deficits during 2007–2008, farmers in northern Syria generally experienced far worse consequences in productivity compared to northwest Iraq and southeast Turkey (Eklund and Thompson 2017). Turkey’s substantial investment in water infrastructure and placing policies for better management during the 1990s and 2000s seem to have reduced their vulnerability to droughts (Kelley et al. 2015; Eklund and Thompson 2017). On the contrary, the Syrian regime’s agricultural expansion policy, unsustainable groundwater use, and economic policy have exacerbated the population’s drought vulnerability. Agricultural expansion schemes in Syria more than doubled the irrigated area from 650,000 ha in 1985 to 1.4 million ha in 2005, driven by “a vision of development through agrarian modernization” (Selby 2019, 268). The policy overlooked physical limitations of groundwater resources by over-extracting water from aquifers at a rate of 300 percent or more than the basin’s yield and depleting aquifers prior to the 2007–2008 drought (Selby 2019, 266). Groundwater depletion in the region has a major effect on drought vulnerability because groundwater is an important source of water during low rainfall years (Kelley et al. 2015).
Weiss (2015) makes a similar observation in Yemen, indicating that governance issues are mainly responsible for groundwater depletion in the country rather than climate-related environmental changes. Factors related to agrarian political economy and governance capacities further affect the vulnerability. The government’s capacity to deal with environmental changes and their impact on local economies and livelihoods is pointed out to be a key mediating factor in the linkage between climate change and violent conflict. The issues related to mismanagement and elite exploitation of climate change are further discussed in the later section of the article.
A few studies found differing climate impacts based on gender and ethnicity. Vulnerability to climate change varies between communities and countries, and intersectional identities of the affected people such as gender, age, and ethnicity influence their capacity to adapt to climate change and resilience (Thomas et al. 2019). Evidence from Iran shows how women are forced to carry the “double burden” of doing off-farm work activities such as weeding or thinning cotton for minimal wages, in addition to the regular household and on-farm tasks (Keshavarz, Karami, and Vanclay 2013). In Syria, the mechanization of agriculture has led to a significant loss of rural employment and disproportionately affected women (Selby 2019, 267). The disproportionate effect on women is related to structural gender inequality restricting women’s economic opportunities and wealth accumulation (Selby 2019). This finding aligns with previous literature linking gender and climate change indicating that women are often worse affected by climate impacts due to restrictive norms and rights (Denton 2002). In Israel, pastoralists are often disadvantaged due to the Israeli state’s resource allocation policies prioritizing farmers. In the northern Negev region, the state’s land appropriation disproportionately affected agri-pastoralist Bedouin tribes during the early 1900s. This has led to higher vulnerability of the Bedouins during droughts (Tubi and Feitelson 2016). A similar pattern of marginalization is found in Hasakah, a region in northern Syria, where the state turned open range lands into farmlands (Selby 2019). The findings on differing vulnerability and impacts on livelihoods are based on a handful of studies, and intersectional approaches are generally absent in most studies reviewed in the analytic essay.
Changes in Migration and Mobility Patterns
Migration represents a critical adaptation strategy for populations affected by climate-induced environmental changes. Existing research examines various linkages between climate-induced environmental changes and migration in the MENA region. The main discussions are related to the contribution of climate shocks in internal and international migration and migration as a source of political instability and conflict. Existing evidence in the reviewed studies does not fully confirm that climate shocks and changing climate conditions are the primary drivers of internal or international migration. The link between displacement and violent conflict seems to be contested as well.
One of the predominant narratives links climate, migration, and insecurity theorizes worsening of livelihood conditions due to climate change has led to distressed migration of rural population to urban or peri-urban areas, which can contribute to greater political instability (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Feitelson and Tubi 2017; Ash and Obradovich 2020). This argument gained prominence after out-migration from drought-affected regions in northern Syria in 2008 and the agricultural sector collapse in 2010 preceded the 2011 uprising.
Several studies focus on empirically examining the migration patterns after the 2007–2008 droughts in the Levant (De Châtel 2014; Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Ash and Obradovich 2020). There seems to be a wide-ranging estimation of the scale of internal migration in Syria during this time (Ide 2018). While acknowledging the multiple factors contributing to migration, researchers have debated on the number of displaced people in northern Syria and Iraq amid the 2007–2008 drought. While Gleick (2014, 334) and Kelley et al. (2015, 3241–2) estimate ∼1.5 million people to be internally displaced, others suggest 40–60,000 households or ∼ 300,000 displaced people (Selby et al. 2017, 254). Several methods are employed in estimating drought-induced migration. For instance, Ash and Obradovich (2020) used nightlight intensity as a proxy measure for population change, which seemed to detect the changes in population in drought-affected regions. Satellite imagery can be analyzed for measuring agricultural land use, which can be a proxy indicator for out-migration (Eklund et al. 2022). Others relied on official statistics and survey data, which are based on a combination of census, fieldwork, and expert assessment (e.g., OCHA 2009). Nightlight intensity and satellite imagery are effective measurements of population changes, but remote sensing data provide little context about who moved, to where, and why. Fieldwork-based studies such as De Châtel (2014) provide insights into the socio-economic circumstances of migrants and their political orientation. A UN rapid assessment report is based on various UN-led field reports and assessments during 2006–2008 and supplies valuable on-the-ground information including changing migration patterns, children’s school enrollment, and water availability (OCHA 2009). The evidence indicates that migration after the drought was indeed significant, although we cannot exactly say the scale of it. The question is whether these migrants play a role in the subsequent uprising and civil war.
Critics of this narrative argue that the Syrian uprising emerged due to political discontent, economic recession, youth unemployment, discrimination, and injustice, not because of the mass climate migrants (De Châtel 2014; Selby et al. 2017; Daoudy 2020a). Eklund et al. (2022) suggest migration triggered by the 2007–2008 droughts did not play a significant role in the uprising because migrants were likely to have returned as early as 2010 based on the satellite images showing full recovery of agricultural activities in drought-affected areas (Eklund et al. 2022). Rural-to-urban migration in the MENA region is rather influenced by pre-existing socio-economic conditions and political decisions. For example, in Syria, the introduction of neoliberal agrarian policies by the government generated a significant degree of insecurity in the rural populations and prompted rural-to-urban migration (De Châtel 2014; Selby 2019). And region’s demographic trend has a much greater and long-lasting impact on the pressure in urban areas. For instance, the urban population in Syria is estimated to have grown from 8.9 million in 2002 to 13.8 million in 2010, and most migrants lived in informal settlements with poor infrastructure and no jobs (Kelley et al. 2015).
The narratives on climate change and migration in the MENA region in existing literature reflect how countries perceive climate-induced migration as a source of conflict and insecurity. Jordan, for instance, fears the influx of migration from the MENA region, mostly Palestine, Iraq, and Syria, would worsen the country’s water scarcity and thus security (Weinthal, Zawahri, and Sowers 2015). Fears of “climate refugees” from Africa have shaped Israel’s discriminatory discourses and practices against African refugees and Bedouin communities inside the country (Weinthal et al. 2015). Media reports have suggested that climate shocks in the MENA regions, where asylum seekers and irregular migrants originated from, have affected their decision to migrate (O'Hagan 2015). More than 2.2 million migrants without legal permits have amassed at EU external borders during 2009–2017, and most migrants during this period were from the MENA region (Cottier and Salehyan 2021, 2).
Findings from existing research refute the idea of climate shocks would trigger refugee flows from the MENA region. Climate shocks and precipitation deficits are not linked to the increase of out-migration from the MENA region to Europe (Abel et al. 2019; Cottier and Salehyan 2021). Severe droughts and drier weather conditions in the MENA region are associated with the reduced migration flow to Europe, which is contradictory from the popular media narrative about “climate refugees” (Cottier and Salehyan 2021). This finding alone suggests that migration can be an “investment,” because the extra income generated from additional rain reduces financial barriers to emigrating (Cottier and Salehyan 2021, 6). The correlation between rainfall variability and asylum-seeking flows has been found during 2010–2012 when the Arab Spring swept a dozen MENA countries but not during other periods between 2006 and 2015 (Abel et al. 2019). This finding demonstrates that the impact of climate change on generating asylum-seeking flows seems to be conditional on the origin country’s political stability.
Armed Group’s Tactical Considerations
Existing research specifically focusing on how climate change affects armed groups’ tactics is sparse in the MENA region (exception of Linke and Ruether 2021), but several research works demonstrate that armed groups may escalate their tactics due to the increased environmental stress on water and agricultural land. Changing climate conditions and weather shocks adversely affect water availability for agriculture. This trend underscores the notion that the strategic importance of controlling water and water infrastructure could emerge as an effective instrument for exerting pressure to local populations in times of armed conflicts. Previous research supplies evidence on how water is weaponized by armed groups, which is a case of escalation of tactics (Grech-Madin 2020). Water weaponization is defined as the “intentional or unintentional damage or destruction of (sensitive) components of the water infrastructure like dams, treatment plants, pumping stations, piping and canal systems, sewage plants, reservoirs, wells, etc” (von Lossow 2016, 84).
Water has been used as both a target and a weapon by state and non-state actors. Existing studies focus on how non-state armed groups and government militaries have strategically attacked or captured water and other environmental infrastructure (King 2015; von Lossow 2016; Sowers, Weinthal, and Zawahri 2017; Gleick 2019; Daoudy 2020b). Water scarcity in the region is an incentivizing factor for government troops and armed groups to use water to incur damage to the local population. Attacks on water pipes, sanitation and desalination plants, water treatment, pumping and distribution facilities, and dams have occurred in Syria, Libya, and Yemen during civil wars. Targeting of water infrastructure also occurs in protracted conflict situations such as the Israel and Palestine conflict when Israel was accused of attacking wells in Gaza City (von Lossow 2016, 84). Particular attention has been drawn to rebel groups’ ability to use water for strategic but as well psychological terrorism (King 2015).
The weaponization of water is not limited to targeting water infrastructure during wartime. Increasing water scarcity and the importance of water access influence the strategic calculation by armed groups on when and where they would deploy violence (King 2015). Non-state armed groups such as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq are known to have fought over the control of water infrastructure in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as part of their expansion strategy (von Lossow 2016). Armed groups fight more intensely during the growing season, which is linked to tax revenue from agricultural harvest and control of the population who rely on farming (Linke and Ruether 2021, 116).
Armed groups can also use water as a tool of governance. By providing water and electricity to the local population, the Islamic State achieved ideological credibility as well as legitimacy over the local population, which was a core component of the IS claim of statehood (King 2015; von Lossow 2016). Supplying water is a crucial governance function, so armed groups can obstruct water infrastructure to damage the conflict party’s control and legitimacy.
Elite Exploitation
Previous research demonstrates how elite exploitation is linked to protests and violent conflict by focusing on corruption, elite capture of disaster relief, and elite bias in the MENA region. Political patronage and ethnic, tribal, and religious networks for political mobilization shape elite behavior in the region. Political patronage is not unique to the MENA region, but clientelism explains the viability of political networks of some political elites in the MENA region who maintained power through providing resources and preferential treatment in return for votes, loyalty, and compliance (Herb 1999; Haddad 2012). Social fabrics of the MENA are woven with diverse ethnic, tribal, and religious groups, and these minorities have also been part of political cleavage structures (Belge and Karakoç 2015). Political mobilization along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines has been effective in the contexts when these identities are contested (Yiftachel 1996). In the following, three main findings from existing research are outlined.
Climate change may increase opportunities for elites to appropriate humanitarian aid for their benefit, and elite exploitation can worsen the conflict risk amid climate-induced disasters and environmental scarcities. The risk of politicization of humanitarian and development aid has been extensively studied (Doocy and Lyles 2018; Alqatabry and Butcher 2020). In situations of climate-induced disasters, local and central elites can have a significant influence on the planning and distribution of humanitarian aid. Political elites can be biased in their relationship with local elites, and this elite bias can have implications for local-level politics (Brosché and Elfversson 2012). After the 2007–2008 drought in Syria, the Assad government directed the UN-led relief efforts to almost entirely focus on the Arab district of Al-Shaddadi, although the Kurdish communities were equally or worse affected (Selby 2019, 270). Unequal aid distribution can increase intercommunal tensions during droughts. State intervention can reduce the risk of conflict amid climate-related natural disasters. Tubi and Feitelson (2016) demonstrate how proactive relief provisions during droughts have reduced communal violence between Bedouin herders and Jewish farmers in Israel. The findings from Tubi and Feitelson (2016) confirm that the state’s capacity to adapt and absorb shocks remains essential for the inhabitants’ perceived marginal benefits and the opportunity cost of conflict (Post et al. 2016).
Powerful elites compete over acquiring land and water resources from weak and vulnerable groups. Mismanagement and corruption in the public sector are other factors that affect the population’s access to water and basic services, which are simultaneously hampered by climate change (Kim and Swain 2017). In Yemen, most communal conflict occurs over water and land when tribal elites compete with one another (Weiss 2015). In southern Iraq, a large volume of water is illegally diverted for commercial farms owned by elites, which worsens water scarcity (Mason 2022). Donor-funded projects for repairing Basra’s aging water infrastructure after the 2003 invasion, worth 2 billion USD over nearly two decades, were succumbed to widespread corruption (Mason 2022). Bureaucratic procedures endow opportunities for officials to extort bribes such as well-licensing in Syria and water development project licensing in Lebanon (De Châtel 2014; Mason and Khawlie 2016). In Syria, the government’s requirement to annually renew well licences was an opportunity for security personnel and local officials to collect bribes (De Châtel 2014, 12). Protestors in Dara’a, Syria initially demanded to end corruption in the water sector (De Châtel 2014). In Iraq, the epidemic of corruption in the water sector endowed youth and urban poor grievances against the state, which led to widespread protests (Human Rights Watch 2019).
Although the MENA region is a climate change hotspot, governance failures, and mismanagement account for declining water access (Mason and Khawlie 2016; Selby et al. 2017; Daoudy 2021). Elites in the MENA region have leveraged climate change to explain some of the governance failures in the water and agriculture sectors. The Syrian state and security apparatus have exploited the narratives around climate change by portraying Syria as a “naturally water-scarce” country, although the reality on the ground shows a man-made water crisis due to corruption and inefficient management by the government authorities (De Châtel 2014, 9). Similarly, the Lebanese government blamed climate change for the reduction of water flow in the Hasbani Basin, while civil society representatives accused the government of “systematically neglecting their concerns” about water access (Mason and Khawlie 2016, 1352–3).
Tensions over transboundary water sharing may continue to rise in the MENA region (Bulloch and Darwish 1993; Amery 2002). The Euphrates River and Tigris River are important water sources for Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and Turkey controls the water flow through the investment in the Southeastern Anatolia Project consisting of twenty-two large reservoirs and nineteen hydroelectric power stations on the upper tributaries of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Karnieli et al. (2019) argue that Turkey’s transboundary investment and dam filling to be the primary driver of 2007–2008 droughts in Syria instead of climate change. This might be inconsequential because Turkey released additional water to Syria during the drought (see Kibaroglu and Scheumann 2011, 297). As long as the downstream countries, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, see their domestic water problems to be attributed to the upstream dams in Turkey (e.g., Al-Muqdadi et al. 2016), transboundary rivers can be a source of interstate tension—although it is unlikely to develop into a full-scale armed conflict (Bencala and Dabelko 2008). The impact of climate change in transboundary water governance is still an under-researched area that deserves more attention. Another area that can be a subject for further research is a growing sub-national competition over water such as brewing tension within Iraq due to the Kurdish Regional Government’s dam building plans (Tinti 2023).
Evaluating the “Pathways” Framework in the MENA Region
Existing evidence demonstrates that climate impacts, particularly droughts and drying trends, contribute to armed conflict in various ways. This section weighs in on the findings from the analysis to evaluate the overall framework of pathways to climate insecurity in the MENA region. The synthesis of findings highlights consensus and disagreement in existing studies and identifies the areas for further research.
Water scarcity in the MENA region is apparent at multiple scales, from domestic to transboundary, and has various implications for social vulnerability and political stability. The region’s water insecurity is as much driven by governance challenges as climatic and environmental trends. Severe droughts in the Levant during 2007–2009 appear to have led to the decline in agricultural production in the affected areas, but the drought vulnerability is mediated by groundwater availability, the viability of irrigation systems, and the capacity of water infrastructure (Kelley et al. 2015). Decades of mismanagement of water resources and institutional failings undermine adaptive capacities in the region, demonstrated in examples from Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq (Weiss 2015; Mason and Khawlie 2016; Selby 2019; Mason 2022).
The depletion of groundwater in parts of the MENA region is largely attributed to the government’s unsustainable agricultural and water policies. Groundwater offers an important source of reserve during droughts, and the unsustainable use of groundwater adversely affects farmers’ drought vulnerability. Government subsidies on fuels encouraged farmers to install diesel pumps to use groundwater for irrigation, without consideration for sustainability in Yemen and Syria (Weiss 2015; Selby 2019). These governments’ agricultural and economic policies resulted in farmers growing more water-intensive crops such as cotton and citrus fruits, which accelerated groundwater depletion. Political elites used fuel subsidies to ensure support from farmers at the expense of the environment. These unsustainable water and agricultural policies are not technical “mismanagement” but embedded in a much larger political context and ideology (Daoudy 2021, 13). Considering political factors in climate vulnerability is an important aspect to understand the climate-conflict nexus in the MENA region.
This analytic essay also looks into the important debate about the contribution of droughts in the Syrian uprising and subsequent civil war. Fourteen out of thirty-nine existing studies focus on the Syrian conflict and examine various linkages between the conflict and climate-related environmental factors. The popular narrative portrays the Syrian civil war as a climate conflict that is triggered by climate-induced agricultural collapse resulting in mass displacement (Gleick 2014; Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015). Research refutes this narrative by contesting the empirical foundations. Drought-displaced people in urban or peri-urban areas did not participate in street protests (De Châtel 2014), and a significant proportion of the displaced returned to northern Syria before the revolution began (Eklund and Thompson 2017; Eklund et al. 2022). Reviewing the literature demonstrates that attributing the onset of the Syrian civil war solely to climate change lacks empirical substantiation. Nevertheless, climate-related environmental changes, such as falling groundwater levels, have significant impact on natural resources and livelihoods, which can consequently undermine human and environment security.
Internal migration is more prominent than international migration in the research focusing on climate-induced mobility in the MENA region. This is similar to other studies with different regional focus (e.g., Burrows and Kinney 2016). The disruption of the rural livelihoods appears to be a strong push factor in Syria, which can be worsened by droughts (Fröhlich 2016). Data on migration seem to be a challenge in unpacking this complex phenomenon. It is challenging to disentangle environmental changes from economic drivers in migration decision-making. Satellite-based data provide reasonable proxy measures for in- and out-migration in locations (e.g., Ash and Obradovich 2020), but they do not offer insights on who moved from where to where and why. More studies incorporating qualitative data are needed to further the understanding of climate-induced internal migration.
There is clear evidence that armed groups have escalated their tactics by weaponizing water in the MENA region. Several studies demonstrate how armed groups escalate their tactics by weaponizing water. Such a wartime trend indicates a heightened risk for civilians and long-term consequences by destructing key water infrastructures. This finding is highly policy relevant for strengthening and enforcing international laws for civilian protection during armed conflict (see Grech-Madin 2021). In relation to the armed group’s tactics, more research is needed to unpack the role of climate-related environmental factors in the armed group’s recruitment and tactical decisions.
The findings on differing vulnerability and gendered impacts on livelihoods are based on a handful of studies, and intersectional approaches are generally absent in most studies reviewed in the analytic essay. How climate shocks have varying impacts on people based on their gender, age, livelihoods, ethnicity, and combinations of these identities is missing. If marginalization and grievances are key processes of climate-induced conflict, how climate change affects different segments of the population differently needs better understanding.
Conclusion
The relationship between climate change and violent conflict is primarily indirect and varied, cautioning against generalized assumptions. How climate change influences the risk of violent conflict in the MENA region is mediated by political economy, institutional shortcomings, and elite competition. The risk of violent conflict is contingent on pre-existing negative socio-political relationships, types of political systems, and different climate vulnerabilities of various social groups. Gendered climate vulnerabilities need better understanding for establishing the linkage between climate vulnerability and insecurity. Carefully examining existing evidence is important for both over general climate security discussions as well as for the policy discussions on the MENA region, which has remained a focal point of scholarly and policy debates concerning climate security (Daoudy, Sowers, and Weinthal 2022, 7).
Disentangling specific climate impacts is also crucial for enhancing government’s climate adaptation and disaster mitigation policies in the MENA region. Civil society representatives from the MENA region have been concerned that states and political elites blame climate change to legitimize inequalities and to devoid accountability (Selby et al. 2017; Kausch 2022). As existing research demonstrated, water and food insecurity in the region is driven by a lack of state capacity to properly manage natural resources and the integrity of public institutions in the MENA region.
Future research should pay attention to other types of climate hazards, including floods, heatwaves, and dust storms. Existing research primarily focuses on droughts and precipitation deficits, failing to account for heatwaves and flooding, which also are common in the MENA region. Floods are understudied despite their severe humanitarian impact. For instance, heavy flooding forced more than 84,000 people to displacement in Yemen, 13,000 people in Iran, and 5,000 people in northern Iraq in 2021 (IDMC 2023). How flooding affects livelihood conditions and social vulnerability would be considerably different from droughts. Studies from other regions suggest floods are not associated with communal violence (Petrova 2022). Ultra-heatwaves are likely to worsen without substantial government interventions (Zittis et al. 2021), and their impact on oil exploitation, tourism, and urban areas demands more research. Oil and tourism industries are economic backbones of several MENA countries, and adverse impact on these sectors is likely lead to ripple effects on the society. A decrease in oil production due to extreme heatwaves and dust storms will affect public service provisions by the governments, which can be a source of instability as previous research points out (e.g., Mason 2022).
Future research should look at non-violent conflicts, especially protests linked to climate change in the MENA region. There is already a substantial debate on the role of food security in political stability, such as in the Arab Spring (Werrell and Femia 2013; Schilling et al. 2020). And few studies focus on under what conditions droughts and floods can lead to non-violent conflicts such as political unrest and protests (Ide, Kristensen, and Bartusevičius 2021; Ide et al. 2021). Youth climate activists in the region have demanded their respective governments to take proactive climate actions (Altaeb 2022). Climate change is becoming a politically salient topic, and the MENA region’s civil society has voiced its concerns about the inaction and growing uncertainty about the future. How the region’s climate activism interacts with politics appears to be an important area for future research.
The narrative about climate change and conflict in the MENA region is shaped by both scientific projections but also a “long history of colonial and postcolonial scholarship invoking environmental determinism as an explanation for underdevelopment” (Daoudy et al. 2022, 7). This calls for more “open” and critical approaches in researching the climate-conflict nexus in the region. The evidence from existing studies shows that current water and food insecurity in the MENA region are outcomes of domestic politics and institutional shortcomings rather than past climate change. This highlights the importance of governance reforms for enhancing adaptative capacity in the region (Sowers et al. 2011). Improved understanding of how vulnerability to climate change interacts with political systems, institutions, and social relations can inform policy development. This enhanced understanding can equip relevant stakeholders to more effectively anticipate, prevent, and respond to the intricate web of risks entwining climate change and violent conflict, while concurrently enhancing resilience-building efforts.
Footnotes
We adopt SIPRI’s definition of the MENA region, which includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), North Yemen (–1990), South Yemen (–1990) and Yemen; (NA) Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. See “Regional coverage,” See SIPRI databases at https://www.sipri.org/databases/regional-coverage.
The search string was the following: AB=((climat* OR "climat* change" OR "climat* variability" OR rainfall OR precipitation OR drought OR "water scarcity" OR "land degradation" OR weather OR disaster OR temperature OR warming OR "sea level rise" OR desertification OR famine OR “soil erosion” OR flood*) AND (conflict OR jihad* OR armed OR insurgen* OR rebel* OR terror* OR violen* OR war) AND ("middle east*" OR “north africa*” OR MENA OR algeria OR bahrain OR egypt OR iran OR Iraq OR israel OR jordan OR kuwait OR lebanon OR libya OR morocco OR oman OR palestin* OR qatar OR “saudi arabia” OR syria OR tunisia OR “united arab emirates” OR yemen OR “western sahara”)).
Here, we use SIPRI’s definition of the MENA region, which includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), North Yemen (–1990), South Yemen (–1990) and Yemen; (NA) Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.
Notes
Author’s note: This work is supported by funding from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs as part of SIPRI’s Climate Change and Security Project and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for SIPRI’s Climate-Related Security and Development Risks Project. We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback for improving the manuscript. We are indebted to Florian Krampe, Farah Hegazi, and Kheira Tarif for their helpful comments throughout the writing process.
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