Market integration is an objective of Article 101 TFEU. As a result, agreements aimed at partitioning national markets are in principle restrictive of competition by object. The case law on this point has been consistent since Consten-Grundig. Making sense of it, however, remains a challenge. The purpose of this article is to first show how the methodological approach followed by the Court of Justice changes when market integration considerations are at stake. Second, this article explains why and when restrictions on cross-border trade have been found not to restrict competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. An agreement aimed at partitioning national markets is not as such contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU if the analysis of the counterfactual reveals that it does not restrict inter-brand and/or intra-brand competition that would have existed in its absence. It is possible to think of three scenarios in this regard: (1) an agreement may be objectively necessary to achieve the aims sought by the parties; (2) a clause may be objectively necessary for an agreement; and (3) competition is precluded by the underlying regulatory context (as is the case, in particular, when the exercise of intellectual property rights is at stake).