The New Regulation on Religious Affairs and Its Possible Impact on the Catholic Church in China

Introduction

The Chinese government has regulated all public religious activity for many years.¹ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) considers one of its essential roles to be making sure that religion neither interferes with the state’s power nor harms its citizens. Policy and legal documents have therefore been issued to control and regulate religious life in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

A revision of the Regulation on Religious Affairs (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli, 宗教事务条例) took effect on February 1, 2018. The prime minister, Li Keqiang 李克强, and the State Council for Legislative Affairs (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan, 中华人民共和国国务院) signed the new regulation in September 2017. The new version revised the regulation that was drafted in 2004 and brought into force in 2005. As the new revision has only recently taken effect, it is essential to introduce the regulation and particularly to focus on the changes it has brought about.

In addition to comparing the new regulation with the 2004 version, this article will provide a broader context by introducing other PRC policies and legal documents that concern religion. The changes introduced by the new regulation affect all religious groups in China, but for some the implications could be more serious than for others. With this in mind, the article will focus on the Catholic church in China (Tianzhujiao, 天主教).

The regulation is so new that few academic articles addressing the issue have been published to date. This article will seek to offer a clearer understanding of the current Chinese legal system regarding religion and to address two questions in particular: 1) What are the changes in the new Regulation on Religious Affairs? 2) What are the possible effects of the new regulation on the Catholic church in China?

Policy and Legislation Documents on Religion before 2018

To understand the current regime for regulating religion, it is important to grasp the broader historical context of the PRC policy towards religion. As explained by Goossaert and Palmer: “the state, from the late 1970s onward, attempted to shape religious orthodoxy and to draw clear demarcations between legitimate and illegitimate forms of religiosity, both through its structuring of public discourse on religion and through its attempts to institutionalize religious communities.”² Furthermore, I would argue, the state attempted to shape religious orthodoxy through means of policies and legislative documents published by the Chinese government on the subject of religion.

The primary legal document on religion in the PRC is the Chinese Constitution. The current version of the constitution was adopted in December 1982, since then it has undergone several revisions.³ Article 36 regulates religious belief and affirms freedom of religion:

中华人民共和国公民有宗教信仰自由。

任何国家机关、社会团体和个人不得强制公民信仰宗教或者不信仰宗教, 不得歧视信仰宗教的公民和不信仰宗教的公民。

国家保护正常的宗教活动。任何人不得利用宗教进行破坏社会秩序、损害公民身体健康、妨碍国家教育制度的活动。

宗教团体和宗教事务不受外国势力的支配。

Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.

No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.

The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state.

Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.⁴

According to the constitution, the Chinese government guarantees access to all “normal religious activities” (zhengchang de zongjiao huodong, 正常的宗教活动), although many scholars have raised questions as to what this actually means.⁵ The problem is that “normal” (zhengchang, 正常) is not defined and therefore remains rather vague. The intended meaning could be “legal religious activities,” but without definition the term could be used differently in different situations. In other words, in a certain situation, one religious group could receive authorized status and become “normal,” while other groups, those not allowed by the government, could be seen as illegal, be outlawed, and deemed not “normal.” Furthermore, the status of any given group is not permanent or static but can change over time, even as far as being labeled an evil cult (xiejiao 邪教).⁶ The Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (Zhongguo Tianzhujiao Aiguohui, 中国天主教爱国会) should, however, belong to the list of groups carrying out “normal” religious activities.⁷

Two crucial points that are clear from the current formula are that only those religious activities that pose no threat to the leadership of the CCP receive legal protection and that no religious group in China should be influenced by a foreign entity. This includes any possible connection between the Chinese Catholic church and the Vatican. If such a connection could be proven, the Catholic church could face accusations of being aligned with foreign imperial forces.⁸

Since 1982, the Central Committee of the CCP has issued numerous documents on the regulation of religious life in China. The first official and detailed explanation of the PRC’s policy on religions was the document Basic Viewpoints and Policies on Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period (Zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben zhengce 宗教问题的基本观点和基本政策) – also known as Document No. 19.⁹ The following year, a revised draft, for public consumption, was published in the CCP journal Red Flag (Hongqi, 红旗).¹⁰ The document recognized the continued existence of religion in China and rejected any suppression of religious groups and discrimination based on religious belief.¹¹ In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the document therefore reaffirmed the constitutional freedom of religious belief in China. As Thomas David DuBois concluded, this regulation was the “key moment of rehabilitation for religion in the post-Mao era.”¹² Its principal tenet was respect and protection for religious groups in China and making such respect and protection a legal requirement. The party’s actual position, however, changed little from its original Marxist perspective – the CCP repeatedly proclaimed that religion should not be an influential part of society, reaffirmed the belief that it would eventually disappear, and stressed the need for all religious organizations to adapt to socialism (shehuizhuyi 社会主义) and promote patriotism (aiguo 爱国).¹³ Furthermore, as the CCP propagated atheism, it “required that all religious activities be confined within designated areas.”¹⁴ For the Catholic church, this meant that no Catholic meeting should be held outside official church facilities. Any form of pilgrimage or seminars outside of a property designed for religious purposes was thus outlawed.¹⁵

Despite the proclamation that “every citizen has the freedom to believe in religion and also the freedom not to believe in religion,” the CCP reaffirmed its atheistic position in proclaiming that religion could not interfere with politics and no party member could be religious.¹⁶ The document recognized that some citizens may be religious, but, according to the CCP, this should not be the case with party members and county leaders. The CCP required its members to believe only in communism and socialism. The party’s position on this matter was strong: party members should not belong to any religious group because political and religious institutions should be separated from one another.¹⁷

For Roman Catholics, one section of the document was particularly noteworthy, namely that which related to “The International Relations of China’s Religions,” which dealt with how religious groups were to engage with foreign entities. It supported friendly visits and mutual contact but at the same time emphasized the need for Chinese religions to maintain independence and to shun foreign interference.¹⁸ It opposed the idea of “designs of all reactionary religious forces from abroad who desire to once again gain control over religion” in China.¹⁹ As argued by some scholars, this approach was aimed principally at the complicated relationship between the Vatican and the Catholic church in China. The Chinese government was still worried that normalizing diplomatic ties with the pope might lead to misunderstandings and renewed efforts from the Vatican to control the Chinese church.²⁰ This would be unacceptable to the CCP.

Lanier Britsch has summed up the basic position of Document No. 19:

1. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought are the official theoretical and philosophical bases for attitudes, policies, and laws related to religion in the PRC.

2. According to Communist beliefs, religion and religious activities are expected in time to wither away.

3. Force and/or coercion are not to be used to hurry up the natural process of religion's decline and ultimate demise.

4. Religious organizations and religious people are to be induced to participate in the United Front to create a strong Socialist state and economy.

5. Religion is a political matter and should be organized and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and the state. Members of the Party are not to believe in religion. According to policy, they must be atheists.²¹

In 1991, almost ten years after issuing Document No. 19, the Chinese government introduced a new policy document, the so-called Document No. 6, called On Some Problems Concerning Further Improving Work on Religion.²² This was an internal paper not for consumption by the general public.²³ Some scholars nonetheless released it at a later date. The document reaffirmed the principles of Document No. 19, urging the supervision of religious activities on a provincial level and defining the jurisdictions of the various authorities.²⁴ It stressed the need for additional control over religious groups in order to strengthen social stability, for a sense of national unity between believers and non-believers, and for prohibition of “the lawless elements who use religion and religious activities to stir up trouble, violate the law and commit crimes.”²⁵

One adjustment was the demand to register all sites where religious activities took place. Only registered sites could be considered valid locations for “normal religious activities” and thereby receive protection from the Chinese government. If any religious group wanted to open a new site, it was obligatory to seek government approval above the county level. Otherwise, it was outlawed. This was the case for many protestant house churches (jiating jiaohui 家庭教会), which refused to come under the direct control of the CCP.²⁶ The document stated that local public security departments could directly intervene (“take forceful measures”) against individuals or organizations who misused religious influence to encourage social disturbances and opposition to the leadership of the CCP.

Building on previous legal documents, the State Council under the premiership of Li Peng 李鹏 introduced a further set of national regulations on religions in January 1994. These were Regulations on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners within China’s Borders, known as Document No. 144, and Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China No. 145 on Management of Places for Religious Activities.²⁷ The first document issued more detailed regulations on foreign bodies and organizations involved with religious groups in China. While allowing them to participate or even lecture at religious sites in China, it strictly forbade them to establish or lead local religious organizations or to appoint religious clergy in China. It also prohibited foreigners from conducting missionary work among Chinese citizens in China and from circulating religious materials from abroad. Document No. 145, on the other hand, concerned local issues, such as the registration of places of worship. It directed all churches to undergo an official registration process and expressed the need for “appropriate management systems.”²⁸ The legislation also mentioned the kinds of punishments that would be meted out on those who violated the orders. According to the document, the penalties would range from an initial warning to the abolishment (physical destruction or closure) of the local religious places. Both directives complied with the previous two documents on religions but clarified some practical points concerning the CPP’s policy on beliefs.

In 2004, the State Council of the PRC issued a new document entitled Regulations on Religious Affairs (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli, 宗教事务条例).²⁹ This legal document, which regulates religious communities, took effect on March, 1 2005; soon afterwards, a series of provincial regulations were established.³⁰ According to some scholars, the new regulations signaled a “paradigm shift” in the CCP’s policy on religion. The observation appears sound as the document stressed the need to regulate religious groups in accordance with administrative transparency and straightforward legal regulations and laws.³¹ The document was also much longer than any previously published policy documents on the issue and contained more detailed instructions. As James Tong noted, the Chinese government’s position towards managing religion shifted “from systemic policies toward the rule of law.”³² All regulations were now more focused on following exact legal procedures, whereas previous documents had been much more ambiguous. For example, the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs contained fewer inconsistencies in the directions concerning the registration and legalization of religious activities.³³ For instance, Articles 12–15 contained detailed guidance for applicants seeking to obtain a license to organize collective religious activities; a long list of bureaucratic procedures was included.

Alongside its socioeconomic and political reforms, the Chinese government was seeking to integrate religious policy into a new legal system. According to the new policy, religious organizations should gain more institutional autonomy and sovereignty over their internal affairs. Religious patriotic associations could run their religious training schools, recruit seminary teachers, certify religious personnel, and own and use property designed to religious groups. The regulations provided a more detailed administrative and judicial system for managing religious groups and activities, but this did not mean an end to all ambiguity.³⁴ For example, the 2005 regulation still guaranteed government protection of “normal religious activities” without any further explanation of what exactly these activities might be. A further change was that religious groups came under the same administration as social groups and organizations and were required to follow the same registration procedures and legal duties as civic groups and social corporations.³⁵ To gain legal status, all previously unregistered religious groups were required to “register with the government to become legal if they had a fixed place for religious gatherings, a regular number of attendants, and a designated set of leaders.”³⁶ Many of the protestant “house” churches hoped finally to become legalized under the new regulations.³⁷ While the government offered the possibility for unrecognized religious groups to apply for registration, any group failing the registration procedure would be abolished, and unauthorized facilities and publications would be destroyed or confiscated; only very few religious communities succeeded in passing the strict registration procedures.³⁸ As most unrecognized religious groups failed to achieve registration, many decided not even to try.³⁹

After 2005, religious associations enjoyed greater legal protection as they were “empowered to lodge administrative appeals against bureaucratic decisions, challenge administrative actions in court, and sue for compensatory damage from illegal or negligent government actions.”⁴⁰ This meant that the new legislation introduced a more standardized administrative system for controlling religion in China, which even allowed officially registered religious groups to be protected against the misuse of government power. At the same time, however, the regulation granted greater legal power to restrict unwanted religious activities.

One important change in the 2005 regulation was that it contained, for the first time, no explicit requirement for religious organizations to support socialism. Before 2005, the central government repeatedly highlighted the need for religions in China to adapt to socialism, but the new regulation carried no requirement to adjust religious doctrines to the state’s socialist paradigm. Furthermore, the document did not promote atheism or imply that politically the CCP viewed religion as a phenomenon that would ultimately disappear from Chinese society.

The document continued the CCP’s previous stance of insisting on government control of international relations for the five approved religions: it authorized “friendly relations” and cooperation between Chinese religious communities and religious organizations abroad. Local priests and religious specialists could go for training abroad, and foreign religious personnel could visit Chinese religious facilities to give lectures – providing they had received an official invitation. In practice, this meant that many students from Catholic colleges went to study at theological institutions outside China. Prior to these new permissions, that is, since 1994, many theological colleges had been sending their students abroad illegally. The government also now officially allowed domestic religious groups to receive donations from foreign individuals or organizations.⁴¹ All these changes signaled a new phase in state-church relations and greater autonomy for religious bodies.

New Regulation on Religious Affairs

More than ten years after issuing the Regulation on Religious Affairs, the State Council of the PRC implemented a new and revised draft of the regulations. The government had indicated its intention to update the regulations as early as 2016 when the Office for Legislative Affairs published a first draft of the changes on its website so that the general public could read and review the new regulations and raise their concerns. The review process was open for a month: Chinese religious organizations and netizens were able to offer recommendations from September 7 to October 7, 2016.⁴² The final draft was signed a year later, in September 2017. The final version of the regulations was signed by the premier Li Keqiang 李克强 and the State Council for Legislative Affairs and took effect on February 1, 2018.

The revised legal order added two chapters and several articles to the regulations, which increased in size from 7 chapters and 48 articles to 9 chapters and 77 articles.⁴³ The numerous changes included closer monitoring of online preaching and of religious schools and training and fundraising for religious groups. It also brought in changes to the legal status of religious bodies and places for religious activities and reaffirmed the CCP’s previous position on religion. I believe the most important changes to be: (1) the shift in the basic position of the CCP back to the days of Document No. 19 by reinserting the requirement of actively promoting and supporting socialism; (2) the new role for the local government institutions in controlling religious activity; (3) stricter control of religious schools and changes in the legal management of these bodies; (4) new restrictions on spreading information, both printed and digital; (5) greater supervision of religious finances and investments and restrictions on donations to religious groups.

The CCP’s Basic Position on Religion

The revision reaffirms the Chinese government’s position on religion – a position which is anchored in the constitution:

任何组织或者个人不得强制公民信仰宗教或者不信仰宗教 …

No organisation or individual may force citizens to believe in or not to believe in religion …⁴⁴

国家依法保护正常的宗教活动 … 。

The state protects normal religious activities …⁴⁵

任何组织或者个人不得利用宗教进行危害国家安全、破坏社会秩序、损害公民身体健康、以及其他损害国家利益, 以及其他损害国家利益、社会公共利益和公民合法权益等违法活动。

No organisation or individual may use religion to endanger national security, disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State, or in other activities that harm State or public interests, or citizens’ lawful rights and interests, or in other illegal activities.⁴⁶

The new regulation follows almost the same formulae as Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution. It again reaffirms that the PRC promotes freedom of religion. However, the term “normal religious activities” still lacks a proper description of what these religious activities might be. At the same time, it highlights the need for religions to duly observe the law. In this sense, only if the government officially recognizes the religious group is it considered authorized and labeled “normal.”⁴⁷ In contrast, if the religious group does not gain official recognition and fails the registration, it is not a “normal” religious group but instead is forbidden and illegal. Still, a “normal” religion must not threaten public order and stability or the unity of the PRC.

One significant change is the new requirement that all religious groups adopt the tenets of socialism:

国家 … 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应。… 宗教团体、宗教院校、宗教活动场所和信教公民应当 … 践行社会主义核心价值观.

The State … actively guides religions to adapt to socialistic society…. Religious bodies, religious schools, sites for religious activities and religious citizens shall practice the core values of socialism.⁴⁸

This requirement was not included in the regulations of 2004, which in fact never used the term socialism. As already mentioned, after the publication of the 2004 regulation, many academics expressed optimism over the fact that there was no mention of a requirement to follow socialism and obey the leadership of the CCP. James W. Tong, for example, even called the earlier regulation a “series of enlightened religious policies.”⁴⁹ The new demand from the government is no surprise, however. The requirement for religious groups to “adapt to” socialism was included in previous legal documents on religion, and the new regulation simply indicates a return to official state ideology. In recent years, the CCP has promoted its theory of religion “following socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi zongjiao lilun, 中国特色社会主义宗教理论).⁵⁰ One manifestation of this is mandatory patriotic seminars in religious schools.⁵¹ Pursuant to this program, many religious associations have sought to reinterpret their teaching as one that serves socialism through promoting morality and a united and harmonious Chinese society.⁵² Since 2002, the authors of textbooks for this kind of education have interpreted numerous verses from the Bible in the light of socialism and patriotism.⁵³ In 2016, President Xi Jinping 习近平 insisted that in the new era it was essential that religious groups in China adopt socialism and adhere to sinicization (zhongguohua, 中国化):

积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应, 一个重要的任务就是支持我国宗教坚持中国化方向。

Actively guide religion to adapt to socialistic society. An important task is to support religion in our country to adhere to the way of sinicization [way of Chineseness].⁵⁴

He also stressed the party’s responsibility for managing religions in China. Religious citizens should support and love the country, and religious groups (aiguo aijiao, 爱国爱教) should promote the leadership of the CCP and the socialist path.⁵⁵ This trend towards promoting Chinese characteristics within religion is clear from articles published by the official Wechat group for religions in the PRC. For example, in May and June 2018, the Wechat group Weixin zongjiao微信宗教posted 57 articles, 35 of which discussed religion and Chinese culture or Chinese “characteristics,” which means more than half of the articles were about the topic.⁵⁶ The fact that the official group for religions on Wechat is promoting state policy should come as no surprise: from the sheer volume of articles published on the topic, we can conclude that this particular policy is central. In order to promote harmony between socialism and Catholicism, some believers even directly associate Pope Francis with socialist values by highlighting his support for underprivileged people. One interviewee even suggested that the pope is a communist.⁵⁷ Patriotism is explained as a Christian value. One priest described the need to love one’s country (aiguo, 爱国) as being connected to loving other citizens and other people in general, which he then compared to the basic command in Christianity to “love one another.”⁵⁸ Furthermore, Pope Francis also appealed to Chinese Catholics (underground as well as open) to “be good citizens, loving their homeland and serving their country with diligence and honesty, to the best of their ability.”⁵⁹ The wording is in fact analogous to the government’s request on religious citizens to support and love the country (aiguo aijiao, 爱国爱教). In this appeal for patriotism, some scholars also see a tacit appeal to support the Chinese Communist Party (aidang 爱党).⁶⁰ The Pope is de facto promoting obedience of Chinese Catholics to the communist regime. Promoting cooperation with the government is one common strategy of religious groups under the totalitarian regime. As explained by Karrie Koesel: “Although the two sets of actors [religious group and a totalitarian regime] certainly have different interests and objectives, the nature of their relations can be cooperative because each side has the ability to provide resources needed by the other and can maximize its own interests through cooperative activities.”⁶¹ The open church is already utilizing this strategy, and Pope Francis is not promoting the same for the underground church. It is questionable, however, whether such subordination would truly lead to mutual cooperation as the government is rather strictly controlling the religious life in China.

Local Control

A second significant change is the new role for local government institutions. The previous regulation had partially shifted administration from government to religious associations, which were thus given more authority and sovereignty.⁶² Now, local and regional government was to be responsible for implementing religious policy and supervising religious groups:

各级人民政府应当加强宗教工作, 建立健全宗教工作机制, 保障工作力量和必要的工作条件。… 乡级人民政府应当做好本行政区域的宗教事务管理工作。村民委员会、居民委员会应当依法协助人民政府管理宗教事务。

The government at all levels should strengthen the guidance of religious work, establish and improve religious work mechanisms, and ensure the necessary conditions for religious work … The government at the county level should be responsible for leadership of religious affairs within its responsibilities. The villagers’ and residents’ committees should assist the government in managing religious affairs according to law.⁶³

This represents a shift from the previous regulation that was directed at least towards the partial autonomy of religious groups. President Xi Jinping confirmed the responsibilities of local organs. During the Religious Affairs Work Conference in 2017, he explained that it is essential to include this notion into the training of cadres. The CCP promotes cooperation between the central government in Beijing and local-level organs while implementing national rules and policies.⁶⁴ This adjustment can therefore be seen as following the general policy of the CCP in seeking to strengthen local control.⁶⁵ Katharina Wenzel-Tauber suggests that this is the most significant change to the regulation as it indicates stronger control over religion in China.⁶⁶ Some other scholars are also critical of such a direction and also highlight the regulation’s stricter persecution of unauthorized religious leaders.⁶⁷

Religious Education and Appointing Clergy

The revision places fresh emphasis on institutions for religious education. The previous regulation mentioned facilities for religious education (zongjiao yuanxiao, 宗教院校) just four times; the new regulation mentions them 55 times. Schools which provide religious training now come under the same regulation as all religious bodies. A whole new chapter is dedicated to the management of religious schools: the authors of the revision were clearly keen to highlight the issue of religious training and the administration of religious schools.⁶⁸

The most important change regarding religious education is arguably the fact that religious schools can now apply to register as legal persons (faren, 法人).⁶⁹ Numerous religious groups had already demanded this possibility as it allowed religious institutions to obtain legal status and protection.⁷⁰ This step is therefore welcomed by many religious groups.

The registration procedure for establishing religious schools has not changed in essence:⁷¹ religious schools can be established only if the national religious association applies to the Religious Affairs department of the State Council. But the new regulation provides more detail than the previous one. Because of the CCP’s efforts to move towards the rule of law (fazhi, 法制), the party supports more detailed regulations in order to create the sense that government regulations, legislation, and systemic policies are fair and legitimate.⁷² Some scholars, however, suggest that there may be a hidden agenda behind this process. In the words of Ping Xiong: “The government tries to administer almost every aspect of religious activities in order to maintain control over religious bodies, persons, and activities.”⁷³

The new regulation states that religious schools can be established only by national religious associations or by religious groups at the provincial level under the direction of central government. Any other organization or individual is prevented from running institutions for religious schooling or performing any religious activity.⁷⁴ Some authors have sought to prove that the new education-related regulations “are likely meant at least in part to further foreclose any possibility of external influence (such as the pope or the Dalai Lama) over the next generation of the faithful.”⁷⁵ This tighter control and management of religious schools provides the government with even more influence over religious education and believers. But in the light of the new provisional agreement between the Holy See and the PRC signed in September 2018, it seems that the pope, who had previously been seen by some commentators as providing “moral leadership,” may yet be able to wield at least some kind of influence.

In a change from any previous document, religious schools are now officially allowed to employ foreign personnel. The previous regulation had only allowed students of religious educational institutions to go abroad for religious training or foreigners to study at religious schools in China.⁷⁶ It did not mention foreign teachers at religious schools in China at all. Of course, it was not unheard of for foreigners to be invited to lecture at Chinese religious institutions. Many Chinese seminars had gained permission to hire religious teachers from abroad, mostly from North America and Europe.⁷⁷

In September 2018, the Vatican and the PRC signed a new provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops. Pope Francis has not only recognized all bishops appointed by the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) and granted them with his additional approval, he has also revoked their previous de facto excommunication. The agreement grants authority to elect Catholic bishops in China to the CCP, while the Holy See retains the right for veto. Chinese bishops have even invited Pope Francis to visit China. If he accepts, he would be the first pope to visit the PRC since its establishment. Four days after the signing of the agreement, the Pope explained the agreement in the Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church. As well as clarifying his motives, he also conciliated seven bishops elected by the CCP without papal approval. He urged unofficial underground bishops to step down from their posts in favor of candidates officially assigned by the CCPA.⁷⁸

There are voices criticizing the agreement as the PRC does not promote religious freedom. Some ask Pope Francis to be promoter of human rights. According to many, since Beijing’s government is not allowing all citizens to believe and practice their religious beliefs truly and freely, the pope should seek no cooperation with the regime. Especially, many underground priests and bishops in the PRC are disappointed as they do not consider the agreement to benefit the overall situation of Catholics in China.⁷⁹ They are afraid that if the CCP elects the bishops, they might not be truly devoted to the Vatican.

This agreement might put even more power over the Catholic church in China in the hands of the CCP. We should not forget that “a key concern of the Religious Affairs authorities and of the official associations was the ordination, registration, and management of the five religion’s clergy.”⁸⁰ Therefore the question of the Pope’s approval of these bishops was an important issue for the Chinese government as well. Solving the question of the “apostolic mandate” promotes the legitimacy and power of the state-run Catholic organization, including the loyalty of lay believers.

Distribution of Religious Information

Although religious organizations are allowed to publish and distribute printed religious material and to publish information on the Internet, they must closely follow government directives and are subject to strict central control. The basic rules for circulating publications involving religious content are still the same: they must not promote disturbances or create problems between different religious groups or between religious and non-religious citizens; they must not promote extremism, separatism, or discrimination; and the content must not “violate the principle of independence and self-government of religious groups” (weibei zongjiao de dulizizhu ziban yuanze, 违背宗教的独立自主自办原则).⁸¹ The new regulation does, however, prohibit the distribution of religious materials from abroad without informing the government:

超出个人自用、合理数量的宗教类出版物及印刷品进境, 或者以其他方式进口宗教类出版物及印刷品, 应当按照国家有关规定办理。

Importing religious publications and prints exceeding a reasonable amount for personal use, or using different means to import religious materials, shall comply with the relevant state’s regulations.⁸²

The regulation prohibits the circulation of non-approved religious materials from abroad: all printed religious materials must observe government regulations, and no religious materials can be circulated without permission of the government. In effect, the regulation prohibits any form of evangelization through written material, although is not in fact a change from previous policy documents on religion.

The new regulation places more emphasis on use of the Internet. In fact, the very term Internet (hulianwang, 互联网) appears for the first time. It did not appear at all in the 2004 regulation, but the new draft uses the term six times, thus reflecting the greater need to regulate religious content on the Internet in the modern era of global information and communication.⁸³ Today, over 82 percent of all netizens use the Internet to search for information.⁸⁴ When the government issued the 2004 regulation, the spread of information via the Internet was not so much of an issue, but from 2014, there has been a significant increase in the number of Internet users and all information within Chinese cyberspace is accessible 24 hours a day.⁸⁵ The Internet has become a space for sharing information about various events and even for airing criticism. Many have used the Internet for organizing protests, offline gatherings, and religious seminars.⁸⁶ Official churches often use online platforms, social networks, and microblogs to reach and contact their members. They share various religious content online – for example information about the next mass, Saturday school, photos from religious trips to other churches, videos from religious events, or news from the Vatican.⁸⁷ However, publishing religious content on the Internet without government approval can lead to punishment for the responsible religious organization or individual.⁸⁸

Finances and Donations

The new Chapter VII on religious assets is longer than before, provides more detail regarding the management of religious finances, and directs authorized religious groups in China to implement the national unified finance, assets, and accounting system (guojia tongyi de caiwu, zichang, kuaiji zhidu, 国家统一的财务, 资产, 会计制度). All assets of religious organizations are supervised and inspected by government departments at the county level or above. All income, donations, and expenditure must be transparent and accessible to the public. Similar regulations had already been implemented for many years via an existing government document, so in this sense the new regulation did not have a major effect on religious groups and schools, who already had to follow corresponding regulations.

Articles 53 and 57 do, however, bring greater regulation of donations and investments and the commercial activities of religious organizations. For example, it is now illegal to invest in a site or building set aside for religious activities or in a religious or other large outdoor statue or to gain financial benefit from religion. It is also illegal to promote commercial advertising on behalf of a religious group (yi zongjiao mingyi jinxing shangye xuanchuan, 以宗教名义进行商业宣传).⁸⁹ Finally, although the Chinese government still allows national and foreign individuals to make donations to religious organizations, there is a new limit on the amount that religious bodies can accept without government approval. Donations exceeding 100,000 yuan (around 14,500 USD) must be reported to the Department for Religious Affairs at the county level or above.⁹⁰ This new restriction is unlikely to affect most small Catholic churches in China as these groups remain small and often with only marginal financial support. One Catholic priest explained that most contributions to church funds come from smaller donations from local believers.⁹¹ Some wealthy Christian businessmen from abroad (for example, Korea) do make larger contributions, but rarely are they in excess of 100,000 yuan.⁹² The restriction may be more significant for some larger, well-known city churches with ties to foreign Christian organizations, including the Vatican. Some prominent local church leaders have obtained financial help from abroad, usually from the USA or Korea,⁹³ but the Vatican is also sponsoring the Catholic church in China. Pope Benedict XVI, for example, donated 80,000 USD to a Christian charity organization in 2008.⁹⁴ Today, government approval would be required for such a donation. Katharina Wenzel-Teuber’s suggestion that the main impact of this regulation is on Buddhism and Daoism appears inaccurate.⁹⁵ Even if these two religious groups have great numbers of supporters and therefore more donations, the regulation could still trigger much trouble for other religious groups, including the Catholic church.

Conclusion

This paper analyzed the new regulation on religion in the PRC. It compared the previously published policy and legal documents with the new regulation of 2017 and introduced the principal changes, which were seen to be: (1) the shift in the basic position of the CCP back to the direct promotion of socialism; (2) the new role for local government institutions in controlling religious activity; (3) the control of religious schools; (4) new restrictions on the dissemination of information; (5) greater supervision of the finances of religious institutions.

The Chinese government promoted the new regulation as a means of creating the state, following the rule of law (fazhi, 法制), and further implementing bureaucratic measures with transparent administrative procedures. From a closer look at the changes, however, it seems that instead of the rule of law, the real aim of the regulation is to support a regime which follows the concept of rule by law (yifa zhiguo, 依法治国). I fully agree with Martin Slobodník’s suggestion that while the rule of law should support the creation of a democratic society, the rule by law allows the state to utilize legal norms to enforce its own interests.⁹⁶ In China, this means that the main aim of the regulation is not to create freedom of religion, nor to protect the rights of individual believers or religious groups. The ultimate goal is to create a legal platform that legitimizes the state’s control of all religious life in China.

As for the Catholic church in China, the changes may not be as critical as was feared. According to interviews carried out with representatives of the open Catholic church in China, the church is aware that it needs to follow the CCP’s position on religion or else make trouble for itself. This was clear, however, even before the publication of the 2017 regulation. Interviewed Catholic priests and nuns were concerned about their everyday duties and responsibilities towards ordinary believers and would rather follow the law than create problems.⁹⁷ The main interest of the Catholic priests in the open church is to protect the interest of their parishes. For this reason, they tend to cooperate with the regime. After all, it is the government who can provide resources needed for normal functioning of the religious group. The government decides whether any religious activity is legal, and the local religious leaders are often concerned with survival intrusions.

The PRC enforced new regulations on religion that directly promotes socialism and an overall greater control over religious groups in China. The changes in regulations are not surprising as the state has tried to control the religious life of the PRC’s citizens for a long time.

Footnotes

1.

As early as the Tang dynasty, the Chinese court had the sovereign right to control and regulate religion as part of the life of its subjects. In fact, even earlier, various secret religious societies might have been operating as sources of resistance to imperial rule, which led the Chinese state to attempt to keep them under direct control. Since 1949, the CCP government has also felt the need to control religious groups. See Lanier Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” BYU Law Review 347, no. 2 (1995): 347–99; Pitman Potter, “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” The China Quarterly 174, (2003): 317–37.

2.

Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 317.

3.

The constitution was revised in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2018.

4.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa.” (Constitution of The People's Republic of China), Npc.gov.cn, March 22, 2018, accessed May 16, 2019, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/22/content_2052489.htm. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. The bolded words are highlighted by the author.

5.

The CCP officially guaranteed the freedom of religion as early as 1949 when the party approved the Common Program (gongtong gangling, 共同纲领), which served as a provisional constitution. The first constitution signed in 1954 followed the same stance on religion (See Martin Slobodník, Mao a Buddha: náboženská politika voči tibetskému buddhizmu v Číne [Mao and Buddha: Religious Policy towards Tibetan Buddhism] (Bratislava: Chronos, 2007). The article 36 is identical to the version from 1954.

6.

Guobin Zhu, “Prosecuting ‘Evil Cults’: A Critical Examination of Law Regarding Freedom of Religious Belief in Mainland China,” Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2010): 471–501, here 491–2.

7.

Founded in July 1957 and based in Beijing.

8.

Since 1949, the CCP has sought to break all ties between the Chinese church and Western powers, including cutting off organizational support from foreign Christian bodies. The Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association began electing and ordaining its bishops in 1957, but the Vatican did not approve the Chinese bishops and refused to recognize them. Since then, there have been two Catholic bodies within the PRC: the Patriotic Catholic Association supported by the government, and the underground church (dixia jiaohui, 地下教会) loyal to the pope. The situation changed very recently (September 2018) when the Vatican and the PRC signed a new provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops. The agreement signals a possible reunification of the Catholic church in China after more than sixty years of division.

9.

Document No. 19, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 364–83.

10.

Peter Morrison, “Religious Policy in China and its Implementation in the Light of Document No. 19,” Religion, State and Society 29, no. 2 (2001): 244–55, here 245.

11.

Daniel Bays, A New History of Christianity in China. (Chichester – West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

12.

Thomas D. DuBois, “China’s Religion Law and the Perils of Counting Consciousness,” in Disturbances in Heaven, ed. Ivan Franceschini, Kevin Lin, and Nicholas Loubere, (Acton: Australia National University Press, 2017), 92–97, here 95.

13.

Potter, “Belief in Control,” 319; Morrison, “Religious Policy in China,” 246.

14.

See Beatrice Leung, “China's Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity,” The China Quarterly 184, (2005): 894–913; Yang Fenggang, “Lost in the Market, Saved at McDonald's: Conversion to Christianity in Urban China,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44, no. 4 (2005): 423–41.

15.

Leung, “China's Religious Freedom Policy,” 899.

16.

Document No. 19; trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 369.

17.

Zhu, “Prosecuting ‘Evil Cults,’” 483.

18.

Leung, “China's Religious Freedom Policy,” 903.

19.

Document No. 19, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 380.

20.

David Palmer, “China's Religious Danwei: Institutionalising Religion in the People’s Republic,” China Perspectives 4, no. 80 (2009): 17–30.

21.

Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 361.

22.

Document No. 6, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 384–91.

23.

Lawrence Cox, “Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers,” The Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 8, no. 2 (2007): 371–430, here 374.

24.

Palmer, “China's Religious Danwei,” 23.

25.

Document No. 6, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 387.

26.

Document No. 6, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 384.

27.

Document No. 144, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 394–6; Document No. 145, trans. in Britsch, “The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China,” 396–99.

28.

Leung, “China's Religious Freedom Policy,” 909.

29.

“Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli 2004 (2004 Regulations on Religious Affairs),” accessed May 17, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2005/content_63293.htm.

30.

James Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China: Catching Up with Systemic Reforms,” Asian Survey 50, no. 5 (2010): 859–87, here 862.

31.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 859.

32.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 883.

33.

Lauren Homer, “Registration of Chinese Protestant House Churches Under China’s 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs: Resolving the Implementation Impasse,” Journal of Church and State 52, no. 1 (2010): 50–73, here 56.

34.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 859–865.

35.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 866.

36.

Yang Fenggang, “From Cooperation to Resistance: Christian Responses to Intensified Suppression in China Today,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2017): 79–90, here 86.

37.

Homer, “Registration of Chinese Protestant House Churches,” 50.

38.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 884; Homer, “Registration of Chinese Protestant House Churches,” 50.

39.

Zhuo Xinping, “Relationship between Religion and State in the People’s Republic of China,” Religions & Christianity in Today's China 4, no. 1 (2014): 16–24, here 22.

40.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 866.

41.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 862–64.

42.

This process should come as no surprise. In its legitimization of the rule of law, the Chinese government often invites ordinary citizens to assert their right to comment on laws and regulations via the Internet (Huang Xuanyu, “Re-Legalization or De-Legalization? Netizens’ Participation in Criminal Justice Practices in China,” The British Journal of Criminology 52, no. 4 (2012): 724–43, here 738–39). According to Song and Miao (2014, 361), such politics enhances citizens’ ability to communicate and participate in the political process, improves political socialization, and shapes political beliefs and consciousness. But it also balances the power structure between state and society, strengthening the power of Chinese civil society. However, we should not forget that the CCP also seeks to maintain authority and control through strict censorship.

43.

Katharina Wenzel-Teuber, “The State Council Publishes a Draft Revision of the ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs,’” Religions & Christianity in Today’s China, 6 (2016): 21-24 mentions that the new version was to have 9 chapters and 74 articles. We can see, therefore, that the 2016 draft is not the same as the officially enforced version.

44.

“Regulations on Religious Affairs 2017” (RRA), June 14, 2017, accessed May 27, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-09/07/content_5223282.htm.

45.

RRA, Article 4.

46.

RRA, Article 4.

47.

Zhu, “Prosecuting ‘Evil Cults,’” 491–92.

48.

RRA, Article 4.

49.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 862.

50.

Jessica Batke, “PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the CCP,” China Leadership Monitor 52, (2017): 1–9, here 5.

51.

The Catholic and Protestant associations added the term patriotic (aiguo 爱国) to their official name to further express their devotion and loyalty to the regime. See Carsten Vala, “Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian China: The Impact of Official Churches and Unregistered ‘Urban Churches’ on Civil Society Development in the 2000s,” China Perspectives 3, no. 91 (2012): 43–52.

52.

Palmer, “China's Religious Danwei,” 23–26.

53.

Kuo Cheng-tian, “Chinese Religious Reform,” Asian Survey 51, no. 6 (2011): 1042–64, here 1042–51.

54.

Zhang Qiaosu, “Xi Jinping: Quanmian tigao xin xingshi xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping.” (Xi Jinping: The Need to Improve the Level of Religious Work under the New Circumstances), Xinhuanet, April 23, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/23/c_1118716540.htm.

55.

Cox, “Freedom of Religion in China,” 396.

56.

Weixin zongjiao微信宗教, Wechat, April and May 2018.

57.

“那个神父是共产党人!” Interview with a member of the Catholic church, Haining, April 2018.

58.

Interview with a Catholic priest, Haining, May 2018.

59.

“Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church,” Vatican, September 26, 2018 http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/pont-messages/2018/documents/papa-francesco_20180926_messaggio-cattolici-cinesi.html.

60.

Carsten Vala, “Protestant Reaction to the Nationalism Agenda in Contemporary China,” in Christianity in Contemporary China. Socio-cultural Perspectives, ed. F. K. G. Lim (New York: Routledge, 2017), 59–77, here 64.

61.

Karrie J. Koesel, Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 16.

62.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 865.

63.

RRA, Article 6.

64.

Batke, “PRC Religious Policy,” 3–4.

65.

Cao Nanlai, “Spatial Modernity, Party Building, and Local Governance: Putting the Christian Cross-Removal Campaign in Context,” China Review 17, no. 1 (2017): 29–52, here 41.

66.

Wenzel-Teuber, “The State Council Publishes a Draft Revision of the ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs,’” 22.

67.

Yang, “From Cooperation to Resistance,” 81.

68.

RRA, Article 16.

69.

RRA, Article 14. Sites set aside for religious activities can also apply to register as a legal person. Unlike religious schools, sites for religious activities must first seek the approval of the local religious organizations. As a legal person, sites for religious activities or religious education can gain more civil rights and legal privileges. One of these is the ability to sue or challenge other legal bodies before a court as a united organization. At least in theory, therefore, the regulation increases the institutional autonomy of religious groups and creates space for judicial challenges.

70.

Wenzel-Teuber, “The State Council Publishes a Draft Revision of the ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs,’” 22.

71.

Originally, Articles 8, 9, and 10 applied to religious schools and training.

72.

Batke, “PRC Religious Policy,” 2; Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 883.

73.

Ping Xiong, “Freedom of Religion in China Under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies,” BYU Law Review 2013, no. 2 (2014): 605–18, here 610. Dr. Ping Xiong is a senior lecturer at the School of Law of the University of South Australia.

74.

RRA, Article 11 and 41.

75.

Batke, “PRC Religious Policy,” 2.

76.

Originally, Article 10.

77.

Tong, “The New Religious Policy in China,” 864.

78.

“Vatican Mission Oversees Chinese Underground Bishops Stepping Aside,” UCA News, December 19, 2018, https://www.ucanews.com/news/vatican-mission-oversees-chinese-underground-bishops-stepping-aside/84147.

79.

“United We Stand: China's Underground Priests,” UCA News, November 30, 2018, https://www.ucanews.com/news/united-we-stand-chinas-underground-priests/83965.

80.

Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, 331.

81.

RRA, Article 45.

82.

RRA, Article 46.

83.

Thomas D. DuBois, “China’s Religion Law and the Perils of Counting Consciousness,” 95.

84.

James Leibold, “Blogging Alone: China, the Internet, and the Democratic Illusion?” The Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 4 (2011): 1023–41, here 1026.

85.

Wang Xinyuan, Social Media in Industrial China, (London: UCL Press, 2016).

86.

Li Shubo, “The Online Public Space and Popular Ethos in China,” Media, Culture & Society 32, no. 1 (2010): 63–83, here 68.

87.

Interview with a Catholic nun, Haining, May 2018.

88.

Yang “From Cooperation to Resistance,” 79.

89.

RRA, Article 53.

90.

RRA, Article 57.

91.

In Haining (approximately 800,000 citizens), each member of the church (maximum 150 people) donates weekly around 30-100 rmb.

92.

Interview with a Catholic priest, Haining, May 2018.

93.

Carsten Vala, “Protestant Christianity and Civil Society,” 51.

94.

Susan McCarthy, “Serving Society, Repurposing the State: Religious Charity and Resistance in China,” The China Journal 70, (2013): 48–72, here 63.

95.

Wenzel-Teuber, “The State Council Publishes a Draft Revision of the ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs,’” 23.

96.

Martin Slobodník, Mao a Buddha, (Bratislava: Chronos, 2007).

97.

Interview with a Catholic priest, Haining, March 2018.