Will COVID-19 Make or Break EU State Aid Control? An Analysis of Commission Decisions Authorising Pandemic State Aid Measures

EU State aid control has been a tool for the Member States to swiftly counteract the economic losses of the COVID-19 crisis and keep businesses afloat. The present paper assessed how the recent relaxation of EU State aid control by the Temporary Framework for State Aid (TF) has changed the substance and the enforcement of EU State aid rules and whether these changes will have a long-lasting impact on the internal market. An analysis of EU Commission’s Decisions authorising State aid between March and December 2020 shows that the distribution of aid has been geographically disproportionate. Thus, the Temporary Framework might have enhanced disparities between Member States and undermined the level playing field. Second, the study engages with sectoral aid, as to evaluate what sectors have been the most aided by State resources during the pandemic. Evidence shows that the traditional policy objectives, such as environmental policies, research & development & innovation (RDI) and regional aid have been set aside in order to aid companies in financial hardship. Two case studies are further analysed, RDI and the aviation sector. In conclusion, as the Temporary Framework represents a critical junction in the evolution of EU State aid control, the article aims to take stock of the lessons learnt from the Commission Decisions authorising pandemic aid to reflect on the future of EU State aid control and eventually formulate normative recommendations.

are other instruments, which have been particularly sought by the undertakings, i.e., deferrals of tax payments, suspensions of social security contributions, and wage subsidies for employees. Moreover, whereby the January 2021 amendment repayable instruments can be converted into direct grants. 5 The TF has certainly been wellreceived by the Member States, so much that between 12 March and 31 December 2020, 428 Commission decisions authorised more than e1.5 trillion aid, mostly to compensate the economic losses suffered by businesses as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. 6 Many commentators point out that the social and financial costs which derive from the COVID-19 crisis will be even higher that those borne in the EU after the 2008 financial crisis. 7 The policy response to the current crisis has nevertheless diverged from the Member States' and the EU's reaction to the financial crisis. Indeed, whilst most aid during the financial crisis was aimed at ensuring that banks had sufficient resources, 8  The following sections will give an overview on some preliminary data related to State aid during the current pandemic. Before examining the research's outputs, Section II lays out the methodology for research, by describing the type of data which are included in this preliminary study, how the figures related to State aid are elaborated and calculated, and which type of outputs are extrapolated from such analysis. Then, the results on the geographical distribution of aid in the EU-plus the UK-are provided in Section III. It will be demonstrated that the disproportionate distribution of State aid might have increased disparities between Member States in the medium and long-term. Moreover, Section IV looks at the sectoral application of aid. This part will highlight that the classical goals of State aid in the EU, such as environmental policies, research & development and innovation (hereinafter 'RDI') and regional development, were set aside in order to aid companies which have experienced financial hardship. In addition, two specific policy objectives will be tackled-RDI and the aviation sector. To conclude, the research will take stock of the findings in order to assess whether the framework for State aid has been fit for purpose and eventually formulate normative recommendations.

II. The analysis of aid between March and December 2020: methodology explained
Several preliminary observations on methodology need to be made. Data were firstly collected from the official list of Commission Decisions regarding State aid during the pandemic, which has been regularly updated over the last months. 11 This paper presents the results of a pilot conducted on decisions taken between 12 March and 31 December 2020, as this is the original timespan conceived for the TF. The data were organised following the structure of Commission's decisions which embed the following information: date, country of aid implementation, amount of aid, type of undertakings, policy objectives, and legal basis under which the decision is taken. Finally, all inputs have been translated into an original database to which a number of filters have been applied. Final outputs were extrapolated from the database by using specific techniques in data processing, such as Pivot Tables. This tool serves as a technique to create statistics and focus on relevant information. 12 As regards the policy objectives, 25 categories result from the analysis of Commission's decisions. Most of them attain to specific goals and policies, such as agriculture, fishery and forestry, food industry, hospitality, credit insurance, export, media, regional aid, transport, tourism and travel, aviation, retail, manufacturing, automotive industry, culture, the maritime sector, real estate, non-profit, sport, RDI, COVID-related RDI, healthcare, and aid having a social character and compensation for the cancellation of public events. However, the largest proportion of aid was given to one category only-aid to undertakings in financial hardship, regardless the size and the sector they operate in.
State measures may refer to more than one policy objective. For instance, a State may decide to grant aid to companies operating in a particular sector of the economy in a specific region of its territory. Thus, it could be classified under regional aid or sectoral aid. For instance, on 19 May 2020 Italy granted e70 million to undertakings 'of the agricultural sector, of the fishery and aquaculture sector, of the buffalo livestock sector and of the floriculture sector' operating in the Campania region. 13 In such cases, the choice of policy objective depends on a prevalence criterion that I applied case by case, by looking at the primary objective contained in the Commission's decisions. In this example, as a result, the measure was classified as aid referring to the ' Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry' category, rather than under regional aid.
As far as the country of aid implementation is concerned, 28 states are taken into consideration, i.e., all 27 EU Member States and the UK. Indeed, although the UK officially left the EU in January 2020, State aid rules continued to apply until December 2020-the end of the transition period. Therefore, aid granted by the UK until December 2020 might fall under the Commission's investigation, be brought before the CJEU and examined against EU State aid rules, including the TF.  Although the research is intended to be comprehensive and to elaborate all information given by the Commission through its decisions, there are two main caveats in terms of inputs. First, it should be noted that at this stage of the research some data are intentionally left out, for instance the form of aid. The form of aid refers to the specific instrument whereby aid is granted by the State of through State resources to the undertakings. Whilst in some cases the decisions clearly state the form of aid to be implemented (e.g., wage subsidies only or direct grants only), however, a large number of decisions embed complex schemes where grants, loans, subsidies, guarantees, or other instruments cannot be clearly distinguished. 15 Furthermore, aid authorised by eight Commission decisions between 22 March and 14 April 2020 could not be calculated towards the final amount of aid. Indeed, those eight measures lack a precise budget, thus they could not be counted towards the final amount. Indefinite aid was authorised four times to Germany to compensate national undertakings in difficulty, 16 to Italy 17 and the UK 18 to compensate small-medium enterprises (SMEs), to Belgium in order to tackle the economic difficulties of its airports 19 and to Italy, again, to support the labour market by paying wages to companies and self-employed workers. 20 For the purposes of the present analysis, such measures will be analysed qualitatively rather than quantitatively. On the one side, decisions without a specified budget limitation cannot be counted towards the total amount of aid, because their precise budget remains unknown. On the other side, such decisions might have served as a sign of the EU's political willingness to reverse  the sentiment against State support which had been popular during the financial crisis.

III. Analysis on the geographical distribution of State aid
The analysis reveals an uneven distribution of aid during the pandemic. Germany granted the largest amount of aid, circa e619 276 000 000 (41 per cent of the total amount of aid in Europe). France follows with e377 394 000 000 (25 per cent of the total). Thus, Germany and France together granted 66 per cent of aid in Europe. The other 26 States share the remaining 34 per cent. Among them, Spain granted e81 billion (5.3 per cent), the UK e73.5 billion (4.8 per cent), whereas Italy and Austria around e40 billion (2.6 per cent). Poland and Belgium spent almost the same e61 and e65 billion, respectively (4 per cent and 4.3 per cent). Aid of the other Member States represents only smaller percentages (Figures 1 and 2). It has to be analysed whether the new rules might have enhanced the growing disparities in the Member States' fiscal capacities-the so-called 'deep pocket distortions' 21 -whose eradication is actually one of the main goals of the EU State aid regime. In this respect, in addition to all data already recalled above, two more inputs were inserted in the database: the population of Member States and their GDP, as represented by EUROSTAT in 2019. Those figures are necessary to draw appropriate comparisons between Member States so that to evaluate the full impact of State aid. First, the examination covers the quantity of State aid implemented by each country. Second, similar countries in terms of their populations will be compared. The results will show how much State aid Member States have implemented when compared to their national GDPs and finally the distribution of aid per capita in each Member State.
The Commission appears to have given up on the even distribution of aid throughout the territory of the Union by implementing the TF. On the one side, Member States with a larger fiscal capacity spent more on aid, resulting in an advantage to national companies vis-à-vis the European competitors. On the other side, it could be argued that Member States with a greater fiscal capacity also have a larger population and therefore more or bigger companies to aid. For instance, Germany is the biggest Member State in terms of population, 83 million inhabitants. 22 Its GDP in 2019 was e3121 billion.   numerous. For instance, France, Italy and Spain have about 66 000 000, 60 360 000 and 47 000 000 inhabitants, respectively. 24 France granted around e377 billion, Italy e40 billion, and Spain e80 billion. It should be added that French GDP in 2019 was e2214 billion, whereas Italy's e1785 billion and Spain's e1331 billion. 25 It could be observed that France spent 17 per cent of its GDP during the pandemic, whereas Italy and Spain less, around 2.2 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively. The second figure is even more significant. The disproportionate distribution of aid has enhanced disparities among citizens. Indeed, France could distribute circa e5.632 per person, Spain e1.715, and Italy e665 only (Figure 4). A second example concerns medium-size countries-Belgium with a population of about 11 460 000 and Greece with its 10 700 000 inhabitants. 26 Despite the similar size, their implementation of aid differed by a large extent. Belgium spent approximately e65 billion, whereas Greece only e14 billion. Their GDPs differ as well: in 2019, the Belgian GDP amounted to e420 billion, whereas the Greek one to e225 billion. 27 Their State aid implementation during the pandemic had a diverse outcome. Indeed, Belgium spent 15 per cent of its GDP and gave around e5.731 per citizen, whereas Greece spent 6.3 per cent of its already lower GDP and that resulted in about e1.321 per person ( Figure 5).  The last comparison addresses the discrepancies in aid implementation between Austria and Bulgaria which have a population of 8 860 000 and 7 000 000 inhabitants. 28 The Austrian GDP in 2019 was e351 billion and the Bulgarian GDP e115 billion. As for State aid, Austria spent e40 billion, whereas Bulgaria only e1.5 billion. 29 It derives that while Austria spent 11.5 per cent of its GDP and applied an average e4.564 per person, Bulgaria spent 1.33 per cent of its GDP and transferred e218 pro capite ( Figure 6).

IV. Analysis on the sectoral distribution of State aid
The analysis on the sectoral distribution of aid should take into account data available from previous years. Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a clear positive trend in State aid policy. 30 Member States had consistently redirected aid towards horizontal objectives. For instance, in 2016 Member States spent e105.9 billion and the reported primary objectives were environmental policies, regional aid and RDI. 31   total e116.2 billion aid focused on environmental policies primarily, as well. 32 Moreover, although regional development remained stable, there was a decrease of RDI and an increase of spending on other projects, such as projects of common European interest ('PCEIs' hereinafter), broadband and infrastructures. In 2018, State aid amounted to e120.9 billion of which environmental protection including energy savings represented 55 per cent, regional development 9 per cent and RDI 9 per cent. 33 Data on State aid in 2019 are still unavailable but it is conceivable that they will confirm such positive trend of expenditure in horizontal policies. On the contrary, most aid implemented in the EU and the UK between March and December 2020 was granted towards none of the above-mentioned horizontal objectives. For example, no measure attaining to environmental goals was authorised by the Commission, nor such policy objective has been encouraged by the Commission itself in the TF. Moreover, only 1 per cent of total aid was granted towards research and development, including COVID-related measures. Regional aid, which is a key EU policy in promoting the development of particularly low-income areas in the EU, has attracted 3 per cent of total aid, compared to 9 per cent in 2018. As shown in Figure 7, the largest proportion of aid was granted to undertakings in difficulty, regardless the size and the sector which they operate in. On such objective Member States spent around e1.3 trillion (85 per cent of total aid). In addition, some measures specifically targeted SMEs, micro-companies and start-ups which received a dedicated amount of e59 billion as well. The figures appear to be coherent with the TF's main goal, which is ensuring liquidity in order to keep businesses afloat. As SMEs, micro companies and start-ups-which have less than 50 employees and less than e10 million of annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total-are considered particularly hit by the harshness of the crisis, the Commission extended emergency aid to such companies in July 2020. 34 On the same occasion, more safeguards were put in place for those undertakings. Indeed, although larger companies are only entitled to receive aid if they were not in difficulty before the outbreak of the pandemic, yet micro and small companies can benefit from aid even in case they were already in difficulty before 31 December 2019.
A variety of instruments were used by the Member States, including direct grants, 35 43 The Italian measure to support SMEs, mid-caps, and selfemployed workers-Fondo di garanzia per le PMIprovided a budget of e1.7 billion through guarantees on loans and grants covering the value of the premiums on those guarantees available for such undertakings. 44 Unsurprisingly, data pertaining to Germany are coherent with the main percentages shown at the EU level, as Germany represents 41 per cent of total aid granted in Europe between March and December 2020 (Figure 8) of aid to its national companies affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Further allocation of aid to different policy objectives is as follows: 7 per cent regional aid, 1 per cent to the aviation sector, COVID-related RDI, credit insurance, and transport. These preliminary findings suggest that aid measures implemented during the pandemic might have caused distortions of competition within the internal market, as pandemic aid departs from the traditional policy objectives which had been encouraged by the Commission. There are in particular two case studies which flag specific issues and possible consequences on trade and competition in the EU. The first focus will be on RDI, an important policy of the Union promoted by Article 179 TFEU and recognised as a key driver for achieving a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 45 In this respect, RDI is mostly dealt with at the national level through State resources, although it has become one of the essential objectives of the Union's industrial policy since Horizon 2020 Programme 46 and in Horizon Europe 47 which sets to replace the former. Due to its relevance for the EU industrial strategy and the Member States' economic  development, one can wonder if a disproportionate distribution of RDI aid among Member States or, in the alternative, an overall small implementation of it during the pandemic, will produce systemic deficiencies in the EU economy.
The second policy concerned is the aviation sector, i.e., the sector where the majority of Rescue & Restructuring aid (hereinafter 'R&R aid') has taken place. Notwithstanding the Commission's caution on State intervention in the economy, the COVID-19 crisis has brought exceptional consequences on some sectors of the economy, such as the air operators. Multiple lockdowns and several bans on movement within and outside Europe has caused the worst air crisis of history which many Member States have decided to address by investing in national air companies. Nevertheless, R&R aid is one of the most distortive aid on the internal market. Therefore, a reflection on the criteria set out by the TF should be drawn.

A. The evolution of RDI during the pandemic
Whereby the first amendment to the TF research activities, testing systems and production of PPE were included among the activities which are entitled to obtain aid from the Member States. 48 If we consider companies engaging with pure RDI activities alongside those carrying out COVID-related research and production, RDI represents 48 Temporary Framework for State aid (n 3). however nearly 1 per cent of total aid, although the figures approximately equate those of 2018 49 .
Most RDI aid during the pandemic was obviously COVID-related. Member States spent e11.5 billion on such objective (Figure 9). For example, Italy granted e50 million to undertakings which would 'set up new facilities for the production of equipment and devices [...], expand the production of their existing structures producing such equipment, or convert their production line to that effect' . 50 Furthermore, Poland 51 invested e449 million and Ireland 52 e200 million in COVID-relevant research, including antivirals, vaccines, relative products and treatments, PPE and equipment.
Similarly, Germany aided companies aimed at 'supporting research and development activities and testing and upscaling infrastructures that contribute to develop COVID-19 relevant products, as well as to support investments into the production of products needed to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak' . 53 However, its investment was greater-e5 billion in direct grants, repayable advances and tax advantages. The same e5 billion budget was invested by France in June 2020 as to support COVID-19 relevant RDI activities, testing and upscaling infrastructures that contribute to develop COVID-19 relevant products, as well as investments into production capacities for products needed to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak. 54 It should be noted that French and German aid considered together is e10 billion out of the total e11.5 billion spent by all the States. The Dutch case is yet peculiar. The Commission authorised the Netherlands to grant e100 million to social support services, healthcare services and youth care for the purchase, leasing, licensing, and implementation of ehealth applications. 55 Two observations could be drawn on the application of such aid. First, it could be wondered whether such aid falls within the category of RDI with the purposes of COVID-research or on the contrary whether it is simply aimed at helping national companies to develop a specific technology framed within the national industrial strategy. It then must be acknowledged that the development of the national healthcare systems along with investments on affordable treatments and medicines is already at the centre of the brand-new proposal for a e9.5 billion EU4Health Programme. 56 By fostering the healthcare systems, the EU4Health Programme aims to enact digital transformation. Updated systems mean faster procedures, which could impact positively on the access to healthcare services by individuals and on business opportunities. Another goal set out by the programme is the creation of reserves of medical supplies for crises. Indeed, at the outbreak of the pandemic, Europe was heavily relying on overseas medical supplies. Yet, in order for the Union to create its own reserves of medical supplies, it shall organise a net of businesses and develop its own industrial strategy.
Fewer Member States invested on RDI projects other than COVID-related. Among them, Hungary spent e88 million in wage subsidies to undertakings, which employ researchers and developers. 57 However, the measure is aimed at supporting the labour market in the field, rather than investing on new projects. On the contrary, a suitable example of classical RDI aid is represented by a Slovakian measure granting e25 million to innovative companies which have 'a scalable innovative product or service with potential for significant growth and penetration on international markets' . 58 These preliminary findings demonstrate that RDI aid has been facing a process of adaptation to the pandemic in a twofold manner. First, most RDI was COVID-related in the period of time concerned. Therefore, RDI has served as a tool of investment for Member States to counteract the health crisis caused by the pandemic. Second, although RDI is considered horizontal aid, as it often produces positive spillovers in many sectors of the economy and it could result in an overall improvement in the country's economic performance and competitiveness through for instance technology, 59 nevertheless, during the pandemic ad hoc measures were also applied in the field of RDI. For instance, Austria granted e840 000 to Apeptico and e1.2 million to Panoptes, which are both biotech companies engaging with COVID-related research. 60 The Netherlands granted e6.5 million to InnoGenerics, a pharma company which deals with the production of generic medicines, as to remedy a lack of liquidity. 61 B. Selective aid during the pandemic: the case of the aviation sector From March to December 2020, several carriers, air companies and airport operators have been forced to stop their flights and ground activities or highly reduce them. Thus, Member States have implemented many ad hoc measures and aid schemes, amounting to circa e24.6 billion. Germany and France outreached the other states on aid granted to the aviation sector as well-about e7.9 billion and e7.1 billion, respectively (see Figure 10). Overall, most aid has been given to compensate damage suffered as a consequence of the crisis and the restrictions on global movements. Moreover, there have been several rescue and restructuring measures to aid undertakings operating in the aviation sector. Aid has been granted not only to air carriers, but also to airport operators. to Belgium, in the form of suspension of royalties due by owners of airports in the Waloon region. 62 As compensation for damage is concerned, the examples are numerous due to the harsh consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. For instance, Alitalia has been aided twice by the Italian government in the period of time concerned, with e199.45 million in September 2020 and e73 million in December 2020. 63 Other undertakings were compensated for their losses, such as SAS 64 by Denmark and Sweden with e137 million each, Condor 65 by Germany with e550 million, Corsair 66 by France with e30.2 million, Austria Airlines 67 with e150 million, and Aegean Airlines 68 by Greece with e120 million. All the above-mentioned decisions were assessed under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU which provides that aid shall be held compatible with the internal market by the Commission if it is given to remedy natural disasters or exceptional occurrences. Given the little margin of discretion left to the Commission under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, the requirements to be met are particularly strict. 69 There must be exceptional occurrences, which may have caused prohibitions and recommendations affecting the beneficiaries. Moreover, the State has to include a detailed and accurate analysis on the type of damages compensated, whether it is a loss of income and/or additional costs related to COVID-19. Third, the Member State is required to provide evidence of the causal link between, on the one hand, the COVID-19 outbreak and the prohibitions affecting the beneficiaries and, on the other hand, between the damage suffered by the company and the compensation. However, even though Member States have to meet such strict requirements imposed by Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, aid might have anyways distorted the internal market. For instance, Alitalia was granted compensation for damage twice in 2020, despite the two ongoing Commission's investigations on aid granted to the company between 2017 and 2019. 70 The last Commission's investigation had been officially communicated on 28 February 2020, a few days before the establishment of the TF.
In addition to compensations for damage, the aviation sector has registered an increased volume of R&R aid over the last months, especially after the introduction of specific rules on recapitalisations and debt's restructures in May 2020. 71 One of the most criticised measures concerns the recapitalisation of DLH, the holding company of LH Group which owns several air transport businesses including Lufthansa. The financial operation costed e6 billion by means of equity and hybrid capital instruments. 72 Further R&R aid was implemented by Estonia granting e30 million to Nordica, 73 Latvia e250 million to AirBaltic, 74 Poland e250 million to LOT, 75 Portugal e1.2 billion to TAP 76 and Belgium with two measures-e25 million to Aviapartner, a groundhandling service provider at Brussels National Airport (Zaventhem), 77 and e290 million to Brussels Airlines. 78 Moreover, Scandinavian Airlines 79 -better known as SAS-was recapitalised by Denmark and Sweden jointly, by granting e583 million and e486 million, respectively and Corsair 80 was restructured by France with e106.7 million.
Those recapitalisations are mostly assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU in light of Section 3.11 of the TF. Member States are allowed to give public support in the form of equity and/or hybrid capital instruments to undertakings facing financial difficulties due to the COVID-19 outbreak. However, as recapitalisations are deemed the most distortive measures to the internal market, the TF lays out more specific requirements in comparison with the 2014 R&R Guidelines. For instance, the existing Guidelines provide that aid should be 'as short as possible' , in order to restore the long-term viability. 81 Furthermore, the Commission should take into account 'possible commitments' from the Member States and assess restructuring aid by considering measures to limit the distortion of competition, so that 'possible and positive effects outweigh any adverse ones' . 82 The TF however imposes more specific clauses, as it requires Member States to lay out clear conditions on 'the State's entry, remuneration and exit from the equity of the undertakings concerned, governance provisions and appropriate measures to limit distortions of competition' . 83 A 'credible and detailed exit strategy' shall be presented, including a plan on the continuation of the beneficiary's activity, the use of funds invested by the State and further measures that both the State and the beneficiary will take to abide by the repayment schedule. 84 Moreover, if-after 6 years from the recapitalisationthe State's intervention has not been reduced below 15 per cent of beneficiary's equity, a restructuring plan in accordance with the R&R Guidelines must be notified to the Commission for approval. 85 In general, measures 'must not exceed the minimum needed to ensure the viability of the beneficiary, and should not go beyond restoring the capital structure of the beneficiary to the one predating the COVID-19 outbreak, i.e., the situation on 31 December 2019' . 86 In addition, whilst the existing Guidelines 87 impose obligations on Member States not to acquire shares in any company during the restructuring period and from engaging in commercial behaviours aimed at its rapid expansion in the market, the TF includes specific behavioural and structural commitments that the Commission looks at when clearing measures above e250 million. Such additional provisions directly draw on merger control tools. 88 Indeed, the TF more specifically prevents beneficiaries from acquiring a more than 10 per cent stake in competitors or other operators in the same line of business and imposes a limit on management remuneration which shall not go beyond the fixed part of his/her remuneration on 31 December 2019, as long as at least 75 per cent of the COVID-19 recapitalisation measures have not been redeemed. Moreover, the undertakings which receive restructuring aid cannot make dividend payments, nor non-mandatory coupon payments, nor buy back shares, other than in relation to the State, as long as the COVID-19 recapitalisation measures have not been fully redeemed. 89 For instance, the Commission-after assessing all eligibility criteria, entry conditions, types of recapitalisation measures, relevant amounts, and remuneration mechanisms-concludes that aid to Lufthansa constitutes State aid compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)b TFEU. The Commission takes into account Germany's commitments to limit the distortion of competition. For instance, the beneficiary will allow one air carrier to establish a base at the Munich Airport and one at the Frankfurt airport, by divesting a number of slots. 90 Moreover, to facilitate new entrants, Lufthansa will grant access to the investors at said airport infrastructures and allow overnight parking stands for the aircraft to be based at the airports. 91

V. A preliminary assessment
The analysis has highlighted some pressing issues regarding the future of EU State aid control as the core mechanism to ensure the functioning of the internal market and the maintenance of the level playing field. The analysis carried out on Commission decisions shows a disproportionate distribution of aid, as Germany and France represent 66 per cent of total aid, thus outreaching all other Member States plus the UK by far. It appears that the increasing disparities are linked to States' GDPs and their fiscal capacities which thus produce unfair advantages for some companies vis-à-vis the competitors. Although the Commission may argue that possible negative effects on the internal market have already been taken into account by the TF itself, EU State aid rules must always ensure the full respect of the principle of non-discrimination as contained in Article 18 TFEU.
The second main finding concerns policy objectives. The largest amount of aid has been granted to undertakings in financial hardship, whereas the most common policy objectives for State aid in previous years, such as environmental policies including energy savings, RDI and regional aid, have been set aside. As Member States have been at the liberty of deciding how much aid to apply, which companies to help, what sectors to support, a prolonged TF would produce long-term repercussions in the European and national economies. Therefore, some conclusive suggestions for the future of State aid control will be proposed.
Since the TF might have already produced distortions of competition and negative effects on trade which will last in the medium and long-term, it is recommended that the TF should stay in place for the time strictly necessary to address the immediate consequences of the pandemic. Yet, the TF has already been extended twice. First, in October 2020 it was prolonged until June 2021 while specific clauses provided that rules on recapitalisations would be applicable until September 2021. 92 Second, on 19 January 2021 the Commission issued consultations 93 to the Member States seeking opinions on the TF's prolongation until the end of 2021. Ten days later the 91  effects. For instance, the new instruments could limit aid or set thresholds and limits for undertakings which have benefitted from aid under the TF once or more than once, where deemed appropriate. Finally, one can wonder whether EU State aid control is an adequate tool to counteract the crisis and whether the national efforts will be sufficient to respond to it. Despite the initial reluctance, the Commission eventually allocated common funds, through for instance Sure, Next Generation, including the Recovery Fund and the emission of Eurobonds. These might be effective and appropriate instruments to enact an EU industrial strategy and start recovering together. Indeed, it would have been better if the amount granted by the States through public resources had been provided by an EU-wide fund based on the principle of solidarity. 98 Notwithstanding the necessity for a Treaty amendment, especially as far as Article 125 TFEU is concerned, many commentators highlight that if the recovery was funded by the UE, there would be less distortions in the internal market and more common goals achieved. In conclusion, Europe will properly tackle the crisis when it eventually finds a common route. Archimedes once said, 'give me a place to stand and with a lever I will move the whole world' . Although still in the search of a working lever, the European Union has been using EU State aid as a substitute tool. Only when it eventually finds the proper lever to lift economic growth, the EU will say: Eureka!. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpab060 98 Motta, Peitz (n 4); Lamadrid de Pablo, Buendía Sierra (n 4).