Threat by Example: Economic Sanctions and Global Respect for Human Rights

Abstract

Are economic sanctions an effective tool for the improvement of global human rights practices? Imposed economic sanctions seem to lead to increased target state repression. However, governments still impose sanctions for the expressed reason of the target's poor human rights practices. If sanctions are detrimental to the enjoyment of human rights, why do governments continue to use them in response to state repression? I argue that sanction activity may improve human rights practices in (1) states threatened with human rights–based economic sanctions and (2) nontarget states whose perceived cost of repression is increased by the example set by target states in their human rights and foreign policy peer groups. Using data on 159 countries from 1981–2005, I demonstrate that, while imposed sanctions are related to worsened human rights practices in target states, threatened human rights sanctions are related to increases in government respect for human rights in both target states and others whose human rights practices and foreign policies are similar to those of target states.

economic sanctions, human rights, physical integrity, spatial diffusion