In this article I offer a three-prolonged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke's puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean's arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents that are sensitive to our varying personal conceptions of the referents of those elements) are viciously circular. Thus, the Fregean must give new arguments for her central claims. Second, I offer original, positive arguments for the Millian idea that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are identical. Strangely enough, the arguments appeal to nothing but pre-theoretical principles regarding folk psychological usage - traditionally the source of Fregean intuitions. Third, I examine one of the most important recent papers on Kripke's puzzle, that by David Sosa (1996). Sosa claims to have found a way to turn the tables on Kripke's puzzle by using it to argue against Millian theories. I argue that Sosa's argument on behalf of the Fregean is question-begging. I conclude that Millian theories can be seriously defended without any use of theoretical constructs such as guises or Russellian propositions, and that Fregeans provide new argument for their theory's central claims.