Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, by Mark Kaplan

Extract

1. Introduction

Kaplan’s aim in this admirable book is to argue for the continuing significance of J. L. Austin’s work in (or on) epistemology. He attempts to recover, and defend, both Austin’s philosophical method and epistemological doctrines that emerged from Austin’s attempts to apply it. Recovery is a matter of interpretation, and so questions arise concerning Kaplan’s claims about what Austin said, or, more delicately, would have said. Further questions concern the assessment of the emergent methods and doctrine: do they warrant our attention? I’ll begin by outlining Kaplan’s argument (§2), before pursuing some questions (§§3–5).

2. Outline

Kaplan’s main focus is Austin’s way with arguments for scepticism: a view on which we know far less than we ordinarily (take ourselves to) take ourselves to know. Chapter 1 develops Stroud’s (1984) argument for scepticism and brings it into contact with Austin’s thoughts about method. The target is an instance of the Argument from Ignorance (with Descartes playing the unlikely role of an arbitrary individual):