This brief but dense monograph has virtues whose impact it is not easy to assess. The book’s central idea, both interesting and plausible, concerns certain key distinctions with respect to the relationships between kinds, properties, and concepts. Funkhouser aims to set out the methodological tools for an approach that he regards as promising (Funkhouser 2014, p. 137), instead of getting to the bottom of specific philosophical questions with the use of the tools: that’s why the book’s impact isn’t easy to assess. Funkhouser defers to science to produce examples he’s willing to wait for ( Funkhouser 2014, p. 110), so the reader is put on hold. In what follows, I’ll elaborate this aspect of Funkhouser’s interesting work.

Funkhouser begins, helpfully, with a taxonomic look at relations of necessity between kinds. He goes on:

The relations that are of particular interest to me are necessitation relations among...

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