
Contents
-
-
-
-
Knowledge Knowledge
-
The Intrinsic Nature of Knowledge The Intrinsic Nature of Knowledge
-
The Platonic analysis The Platonic analysis
-
Justification Justification
-
Internalism and externalism Internalism and externalism
-
Foundationalism and coherentism Foundationalism and coherentism
-
Gettier examples Gettier examples
-
Rejecting justification Rejecting justification
-
-
The Extrinsic Nature of Knowledge The Extrinsic Nature of Knowledge
-
Knowledge and action Knowledge and action
-
Invariantism and contextualism Invariantism and contextualism
-
-
Types of Knowledge Types of Knowledge
-
Skepticism Skepticism
-
The Argument for Skepticism The Argument for Skepticism
-
The Commonsense Response The Commonsense Response
-
Principle of Deductive Epistemic Closure Principle of Deductive Epistemic Closure
-
-
Externalist Responses Externalist Responses
-
Denying Closure and Relevant Alternatives Denying Closure and Relevant Alternatives
-
The Two-‘Knows’ View and Contextualism The Two-‘Knows’ View and Contextualism
-
Types of Knowledge Types of Knowledge
-
Concessive Responses to Skepticism Concessive Responses to Skepticism
-
-
Studies in Knowledge and Skepticism Studies in Knowledge and Skepticism
-
chapter : The Intrinsic Nature of Knowledge chapter : The Intrinsic Nature of Knowledge
-
chapter 4 to 6: The Extrinsic Nature of Knowledge chapter 4 to 6: The Extrinsic Nature of Knowledge
-
Chapters 7 to 10: Types of Knowledge Chapters 7 to 10: Types of Knowledge
-
chapter 11 to 14: Considering Skepticism chapter 11 to 14: Considering Skepticism
-
-
Notes Notes
-
References References
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Introduction: Framing Knowledge and Skepticism
Get access-
Published:May 2010
Cite
Abstract
The first few chapters of this book concern the intrinsic and extrinsic nature of knowledge. Here David Hemp provides a defense of Dretske’s claim that when knowledge is based on evidence, this evidence must be conclusive. He discusses a variety of puzzles about knowledge as well as some notable contextualist solutions to them. The second set of chapters specifically concerns the prospects for contextualism, wherein Duncan Pritchard marshals a linguistic defense of the invariantist use of WAMs against DeRose’s challenge. In particular, he contends that the invariantist can identify a WAM that meets DeRose’s three pragmatic conditions. Finally, the last set of chapters pushes procedural knowledge into the background and focuses on propositional knowledge. In particular, knowledge is carved according to its causal modes, specifically perception, introspection, and reason.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
December 2022 | 1 |
May 2023 | 2 |
December 2023 | 2 |
March 2024 | 6 |
August 2024 | 1 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.